linux-stable.git/net, branch v4.4.231 Linux kernel stable tree tcp: md5: allow changing MD5 keys in all socket states 2020-07-22T07:10:04+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2020-07-02T01:39:33+00:00 3392ec08b4a0dfcc779d2d323eb23184a7ab846c [ Upstream commit 1ca0fafd73c5268e8fc4b997094b8bb2bfe8deea ] This essentially reverts commit 721230326891 ("tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets") Mathieu reported that many vendors BGP implementations can actually switch TCP MD5 on established flows. Quoting Mathieu : Here is a list of a few network vendors along with their behavior with respect to TCP MD5: - Cisco: Allows for password to be changed, but within the hold-down timer (~180 seconds). - Juniper: When password is initially set on active connection it will reset, but after that any subsequent password changes no network resets. - Nokia: No notes on if they flap the tcp connection or not. - Ericsson/RedBack: Allows for 2 password (old/new) to co-exist until both sides are ok with new passwords. - Meta-Switch: Expects the password to be set before a connection is attempted, but no further info on whether they reset the TCP connection on a change. - Avaya: Disable the neighbor, then set password, then re-enable. - Zebos: Would normally allow the change when socket connected. We can revert my prior change because commit 9424e2e7ad93 ("tcp: md5: fix potential overestimation of TCP option space") removed the leak of 4 kernel bytes to the wire that was the main reason for my patch. While doing my investigations, I found a bug when a MD5 key is changed, leading to these commits that stable teams want to consider before backporting this revert : Commit 6a2febec338d ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()") Commit e6ced831ef11 ("tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers") Fixes: 721230326891 "tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets" Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 1ca0fafd73c5268e8fc4b997094b8bb2bfe8deea ]

This essentially reverts commit 721230326891 ("tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG
or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets")

Mathieu reported that many vendors BGP implementations can
actually switch TCP MD5 on established flows.

Quoting Mathieu :
   Here is a list of a few network vendors along with their behavior
   with respect to TCP MD5:

   - Cisco: Allows for password to be changed, but within the hold-down
     timer (~180 seconds).
   - Juniper: When password is initially set on active connection it will
     reset, but after that any subsequent password changes no network
     resets.
   - Nokia: No notes on if they flap the tcp connection or not.
   - Ericsson/RedBack: Allows for 2 password (old/new) to co-exist until
     both sides are ok with new passwords.
   - Meta-Switch: Expects the password to be set before a connection is
     attempted, but no further info on whether they reset the TCP
     connection on a change.
   - Avaya: Disable the neighbor, then set password, then re-enable.
   - Zebos: Would normally allow the change when socket connected.

We can revert my prior change because commit 9424e2e7ad93 ("tcp: md5: fix potential
overestimation of TCP option space") removed the leak of 4 kernel bytes to
the wire that was the main reason for my patch.

While doing my investigations, I found a bug when a MD5 key is changed, leading
to these commits that stable teams want to consider before backporting this revert :

 Commit 6a2febec338d ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()")
 Commit e6ced831ef11 ("tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers")

Fixes: 721230326891 "tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets"
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers 2020-07-22T07:10:04+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2020-07-01T18:43:04+00:00 190a385e7bfc387524772c6f99c28626775a5bb3 [ Upstream commit e6ced831ef11a2a06e8d00aad9d4fc05b610bf38 ] My prior fix went a bit too far, according to Herbert and Mathieu. Since we accept that concurrent TCP MD5 lookups might see inconsistent keys, we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() instead of smp_rmb()/smp_wmb() Clearing all key->key[] is needed to avoid possible KMSAN reports, if key->keylen is increased. Since tcp_md5_do_add() is not fast path, using __GFP_ZERO to clear all struct tcp_md5sig_key is simpler. data_race() was added in linux-5.8 and will prevent KCSAN reports, this can safely be removed in stable backports, if data_race() is not yet backported. v2: use data_race() both in tcp_md5_hash_key() and tcp_md5_do_add() Fixes: 6a2febec338d ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit e6ced831ef11a2a06e8d00aad9d4fc05b610bf38 ]

My prior fix went a bit too far, according to Herbert and Mathieu.

