linux-stable.git/net, branch v3.14.78

mac80211: fix purging multicast PS buffer queue

2016-09-07T06:30:00+00:00

commit 6b07d9ca9b5363dda959b9582a3fc9c0b89ef3b5 upstream.

The code currently assumes that buffered multicast PS frames don't have
a pending ACK frame for tx status reporting.
However, hostapd sends a broadcast deauth frame on teardown for which tx
status is requested. This can lead to the "Have pending ack frames"
warning on module reload.
Fix this by using ieee80211_free_txskb/ieee80211_purge_tx_queue.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau 
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlabel: add address family checks to netlbl_{sock,req}_delattr()

2016-08-20T09:53:21+00:00

commit 0e0e36774081534783aa8eeb9f6fbddf98d3c061 upstream.

It seems risky to always rely on the caller to ensure the socket's
address family is correct before passing it to the NetLabel kAPI,
especially since we see at least one LSM which didn't. Add address
family checks to the *_delattr() functions to help prevent future
problems.

Reported-by: Maninder Singh 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffers

2016-08-20T09:53:21+00:00

commit 197c949e7798fbf28cfadc69d9ca0c2abbf93191 upstream.

Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.

In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
                                 msg->msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.

This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.

For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.

This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques 
Signed-off-by: Charles (Chas) Williams 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: Fix l2cap_sock_setsockopt() with optname BT_RCVMTU

2016-08-20T09:53:20+00:00

commit 23bc6ab0a0912146fd674a0becc758c3162baabc upstream.

When we retrieve imtu value from userspace we should use 16 bit pointer
cast instead of 32 as it's defined that way in headers. Fixes setsockopt
calls on big-endian platforms.

Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński 
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: make challenge acks faster

2016-08-20T09:53:19+00:00

When backporting upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd ("tcp: make challenge acks
less predictable") I negelected to use the correct ACCESS* type macros.
This fixes that up to hopefully speed things up a bit more.

Thanks to Chas Wiliams for the 3.10 backport which reminded me of this.

Cc: Yue Cao 
Cc: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Yuchung Cheng 
Cc: Neal Cardwell 
Cc: Neal Cardwell 
Cc: Yuchung Cheng 
Cc: David S. Miller 
Cc: Chas Williams 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: make challenge acks less predictable

2016-08-16T07:29:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 ]

Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.

This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.

Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.

Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.

v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.

Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Yuchung Cheng 
Cc: Neal Cardwell 
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell 
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tcp: consider recv buf for the initial window scale

2016-08-16T07:29:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit f626300a3e776ccc9671b0dd94698fb3aa315966 ]

tcp_select_initial_window() intends to advertise a window
scaling for the maximum possible window size. To do so,
it considers the maximum of net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2] and
net.core.rmem_max as the only possible upper-bounds.
However, users with CAP_NET_ADMIN can use SO_RCVBUFFORCE
to set the socket's receive buffer size to values
larger than net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2] and net.core.rmem_max.
Thus, SO_RCVBUFFORCE is effectively ignored by
tcp_select_initial_window().

To fix this, consider the maximum of net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2],
net.core.rmem_max and socket's initial buffer space.

Fixes: b0573dea1fb3 ("[NET]: Introduce SO_{SND,RCV}BUFFORCE socket options")
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Suggested-by: Neal Cardwell 
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/irda: fix NULL pointer dereference on memory allocation failure

2016-08-16T07:29:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit d3e6952cfb7ba5f4bfa29d4803ba91f96ce1204d ]

I ran into this:

    kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
    kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
    general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
    CPU: 2 PID: 2012 Comm: trinity-c3 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ #19
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
    task: ffff8800b745f2c0 ti: ffff880111740000 task.ti: ffff880111740000
    RIP: 0010:[]  [] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
    RSP: 0018:ffff880111747bb8  EFLAGS: 00010286
    RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000069dd8358
    RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 0000000000000048
    RBP: ffff880111747c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000069dd8358 R11: 1ffffffff0759723 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: ffff88011a7e4780 R14: 0000000000000027 R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007fc738404700(0000) GS:ffff88011af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00007fc737fdfb10 CR3: 0000000118087000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Stack:
     0000000000000200 ffff880111747bd8 ffffffff810ee611 ffff880119f1f220
     ffff880119f1f4f8 ffff880119f1f4f0 ffff88011a7e4780 ffff880119f1f232
     ffff880119f1f220 ffff880111747d58 ffffffff82bca542 0000000000000000
    Call Trace:
     [] irda_connect+0x562/0x1190
     [] SYSC_connect+0x202/0x2a0
     [] SyS_connect+0x9/0x10
     [] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410
     [] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    Code: 41 89 ca 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 d7 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 48 48 89 fa 41 89 f6 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 4c 8b 65 10 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 84 c0 0f 8e 4c 04 00 00 80 7b 48 00 74
    RIP  [] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
     RSP 
    ---[ end trace 4cda2588bc055b30 ]---

The problem is that irda_open_tsap() can fail and leave self->tsap = NULL,
and then irttp_connect_request() almost immediately dereferences it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event

2016-08-16T07:29:02+00:00

commit 635682a14427d241bab7bbdeebb48a7d7b91638e upstream.

A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake.  Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.

Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.

 BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
 ...
 RIP: 0010:[]  [] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
 RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20  EFLAGS: 00000206
 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
 RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
 R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
 CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
 Stack:
 ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
  0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
  ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
 Call Trace:
 
 [] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
 [] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
 [] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
 [] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
 [] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
 [] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
 ...

With lockdep debugging:

 =====================================
 [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
 -------------------------------------
 CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
 [] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
 but there are no more locks to release!

 other info that might help us debug this:
 2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
 #0:  (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
 #1:  (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]

Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.

Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques 
(cherry picked from commit 013dd9e038723bbd2aa67be51847384b75be8253)
Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <3chas3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: apply new_state before new_up_client on incrementals

2016-08-10T08:21:04+00:00

commit 930c532869774ebf8af9efe9484c597f896a7d46 upstream.

Currently, osd_weight and osd_state fields are updated in the encoding
order.  This is wrong, because an incremental map may look like e.g.

    new_up_client: { osd=6, addr=... } # set osd_state and addr
    new_state: { osd=6, xorstate=EXISTS } # clear osd_state

Suppose osd6's current osd_state is EXISTS (i.e. osd6 is down).  After
applying new_up_client, osd_state is changed to EXISTS | UP.  Carrying
on with the new_state update, we flip EXISTS and leave osd6 in a weird
"!EXISTS but UP" state.  A non-existent OSD is considered down by the
mapping code

2087    for (i = 0; i < pg->pg_temp.len; i++) {
2088            if (ceph_osd_is_down(osdmap, pg->pg_temp.osds[i])) {
2089                    if (ceph_can_shift_osds(pi))
2090                            continue;
2091
2092                    temp->osds[temp->size++] = CRUSH_ITEM_NONE;

and so requests get directed to the second OSD in the set instead of
the first, resulting in OSD-side errors like:

[WRN] : client.4239 192.168.122.21:0/2444980242 misdirected client.4239.1:2827 pg 2.5df899f2 to osd.4 not [1,4,6] in e680/680

and hung rbds on the client:

[  493.566367] rbd: rbd0: write 400000 at 11cc00000 (0)
[  493.566805] rbd: rbd0:   result -6 xferred 400000
[  493.567011] blk_update_request: I/O error, dev rbd0, sector 9330688

The fix is to decouple application from the decoding and:
- apply new_weight first
- apply new_state before new_up_client
- twiddle osd_state flags if marking in
- clear out some of the state if osd is destroyed

Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/14901

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov 
Reviewed-by: Josh Durgin 
[idryomov@gmail.com: backport to 3.10-3.14: strip primary-affinity]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman