<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net, branch linux-4.17.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net/smc: no shutdown in state SMC_LISTEN</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ursula Braun</name>
<email>ubraun@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-08T12:13:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3cb744554f4d686fdf01dd24d6df57e0f260a96e'/>
<id>3cb744554f4d686fdf01dd24d6df57e0f260a96e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit caa21e19e08d7a1445116a93f7ab4e187ebbbadb upstream.

Invoking shutdown for a socket in state SMC_LISTEN does not make
sense. Nevertheless programs like syzbot fuzzing the kernel may
try to do this. For SMC this means a socket refcounting problem.
This patch makes sure a shutdown call for an SMC socket in state
SMC_LISTEN simply returns with -ENOTCONN.

Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun &lt;ubraun@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit caa21e19e08d7a1445116a93f7ab4e187ebbbadb upstream.

Invoking shutdown for a socket in state SMC_LISTEN does not make
sense. Nevertheless programs like syzbot fuzzing the kernel may
try to do this. For SMC this means a socket refcounting problem.
This patch makes sure a shutdown call for an SMC socket in state
SMC_LISTEN simply returns with -ENOTCONN.

Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun &lt;ubraun@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>packet: refine ring v3 block size test to hold one frame</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-06T14:38:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4713ad95833b593a50f7162e503c6c791dc050a9'/>
<id>4713ad95833b593a50f7162e503c6c791dc050a9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4576cd469d980317c4edd9173f8b694aa71ea3a3 upstream.

TPACKET_V3 stores variable length frames in fixed length blocks.
Blocks must be able to store a block header, optional private space
and at least one minimum sized frame.

Frames, even for a zero snaplen packet, store metadata headers and
optional reserved space.

In the block size bounds check, ensure that the frame of the
chosen configuration fits. This includes sockaddr_ll and optional
tp_reserve.

Syzbot was able to construct a ring with insuffient room for the
sockaddr_ll in the header of a zero-length frame, triggering an
out-of-bounds write in dev_parse_header.

Convert the comparison to less than, as zero is a valid snap len.
This matches the test for minimum tp_frame_size immediately below.

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Fixes: eb73190f4fbe ("net/packet: refine check for priv area size")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4576cd469d980317c4edd9173f8b694aa71ea3a3 upstream.

TPACKET_V3 stores variable length frames in fixed length blocks.
Blocks must be able to store a block header, optional private space
and at least one minimum sized frame.

Frames, even for a zero snaplen packet, store metadata headers and
optional reserved space.

In the block size bounds check, ensure that the frame of the
chosen configuration fits. This includes sockaddr_ll and optional
tp_reserve.

Syzbot was able to construct a ring with insuffient room for the
sockaddr_ll in the header of a zero-length frame, triggering an
out-of-bounds write in dev_parse_header.

Convert the comparison to less than, as zero is a valid snap len.
This matches the test for minimum tp_frame_size immediately below.

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Fixes: eb73190f4fbe ("net/packet: refine check for priv area size")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: conntrack: dccp: treat SYNC/SYNCACK as invalid if no prior state</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-17T19:03:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e3648b5ccb51c48ef4889de52827e78eedbe1ca8'/>
<id>e3648b5ccb51c48ef4889de52827e78eedbe1ca8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6613b6173dee098997229caf1f3b961c49da75e6 upstream.

When first DCCP packet is SYNC or SYNCACK, we insert a new conntrack
that has an un-initialized timeout value, i.e. such entry could be
reaped at any time.

Mark them as INVALID and only ignore SYNC/SYNCACK when connection had
an old state.

Reported-by: syzbot+6f18401420df260e37ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6613b6173dee098997229caf1f3b961c49da75e6 upstream.

When first DCCP packet is SYNC or SYNCACK, we insert a new conntrack
that has an un-initialized timeout value, i.e. such entry could be
reaped at any time.

Mark them as INVALID and only ignore SYNC/SYNCACK when connection had
an old state.

Reported-by: syzbot+6f18401420df260e37ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm_user: prevent leaking 2 bytes of kernel memory</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-19T04:35:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0a8fd12f855faeea89a416f38777db38cff8369a'/>
<id>0a8fd12f855faeea89a416f38777db38cff8369a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 45c180bc29babbedd6b8c01b975780ef44d9d09c upstream.

struct xfrm_userpolicy_type has two holes, so we should not
use C99 style initializer.

KMSAN report:

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout lib/iov_iter.c:140 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1b14/0x2800 lib/iov_iter.c:571
CPU: 1 PID: 4520 Comm: syz-executor841 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #5
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1117
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1211
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1253
 copyout lib/iov_iter.c:140 [inline]
 _copy_to_iter+0x1b14/0x2800 lib/iov_iter.c:571
 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:106 [inline]
 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x422/0xfa0 net/core/datagram.c:431
 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3268 [inline]
 netlink_recvmsg+0x6f1/0x1900 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1959
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:802 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg+0x1d6/0x230 net/socket.c:809
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x3fe/0x810 net/socket.c:2279
 __sys_recvmmsg+0x58e/0xe30 net/socket.c:2391
 do_sys_recvmmsg+0x2a6/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2472
 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2485 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2481 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x15d/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2481
 do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x446ce9
RSP: 002b:00007fc307918db8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dbc24 RCX: 0000000000446ce9
RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000020005040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dbc20 R08: 0000000020004e40 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000040000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc8d2df32f R14: 00007fc3079199c0 R15: 0000000000000001

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:294 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:685
 kmsan_memcpy_origins+0x11d/0x170 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:527
 __msan_memcpy+0x109/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:413
 __nla_put lib/nlattr.c:569 [inline]
 nla_put+0x276/0x340 lib/nlattr.c:627
 copy_to_user_policy_type net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1678 [inline]
 dump_one_policy+0xbe1/0x1090 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1708
 xfrm_policy_walk+0x45a/0xd00 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1013
 xfrm_dump_policy+0x1c0/0x2a0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1749
 netlink_dump+0x9b5/0x1550 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2226
 __netlink_dump_start+0x1131/0x1270 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2323
 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:214 [inline]
 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x8a3/0x9b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2577
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x37e/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0xb2/0xf0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2598
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1680/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec8/0x1320 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Local variable description: ----upt.i@dump_one_policy
Variable was created at:
 dump_one_policy+0x78/0x1090 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1689
 xfrm_policy_walk+0x45a/0xd00 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1013

Byte 130 of 137 is uninitialized
Memory access starts at ffff88019550407f

Fixes: c0144beaeca42 ("[XFRM] netlink: Use nla_put()/NLA_PUT() variantes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 45c180bc29babbedd6b8c01b975780ef44d9d09c upstream.

struct xfrm_userpolicy_type has two holes, so we should not
use C99 style initializer.

KMSAN report:

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout lib/iov_iter.c:140 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1b14/0x2800 lib/iov_iter.c:571
CPU: 1 PID: 4520 Comm: syz-executor841 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #5
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1117
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1211
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1253
 copyout lib/iov_iter.c:140 [inline]
 _copy_to_iter+0x1b14/0x2800 lib/iov_iter.c:571
 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:106 [inline]
 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x422/0xfa0 net/core/datagram.c:431
 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3268 [inline]
 netlink_recvmsg+0x6f1/0x1900 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1959
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:802 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg+0x1d6/0x230 net/socket.c:809
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x3fe/0x810 net/socket.c:2279
 __sys_recvmmsg+0x58e/0xe30 net/socket.c:2391
 do_sys_recvmmsg+0x2a6/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2472
 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2485 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2481 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x15d/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2481
 do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x446ce9
RSP: 002b:00007fc307918db8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dbc24 RCX: 0000000000446ce9
RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000020005040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dbc20 R08: 0000000020004e40 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000040000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc8d2df32f R14: 00007fc3079199c0 R15: 0000000000000001

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:294 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:685
 kmsan_memcpy_origins+0x11d/0x170 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:527
 __msan_memcpy+0x109/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:413
 __nla_put lib/nlattr.c:569 [inline]
 nla_put+0x276/0x340 lib/nlattr.c:627
 copy_to_user_policy_type net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1678 [inline]
 dump_one_policy+0xbe1/0x1090 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1708
 xfrm_policy_walk+0x45a/0xd00 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1013
 xfrm_dump_policy+0x1c0/0x2a0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1749
 netlink_dump+0x9b5/0x1550 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2226
 __netlink_dump_start+0x1131/0x1270 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2323
 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:214 [inline]
 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x8a3/0x9b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2577
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x37e/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0xb2/0xf0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2598
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1680/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec8/0x1320 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Local variable description: ----upt.i@dump_one_policy
Variable was created at:
 dump_one_policy+0x78/0x1090 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1689
 xfrm_policy_walk+0x45a/0xd00 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1013

Byte 130 of 137 is uninitialized
Memory access starts at ffff88019550407f

Fixes: c0144beaeca42 ("[XFRM] netlink: Use nla_put()/NLA_PUT() variantes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: identify cryptic messages as TCP seq # bugs</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-18T01:27:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cb0bd535041ea0541b06d1d152954469799ec8a4'/>
<id>cb0bd535041ea0541b06d1d152954469799ec8a4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e56b8ce363a36fb7b74b80aaa5cc9084f2c908b4 ]

Attempt to make cryptic TCP seq number error messages clearer by
(1) identifying the source of the message as "TCP", (2) identifying the
errors as "seq # bug", and (3) grouping the field identifiers and values
by separating them with commas.

E.g., the following message is changed from:

recvmsg bug 2: copied 73BCB6CD seq 70F17CBE rcvnxt 73BCB9AA fl 0
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1501 at /linux/net/ipv4/tcp.c:1881 tcp_recvmsg+0x649/0xb90

to:

TCP recvmsg seq # bug 2: copied 73BCB6CD, seq 70F17CBE, rcvnxt 73BCB9AA, fl 0
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1501 at /linux/net/ipv4/tcp.c:2011 tcp_recvmsg+0x694/0xba0

Suggested-by: 積丹尼 Dan Jacobson &lt;jidanni@jidanni.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e56b8ce363a36fb7b74b80aaa5cc9084f2c908b4 ]

Attempt to make cryptic TCP seq number error messages clearer by
(1) identifying the source of the message as "TCP", (2) identifying the
errors as "seq # bug", and (3) grouping the field identifiers and values
by separating them with commas.

E.g., the following message is changed from:

recvmsg bug 2: copied 73BCB6CD seq 70F17CBE rcvnxt 73BCB9AA fl 0
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1501 at /linux/net/ipv4/tcp.c:1881 tcp_recvmsg+0x649/0xb90

to:

TCP recvmsg seq # bug 2: copied 73BCB6CD, seq 70F17CBE, rcvnxt 73BCB9AA, fl 0
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1501 at /linux/net/ipv4/tcp.c:2011 tcp_recvmsg+0x694/0xba0

Suggested-by: 積丹尼 Dan Jacobson &lt;jidanni@jidanni.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/smc: reset recv timeout after clc handshake</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Karsten Graul</name>
<email>kgraul@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-18T13:22:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6445942b559981bf12607990c396b071979f73ca'/>
<id>6445942b559981bf12607990c396b071979f73ca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f6bdc42f021194ec095914b92c7a8b1a09789e6d ]

During clc handshake the receive timeout is set to CLC_WAIT_TIME.
Remember and reset the original timeout value after the receive calls,
and remove a duplicate assignment of CLC_WAIT_TIME.

Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul &lt;kgraul@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun &lt;ubraun@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f6bdc42f021194ec095914b92c7a8b1a09789e6d ]

During clc handshake the receive timeout is set to CLC_WAIT_TIME.
Remember and reset the original timeout value after the receive calls,
and remove a duplicate assignment of CLC_WAIT_TIME.

Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul &lt;kgraul@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun &lt;ubraun@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/9p/client.c: put refcount of trans_mod in error case in parse_opts()</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>piaojun</name>
<email>piaojun@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-13T23:59:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=41b5285e24173c0d20aab129111acccff9dbcb9f'/>
<id>41b5285e24173c0d20aab129111acccff9dbcb9f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c290fba8c4ce6530cd941ea14db5a4ac2f77183f ]

In my testing, the second mount will fail after umounting successfully.
The reason is that we put refcount of trans_mod in the correct case
rather than the error case in parse_opts() at last.  That will cause the
refcount decrease to -1, and when we try to get trans_mod again in
try_module_get(), we could only increase refcount to 0 which will cause
failure as follows:

parse_opts
  v9fs_get_trans_by_name
    try_module_get : return NULL to caller which cause error

So we should put refcount of trans_mod in error case.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5B3F39A0.2030509@huawei.com
Fixes: 9421c3e64137ec ("net/9p/client.c: fix potential refcnt problem of trans module")
Signed-off-by: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yiwen Jiang &lt;jiangyiwen@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominique Martinet &lt;dominique.martinet@cea.fr&gt;
Tested-by: Dominique Martinet &lt;dominique.martinet@cea.fr&gt;
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen &lt;ericvh@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ron Minnich &lt;rminnich@sandia.gov&gt;
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov &lt;lucho@ionkov.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c290fba8c4ce6530cd941ea14db5a4ac2f77183f ]

In my testing, the second mount will fail after umounting successfully.
The reason is that we put refcount of trans_mod in the correct case
rather than the error case in parse_opts() at last.  That will cause the
refcount decrease to -1, and when we try to get trans_mod again in
try_module_get(), we could only increase refcount to 0 which will cause
failure as follows:

parse_opts
  v9fs_get_trans_by_name
    try_module_get : return NULL to caller which cause error

So we should put refcount of trans_mod in error case.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5B3F39A0.2030509@huawei.com
Fixes: 9421c3e64137ec ("net/9p/client.c: fix potential refcnt problem of trans module")
Signed-off-by: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yiwen Jiang &lt;jiangyiwen@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominique Martinet &lt;dominique.martinet@cea.fr&gt;
Tested-by: Dominique Martinet &lt;dominique.martinet@cea.fr&gt;
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen &lt;ericvh@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ron Minnich &lt;rminnich@sandia.gov&gt;
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov &lt;lucho@ionkov.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: remove DELAYED ACK events in DCTCP</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yuchung Cheng</name>
<email>ycheng@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-12T13:04:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=04f5fcc50d6abda9ab09690100ff9d1bd17b6c20'/>
<id>04f5fcc50d6abda9ab09690100ff9d1bd17b6c20</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a69258f7aa2623e0930212f09c586fd06674ad79 ]

After fixing the way DCTCP tracking delayed ACKs, the delayed-ACK
related callbacks are no longer needed

Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Lawrence Brakmo &lt;brakmo@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a69258f7aa2623e0930212f09c586fd06674ad79 ]

After fixing the way DCTCP tracking delayed ACKs, the delayed-ACK
related callbacks are no longer needed

Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Lawrence Brakmo &lt;brakmo@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>packet: reset network header if packet shorter than ll reserved space</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-11T16:00:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a2186f729d694c7d510d175ec59dd7b6298641d6'/>
<id>a2186f729d694c7d510d175ec59dd7b6298641d6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 993675a3100b16a4c80dfd70cbcde8ea7127b31d ]

If variable length link layer headers result in a packet shorter
than dev-&gt;hard_header_len, reset the network header offset. Else
skb-&gt;mac_len may exceed skb-&gt;len after skb_mac_reset_len.

packet_sendmsg_spkt already has similar logic.

Fixes: b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 993675a3100b16a4c80dfd70cbcde8ea7127b31d ]

If variable length link layer headers result in a packet shorter
than dev-&gt;hard_header_len, reset the network header offset. Else
skb-&gt;mac_len may exceed skb-&gt;len after skb_mac_reset_len.

packet_sendmsg_spkt already has similar logic.

Fixes: b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_conntrack: Fix possible possible crash on module loading.</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:07:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>aryabinin@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-06T13:38:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d3924825477fbb228af3e3f74d2474f2720ac5a5'/>
<id>d3924825477fbb228af3e3f74d2474f2720ac5a5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2045cdfa1b40d66f126f3fd05604fc7c754f0022 ]

Loading the nf_conntrack module with doubled hashsize parameter, i.e.
	  modprobe nf_conntrack hashsize=12345 hashsize=12345
causes NULL-ptr deref.

If 'hashsize' specified twice, the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() function
will be called also twice.
The first nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() call will set the
'nf_conntrack_htable_size' variable:

	nf_conntrack_set_hashsize()
		...
		/* On boot, we can set this without any fancy locking. */
		if (!nf_conntrack_htable_size)
			return param_set_uint(val, kp);

But on the second invocation, the nf_conntrack_htable_size is already set,
so the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() will take a different path and call
the nf_conntrack_hash_resize() function. Which will crash on the attempt
to dereference 'nf_conntrack_hash' pointer:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
	RIP: 0010:nf_conntrack_hash_resize+0x255/0x490 [nf_conntrack]
	Call Trace:
	 nf_conntrack_set_hashsize+0xcd/0x100 [nf_conntrack]
	 parse_args+0x1f9/0x5a0
	 load_module+0x1281/0x1a50
	 __se_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0xf0
	 do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x390
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fix this, by checking !nf_conntrack_hash instead of
!nf_conntrack_htable_size. nf_conntrack_hash will be initialized only
after the module loaded, so the second invocation of the
nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() won't crash, it will just reinitialize
nf_conntrack_htable_size again.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2045cdfa1b40d66f126f3fd05604fc7c754f0022 ]

Loading the nf_conntrack module with doubled hashsize parameter, i.e.
	  modprobe nf_conntrack hashsize=12345 hashsize=12345
causes NULL-ptr deref.

If 'hashsize' specified twice, the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() function
will be called also twice.
The first nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() call will set the
'nf_conntrack_htable_size' variable:

	nf_conntrack_set_hashsize()
		...
		/* On boot, we can set this without any fancy locking. */
		if (!nf_conntrack_htable_size)
			return param_set_uint(val, kp);

But on the second invocation, the nf_conntrack_htable_size is already set,
so the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() will take a different path and call
the nf_conntrack_hash_resize() function. Which will crash on the attempt
to dereference 'nf_conntrack_hash' pointer:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
	RIP: 0010:nf_conntrack_hash_resize+0x255/0x490 [nf_conntrack]
	Call Trace:
	 nf_conntrack_set_hashsize+0xcd/0x100 [nf_conntrack]
	 parse_args+0x1f9/0x5a0
	 load_module+0x1281/0x1a50
	 __se_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0xf0
	 do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x390
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fix this, by checking !nf_conntrack_hash instead of
!nf_conntrack_htable_size. nf_conntrack_hash will be initialized only
after the module loaded, so the second invocation of the
nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() won't crash, it will just reinitialize
nf_conntrack_htable_size again.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