Since we accept that concurrent TCP MD5 lookups might see inconsistent
keys, we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() instead of smp_rmb()/smp_wmb()

Clearing all key->key[] is needed to avoid possible KMSAN reports,
if key->keylen is increased. Since tcp_md5_do_add() is not fast path,
using __GFP_ZERO to clear all struct tcp_md5sig_key is simpler.

data_race() was added in linux-5.8 and will prevent KCSAN reports,
this can safely be removed in stable backports, if data_race() is
not yet backported.

v2: use data_race() both in tcp_md5_hash_key() and tcp_md5_do_add()

Fixes: 6a2febec338d ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() 2020-07-22T07:10:04+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2020-06-30T23:41:01+00:00 172671b46c16b49e7850cc0d511a57413f0aa518 [ Upstream commit 6a2febec338df7e7699a52d00b2e1207dcf65b28 ] MD5 keys are read with RCU protection, and tcp_md5_do_add() might update in-place a prior key. Normally, typical RCU updates would allocate a new piece of memory. In this case only key->key and key->keylen might be updated, and we do not care if an incoming packet could see the old key, the new one, or some intermediate value, since changing the key on a live flow is known to be problematic anyway. We only want to make sure that in the case key->keylen is changed, cpus in tcp_md5_hash_key() wont try to use uninitialized data, or crash because key->keylen was read twice to feed sg_init_one() and ahash_request_set_crypt() Fixes: 9ea88a153001 ("tcp: md5: check md5 signature without socket lock") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 6a2febec338df7e7699a52d00b2e1207dcf65b28 ]

MD5 keys are read with RCU protection, and tcp_md5_do_add()
might update in-place a prior key.

Normally, typical RCU updates would allocate a new piece
of memory. In this case only key->key and key->keylen might
be updated, and we do not care if an incoming packet could
see the old key, the new one, or some intermediate value,
since changing the key on a live flow is known to be problematic
anyway.

We only want to make sure that in the case key->keylen
is changed, cpus in tcp_md5_hash_key() wont try to use
uninitialized data, or crash because key->keylen was
read twice to feed sg_init_one() and ahash_request_set_crypt()

