linux-stable.git/net, branch v3.2.81 Linux kernel stable tree net: fix a kernel infoleak in x25 module 2016-06-15T20:28:15+00:00 Kangjie Lu kangjielu@gmail.com 2016-05-08T16:10:14+00:00 132c5255a23f505ffefe03cfc1f01ee9c82f3e09 commit 79e48650320e6fba48369fccf13fd045315b19b8 upstream. Stack object "dte_facilities" is allocated in x25_rx_call_request(), which is supposed to be initialized in x25_negotiate_facilities. However, 5 fields (8 bytes in total) are not initialized. This object is then copied to userland via copy_to_user, thus infoleak occurs. Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 79e48650320e6fba48369fccf13fd045315b19b8 upstream.

Stack object "dte_facilities" is allocated in x25_rx_call_request(),
which is supposed to be initialized in x25_negotiate_facilities.
However, 5 fields (8 bytes in total) are not initialized. This
object is then copied to userland via copy_to_user, thus infoleak
occurs.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink 2016-06-15T20:28:15+00:00 Kangjie Lu kangjielu@gmail.com 2016-05-03T20:46:24+00:00 114253841cddf0f87b19ab8b0091abea41c58735 commit 5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6 upstream. The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4 bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”. Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6 upstream.

The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
net: fix infoleak in llc 2016-06-15T20:28:15+00:00 Kangjie Lu kangjielu@gmail.com 2016-05-03T20:35:05+00:00 3ec6a22dc6ded2c350e1d47513d316c55e9330c1 commit b8670c09f37bdf2847cc44f36511a53afc6161fd upstream. The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”. Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit b8670c09f37bdf2847cc44f36511a53afc6161fd upstream.

The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab name 2016-06-15T20:28:14+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2016-05-14T18:11:44+00:00 9f9aa476de1b6bd8fe179dfd9b204972c8c98791 commit 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 upstream. The slab name ends up being visible in the directory structure under /sys, and even if you don't have access rights to the file you can see the filenames. Just use a 64-bit counter instead of the pointer to the 'net' structure to generate a unique name. This code will go away in 4.7 when the conntrack code moves to a single kmemcache, but this is the backportable simple solution to avoiding leaking kernel pointers to user space. Fixes: 5b3501faa874 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: per netns nf_conntrack_cachep") Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 upstream.

The slab name ends up being visible in the directory structure under
/sys, and even if you don't have access rights to the file you can see
the filenames.

Just use a 64-bit counter instead of the pointer to the 'net' structure
to generate a unique name.

This code will go away in 4.7 when the conntrack code moves to a single
kmemcache, but this is the backportable simple solution to avoiding
leaking kernel pointers to user space.

Fixes: 5b3501faa874 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: per netns nf_conntrack_cachep")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
batman-adv: Fix broadcast/ogm queue limit on a removed interface 2016-06-15T20:28:13+00:00 Linus Lüssing linus.luessing@c0d3.blue 2016-03-11T13:04:49+00:00 10282cba1bcc4a22baf4abb2713a5816d55dfed1 commit c4fdb6cff2aa0ae740c5f19b6f745cbbe786d42f upstream. When removing a single interface while a broadcast or ogm packet is still pending then we will free the forward packet without releasing the queue slots again. This patch is supposed to fix this issue. Fixes: 6d5808d4ae1b ("batman-adv: Add missing hardif_free_ref in forw_packet_free") Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue> [sven@narfation.org: fix conflicts with current version] Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org> Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit c4fdb6cff2aa0ae740c5f19b6f745cbbe786d42f upstream.

When removing a single interface while a broadcast or ogm packet is
still pending then we will free the forward packet without releasing the
queue slots again.

This patch is supposed to fix this issue.

Fixes: 6d5808d4ae1b ("batman-adv: Add missing hardif_free_ref in forw_packet_free")
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue>
[sven@narfation.org: fix conflicts with current version]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
batman-adv: Reduce refcnt of removed router when updating route 2016-06-15T20:28:12+00:00 Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org 2016-03-20T11:27:53+00:00 c1b3b151b541a54f535226142812a823ac86541b commit d1a65f1741bfd9c69f9e4e2ad447a89b6810427d upstream. _batadv_update_route rcu_derefences orig_ifinfo->router outside of a spinlock protected region to print some information messages to the debug log. But this pointer is not checked again when the new pointer is assigned in the spinlock protected region. Thus is can happen that the value of orig_ifinfo->router changed in the meantime and thus the reference counter of the wrong router gets reduced after the spinlock protected region. Just rcu_dereferencing the value of orig_ifinfo->router inside the spinlock protected region (which also set the new pointer) is enough to get the correct old router object. Fixes: e1a5382f978b ("batman-adv: Make orig_node->router an rcu protected pointer") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org> Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: s/orig_ifinfo/orig_node/] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit d1a65f1741bfd9c69f9e4e2ad447a89b6810427d upstream.

