linux-stable.git/net, branch v4.2.3

fib_rules: fix fib rule dumps across multiple skbs

2015-10-03T11:51:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit 41fc014332d91ee90c32840bf161f9685b7fbf2b ]

dump_rules returns skb length and not error.
But when family == AF_UNSPEC, the caller of dump_rules
assumes that it returns an error. Hence, when family == AF_UNSPEC,
we continue trying to dump on -EMSGSIZE errors resulting in
incorrect dump idx carried between skbs belonging to the same dump.
This results in fib rule dump always only dumping rules that fit
into the first skb.

This patch fixes dump_rules to return error so that we exit correctly
and idx is correctly maintained between skbs that are part of the
same dump.

Signed-off-by: Wilson Kok 
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: revert "net_sched: move tp->root allocation into fw_init()"

2015-10-03T11:51:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit d8aecb10115497f6cdf841df8c88ebb3ba25fa28 ]

fw filter uses tp->root==NULL to check if it is the old method,
so it doesn't need allocation at all in this case. This patch
reverts the offending commit and adds some comments for old
method to make it obvious.

Fixes: 33f8b9ecdb15 ("net_sched: move tp->root allocation into fw_init()")
Reported-by: Akshat Kakkar 
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim 
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang 
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Fix AF_PACKET ABI breakage in 4.2

2015-10-03T11:51:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit d3869efe7a8a2298516d9af4f91487cf486ca945 ]

Commit 7d82410950aa ("virtio: add explicit big-endian support to memory
accessors") accidentally changed the virtio_net header used by
AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDR from host-endian to big-endian.

Since virtio_legacy_is_little_endian() is a very long identifier,
define a vio_le macro and use that throughout the code instead of the
hard-coded 'false' for little-endian.

This restores the ABI to match 4.1 and earlier kernels, and makes my
test program work again.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: add proper TS val into RST packets

2015-10-03T11:51:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit 675ee231d960af2af3606b4480324e26797eb010 ]

RST packets sent on behalf of TCP connections with TS option (RFC 7323
TCP timestamps) have incorrect TS val (set to 0), but correct TS ecr.

A > B: Flags [S], seq 0, win 65535, options [mss 1000,nop,nop,TS val 100
ecr 0], length 0
B > A: Flags [S.], seq 2444755794, ack 1, win 28960, options [mss
1460,nop,nop,TS val 7264344 ecr 100], length 0
A > B: Flags [.], ack 1, win 65535, options [nop,nop,TS val 110 ecr
7264344], length 0

B > A: Flags [R.], seq 1, ack 1, win 28960, options [nop,nop,TS val 0
ecr 110], length 0

We need to call skb_mstamp_get() to get proper TS val,
derived from skb->skb_mstamp

Note that RFC 1323 was advocating to not send TS option in RST segment,
but RFC 7323 recommends the opposite :

  Once TSopt has been successfully negotiated, that is both  and
   contain TSopt, the TSopt MUST be sent in every non-
  segment for the duration of the connection, and SHOULD be sent in an
   segment (see Section 5.2 for details)

Note this RFC recommends to send TS val = 0, but we believe it is
premature : We do not know if all TCP stacks are properly
handling the receive side :

   When an  segment is
   received, it MUST NOT be subjected to the PAWS check by verifying an
   acceptable value in SEG.TSval, and information from the Timestamps
   option MUST NOT be used to update connection state information.
   SEG.TSecr MAY be used to provide stricter  acceptance checks.

In 5 years, if/when all TCP stack are RFC 7323 ready, we might consider
to decide to send TS val = 0, if it buys something.

Fixes: 7faee5c0d514 ("tcp: remove TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

openvswitch: Zero flows on allocation.

2015-10-03T11:51:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit ae5f2fb1d51fa128a460bcfbe3c56d7ab8bf6a43 ]

When support for megaflows was introduced, OVS needed to start
installing flows with a mask applied to them. Since masking is an
expensive operation, OVS also had an optimization that would only
take the parts of the flow keys that were covered by a non-zero
mask. The values stored in the remaining pieces should not matter
because they are masked out.