Fixes: 9ea88a153001 ("tcp: md5: check md5 signature without socket lock")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: make sure listeners don't initialize congestion-control state 2020-07-22T07:10:04+00:00 Christoph Paasch cpaasch@apple.com 2020-07-08T23:18:34+00:00 37497744010835244cde515325cebcecbb5e9aff [ Upstream commit ce69e563b325f620863830c246a8698ccea52048 ] syzkaller found its way into setsockopt with TCP_CONGESTION "cdg". tcp_cdg_init() does a kcalloc to store the gradients. As sk_clone_lock just copies all the memory, the allocated pointer will be copied as well, if the app called setsockopt(..., TCP_CONGESTION) on the listener. If now the socket will be destroyed before the congestion-control has properly been initialized (through a call to tcp_init_transfer), we will end up freeing memory that does not belong to that particular socket, opening the door to a double-free: [ 11.413102] ================================================================== [ 11.414181] BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 [ 11.415329] [ 11.415560] CPU: 3 PID: 4884 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2 #80 [ 11.416544] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 11.418148] Call Trace: [ 11.418534] <IRQ> [ 11.418834] dump_stack+0x7d/0xb0 [ 11.419297] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x210 [ 11.422079] kasan_report_invalid_free+0x51/0x80 [ 11.423433] __kasan_slab_free+0x15e/0x170 [ 11.424761] kfree+0x8c/0x230 [ 11.425157] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 [ 11.425872] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0 [ 11.426493] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0 [ 11.427093] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0xb29/0x1100 [ 11.427731] tcp_get_cookie_sock+0xc3/0x4a0 [ 11.429457] cookie_v4_check+0x13d0/0x2500 [ 11.433189] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x60e/0x780 [ 11.433727] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2869/0x2e10 [ 11.437143] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x23/0x190 [ 11.437810] ip_local_deliver+0x294/0x350 [ 11.439566] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15d/0x1a0 [ 11.441995] process_backlog+0x1b1/0x6b0 [ 11.443148] net_rx_action+0x37e/0xc40 [ 11.445361] __do_softirq+0x18c/0x61a [ 11.445881] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [ 11.446409] </IRQ> [ 11.446716] do_softirq_own_stack+0x34/0x40 [ 11.447259] do_softirq.part.0+0x26/0x30 [ 11.447827] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x46/0x50 [ 11.448406] ip_finish_output2+0x60f/0x1bc0 [ 11.450109] __ip_queue_xmit+0x71c/0x1b60 [ 11.451861] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1727/0x3bb0 [ 11.453789] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x3070/0x4d3a [ 11.456810] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2ad/0x780 [ 11.457995] __release_sock+0x14b/0x2c0 [ 11.458529] release_sock+0x4a/0x170 [ 11.459005] __inet_stream_connect+0x467/0xc80 [ 11.461435] inet_stream_connect+0x4e/0xa0 [ 11.462043] __sys_connect+0x204/0x270 [ 11.465515] __x64_sys_connect+0x6a/0xb0 [ 11.466088] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70 [ 11.466617] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 11.467341] RIP: 0033:0x7f56046dc469 [ 11.467844] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 11.468282] RSP: 002b:00007f5604dccdd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a [ 11.469326] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000068bf00 RCX: 00007f56046dc469 [ 11.470379] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 11.471311] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 11.472286] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 11.473341] R13: 000000000041427c R14: 00007f5604dcd5c0 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 11.474321] [ 11.474527] Allocated by task 4884: [ 11.475031] save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 11.475548] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 [ 11.476182] tcp_cdg_init+0xf0/0x150 [ 11.476744] tcp_init_congestion_control+0x9b/0x3a0 [ 11.477435] tcp_set_congestion_control+0x270/0x32f [ 11.478088] do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.0+0x521/0x1a00 [ 11.478744] __sys_setsockopt+0xff/0x1e0 [ 11.479259] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0x150 [ 11.479895] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70 [ 11.480395] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 11.481097] [ 11.481321] Freed by task 4872: [ 11.481783] save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 11.482230] __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170 [ 11.482839] kfree+0x8c/0x230 [ 11.483240] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 [ 11.483948] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0 [ 11.484502] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0 [ 11.485144] tcp_close+0x932/0xfe0 [ 11.485642] inet_release+0xc1/0x1c0 [ 11.486131] __sock_release+0xc0/0x270 [ 11.486697] sock_close+0xc/0x10 [ 11.487145] __fput+0x277/0x780 [ 11.487632] task_work_run+0xeb/0x180 [ 11.488118] __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x15a/0x160 [ 11.488834] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x70 [ 11.489326] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Wei Wang fixed a part of these CDG-malloc issues with commit c12014440750 ("tcp: memset ca_priv data to 0 properly"). This patch here fixes the listener-scenario: We make sure that listeners setting the congestion-control through setsockopt won't initialize it (thus CDG never allocates on listeners). For those who use AF_UNSPEC to reuse a socket, tcp_disconnect() is changed to cleanup afterwards. (The issue can be reproduced at least down to v4.4.x.) Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Fixes: 2b0a8c9eee81 ("tcp: add CDG congestion control") Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit ce69e563b325f620863830c246a8698ccea52048 ]

syzkaller found its way into setsockopt with TCP_CONGESTION "cdg".
tcp_cdg_init() does a kcalloc to store the gradients. As sk_clone_lock
just copies all the memory, the allocated pointer will be copied as
well, if the app called setsockopt(..., TCP_CONGESTION) on the listener.
If now the socket will be destroyed before the congestion-control
has properly been initialized (through a call to tcp_init_transfer), we
will end up freeing memory that does not belong to that particular
socket, opening the door to a double-free:

