linux-stable.git/net, branch v4.4.228

sunrpc: clean up properly in gss_mech_unregister()

2020-06-20T08:23:24+00:00

commit 24c5efe41c29ee3e55bcf5a1c9f61ca8709622e8 upstream.

gss_mech_register() calls svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() for each
flavour, but gss_mech_unregister() does not call auth_domain_put().
This is unbalanced and makes it impossible to reload the module.

Change svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() to return the registered
auth_domain, and save it for later release.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v2.6.12+)
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206651
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown 
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sunrpc: svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor must reject duplicate registrations.

2020-06-20T08:23:24+00:00

commit d47a5dc2888fd1b94adf1553068b8dad76cec96c upstream.

There is no valid case for supporting duplicate pseudoflavor
registrations.
Currently the silent acceptance of such registrations is hiding a bug.
The rpcsec_gss_krb5 module registers 2 flavours but does not unregister
them, so if you load, unload, reload the module, it will happily
continue to use the old registration which now has pointers to the
memory were the module was originally loaded.  This could lead to
unexpected results.

So disallow duplicate registrations.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206651
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v2.6.12+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown 
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nft_nat: return EOPNOTSUPP if type or flags are not supported

2020-06-20T08:23:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0d7c83463fdf7841350f37960a7abadd3e650b41 ]

Instead of EINVAL which should be used for malformed netlink messages.

Fixes: eb31628e37a0 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add support for IPv6 NAT")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Bluetooth: Add SCO fallback for invalid LMP parameters error

2020-06-20T08:23:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit 56b5453a86203a44726f523b4133c1feca49ce7c ]

Bluetooth PTS test case HFP/AG/ACC/BI-12-I accepts SCO connection
with invalid parameter at the first SCO request expecting AG to
attempt another SCO request with the use of "safe settings" for
given codec, base on section 5.7.1.2 of HFP 1.7 specification.

This patch addresses it by adding "Invalid LMP Parameters" (0x1e)
to the SCO fallback case. Verified with below log:

< HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17
        Handle: 256
        Transmit bandwidth: 8000
        Receive bandwidth: 8000
        Max latency: 13
        Setting: 0x0003
          Input Coding: Linear
          Input Data Format: 1's complement
          Input Sample Size: 8-bit
          # of bits padding at MSB: 0
          Air Coding Format: Transparent Data
        Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02)
        Packet type: 0x0380
          3-EV3 may not be used
          2-EV5 may not be used
          3-EV5 may not be used
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
      Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Max slots: 1
> HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17
        Status: Invalid LMP Parameters / Invalid LL Parameters (0x1e)
        Handle: 0
        Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC)
        Link type: eSCO (0x02)
        Transmission interval: 0x00
        Retransmission window: 0x02
        RX packet length: 0
        TX packet length: 0
        Air mode: Transparent (0x03)
< HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17
        Handle: 256
        Transmit bandwidth: 8000
        Receive bandwidth: 8000
        Max latency: 8
        Setting: 0x0003
          Input Coding: Linear
          Input Data Format: 1's complement
          Input Sample Size: 8-bit
          # of bits padding at MSB: 0
          Air Coding Format: Transparent Data
        Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02)
        Packet type: 0x03c8
          EV3 may be used
          2-EV3 may not be used
          3-EV3 may not be used
          2-EV5 may not be used
          3-EV5 may not be used
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
      Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Max slots: 5
> HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Max slots: 1
> HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 257
        Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC)
        Link type: eSCO (0x02)
        Transmission interval: 0x06
        Retransmission window: 0x04
        RX packet length: 30
        TX packet length: 30
        Air mode: Transparent (0x03)

Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yu Chao 
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ipv6: fix IPV6_ADDRFORM operation logic

2020-06-20T08:23:14+00:00

[ Upstream commit 79a1f0ccdbb4ad700590f61b00525b390cb53905 ]

Socket option IPV6_ADDRFORM supports UDP/UDPLITE and TCP at present.
Previously the checking logic looks like:
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP || sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE)
	do_some_check;
else if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
	break;

After commit b6f6118901d1 ("ipv6: restrict IPV6_ADDRFORM operation"), TCP
was blocked as the logic changed to:
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP || sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE)
	do_some_check;
else if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)
	do_some_check;
	break;
else
	break;

Then after commit 82c9ae440857 ("ipv6: fix restrict IPV6_ADDRFORM operation")
UDP/UDPLITE were blocked as the logic changed to:
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP || sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE)
	do_some_check;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)
	do_some_check;

if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
	break;

Fix it by using Eric's code and simply remove the break in TCP check, which
looks like:
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP || sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE)
	do_some_check;
else if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)
	do_some_check;
else
	break;

Fixes: 82c9ae440857 ("ipv6: fix restrict IPV6_ADDRFORM operation")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

l2tp: do not use inet_hash()/inet_unhash()

2020-06-11T07:21:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit 02c71b144c811bcdd865e0a1226d0407d11357e8 ]

syzbot recently found a way to crash the kernel [1]

Issue here is that inet_hash() & inet_unhash() are currently
only meant to be used by TCP & DCCP, since only these protocols
provide the needed hashinfo pointer.

