<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net, branch linux-5.15.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:40:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hyunwoo Kim</name>
<email>imv4bel@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-15T22:28:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=179f1852bdedc300e373e807cc102cd81feff196'/>
<id>179f1852bdedc300e373e807cc102cd81feff196</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 48f6a5356a33dd78e7144ae1faef95ffc990aae0 upstream.

Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail
to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()-&gt;flags when
moving frags from source to destination.  __pskb_copy_fclone() defers
the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying
frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs,
type} and never touches skb_shinfo()-&gt;flags; skb_shift() moves frag
descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched.  As a result, the
destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or
page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as
false.

The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses
skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured
through skb_cow_data().  ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c,
esp6.c), and a single nft 'dup to &lt;local&gt;' rule -- or any other
nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()'d
skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged
user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via
authencesn-ESN stray writes.

Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors
were actually moved from the source.  skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand()
share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly
allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so
skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own; they need no change.

The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list().
The former moves the incoming skb's frag descriptors into the
accumulator's last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and
the head_frag + memcpy path); the latter chains the incoming skb whole
onto p's frag_list.  Downstream skb_segment() reads only
skb_shinfo(p)-&gt;flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb's
shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker.

The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an
MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue
into a freshly allocated nskb.  The helper falls into the same family
and warrants the same fix for consistency; no TCP TX-side in-place
writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but
a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently.

The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag
merge takes only head_skb's flag, and the inner switch that rebinds
frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the
new frag_skb's flag into nskb.  Fold frag_skb's flag at both sites
so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.

Fixes: cef401de7be8 ("net: fix possible wrong checksum generation")
Fixes: f4c50a4034e6 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Suggested-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Suggested-by: Sultan Alsawaf &lt;sultan@kerneltoast.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Suggested-by: Lin Ma &lt;malin89@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Jingguo Tan &lt;tanjingguo@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Aaron Esau &lt;aaron1esau@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Rajat Gupta &lt;rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ageeJfJHwgzmKXbh@v4bel
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 5.15:
 - skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list() are in skbuff.c here
 - Drop change to tcp_clone_payload(), which does not exist here
 - Adjust context in skb_shift()
]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;benh@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 48f6a5356a33dd78e7144ae1faef95ffc990aae0 upstream.

Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail
to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()-&gt;flags when
moving frags from source to destination.  __pskb_copy_fclone() defers
the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying
frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs,
type} and never touches skb_shinfo()-&gt;flags; skb_shift() moves frag
descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched.  As a result, the
destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or
page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as
false.

The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses
skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured
through skb_cow_data().  ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c,
esp6.c), and a single nft 'dup to &lt;local&gt;' rule -- or any other
nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()'d
skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged
user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via
authencesn-ESN stray writes.

Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors
were actually moved from the source.  skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand()
share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly
allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so
skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own; they need no change.

The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list().
The former moves the incoming skb's frag descriptors into the
accumulator's last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and
the head_frag + memcpy path); the latter chains the incoming skb whole
onto p's frag_list.  Downstream skb_segment() reads only
skb_shinfo(p)-&gt;flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb's
shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker.

The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an
MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue
into a freshly allocated nskb.  The helper falls into the same family
and warrants the same fix for consistency; no TCP TX-side in-place
writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but
a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently.

The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag
merge takes only head_skb's flag, and the inner switch that rebinds
frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the
new frag_skb's flag into nskb.  Fold frag_skb's flag at both sites
so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.

Fixes: cef401de7be8 ("net: fix possible wrong checksum generation")
Fixes: f4c50a4034e6 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Suggested-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Suggested-by: Sultan Alsawaf &lt;sultan@kerneltoast.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Suggested-by: Lin Ma &lt;malin89@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Jingguo Tan &lt;tanjingguo@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Aaron Esau &lt;aaron1esau@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Rajat Gupta &lt;rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ageeJfJHwgzmKXbh@v4bel
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 5.15:
 - skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list() are in skbuff.c here
 - Drop change to tcp_clone_payload(), which does not exist here
 - Adjust context in skb_shift()
]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;benh@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: skbuff: preserve shared-frag marker during coalescing</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:40:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>William Bowling</name>
<email>vakzz@zellic.io</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-13T04:16:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2f2b16022a2e10ca7bccfb98db5ed2ec0f72641c'/>
<id>2f2b16022a2e10ca7bccfb98db5ed2ec0f72641c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f84eca5817390257cef78013d0112481c503b4a3 upstream.

skb_try_coalesce() can attach paged frags from @from to @to.  If @from
has SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set, the resulting @to skb can contain the same
externally-owned or page-cache-backed frags, but the shared-frag marker
is currently lost.

That breaks the invariant relied on by later in-place writers.  In
particular, ESP input checks skb_has_shared_frag() before deciding
whether an uncloned nonlinear skb can skip skb_cow_data().  If TCP
receive coalescing has moved shared frags into an unmarked skb, ESP can
see skb_has_shared_frag() as false and decrypt in place over page-cache
backed frags.

Propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG when skb_try_coalesce() transfers paged
frags.  The tailroom copy path does not need the marker because it copies
bytes into @to's linear data rather than transferring frag descriptors.

Fixes: cef401de7be8 ("net: fix possible wrong checksum generation")
Fixes: f4c50a4034e6 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Signed-off-by: William Bowling &lt;vakzz@zellic.io&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260513041635.1289541-1-vakzz@zellic.io
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f84eca5817390257cef78013d0112481c503b4a3 upstream.

skb_try_coalesce() can attach paged frags from @from to @to.  If @from
has SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set, the resulting @to skb can contain the same
externally-owned or page-cache-backed frags, but the shared-frag marker
is currently lost.

That breaks the invariant relied on by later in-place writers.  In
particular, ESP input checks skb_has_shared_frag() before deciding
whether an uncloned nonlinear skb can skip skb_cow_data().  If TCP
receive coalescing has moved shared frags into an unmarked skb, ESP can
see skb_has_shared_frag() as false and decrypt in place over page-cache
backed frags.

Propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG when skb_try_coalesce() transfers paged
frags.  The tailroom copy path does not need the marker because it copies
bytes into @to's linear data rather than transferring frag descriptors.

Fixes: cef401de7be8 ("net: fix possible wrong checksum generation")
Fixes: f4c50a4034e6 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Signed-off-by: William Bowling &lt;vakzz@zellic.io&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260513041635.1289541-1-vakzz@zellic.io
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: esp: ipv4: fix up flags setting</title>
<updated>2026-05-08T14:31:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-08T14:26:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fe785bb3a8096dffcc4048a85cd0c83337eeecad'/>
<id>fe785bb3a8096dffcc4048a85cd0c83337eeecad</id>
<content type='text'>
In commit ab8b995323e5 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb
frags") in the 5.15.y tree, the tx_flags variable was set, instead of
flags.  This was due to me backporting the 6.1.y version of Ben's
version of the backport and not realizing the variable needed to be
different, so this was my fault, not his.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b941a1353791ddd6fd75fb8e68b377367d689ff.camel@oracle.com
Reported-by: Dominik Grzegorzek &lt;dominik.grzegorzek@oracle.com&gt;
Reported-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer &lt;mpellizzer.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;benh@debian.org&gt;
Fixes: ab8b995323e5 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In commit ab8b995323e5 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb
frags") in the 5.15.y tree, the tx_flags variable was set, instead of
flags.  This was due to me backporting the 6.1.y version of Ben's
version of the backport and not realizing the variable needed to be
different, so this was my fault, not his.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b941a1353791ddd6fd75fb8e68b377367d689ff.camel@oracle.com
Reported-by: Dominik Grzegorzek &lt;dominik.grzegorzek@oracle.com&gt;
Reported-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer &lt;mpellizzer.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;benh@debian.org&gt;
Fixes: ab8b995323e5 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags</title>
<updated>2026-05-08T10:46:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuan-Ting Chen</name>
<email>h3xrabbit@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-04T15:27:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ab8b995323e5237041472d07e5055f5f7dcdf15b'/>
<id>ab8b995323e5237041472d07e5055f5f7dcdf15b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f4c50a4034e62ab75f1d5cdd191dd5f9c77fdff4 upstream.

MSG_SPLICE_PAGES can attach pages from a pipe directly to an skb. TCP
marks such skbs with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG after skb_splice_from_iter(),
so later paths that may modify packet data can first make a private
copy. The IPv4/IPv6 datagram append paths did not set this flag when
splicing pages into UDP skbs.

That leaves an ESP-in-UDP packet made from shared pipe pages looking
like an ordinary uncloned nonlinear skb. ESP input then takes the no-COW
fast path for uncloned skbs without a frag_list and decrypts in place
over data that is not owned privately by the skb.

Mark IPv4/IPv6 datagram splice frags with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, matching
TCP. Also make ESP input fall back to skb_cow_data() when the flag is
present, so ESP does not decrypt externally backed frags in place.
Private nonlinear skb frags still use the existing fast path.

This intentionally does not change ESP output. In esp_output_head(),
the path that appends the ESP trailer to existing skb tailroom without
calling skb_cow_data() is not reachable for nonlinear skbs:
skb_tailroom() returns zero when skb-&gt;data_len is nonzero, while ESP
tailen is positive. Thus ESP output will either use the separate
destination-frag path or fall back to skb_cow_data().

Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 7da0dde68486 ("ip, udp: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Fixes: 6d8192bd69bb ("ip6, udp6: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Kuan-Ting Chen &lt;h3xrabbit@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ting Chen &lt;h3xrabbit@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 6.1: set the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG flag in
 ip_append_page() instead of __ip{,6}_append_data()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;benh@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f4c50a4034e62ab75f1d5cdd191dd5f9c77fdff4 upstream.

MSG_SPLICE_PAGES can attach pages from a pipe directly to an skb. TCP
marks such skbs with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG after skb_splice_from_iter(),
so later paths that may modify packet data can first make a private
copy. The IPv4/IPv6 datagram append paths did not set this flag when
splicing pages into UDP skbs.

That leaves an ESP-in-UDP packet made from shared pipe pages looking
like an ordinary uncloned nonlinear skb. ESP input then takes the no-COW
fast path for uncloned skbs without a frag_list and decrypts in place
over data that is not owned privately by the skb.

Mark IPv4/IPv6 datagram splice frags with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, matching
TCP. Also make ESP input fall back to skb_cow_data() when the flag is
present, so ESP does not decrypt externally backed frags in place.
Private nonlinear skb frags still use the existing fast path.

This intentionally does not change ESP output. In esp_output_head(),
the path that appends the ESP trailer to existing skb tailroom without
calling skb_cow_data() is not reachable for nonlinear skbs:
skb_tailroom() returns zero when skb-&gt;data_len is nonzero, while ESP
tailen is positive. Thus ESP output will either use the separate
destination-frag path or fall back to skb_cow_data().

Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 7da0dde68486 ("ip, udp: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Fixes: 6d8192bd69bb ("ip6, udp6: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Kuan-Ting Chen &lt;h3xrabbit@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ting Chen &lt;h3xrabbit@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 6.1: set the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG flag in
 ip_append_page() instead of __ip{,6}_append_data()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;benh@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting multiple L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:33:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luiz Augusto von Dentz</name>
<email>luiz.von.dentz@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-22T01:27:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=46e5b71666fb7652082e4e214a3365f4b14f1dc3'/>
<id>46e5b71666fb7652082e4e214a3365f4b14f1dc3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5b3e2052334f2ff6d5200e952f4aa66994d09899 ]

Currently the code attempts to accept requests regardless of the
command identifier which may cause multiple requests to be marked
as pending (FLAG_DEFER_SETUP) which can cause more than
L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID(5) to be allocated in l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer
causing an overflow.

The spec is quite clear that the same identifier shall not be used on
subsequent requests:

'Within each signaling channel a different Identifier shall be used
for each successive request or indication.'
https://www.bluetooth.com/wp-content/uploads/Files/Specification/HTML/Core-62/out/en/host/logical-link-control-and-adaptation-protocol-specification.html#UUID-32a25a06-4aa4-c6c7-77c5-dcfe3682355d

So this attempts to check if there are any channels pending with the
same identifier and rejects if any are found.

Fixes: 15f02b910562 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add initial code for Enhanced Credit Based Mode")
Reported-by: Yiming Qian &lt;yimingqian591@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
[ adapted variable names ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5b3e2052334f2ff6d5200e952f4aa66994d09899 ]

Currently the code attempts to accept requests regardless of the
command identifier which may cause multiple requests to be marked
as pending (FLAG_DEFER_SETUP) which can cause more than
L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID(5) to be allocated in l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer
causing an overflow.

The spec is quite clear that the same identifier shall not be used on
subsequent requests:

'Within each signaling channel a different Identifier shall be used
for each successive request or indication.'
https://www.bluetooth.com/wp-content/uploads/Files/Specification/HTML/Core-62/out/en/host/logical-link-control-and-adaptation-protocol-specification.html#UUID-32a25a06-4aa4-c6c7-77c5-dcfe3682355d

So this attempts to check if there are any channels pending with the
same identifier and rejects if any are found.

Fixes: 15f02b910562 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add initial code for Enhanced Credit Based Mode")
Reported-by: Yiming Qian &lt;yimingqian591@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
[ adapted variable names ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: rfkill: prevent unlimited numbers of rfkill events from being created</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:33:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-12T16:57:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b1e0c8d3ab58a0161db487bf5fc47adfcaf5d5ca'/>
<id>b1e0c8d3ab58a0161db487bf5fc47adfcaf5d5ca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ea245d78dec594372e27d8c79616baf49e98a4a1 ]

Userspace can create an unlimited number of rfkill events if the system
is so configured, while not consuming them from the rfkill file
descriptor, causing a potential out of memory situation.  Prevent this
from bounding the number of pending rfkill events at a "large" number
(i.e. 1000) to prevent abuses like this.

Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026033013-disfigure-scroll-e25e@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
[ replaced `scoped_guard()` with explicit `mutex_lock()`/`mutex_unlock()` calls ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ea245d78dec594372e27d8c79616baf49e98a4a1 ]

Userspace can create an unlimited number of rfkill events if the system
is so configured, while not consuming them from the rfkill file
descriptor, causing a potential out of memory situation.  Prevent this
from bounding the number of pending rfkill events at a "large" number
(i.e. 1000) to prevent abuses like this.

Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026033013-disfigure-scroll-e25e@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
[ replaced `scoped_guard()` with explicit `mutex_lock()`/`mutex_unlock()` calls ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:33:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrea Mayer</name>
<email>andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-12T22:00:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=750569d6987a0ff46317a4b86eb3907e296287bf'/>
<id>750569d6987a0ff46317a4b86eb3907e296287bf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c3812651b522fe8437ebb7063b75ddb95b571643 ]

The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.

Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,
so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.

Fixes: 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer &lt;andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Justin Iurman &lt;justin.iurman@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260404004405.4057-2-andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ added missing dst reference loop guard in seg6_output_core() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c3812651b522fe8437ebb7063b75ddb95b571643 ]

The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.

Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,
so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.

Fixes: 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer &lt;andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Justin Iurman &lt;justin.iurman@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260404004405.4057-2-andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ added missing dst reference loop guard in seg6_output_core() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "mptcp: add needs_id for netlink appending addr"</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:33:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)</name>
<email>matttbe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-12T22:52:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=902988b0eee1c849125199f29ab5a2022401c2af'/>
<id>902988b0eee1c849125199f29ab5a2022401c2af</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8e2760eaab778494fc1fa257031e0e1799647f46 ]

This commit was originally adding the ability to add MPTCP endpoints
with ID 0 by accident. The in-kernel PM, handling MPTCP endpoints at the
net namespace level, is not supposed to handle endpoints with such ID,
because this ID 0 is reserved to the initial subflow, as mentioned in
the MPTCPv1 protocol [1], a per-connection setting.

Note that 'ip mptcp endpoint add id 0' stops early with an error, but
other tools might still request the in-kernel PM to create MPTCP
endpoints with this restricted ID 0.

In other words, it was wrong to call the mptcp_pm_has_addr_attr_id
helper to check whether the address ID attribute is set: if it was set
to 0, a new MPTCP endpoint would be created with ID 0, which is not
expected, and might cause various issues later.

Fixes: 584f38942626 ("mptcp: add needs_id for netlink appending addr")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8684#section-3.2-9 [1]
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang &lt;geliang@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) &lt;matttbe@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407-net-mptcp-revert-pm-needs-id-v2-1-7a25cbc324f8@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ adapted changes from pm_kernel.c to pm_netlink.c ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8e2760eaab778494fc1fa257031e0e1799647f46 ]

This commit was originally adding the ability to add MPTCP endpoints
with ID 0 by accident. The in-kernel PM, handling MPTCP endpoints at the
net namespace level, is not supposed to handle endpoints with such ID,
because this ID 0 is reserved to the initial subflow, as mentioned in
the MPTCPv1 protocol [1], a per-connection setting.

Note that 'ip mptcp endpoint add id 0' stops early with an error, but
other tools might still request the in-kernel PM to create MPTCP
endpoints with this restricted ID 0.

In other words, it was wrong to call the mptcp_pm_has_addr_attr_id
helper to check whether the address ID attribute is set: if it was set
to 0, a new MPTCP endpoint would be created with ID 0, which is not
expected, and might cause various issues later.

Fixes: 584f38942626 ("mptcp: add needs_id for netlink appending addr")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8684#section-3.2-9 [1]
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang &lt;geliang@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) &lt;matttbe@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407-net-mptcp-revert-pm-needs-id-v2-1-7a25cbc324f8@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ adapted changes from pm_kernel.c to pm_netlink.c ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix key/keyring checks in setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY/KEYRING)</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:33:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T12:12:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=043e111a4fbc569379ae76b5c6f14c5f14d9f1e7'/>
<id>043e111a4fbc569379ae76b5c6f14c5f14d9f1e7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2afd86ccbb2082a3c4258aea8c07e5bb6267bc2f upstream.

An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time.  When
sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx-&gt;key to set the
security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server),
it uses rx-&gt;securities.

setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx-&gt;key to point to an rxrpc-type key
and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx-&gt;securities to point to a
keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys.

Now, it should be possible to use both rx-&gt;key and rx-&gt;securities on the
same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt()
prevents that.

Fix this by:

 (1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING)
     makes on rx-&gt;key.

 (2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on
     rx-&gt;key down into rxrpc_request_key().

 (3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx-&gt;securities.

This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the
functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent
both key and keyring being set.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
cc: Luxiao Xu &lt;rakukuip@gmail.com&gt;
cc: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-16-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2afd86ccbb2082a3c4258aea8c07e5bb6267bc2f upstream.

An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time.  When
sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx-&gt;key to set the
security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server),
it uses rx-&gt;securities.

setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx-&gt;key to point to an rxrpc-type key
and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx-&gt;securities to point to a
keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys.

Now, it should be possible to use both rx-&gt;key and rx-&gt;securities on the
same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt()
prevents that.

Fix this by:

 (1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING)
     makes on rx-&gt;key.

 (2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on
     rx-&gt;key down into rxrpc_request_key().

 (3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx-&gt;securities.

This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the
functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent
both key and keyring being set.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
cc: Luxiao Xu &lt;rakukuip@gmail.com&gt;
cc: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-16-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:33:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luxiao Xu</name>
<email>rakukuip@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T12:12:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fc76d0bd00850b7372f0a4a319c0c60f80487632'/>
<id>fc76d0bd00850b7372f0a4a319c0c60f80487632</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f125846ee79fcae537a964ce66494e96fa54a6de upstream.

This patch fixes a reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()
by checking if rx-&gt;securities is already set.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Tested-by: Ren Wei &lt;enjou1224z@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu &lt;rakukuip@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-15-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f125846ee79fcae537a964ce66494e96fa54a6de upstream.

This patch fixes a reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()
by checking if rx-&gt;securities is already set.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Tested-by: Ren Wei &lt;enjou1224z@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu &lt;rakukuip@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-15-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