[   11.413102] ==================================================================
[   11.414181] BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0
[   11.415329]
[   11.415560] CPU: 3 PID: 4884 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2 #80
[   11.416544] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   11.418148] Call Trace:
[   11.418534]  <IRQ>
[   11.418834]  dump_stack+0x7d/0xb0
[   11.419297]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x210
[   11.422079]  kasan_report_invalid_free+0x51/0x80
[   11.423433]  __kasan_slab_free+0x15e/0x170
[   11.424761]  kfree+0x8c/0x230
[   11.425157]  tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0
[   11.425872]  tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0
[   11.426493]  inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0
[   11.427093]  tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0xb29/0x1100
[   11.427731]  tcp_get_cookie_sock+0xc3/0x4a0
[   11.429457]  cookie_v4_check+0x13d0/0x2500
[   11.433189]  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x60e/0x780
[   11.433727]  tcp_v4_rcv+0x2869/0x2e10
[   11.437143]  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x23/0x190
[   11.437810]  ip_local_deliver+0x294/0x350
[   11.439566]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15d/0x1a0
[   11.441995]  process_backlog+0x1b1/0x6b0
[   11.443148]  net_rx_action+0x37e/0xc40
[   11.445361]  __do_softirq+0x18c/0x61a
[   11.445881]  asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
[   11.446409]  </IRQ>
[   11.446716]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x34/0x40
[   11.447259]  do_softirq.part.0+0x26/0x30
[   11.447827]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x46/0x50
[   11.448406]  ip_finish_output2+0x60f/0x1bc0
[   11.450109]  __ip_queue_xmit+0x71c/0x1b60
[   11.451861]  __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1727/0x3bb0
[   11.453789]  tcp_rcv_state_process+0x3070/0x4d3a
[   11.456810]  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2ad/0x780
[   11.457995]  __release_sock+0x14b/0x2c0
[   11.458529]  release_sock+0x4a/0x170
[   11.459005]  __inet_stream_connect+0x467/0xc80
[   11.461435]  inet_stream_connect+0x4e/0xa0
[   11.462043]  __sys_connect+0x204/0x270
[   11.465515]  __x64_sys_connect+0x6a/0xb0
[   11.466088]  do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70
[   11.466617]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   11.467341] RIP: 0033:0x7f56046dc469
[   11.467844] Code: Bad RIP value.
[   11.468282] RSP: 002b:00007f5604dccdd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
[   11.469326] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000068bf00 RCX: 00007f56046dc469
[   11.470379] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
[   11.471311] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   11.472286] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[   11.473341] R13: 000000000041427c R14: 00007f5604dcd5c0 R15: 0000000000000003
[   11.474321]
[   11.474527] Allocated by task 4884:
[   11.475031]  save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[   11.475548]  __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0
[   11.476182]  tcp_cdg_init+0xf0/0x150
[   11.476744]  tcp_init_congestion_control+0x9b/0x3a0
[   11.477435]  tcp_set_congestion_control+0x270/0x32f
[   11.478088]  do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.0+0x521/0x1a00
[   11.478744]  __sys_setsockopt+0xff/0x1e0
[   11.479259]  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0x150
[   11.479895]  do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70
[   11.480395]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   11.481097]
[   11.481321] Freed by task 4872:
[   11.481783]  save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[   11.482230]  __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170
[   11.482839]  kfree+0x8c/0x230
[   11.483240]  tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0
[   11.483948]  tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0
[   11.484502]  inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0
[   11.485144]  tcp_close+0x932/0xfe0
[   11.485642]  inet_release+0xc1/0x1c0
[   11.486131]  __sock_release+0xc0/0x270
[   11.486697]  sock_close+0xc/0x10
[   11.487145]  __fput+0x277/0x780
[   11.487632]  task_work_run+0xeb/0x180
[   11.488118]  __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x15a/0x160
[   11.488834]  do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x70
[   11.489326]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Wei Wang fixed a part of these CDG-malloc issues with commit c12014440750
("tcp: memset ca_priv data to 0 properly").

This patch here fixes the listener-scenario: We make sure that listeners
setting the congestion-control through setsockopt won't initialize it
(thus CDG never allocates on listeners). For those who use AF_UNSPEC to
reuse a socket, tcp_disconnect() is changed to cleanup afterwards.

(The issue can be reproduced at least down to v4.4.x.)

Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 2b0a8c9eee81 ("tcp: add CDG congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
genetlink: remove genl_bind 2020-07-22T07:10:03+00:00 Sean Tranchetti stranche@codeaurora.org 2020-06-30T17:50:17+00:00 2506cfc94d2e2738cfe6d3a2800f6604c4586438 [ Upstream commit 1e82a62fec613844da9e558f3493540a5b7a7b67 ] A potential deadlock can occur during registering or unregistering a new generic netlink family between the main nl_table_lock and the cb_lock where each thread wants the lock held by the other, as demonstrated below. 1) Thread 1 is performing a netlink_bind() operation on a socket. As part of this call, it will call netlink_lock_table(), incrementing the nl_table_users count to 1. 2) Thread 2 is registering (or unregistering) a genl_family via the genl_(un)register_family() API. The cb_lock semaphore will be taken for writing. 3) Thread 1 will call genl_bind() as part of the bind operation to handle subscribing to GENL multicast groups at the request of the user. It will attempt to take the cb_lock semaphore for reading, but it will fail and be scheduled away, waiting for Thread 2 to finish the write. 4) Thread 2 will call netlink_table_grab() during the (un)registration call. However, as Thread 1 has incremented nl_table_users, it will not be able to proceed, and both threads will be stuck waiting for the other. genl_bind() is a noop, unless a genl_family implements the mcast_bind() function to handle setting up family-specific multicast operations. Since no one in-tree uses this functionality as Cong pointed out, simply removing the genl_bind() function will remove the possibility for deadlock, as there is no attempt by Thread 1 above to take the cb_lock semaphore. Fixes: c380d9a7afff ("genetlink: pass multicast bind/unbind to families") Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 1e82a62fec613844da9e558f3493540a5b7a7b67 ]

A potential deadlock can occur during registering or unregistering a
new generic netlink family between the main nl_table_lock and the
cb_lock where each thread wants the lock held by the other, as
demonstrated below.

1) Thread 1 is performing a netlink_bind() operation on a socket. As part
   of this call, it will call netlink_lock_table(), incrementing the
   nl_table_users count to 1.
2) Thread 2 is registering (or unregistering) a genl_family via the
   genl_(un)register_family() API. The cb_lock semaphore will be taken for
   writing.
3) Thread 1 will call genl_bind() as part of the bind operation to handle
   subscribing to GENL multicast groups at the request of the user. It will
   attempt to take the cb_lock semaphore for reading, but it will fail and
   be scheduled away, waiting for Thread 2 to finish the write.
4) Thread 2 will call netlink_table_grab() during the (un)registration
   call. However, as Thread 1 has incremented nl_table_users, it will not
   be able to proceed, and both threads will be stuck waiting for the
   other.

genl_bind() is a noop, unless a genl_family implements the mcast_bind()
function to handle setting up family-specific multicast operations. Since
no one in-tree uses this functionality as Cong pointed out, simply removing
the genl_bind() function will remove the possibility for deadlock, as there
is no attempt by Thread 1 above to take the cb_lock semaphore.

Fixes: c380d9a7afff ("genetlink: pass multicast bind/unbind to families")
Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
llc: make sure applications use ARPHRD_ETHER 2020-07-22T07:10:03+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2020-06-27T20:31:50+00:00 f146ae3cf4e79eb0abb6d701ec158d1605fb3925 [ Upstream commit a9b1110162357689a34992d5c925852948e5b9fd ] syzbot was to trigger a bug by tricking AF_LLC with non sensible addr->sllc_arphrd It seems clear LLC requires an Ethernet device. Back in commit abf9d537fea2 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE") Octavian Purdila added possibility for application to use a zero value for sllc_arphrd, convert it to ARPHRD_ETHER to not cause regressions on existing applications. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e0b4078 by task ksoftirqd/3/27 CPU: 3 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline] list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline] waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline] wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline] skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline] sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813 sock_wfree+0x1e1/0x260 net/core/sock.c:1958 skb_release_head_state+0xeb/0x260 net/core/skbuff.c:652 skb_release_all+0x16/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:663 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline] consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:838 [inline] consume_skb+0xfb/0x410 net/core/skbuff.c:832 __dev_kfree_skb_any+0xa4/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:2967 dev_kfree_skb_any include/linux/netdevice.h:3650 [inline] e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource.isra.0+0x21b/0x3a0 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1963 e1000_clean_tx_irq drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3854 [inline] e1000_clean+0x4cc/0x1d10 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3796 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6532 [inline] net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6600 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:595 smpboot_thread_fn+0x6a3/0xa40 kernel/smpboot.c:165 kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Allocated by task 8247: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:521 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3320 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x121/0x710 mm/slab.c:3484 sock_alloc_inode+0x1c/0x1d0 net/socket.c:240 alloc_inode+0x68/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:230 new_inode_pseudo+0x19/0xf0 fs/inode.c:919 sock_alloc+0x41/0x270 net/socket.c:560 __sock_create+0xc2/0x730 net/socket.c:1384 sock_create net/socket.c:1471 [inline] __sys_socket+0x103/0x220 net/socket.c:1513 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1522 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1520 [inline] __ia32_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1520 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:337 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x27b/0xe16 arch/x86/entry/common.c:408 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139 Freed by task 17: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x320 mm/slab.c:3694 sock_free_inode+0x20/0x30 net/socket.c:261 i_callback+0x44/0x80 fs/inode.c:219 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline] rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2183 [inline] rcu_core+0x570/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2408 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2417 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e0b4000 which belongs to the cache sock_inode_cache of size 1152 The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of 1152-byte region [ffff88801e0b4000, ffff88801e0b4480) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0000782d00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88807aa59c40 index:0xffff88801e0b4ffd raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00008e6c88 ffffea0000782d48 ffff88807aa59c40 raw: ffff88801e0b4ffd ffff88801e0b4000 0000000100000003 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88801e0b3f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff88801e0b3f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88801e0b4000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88801e0b4080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88801e0b4100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: abf9d537fea2 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit a9b1110162357689a34992d5c925852948e5b9fd ]

syzbot was to trigger a bug by tricking AF_LLC with
non sensible addr->sllc_arphrd

It seems clear LLC requires an Ethernet device.

Back in commit abf9d537fea2 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE")
Octavian Purdila added possibility for application to use a zero
value for sllc_arphrd, convert it to ARPHRD_ETHER to not cause
regressions on existing applications.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e0b4078 by task ksoftirqd/3/27

CPU: 3 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline]
 list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline]
 waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline]
 wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline]
 skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline]
 sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813
 sock_wfree+0x1e1/0x260 net/core/sock.c:1958
 skb_release_head_state+0xeb/0x260 net/core/skbuff.c:652
 skb_release_all+0x16/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:663
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline]
 consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:838 [inline]
 consume_skb+0xfb/0x410 net/core/skbuff.c:832
 __dev_kfree_skb_any+0xa4/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:2967
 dev_kfree_skb_any include/linux/netdevice.h:3650 [inline]
 e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource.isra.0+0x21b/0x3a0 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1963
 e1000_clean_tx_irq drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3854 [inline]
 e1000_clean+0x4cc/0x1d10 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3796
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6532 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6600
 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline]
 run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:595
 smpboot_thread_fn+0x6a3/0xa40 kernel/smpboot.c:165
 kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