_batadv_update_route rcu_derefences orig_ifinfo->router outside of a
spinlock protected region to print some information messages to the debug
log. But this pointer is not checked again when the new pointer is assigned
in the spinlock protected region. Thus is can happen that the value of
orig_ifinfo->router changed in the meantime and thus the reference counter
of the wrong router gets reduced after the spinlock protected region.

Just rcu_dereferencing the value of orig_ifinfo->router inside the spinlock
protected region (which also set the new pointer) is enough to get the
correct old router object.

Fixes: e1a5382f978b ("batman-adv: Make orig_node->router an rcu protected pointer")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: s/orig_ifinfo/orig_node/]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
batman-adv: Check skb size before using encapsulated ETH+VLAN header 2016-06-15T20:28:12+00:00 Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org 2016-02-26T16:56:13+00:00 983edac6e3cfc2926812713b43408826ab88af95 commit c78296665c3d81f040117432ab9e1cb125521b0c upstream. The encapsulated ethernet and VLAN header may be outside the received ethernet frame. Thus the skb buffer size has to be checked before it can be parsed to find out if it encapsulates another batman-adv packet. Fixes: 420193573f11 ("batman-adv: softif bridge loop avoidance") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org> Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit c78296665c3d81f040117432ab9e1cb125521b0c upstream.

The encapsulated ethernet and VLAN header may be outside the received
ethernet frame. Thus the skb buffer size has to be checked before it can be
parsed to find out if it encapsulates another batman-adv packet.

Fixes: 420193573f11 ("batman-adv: softif bridge loop avoidance")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
nl80211: check netlink protocol in socket release notification 2016-06-15T20:28:11+00:00 Dmitry Ivanov dmitrijs.ivanovs@ubnt.com 2016-04-06T14:23:18+00:00 709aac4092831da73ff0f4578244861479347576 commit 8f815cdde3e550e10c2736990d791f60c2ce43eb upstream. A non-privileged user can create a netlink socket with the same port_id as used by an existing open nl80211 netlink socket (e.g. as used by a hostapd process) with a different protocol number. Closing this socket will then lead to the notification going to nl80211's socket release notification handler, and possibly cause an action such as removing a virtual interface. Fix this issue by checking that the netlink protocol is NETLINK_GENERIC. Since generic netlink has no notifier chain of its own, we can't fix the problem more generically. Fixes: 026331c4d9b5 ("cfg80211/mac80211: allow registering for and sending action frames") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Ivanov <dima@ubnt.com> [rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 8f815cdde3e550e10c2736990d791f60c2ce43eb upstream.

A non-privileged user can create a netlink socket with the same port_id as
used by an existing open nl80211 netlink socket (e.g. as used by a hostapd
process) with a different protocol number.

Closing this socket will then lead to the notification going to nl80211's
socket release notification handler, and possibly cause an action such as
removing a virtual interface.

Fix this issue by checking that the netlink protocol is NETLINK_GENERIC.
Since generic netlink has no notifier chain of its own, we can't fix the
problem more generically.

Fixes: 026331c4d9b5 ("cfg80211/mac80211: allow registering for and sending action frames")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Ivanov <dima@ubnt.com>
[rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Revert "ax25: add link layer header validation function" 2016-06-15T20:28:09+00:00 Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk 2016-05-01T15:59:44+00:00 b5f9a2bbb2cc94ebdf9ecaa8bf87bcded5415d91 This reverts commit 0954b59d9f4b2dcc59f28d1f64c3a21062a64372, which was commit ea47781c26510e5d97f80f9aceafe9065bd5e3aa upstream. It is pointless unless af_packet calls the new function. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
This reverts commit 0954b59d9f4b2dcc59f28d1f64c3a21062a64372, which was
commit ea47781c26510e5d97f80f9aceafe9065bd5e3aa upstream.  It is
pointless unless af_packet calls the new function.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper 2016-04-30T22:05:28+00:00 Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de 2016-03-22T17:02:52+00:00 985970fd0118576d9853d1d1a9c4309ae4d248bb commit 54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309 upstream. Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called -- the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP. However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies. It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching. However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches (no -m args). The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule. Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309 upstream.

Ben Hawkes says:

 In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
 is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
 next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
 counter value at the supplied offset.

Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.

However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.

However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).

The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.

Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.

Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>