linux-stable.git/net, branch v3.14.63 Linux kernel stable tree sunrpc/cache: fix off-by-one in qword_get() 2016-03-03T23:06:53+00:00 Stefan Hajnoczi stefanha@redhat.com 2016-02-18T18:55:54+00:00 0fbc074e6ff1393c43245bae78bd367173be4903 commit b7052cd7bcf3c1478796e93e3dff2b44c9e82943 upstream. The qword_get() function NUL-terminates its output buffer. If the input string is in hex format \xXXXX... and the same length as the output buffer, there is an off-by-one: int qword_get(char **bpp, char *dest, int bufsize) { ... while (len < bufsize) { ... *dest++ = (h << 4) | l; len++; } ... *dest = '\0'; return len; } This patch ensures the NUL terminator doesn't fall outside the output buffer. Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit b7052cd7bcf3c1478796e93e3dff2b44c9e82943 upstream.

The qword_get() function NUL-terminates its output buffer.  If the input
string is in hex format \xXXXX... and the same length as the output
buffer, there is an off-by-one:

  int qword_get(char **bpp, char *dest, int bufsize)
  {
      ...
      while (len < bufsize) {
          ...
          *dest++ = (h << 4) | l;
          len++;
      }
      ...
      *dest = '\0';
      return len;
  }

This patch ensures the NUL terminator doesn't fall outside the output
buffer.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
rfkill: fix rfkill_fop_read wait_event usage 2016-03-03T23:06:53+00:00 Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com 2016-01-26T10:29:03+00:00 24ff5178f249a562174cfc339ac4439a436dab04 commit 6736fde9672ff6717ac576e9bba2fd5f3dfec822 upstream. The code within wait_event_interruptible() is called with !TASK_RUNNING, so mustn't call any functions that can sleep, like mutex_lock(). Since we re-check the list_empty() in a loop after the wait, it's safe to simply use list_empty() without locking. This bug has existed forever, but was only discovered now because all userspace implementations, including the default 'rfkill' tool, use poll() or select() to get a readable fd before attempting to read. Fixes: c64fb01627e24 ("rfkill: create useful userspace interface") Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 6736fde9672ff6717ac576e9bba2fd5f3dfec822 upstream.

The code within wait_event_interruptible() is called with
!TASK_RUNNING, so mustn't call any functions that can sleep,
like mutex_lock().

Since we re-check the list_empty() in a loop after the wait,
it's safe to simply use list_empty() without locking.

This bug has existed forever, but was only discovered now
because all userspace implementations, including the default
'rfkill' tool, use poll() or select() to get a readable fd
before attempting to read.

Fixes: c64fb01627e24 ("rfkill: create useful userspace interface")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
libceph: don't bail early from try_read() when skipping a message 2016-03-03T23:06:53+00:00 Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com 2016-02-17T19:04:08+00:00 739ed1f0c0d26230e686fa12a1b1601b27471723 commit e7a88e82fe380459b864e05b372638aeacb0f52d upstream. The contract between try_read() and try_write() is that when called each processes as much data as possible. When instructed by osd_client to skip a message, try_read() is violating this contract by returning after receiving and discarding a single message instead of checking for more. try_write() then gets a chance to write out more requests, generating more replies/skips for try_read() to handle, forcing the messenger into a starvation loop. Reported-by: Varada Kari <Varada.Kari@sandisk.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Tested-by: Varada Kari <Varada.Kari@sandisk.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit e7a88e82fe380459b864e05b372638aeacb0f52d upstream.

The contract between try_read() and try_write() is that when called
each processes as much data as possible.  When instructed by osd_client
to skip a message, try_read() is violating this contract by returning
after receiving and discarding a single message instead of checking for
more.  try_write() then gets a chance to write out more requests,
generating more replies/skips for try_read() to handle, forcing the
messenger into a starvation loop.

Reported-by: Varada Kari <Varada.Kari@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Varada Kari <Varada.Kari@sandisk.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
rfkill: copy the name into the rfkill struct 2016-03-03T23:06:50+00:00 Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com 2015-12-10T09:37:51+00:00 b25bfd9272838d020da06df12bd0d21c0302a9f9 commit b7bb110008607a915298bf0f47d25886ecb94477 upstream. Some users of rfkill, like NFC and cfg80211, use a dynamic name when allocating rfkill, in those cases dev_name(). Therefore, the pointer passed to rfkill_alloc() might not be valid forever, I specifically found the case that the rfkill name was quite obviously an invalid pointer (or at least garbage) when the wiphy had been renamed. Fix this by making a copy of the rfkill name in rfkill_alloc(). Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit b7bb110008607a915298bf0f47d25886ecb94477 upstream.

Some users of rfkill, like NFC and cfg80211, use a dynamic name when
allocating rfkill, in those cases dev_name(). Therefore, the pointer
passed to rfkill_alloc() might not be valid forever, I specifically
found the case that the rfkill name was quite obviously an invalid
pointer (or at least garbage) when the wiphy had been renamed.

Fix this by making a copy of the rfkill name in rfkill_alloc().

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket 2016-03-03T23:06:49+00:00 Quentin Casasnovas quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com 2015-11-24T22:13:21+00:00 ef8d4d93d242c0153d00ab782a18befdbef35dcc commit 8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a upstream. Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create(). Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if you're interested. I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer with this patch, whereas I could without. Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937: 74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection") Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a upstream.

Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket.  The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket.  This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().

Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.

I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.

Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:

  74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")

Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mac80211: mesh: fix call_rcu() usage 2016-03-03T23:06:49+00:00 Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com 2015-11-17T13:25:21+00:00 1e65a06366da51b0b5c5b2c77804be1529406842 commit c2e703a55245bfff3db53b1f7cbe59f1ee8a4339 upstream. When using call_rcu(), the called function may be delayed quite significantly, and without a matching rcu_barrier() there's no way to be sure it has finished. Therefore, global state that could be gone/freed/reused should never be touched in the callback. Fix this in mesh by moving the atomic_dec() into the caller; that's not really a problem since we already unlinked the path and it will be destroyed anyway. This fixes a crash Jouni observed when running certain tests in a certain order, in which the mesh interface was torn down, the memory reused for a function pointer (work struct) and running that then crashed since the pointer had been decremented by 1, resulting in an invalid instruction byte stream. Fixes: eb2b9311fd00 ("mac80211: mesh path table implementation") Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c2e703a55245bfff3db53b1f7cbe59f1ee8a4339 upstream.

When using call_rcu(), the called function may be delayed quite
significantly, and without a matching rcu_barrier() there's no
way to be sure it has finished.
Therefore, global state that could be gone/freed/reused should
never be touched in the callback.

Fix this in mesh by moving the atomic_dec() into the caller;
that's not really a problem since we already unlinked the path
and it will be destroyed anyway.

This fixes a crash Jouni observed when running certain tests in
a certain order, in which the mesh interface was torn down, the
memory reused for a function pointer (work struct) and running
that then crashed since the pointer had been decremented by 1,
resulting in an invalid instruction byte stream.

Fixes: eb2b9311fd00 ("mac80211: mesh path table implementation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct 2016-03-03T23:06:47+00:00 Hannes Frederic Sowa hannes@stressinduktion.org 2016-02-03T01:11:03+00:00 780f6783bddda8603d919bba5707034714dbee71 commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 upstream. The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should be credited. To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds. Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets") Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 upstream.

The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.

To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.

Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection 2016-03-03T23:06:47+00:00 Sasha Levin sasha.levin@oracle.com 2015-09-08T14:53:40+00:00 d596f66da6e1763fed39c8e76923a3a419d6f001 commit 74e98eb085889b0d2d4908f59f6e00026063014f upstream. There was no verification that an underlying transport exists when creating a connection, this would cause dereferencing a NULL ptr. It might happen on sockets that weren't properly bound before attempting to send a message, which will cause a NULL ptr deref: [135546.047719] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessgeneral protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [135546.051270] Modules linked in: [135546.051781] CPU: 4 PID: 15650 Comm: trinity-c4 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150902-sasha-00041-gbaa1222-dirty #2527 [135546.053217] task: ffff8800835bc000 ti: ffff8800bc708000 task.ti: ffff8800bc708000 [135546.054291] RIP: __rds_conn_create (net/rds/connection.c:194) [135546.055666] RSP: 0018:ffff8800bc70fab0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [135546.056457] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000f2c RCX: ffff8800835bc000 [135546.057494] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff8800835bccd8 RDI: 0000000000000038 [135546.058530] RBP: ffff8800bc70fb18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [135546.059556] R10: ffffed014d7a3a23 R11: ffffed014d7a3a21 R12: 0000000000000000 [135546.060614] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8801ec3d0000 R15: 0000000000000000 [135546.061668] FS: 00007faad4ffb700(0000) GS:ffff880252000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [135546.062836] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [135546.063682] CR2: 000000000000846a CR3: 000000009d137000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [135546.064723] Stack: [135546.065048] ffffffffafe2055c ffffffffafe23fc1 ffffed00493097bf ffff8801ec3d0008 [135546.066247] 0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 0000000000000000 ac194a24c0586342 [135546.067438] 1ffff100178e1f78 ffff880320581b00 ffff8800bc70fdd0 ffff880320581b00 [135546.068629] Call Trace: [135546.069028] ? __rds_conn_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:856 net/rds/connection.c:134) [135546.069989] ? rds_message_copy_from_user (net/rds/message.c:298) [135546.071021] rds_conn_create_outgoing (net/rds/connection.c:278) [135546.071981] rds_sendmsg (net/rds/send.c:1058) [135546.072858] ? perf_trace_lock (include/trace/events/lock.h:38) [135546.073744] ? lockdep_init (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3298) [135546.074577] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.075508] ? __might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.076349] ? __might_fault (mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.077179] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.078114] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:611 net/socket.c:620) [135546.078856] SYSC_sendto (net/socket.c:1657) [135546.079596] ? SYSC_connect (net/socket.c:1628) [135546.080510] ? trace_dump_stack (kernel/trace/trace.c:1926) [135546.081397] ? ring_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2479 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2558 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2674) [135546.082390] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.083410] ? trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.084481] ? do_audit_syscall_entry (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.085438] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.085515] rds_ib_laddr_check(): addr 36.74.25.172 ret -99 node type -1 Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "Charles (Chas) Williams" <3chas3@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 74e98eb085889b0d2d4908f59f6e00026063014f upstream.

There was no verification that an underlying transport exists when creating
a connection, this would cause dereferencing a NULL ptr.

It might happen on sockets that weren't properly bound before attempting to
send a message, which will cause a NULL ptr deref:

[135546.047719] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessgeneral protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
[135546.051270] Modules linked in:
[135546.051781] CPU: 4 PID: 15650 Comm: trinity-c4 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150902-sasha-00041-gbaa1222-dirty #2527
[135546.053217] task: ffff8800835bc000 ti: ffff8800bc708000 task.ti: ffff8800bc708000
[135546.054291] RIP: __rds_conn_create (net/rds/connection.c:194)
[135546.055666] RSP: 0018:ffff8800bc70fab0  EFLAGS: 00010202
[135546.056457] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000f2c RCX: ffff8800835bc000
[135546.057494] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff8800835bccd8 RDI: 0000000000000038
[135546.058530] RBP: ffff8800bc70fb18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[135546.059556] R10: ffffed014d7a3a23 R11: ffffed014d7a3a21 R12: 0000000000000000
[135546.060614] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8801ec3d0000 R15: 0000000000000000
[135546.061668] FS:  00007faad4ffb700(0000) GS:ffff880252000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[135546.062836] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[135546.063682] CR2: 000000000000846a CR3: 000000009d137000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[135546.064723] Stack:
[135546.065048]  ffffffffafe2055c ffffffffafe23fc1 ffffed00493097bf ffff8801ec3d0008
[135546.066247]  0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 0000000000000000 ac194a24c0586342
[135546.067438]  1ffff100178e1f78 ffff880320581b00 ffff8800bc70fdd0 ffff880320581b00
[135546.068629] Call Trace:
[135546.069028] ? __rds_conn_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:856 net/rds/connection.c:134)
[135546.069989] ? rds_message_copy_from_user (net/rds/message.c:298)
[135546.071021] rds_conn_create_outgoing (net/rds/connection.c:278)
[135546.071981] rds_sendmsg (net/rds/send.c:1058)
[135546.072858] ? perf_trace_lock (include/trace/events/lock.h:38)
[135546.073744] ? lockdep_init (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3298)
[135546.074577] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976)
[135546.075508] ? __might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3795)
[135546.076349] ? __might_fault (mm/memory.c:3795)
[135546.077179] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976)
[135546.078114] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:611 net/socket.c:620)
[135546.078856] SYSC_sendto (net/socket.c:1657)
[135546.079596] ? SYSC_connect (net/socket.c:1628)
[135546.080510] ? trace_dump_stack (kernel/trace/trace.c:1926)
[135546.081397] ? ring_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2479 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2558 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2674)
[135546.082390] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749)
[135546.083410] ? trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16)
[135546.084481] ? do_audit_syscall_entry (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16)
[135546.085438] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749)
[135546.085515] rds_ib_laddr_check(): addr 36.74.25.172 ret -99 node type -1

Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Charles (Chas) Williams" <3chas3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it 2016-03-03T23:06:46+00:00 Marcelo Leitner mleitner@redhat.com 2015-02-23T14:17:13+00:00 db449d873870aee9161edb9259d72254987ad7c0 commit 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac upstream. Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet drops. If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values too small, but not for too big ones.) The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU. Note that similar check is already performed at ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "Charles (Chas) Williams" <3chas3@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac upstream.

Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.

If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)

The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.

Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Charles (Chas) Williams" <3chas3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
netfilter: ip6t_SYNPROXY: fix NULL pointer dereference 2016-03-03T23:06:44+00:00 Phil Sutter phil@nwl.cc 2015-08-09T11:14:15+00:00 d70966f182d52bc0032c7024393be7cd80991b41 commit 96fffb4f23f124f297d51dedc9cf51d19eb88ee1 upstream. This happens when networking namespaces are enabled. Suggested-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 96fffb4f23f124f297d51dedc9cf51d19eb88ee1 upstream.

This happens when networking namespaces are enabled.

Suggested-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>