Allocated by task 8247:
 save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486
 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:521
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3320 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x121/0x710 mm/slab.c:3484
 sock_alloc_inode+0x1c/0x1d0 net/socket.c:240
 alloc_inode+0x68/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:230
 new_inode_pseudo+0x19/0xf0 fs/inode.c:919
 sock_alloc+0x41/0x270 net/socket.c:560
 __sock_create+0xc2/0x730 net/socket.c:1384
 sock_create net/socket.c:1471 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0x103/0x220 net/socket.c:1513
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1522 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1520 [inline]
 __ia32_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1520
 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:337 [inline]
 do_fast_syscall_32+0x27b/0xe16 arch/x86/entry/common.c:408
 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139

Freed by task 17:
 save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x320 mm/slab.c:3694
 sock_free_inode+0x20/0x30 net/socket.c:261
 i_callback+0x44/0x80 fs/inode.c:219
 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline]
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2183 [inline]
 rcu_core+0x570/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2408
 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2417
 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e0b4000
 which belongs to the cache sock_inode_cache of size 1152
The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of
 1152-byte region [ffff88801e0b4000, ffff88801e0b4480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0000782d00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88807aa59c40 index:0xffff88801e0b4ffd
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00008e6c88 ffffea0000782d48 ffff88807aa59c40
raw: ffff88801e0b4ffd ffff88801e0b4000 0000000100000003 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88801e0b3f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
 ffff88801e0b3f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88801e0b4000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                                ^
 ffff88801e0b4080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88801e0b4100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: abf9d537fea2 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
l2tp: remove skb_dst_set() from l2tp_xmit_skb() 2020-07-22T07:10:03+00:00 Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com 2020-07-06T18:02:32+00:00 05180703033a128b64eb8e85ceaac6f57157ca58 [ Upstream commit 27d53323664c549b5bb2dfaaf6f7ad6e0376a64e ] In the tx path of l2tp, l2tp_xmit_skb() calls skb_dst_set() to set skb's dst. However, it will eventually call inet6_csk_xmit() or ip_queue_xmit() where skb's dst will be overwritten by: skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst); without releasing the old dst in skb. Then it causes dst/dev refcnt leak: unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1 This can be reproduced by simply running: # modprobe l2tp_eth && modprobe l2tp_ip # sh ./tools/testing/selftests/net/l2tp.sh So before going to inet6_csk_xmit() or ip_queue_xmit(), skb's dst should be dropped. This patch is to fix it by removing skb_dst_set() from l2tp_xmit_skb() and moving skb_dst_drop() into l2tp_xmit_core(). Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core") Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Tested-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 27d53323664c549b5bb2dfaaf6f7ad6e0376a64e ]

In the tx path of l2tp, l2tp_xmit_skb() calls skb_dst_set() to set
skb's dst. However, it will eventually call inet6_csk_xmit() or
ip_queue_xmit() where skb's dst will be overwritten by:

   skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst);

without releasing the old dst in skb. Then it causes dst/dev refcnt leak:

  unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1

This can be reproduced by simply running:

  # modprobe l2tp_eth && modprobe l2tp_ip
  # sh ./tools/testing/selftests/net/l2tp.sh

So before going to inet6_csk_xmit() or ip_queue_xmit(), skb's dst
should be dropped. This patch is to fix it by removing skb_dst_set()
from l2tp_xmit_skb() and moving skb_dst_drop() into l2tp_xmit_core().

Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core")
Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Tested-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv4: fill fl4_icmp_{type,code} in ping_v4_sendmsg 2020-07-22T07:10:03+00:00 Sabrina Dubroca sd@queasysnail.net 2020-07-03T15:00:32+00:00 82f75d0a67ad8c5534a325484a461fc05fea8a54 [ Upstream commit 5eff06902394425c722f0a44d9545909a8800f79 ] IPv4 ping sockets don't set fl4.fl4_icmp_{type,code}, which leads to incomplete IPsec ACQUIRE messages being sent to userspace. Currently, both raw sockets and IPv6 ping sockets set those fields. Expected output of "ip xfrm monitor": acquire proto esp sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 8 code 0 dev ens4 policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 <snip> Currently with ping sockets: acquire proto esp sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 0 code 0 dev ens4 policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 <snip> The Libreswan test suite found this problem after Fedora changed the value for the sysctl net.ipv4.ping_group_range. Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Reported-by: Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com> Tested-by: Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 5eff06902394425c722f0a44d9545909a8800f79 ]

IPv4 ping sockets don't set fl4.fl4_icmp_{type,code}, which leads to
incomplete IPsec ACQUIRE messages being sent to userspace. Currently,
both raw sockets and IPv6 ping sockets set those fields.

Expected output of "ip xfrm monitor":
    acquire proto esp
      sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 8 code 0 dev ens4
      policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32
        <snip>

Currently with ping sockets:
    acquire proto esp
      sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 0 code 0 dev ens4
      policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32
        <snip>

The Libreswan test suite found this problem after Fedora changed the
value for the sysctl net.ipv4.ping_group_range.

Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Reported-by: Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: lost .data_len definition for Q.931/ipv6 2020-07-09T07:35:09+00:00 Vasily Averin vvs@virtuozzo.com 2020-06-09T07:53:22+00:00 555fb3091f3ad6252a96cecb838ecf55e2960fd9 Could you please push this patch into stable@? it fixes memory corruption in kernels v3.5 .. v4.10 Lost .data_len definition leads to write beyond end of struct nf_ct_h323_master. Usually it corrupts following struct nf_conn_nat, however if nat is not loaded it corrupts following slab object. In mainline this problem went away in v4.11, after commit 9f0f3ebeda47 ("netfilter: helpers: remove data_len usage for inkernel helpers") however many stable kernels are still affected. Fixes: 1afc56794e03 ("netfilter: nf_ct_helper: implement variable length helper private data") # v3.5 cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
Could you please push this patch into stable@?
it fixes memory corruption in kernels  v3.5 .. v4.10

Lost .data_len definition leads to write beyond end of
struct nf_ct_h323_master. Usually it corrupts following
struct nf_conn_nat, however if nat is not loaded it corrupts
following slab object.

In mainline this problem went away in v4.11,
after commit 9f0f3ebeda47 ("netfilter: helpers: remove data_len usage
for inkernel helpers") however many stable kernels are still affected.

Fixes: 1afc56794e03 ("netfilter: nf_ct_helper: implement variable length helper private data") # v3.5
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
SUNRPC: Properly set the @subbuf parameter of xdr_buf_subsegment() 2020-06-30T00:08:04+00:00 Chuck Lever chuck.lever@oracle.com 2020-06-25T15:32:34+00:00 8deec224e90e09613a43e00124b719b26349714d commit 89a3c9f5b9f0bcaa9aea3e8b2a616fcaea9aad78 upstream. @subbuf is an output parameter of xdr_buf_subsegment(). A survey of call sites shows that @subbuf is always uninitialized before xdr_buf_segment() is invoked by callers. There are some execution paths through xdr_buf_subsegment() that do not set all of the fields in @subbuf, leaving some pointer fields containing garbage addresses. Subsequent processing of that buffer then results in a page fault. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 89a3c9f5b9f0bcaa9aea3e8b2a616fcaea9aad78 upstream.

@subbuf is an output parameter of xdr_buf_subsegment(). A survey of
call sites shows that @subbuf is always uninitialized before
xdr_buf_segment() is invoked by callers.

There are some execution paths through xdr_buf_subsegment() that do
not set all of the fields in @subbuf, leaving some pointer fields
containing garbage addresses. Subsequent processing of that buffer
then results in a page fault.

Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>