L2TP uses a single list (instead of a hash table)

This old bug became an issue after commit 610236587600
("bpf: Add new cgroup attach type to enable sock modifications")
since after this commit, sk_common_release() can be called
while the L2TP socket is still considered 'hashed'.

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 7063 Comm: syz-executor654 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1
R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0
R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00
FS:  0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 sk_common_release+0xba/0x370 net/core/sock.c:3210
 inet_create net/ipv4/af_inet.c:390 [inline]
 inet_create+0x966/0xe00 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:248
 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428
 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528
 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
RIP: 0033:0x441e29
Code: e8 fc b3 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffdce184148 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000441e29
RDX: 0000000000000073 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000402c30 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 23b6578228ce553e ]---
RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1
R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0
R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00
FS:  0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Fixes: 0d76751fad77 ("l2tp: Add L2TPv3 IP encapsulation (no UDP) support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: James Chapman 
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko 
Reported-by: syzbot+3610d489778b57cc8031@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

l2tp: add sk_family checks to l2tp_validate_socket

2020-06-11T07:21:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit d9a81a225277686eb629938986d97629ea102633 ]

syzbot was able to trigger a crash after using an ISDN socket
and fool l2tp.

Fix this by making sure the UDP socket is of the proper family.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78
Write of size 1 at addr ffff88808ed0c590 by task syz-executor.5/3018

CPU: 0 PID: 3018 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x413 mm/kasan/report.c:382
 __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 mm/kasan/report.c:511
 kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625
 setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78
 l2tp_tunnel_register+0xb15/0xdd0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1523
 l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create+0x4b2/0xa60 net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:249
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:673 [inline]
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:718 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x627/0xdf0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:735
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:746
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x537/0x740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329
 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e6/0x810 net/socket.c:2352
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2406
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2439
 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
RIP: 0033:0x45ca29
Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007effe76edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004fe1c0 RCX: 000000000045ca29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 000000000000094e R14: 00000000004d5d00 R15: 00007effe76ee6d4

Allocated by task 3018:
 save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:495 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:468
 __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3656 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x161/0x7a0 mm/slab.c:3665
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline]
 sk_prot_alloc+0x223/0x2f0 net/core/sock.c:1612
 sk_alloc+0x36/0x1100 net/core/sock.c:1666
 data_sock_create drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:600 [inline]
 mISDN_sock_create+0x272/0x400 drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:796
 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428
 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528
 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3

Freed by task 2484:
 save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:317 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:456
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
 kfree+0x109/0x2b0 mm/slab.c:3757
 kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:603
 __free_fdtable+0x2d/0x70 fs/file.c:31
 put_files_struct fs/file.c:420 [inline]
 put_files_struct+0x248/0x2e0 fs/file.c:413
 exit_files+0x7e/0xa0 fs/file.c:445
 do_exit+0xb04/0x2dd0 kernel/exit.c:791
 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:894
 get_signal+0x47b/0x24e0 kernel/signal.c:2739
 do_signal+0x81/0x2240 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:784
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x26c/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:161
 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
 syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x6b1/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808ed0c000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1424 bytes inside of
 2048-byte region [ffff88808ed0c000, ffff88808ed0c800)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00023b4300 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002838208 ffffea00015ba288 ffff8880aa000e00
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808ed0c000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88808ed0c480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88808ed0c500: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88808ed0c580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                         ^
 ffff88808ed0c600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88808ed0c680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: 6b9f34239b00 ("l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation")
Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: James Chapman 
Cc: Guillaume Nault 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Acked-by: Guillaume Nault 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

vsock: fix timeout in vsock_accept()

2020-06-11T07:21:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7e0afbdfd13d1e708fe96e31c46c4897101a6a43 ]

The accept(2) is an "input" socket interface, so we should use
SO_RCVTIMEO instead of SO_SNDTIMEO to set the timeout.

So this patch replace sock_sndtimeo() with sock_rcvtimeo() to
use the right timeout in the vsock_accept().

Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella 
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

devinet: fix memleak in inetdev_init()

2020-06-11T07:21:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1b49cd71b52403822731dc9f283185d1da355f97 ]

When devinet_sysctl_register() failed, the memory allocated
in neigh_parms_alloc() should be freed.

Fixes: 20e61da7ffcf ("ipv4: fail early when creating netdev named all or default")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang 
Acked-by: Cong Wang 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

esp6: fix memleak on error path in esp6_input

2020-06-11T07:21:37+00:00

commit 7284fdf39a912322ce97de2d30def3c6068a418c upstream.

This ought to be an omission in e6194923237 ("esp: Fix memleaks on error
paths."). The memleak on error path in esp6_input is similar to esp_input
of esp4.

Fixes: e6194923237 ("esp: Fix memleaks on error paths.")
Fixes: 3f29770723f ("ipsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always")
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei 
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert 
Cc: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman