<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net, branch v3.16.80</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net/sched: act_pedit: fix WARN() in the traffic path</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:59:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davide Caratti</name>
<email>dcaratti@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-19T22:47:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d1dab3b8ec630c032e629da5342d0c6a6b60d58e'/>
<id>d1dab3b8ec630c032e629da5342d0c6a6b60d58e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f67169fef8dbcc1ac6a6a109ecaad0d3b259002c upstream.

when configuring act_pedit rules, the number of keys is validated only on
addition of a new entry. This is not sufficient to avoid hitting a WARN()
in the traffic path: for example, it is possible to replace a valid entry
with a new one having 0 extended keys, thus causing splats in dmesg like:

 pedit BUG: index 42
 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 4054 at net/sched/act_pedit.c:410 tcf_pedit_act+0xc84/0x1200 [act_pedit]
 [...]
 RIP: 0010:tcf_pedit_act+0xc84/0x1200 [act_pedit]
 Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ac 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 48 c7 c7 a0 c4 e4 c0 8b 70 18 e8 1c 30 95 ea &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 a0 fa ff ff e8 00 03 f5 ea e9 14 f4 ff ff 48 89 58 40 e9
 RSP: 0018:ffff888077c9f320 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffac2983a2
 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff888053927bec
 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed100a726209 R09: ffffed100a726209
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100a726208 R12: ffff88804beea780
 R13: ffff888079a77400 R14: ffff88804beea780 R15: ffff888027ab2000
 FS:  00007fdeec9bd740(0000) GS:ffff888053900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007ffdb3dfd000 CR3: 000000004adb4006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
 Call Trace:
  tcf_action_exec+0x105/0x3f0
  tcf_classify+0xf2/0x410
  __dev_queue_xmit+0xcbf/0x2ae0
  ip_finish_output2+0x711/0x1fb0
  ip_output+0x1bf/0x4b0
  ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
  raw_sendmsg+0x180c/0x2430
  sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
  __sys_sendto+0x257/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
 RIP: 0033:0x7fdeeb72e993
 Code: 48 8b 0d e0 74 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 0d d6 2c 00 00 75 13 49 89 ca b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 34 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 4b cc 00 00 48 89 04 24
 RSP: 002b:00007ffdb3de8a18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c81972b700 RCX: 00007fdeeb72e993
 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055c81972b700 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 00007ffdb3dea130 R08: 000055c819728510 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040
 R13: 000055c81972b6c0 R14: 000055c81972969c R15: 0000000000000080

Fix this moving the check on 'nkeys' earlier in tcf_pedit_init(), so that
attempts to install rules having 0 keys are always rejected with -EINVAL.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti &lt;dcaratti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Drop change in tcf_pedit_keys_ex_parse()
 - netlink doesn't support error messages
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f67169fef8dbcc1ac6a6a109ecaad0d3b259002c upstream.

when configuring act_pedit rules, the number of keys is validated only on
addition of a new entry. This is not sufficient to avoid hitting a WARN()
in the traffic path: for example, it is possible to replace a valid entry
with a new one having 0 extended keys, thus causing splats in dmesg like:

 pedit BUG: index 42
 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 4054 at net/sched/act_pedit.c:410 tcf_pedit_act+0xc84/0x1200 [act_pedit]
 [...]
 RIP: 0010:tcf_pedit_act+0xc84/0x1200 [act_pedit]
 Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ac 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 48 c7 c7 a0 c4 e4 c0 8b 70 18 e8 1c 30 95 ea &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 a0 fa ff ff e8 00 03 f5 ea e9 14 f4 ff ff 48 89 58 40 e9
 RSP: 0018:ffff888077c9f320 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffac2983a2
 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff888053927bec
 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed100a726209 R09: ffffed100a726209
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100a726208 R12: ffff88804beea780
 R13: ffff888079a77400 R14: ffff88804beea780 R15: ffff888027ab2000
 FS:  00007fdeec9bd740(0000) GS:ffff888053900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007ffdb3dfd000 CR3: 000000004adb4006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
 Call Trace:
  tcf_action_exec+0x105/0x3f0
  tcf_classify+0xf2/0x410
  __dev_queue_xmit+0xcbf/0x2ae0
  ip_finish_output2+0x711/0x1fb0
  ip_output+0x1bf/0x4b0
  ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
  raw_sendmsg+0x180c/0x2430
  sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
  __sys_sendto+0x257/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
 RIP: 0033:0x7fdeeb72e993
 Code: 48 8b 0d e0 74 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 0d d6 2c 00 00 75 13 49 89 ca b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 34 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 4b cc 00 00 48 89 04 24
 RSP: 002b:00007ffdb3de8a18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c81972b700 RCX: 00007fdeeb72e993
 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055c81972b700 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 00007ffdb3dea130 R08: 000055c819728510 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040
 R13: 000055c81972b6c0 R14: 000055c81972969c R15: 0000000000000080