While this works fine for the purposes of matching (which must always
look at the mask), serialization to netlink can be problematic. Since
the flow and the mask are serialized separately, the uninitialized
portions of the flow can be encoded with whatever values happen to be
present.

In terms of functionality, this has little effect since these fields
will be masked out by definition. However, it leaks kernel memory to
userspace, which is a potential security vulnerability. It is also
possible that other code paths could look at the masked key and get
uninitialized data, although this does not currently appear to be an
issue in practice.

This removes the mask optimization for flows that are being installed.
This was always intended to be the case as the mask optimizations were
really targetting per-packet flow operations.

Fixes: 03f0d916 ("openvswitch: Mega flow implementation")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross 
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlink: Replace rhash_portid with bound

2015-10-03T11:51:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit da314c9923fed553a007785a901fd395b7eb6c19 ]

On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 at 02:20:22PM -0400, Tejun Heo wrote:
>
> store_release and load_acquire are different from the usual memory
> barriers and can't be paired this way.  You have to pair store_release
> and load_acquire.  Besides, it isn't a particularly good idea to

OK I've decided to drop the acquire/release helpers as they don't
help us at all and simply pessimises the code by using full memory
barriers (on some architectures) where only a write or read barrier
is needed.

> depend on memory barriers embedded in other data structures like the
> above.  Here, especially, rhashtable_insert() would have write barrier
> *before* the entry is hashed not necessarily *after*, which means that
> in the above case, a socket which appears to have set bound to a
> reader might not visible when the reader tries to look up the socket
> on the hashtable.

But you are right we do need an explicit write barrier here to
ensure that the hashing is visible.

> There's no reason to be overly smart here.  This isn't a crazy hot
> path, write barriers tend to be very cheap, store_release more so.
> Please just do smp_store_release() and note what it's paired with.

It's not about being overly smart.  It's about actually understanding
what's going on with the code.  I've seen too many instances of
people simply sprinkling synchronisation primitives around without
any knowledge of what is happening underneath, which is just a recipe
for creating hard-to-debug races.

> > @@ -1539,7 +1546,7 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
> >  		}
> >  	}
> >
> > -	if (!nlk->portid) {
> > +	if (!nlk->bound) {
>
> I don't think you can skip load_acquire here just because this is the
> second deref of the variable.  That doesn't change anything.  Race
> condition could still happen between the first and second tests and
> skipping the second would lead to the same kind of bug.

The reason this one is OK is because we do not use nlk->portid or
try to get nlk from the hash table before we return to user-space.

However, there is a real bug here that none of these acquire/release
helpers discovered.  The two bound tests here used to be a single
one.  Now that they are separate it is entirely possible for another
thread to come in the middle and bind the socket.  So we need to
repeat the portid check in order to maintain consistency.

> > @@ -1587,7 +1594,7 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
> >  	    !netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
> >  		return -EPERM;
> >
> > -	if (!nlk->portid)
> > +	if (!nlk->bound)
>
> Don't we need load_acquire here too?  Is this path holding a lock
> which makes that unnecessary?

Ditto.

---8<---
The commit 1f770c0a09da855a2b51af6d19de97fb955eca85 ("netlink:
Fix autobind race condition that leads to zero port ID") created
some new races that can occur due to inconcsistencies between the
two port IDs.

Tejun is right that a barrier is unavoidable.  Therefore I am
reverting to the original patch that used a boolean to indicate
that a user netlink socket has been bound.

Barriers have been added where necessary to ensure that a valid
portid and the hashed socket is visible.

I have also changed netlink_insert to only return EBUSY if the
socket is bound to a portid different to the requested one.  This
combined with only reading nlk->bound once in netlink_bind fixes
a race where two threads that bind the socket at the same time
with different port IDs may both succeed.