Fix this moving the check on 'nkeys' earlier in tcf_pedit_init(), so that
attempts to install rules having 0 keys are always rejected with -EINVAL.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti &lt;dcaratti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Drop change in tcf_pedit_keys_ex_parse()
 - netlink doesn't support error messages
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ipset: Fix an error code in ip_set_sockfn_get()</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:58:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-24T14:49:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2797aec2a5555fb8ea46d3358f8632a87e6c1251'/>
<id>2797aec2a5555fb8ea46d3358f8632a87e6c1251</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 30b7244d79651460ff114ba8f7987ed94c86b99a upstream.

The copy_to_user() function returns the number of bytes remaining to be
copied.  In this code, that positive return is checked at the end of the
function and we return zero/success.  What we should do instead is
return -EFAULT.

Fixes: a7b4f989a629 ("netfilter: ipset: IP set core support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik &lt;kadlec@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 30b7244d79651460ff114ba8f7987ed94c86b99a upstream.

The copy_to_user() function returns the number of bytes remaining to be
copied.  In this code, that positive return is checked at the end of the
function and we return zero/success.  What we should do instead is
return -EFAULT.

Fixes: a7b4f989a629 ("netfilter: ipset: IP set core support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik &lt;kadlec@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp: do not leak jiffies on the wire</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:58:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T15:57:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0f1cd1a7518eb06efd2c0473eeac70680971a725'/>
<id>0f1cd1a7518eb06efd2c0473eeac70680971a725</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3d1e5039f5f87a8731202ceca08764ee7cb010d3 upstream.

For some reason I missed the case of DCCP passive
flows in my previous patch.

Fixes: a904a0693c18 ("inet: stop leaking jiffies on the wire")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Thiemo Nagel &lt;tnagel@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3d1e5039f5f87a8731202ceca08764ee7cb010d3 upstream.

For some reason I missed the case of DCCP passive
flows in my previous patch.

Fixes: a904a0693c18 ("inet: stop leaking jiffies on the wire")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Thiemo Nagel &lt;tnagel@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: stop leaking jiffies on the wire</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:58:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-01T17:32:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c1fb8e44ba97f8589b7fc5137e4b45561a27dcc5'/>
<id>c1fb8e44ba97f8589b7fc5137e4b45561a27dcc5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a904a0693c189691eeee64f6c6b188bd7dc244e9 upstream.

Historically linux tried to stick to RFC 791, 1122, 2003
for IPv4 ID field generation.

RFC 6864 made clear that no matter how hard we try,
we can not ensure unicity of IP ID within maximum
lifetime for all datagrams with a given source
address/destination address/protocol tuple.

Linux uses a per socket inet generator (inet_id), initialized
at connection startup with a XOR of 'jiffies' and other
fields that appear clear on the wire.

Thiemo Nagel pointed that this strategy is a privacy
concern as this provides 16 bits of entropy to fingerprint
devices.

Let's switch to a random starting point, this is just as
good as far as RFC 6864 is concerned and does not leak
anything critical.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Thiemo Nagel &lt;tnagel@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: drop changes in chelsio]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a904a0693c189691eeee64f6c6b188bd7dc244e9 upstream.

Historically linux tried to stick to RFC 791, 1122, 2003
for IPv4 ID field generation.

RFC 6864 made clear that no matter how hard we try,
we can not ensure unicity of IP ID within maximum
lifetime for all datagrams with a given source
address/destination address/protocol tuple.

Linux uses a per socket inet generator (inet_id), initialized
at connection startup with a XOR of 'jiffies' and other
fields that appear clear on the wire.

Thiemo Nagel pointed that this strategy is a privacy
concern as this provides 16 bits of entropy to fingerprint
devices.

Let's switch to a random starting point, this is just as
good as far as RFC 6864 is concerned and does not leak
anything critical.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Thiemo Nagel &lt;tnagel@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: drop changes in chelsio]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nl80211: fix validation of mesh path nexthop</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:58:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Markus Theil</name>
<email>markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-29T09:30:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6c69ce12bc4caf2a3175e86a0393438e7d5380ea'/>
<id>6c69ce12bc4caf2a3175e86a0393438e7d5380ea</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1fab1b89e2e8f01204a9c05a39fd0b6411a48593 upstream.

Mesh path nexthop should be a ethernet address, but current validation
checks against 4 byte integers.

Fixes: 2ec600d672e74 ("nl80211/cfg80211: support for mesh, sta dumping")
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil &lt;markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191029093003.10355-1-markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1fab1b89e2e8f01204a9c05a39fd0b6411a48593 upstream.

Mesh path nexthop should be a ethernet address, but current validation
checks against 4 byte integers.

Fixes: 2ec600d672e74 ("nl80211/cfg80211: support for mesh, sta dumping")
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil &lt;markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191029093003.10355-1-markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: move old_secure_tcp into struct netns_ipvs</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:58:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T16:53:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74b5e1077f6dbc4cf0e1bead551d3799dc6fba0c'/>
<id>74b5e1077f6dbc4cf0e1bead551d3799dc6fba0c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c24b75e0f9239e78105f81c5f03a751641eb07ef upstream.

syzbot reported the following issue :

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in update_defense_level / update_defense_level

read to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 3006 on cpu 1:
 update_defense_level+0x621/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:177
 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

write to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 7333 on cpu 0:
 update_defense_level+0xa62/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:205
 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 7333 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events defense_work_handler

Indeed, old_secure_tcp is currently a static variable, while it
needs to be a per netns variable.

Fixes: a0840e2e165a ("IPVS: netns, ip_vs_ctl local vars moved to ipvs struct.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c24b75e0f9239e78105f81c5f03a751641eb07ef upstream.

syzbot reported the following issue :

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in update_defense_level / update_defense_level

read to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 3006 on cpu 1:
 update_defense_level+0x621/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:177
 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

write to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 7333 on cpu 0:
 update_defense_level+0xa62/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:205
 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 7333 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events defense_work_handler

Indeed, old_secure_tcp is currently a static variable, while it
needs to be a per netns variable.

Fixes: a0840e2e165a ("IPVS: netns, ip_vs_ctl local vars moved to ipvs struct.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: netem: correct the parent's backlog when corrupted packet was dropped</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:58:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>jakub.kicinski@netronome.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-18T16:16:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=369851be561fe115c026df020e6beb2bc01f27db'/>
<id>369851be561fe115c026df020e6beb2bc01f27db</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e0ad032e144731a5928f2d75e91c2064ba1a764c upstream.

If packet corruption failed we jump to finish_segs and return
NET_XMIT_SUCCESS. Seeing success will make the parent qdisc
increment its backlog, that's incorrect - we need to return
NET_XMIT_DROP.

Fixes: 6071bd1aa13e ("netem: Segment GSO packets on enqueue")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e0ad032e144731a5928f2d75e91c2064ba1a764c upstream.

If packet corruption failed we jump to finish_segs and return
NET_XMIT_SUCCESS. Seeing success will make the parent qdisc
increment its backlog, that's incorrect - we need to return
NET_XMIT_DROP.

Fixes: 6071bd1aa13e ("netem: Segment GSO packets on enqueue")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: avoid potential infinite loop in tc_ctl_action()</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:58:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-14T18:22:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=85e4c4176d83e7a8685d3e8626546ce042f60cdc'/>
<id>85e4c4176d83e7a8685d3e8626546ce042f60cdc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 39f13ea2f61b439ebe0060393e9c39925c9ee28c upstream.

tc_ctl_action() has the ability to loop forever if tcf_action_add()
returns -EAGAIN.

This special case has been done in case a module needed to be loaded,
but it turns out that tcf_add_notify() could also return -EAGAIN
if the socket sk_rcvbuf limit is hit.

We need to separate the two cases, and only loop for the module
loading case.

While we are at it, add a limit of 10 attempts since unbounded
loops are always scary.

syzbot repro was something like :

socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW|SOCK_NONBLOCK, NETLINK_ROUTE) = 3
write(3, ..., 38) = 38
setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, [0], 4) = 0
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{..., 388}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0x10}, ...)

NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 1054 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold+0x70/0xb2 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:101
 nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x23b/0x28b lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
 arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/apic/hw_nmi.c:38
 trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:146 [inline]
 check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:205 [inline]
 watchdog+0x9d0/0xef0 kernel/hung_task.c:289
 kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 8859 Comm: syz-executor910 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:751 [inline]
RIP: 0010:lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x1df/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3453
Code: 5c 08 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 48 c7 c0 58 1d f3 88 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 10 00 0f 85 d3 00 00 00 &lt;48&gt; 83 3d 21 9e 99 07 00 0f 84 b9 00 00 00 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 f6
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a6f3f1b8 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 1ffffffff11e63ab RBX: ffff88808c9c6080 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88808c9c6914
RBP: ffff8880a6f3f1d0 R08: ffff88808c9c6080 R09: fffffbfff16be5d1
R10: fffffbfff16be5d0 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffffff8746591f
R13: ffff88808c9c6080 R14: ffffffff8746591f R15: 0000000000000003
FS:  00000000011e4880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000000a8920000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 trace_hardirqs_off+0x62/0x240 kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:45
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6f/0xcd kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
 __wake_up_common_lock+0xc8/0x150 kernel/sched/wait.c:122
 __wake_up+0xe/0x10 kernel/sched/wait.c:142
 netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:466 [inline]
 netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:463 [inline]
 netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x705/0xb80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1514
 netlink_broadcast+0x3a/0x50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1534
 rtnetlink_send+0xdd/0x110 net/core/rtnetlink.c:714
 tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:1343 [inline]
 tcf_action_add+0x243/0x370 net/sched/act_api.c:1362
 tc_ctl_action+0x3b5/0x4bc net/sched/act_api.c:1410
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x463/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5386
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5404
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
 netlink_sendmsg+0x8a5/0xd60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2311
 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2356
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2365 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2363 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2363
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440939

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+cf0adbb9c28c8866c788@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 39f13ea2f61b439ebe0060393e9c39925c9ee28c upstream.

tc_ctl_action() has the ability to loop forever if tcf_action_add()
returns -EAGAIN.

This special case has been done in case a module needed to be loaded,
but it turns out that tcf_add_notify() could also return -EAGAIN
if the socket sk_rcvbuf limit is hit.

We need to separate the two cases, and only loop for the module
loading case.

While we are at it, add a limit of 10 attempts since unbounded
loops are always scary.

syzbot repro was something like :

socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW|SOCK_NONBLOCK, NETLINK_ROUTE) = 3
write(3, ..., 38) = 38
setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, [0], 4) = 0
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{..., 388}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0x10}, ...)

NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 1054 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold+0x70/0xb2 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:101
 nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x23b/0x28b lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
 arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/apic/hw_nmi.c:38
 trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:146 [inline]
 check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:205 [inline]
 watchdog+0x9d0/0xef0 kernel/hung_task.c:289
 kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 8859 Comm: syz-executor910 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:751 [inline]
RIP: 0010:lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x1df/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3453
Code: 5c 08 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 48 c7 c0 58 1d f3 88 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 10 00 0f 85 d3 00 00 00 &lt;48&gt; 83 3d 21 9e 99 07 00 0f 84 b9 00 00 00 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 f6
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a6f3f1b8 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 1ffffffff11e63ab RBX: ffff88808c9c6080 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88808c9c6914
RBP: ffff8880a6f3f1d0 R08: ffff88808c9c6080 R09: fffffbfff16be5d1
R10: fffffbfff16be5d0 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffffff8746591f
R13: ffff88808c9c6080 R14: ffffffff8746591f R15: 0000000000000003
FS:  00000000011e4880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000000a8920000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 trace_hardirqs_off+0x62/0x240 kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:45
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6f/0xcd kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
 __wake_up_common_lock+0xc8/0x150 kernel/sched/wait.c:122
 __wake_up+0xe/0x10 kernel/sched/wait.c:142
 netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:466 [inline]
 netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:463 [inline]
 netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x705/0xb80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1514
 netlink_broadcast+0x3a/0x50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1534
 rtnetlink_send+0xdd/0x110 net/core/rtnetlink.c:714
 tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:1343 [inline]
 tcf_action_add+0x243/0x370 net/sched/act_api.c:1362
 tc_ctl_action+0x3b5/0x4bc net/sched/act_api.c:1410
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x463/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5386
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5404
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
 netlink_sendmsg+0x8a5/0xd60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2311
 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2356
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2365 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2363 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2363
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440939

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+cf0adbb9c28c8866c788@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>batman-adv: Avoid free/alloc race when handling OGM buffer</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:58:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sven Eckelmann</name>
<email>sven@narfation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-03T15:02:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6f2088aaa4bf8df9c35c92dbc9fe381f49b8f62a'/>
<id>6f2088aaa4bf8df9c35c92dbc9fe381f49b8f62a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 40e220b4218bb3d278e5e8cc04ccdfd1c7ff8307 upstream.

Each slave interface of an B.A.T.M.A.N. IV virtual interface has an OGM
packet buffer which is initialized using data from netdevice notifier and
other rtnetlink related hooks. It is sent regularly via various slave
interfaces of the batadv virtual interface and in this process also
modified (realloced) to integrate additional state information via TVLV
containers.

It must be avoided that the worker item is executed without a common lock
with the netdevice notifier/rtnetlink helpers. Otherwise it can either
happen that half modified/freed data is sent out or functions modifying the
OGM buffer try to access already freed memory regions.

Reported-by: syzbot+0cc629f19ccb8534935b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c6c8fea29769 ("net: Add batman-adv meshing protocol")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich &lt;sw@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Don't add status check in batadv_iv_ogm_schedule()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 40e220b4218bb3d278e5e8cc04ccdfd1c7ff8307 upstream.

Each slave interface of an B.A.T.M.A.N. IV virtual interface has an OGM
packet buffer which is initialized using data from netdevice notifier and
other rtnetlink related hooks. It is sent regularly via various slave
interfaces of the batadv virtual interface and in this process also
modified (realloced) to integrate additional state information via TVLV
containers.

It must be avoided that the worker item is executed without a common lock
with the netdevice notifier/rtnetlink helpers. Otherwise it can either
happen that half modified/freed data is sent out or functions modifying the
OGM buffer try to access already freed memory regions.

Reported-by: syzbot+0cc629f19ccb8534935b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c6c8fea29769 ("net: Add batman-adv meshing protocol")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich &lt;sw@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Don't add status check in batadv_iv_ogm_schedule()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>batman-adv: iv_ogm_iface_enable, direct return values</title>
<updated>2019-12-19T15:58:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Markus Pargmann</name>
<email>mpa@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-26T11:41:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bc1e75e2f759973eb81dd09757952f1a2f95e607'/>
<id>bc1e75e2f759973eb81dd09757952f1a2f95e607</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42d9f2cbd42e1ba137584da8305cf6f68b84f39d upstream.

Directly return error values. No need to use a return variable.

Signed-off-by: Markus Pargmann &lt;mpa@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner &lt;mareklindner@neomailbox.ch&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of commit 40e220b4218b
 "batman-adv: Avoid free/alloc race when handling OGM buffer"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 42d9f2cbd42e1ba137584da8305cf6f68b84f39d upstream.

Directly return error values. No need to use a return variable.

Signed-off-by: Markus Pargmann &lt;mpa@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner &lt;mareklindner@neomailbox.ch&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of commit 40e220b4218b
 "batman-adv: Avoid free/alloc race when handling OGM buffer"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