Fixes: 1f770c0a09da ("netlink: Fix autobind race condition that leads to zero port ID")
Reported-by: Tejun Heo 
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Nacked-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlink: Fix autobind race condition that leads to zero port ID

2015-10-03T11:51:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1f770c0a09da855a2b51af6d19de97fb955eca85 ]

The commit c0bb07df7d981e4091432754e30c9c720e2c0c78 ("netlink:
Reset portid after netlink_insert failure") introduced a race
condition where if two threads try to autobind the same socket
one of them may end up with a zero port ID.  This led to kernel
deadlocks that were observed by multiple people.

This patch reverts that commit and instead fixes it by introducing
a separte rhash_portid variable so that the real portid is only set
after the socket has been successfully hashed.

Fixes: c0bb07df7d98 ("netlink: Reset portid after netlink_insert failure")
Reported-by: Tejun Heo 
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rtnetlink: catch -EOPNOTSUPP errors from ndo_bridge_getlink

2015-10-03T11:51:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit d64f69b0373a7d0bcec8b5da7712977518a8f42b ]

problem reported:
	kernel 4.1.3
	------------
	# bridge vlan
	port	vlan ids
	eth0	 1 PVID Egress Untagged
	 	90
	 	91
	 	92
	 	93
	 	94
	 	95
	 	96
	 	97
	 	98
	 	99
	 	100

	vmbr0	 1 PVID Egress Untagged
	 	94

	kernel 4.2
	-----------
	# bridge vlan
	port	vlan ids

ndo_bridge_getlink can return -EOPNOTSUPP when an interfaces
ndo_bridge_getlink op is set to switchdev_port_bridge_getlink
and CONFIG_SWITCHDEV is not defined. This today can happen to
bond, rocker and team devices. This patch adds -EOPNOTSUPP
checks after calls to ndo_bridge_getlink.

Fixes: 85fdb956726ff2a ("switchdev: cut over to new switchdev_port_bridge_getlink")
Reported-by: Alexandre DERUMIER 
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bridge: fix igmpv3 / mldv2 report parsing

2015-10-03T11:51:36+00:00

[ Upstream commit c2d4fbd2163e607915cc05798ce7fb7f31117cc1 ]

With the newly introduced helper functions the skb pulling is hidden in
the checksumming function - and undone before returning to the caller.

The IGMPv3 and MLDv2 report parsing functions in the bridge still
assumed that the skb is pointing to the beginning of the IGMP/MLD
message while it is now kept at the beginning of the IPv4/6 header,
breaking the message parsing and creating packet loss.

Fixing this by taking the offset between IP and IGMP/MLD header into
account, too.

Fixes: 9afd85c9e455 ("net: Export IGMP/MLD message validation code")
Reported-by: Tobias Powalowski 
Tested-by: Tobias Powalowski 
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization

2015-10-03T11:51:36+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4 ]

Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.

During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:

        status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
        if (status)
                goto err_protosw_init;

        status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
        if (status)
                goto err_v6_protosw_init;

        status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);

The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.

The race happens like this:

     CPU 0                           |  CPU 1
  socket()                           |
   __sock_create                     | socket()
    inet_create                      |  __sock_create
     list_for_each_entry_rcu(        |
        answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
        list) {                      |   inet_create
      /* no hits */                  |
     if (unlikely(err)) {            |
      ...                            |
      request_module()               |
      /* socket creation is blocked  |
       * the module is fully loaded  |
       */                            |
       sctp_init                     |
        sctp_v4_protosw_init         |
         inet_register_protosw       |
          list_add_rcu(&p->list,     |
                       last_perm);   |
                                     |  list_for_each_entry_rcu(
                                     |     answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
        sctp_v6_protosw_init         |     list) {
                                     |     /* hit, so assumes protocol
                                     |      * is already loaded
                                     |      */
                                     |  /* socket creation continues
                                     |   * before netns is initialized
                                     |   */
        register_pernet_subsys       |

Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.

So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.

Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman