linux-stable.git/net/socket.c, branch v6.1.69 Linux kernel stable tree net: prevent address rewrite in kernel_bind() 2023-10-19T21:08:50+00:00 Jordan Rife jrife@google.com 2023-09-21T23:46:42+00:00 020958c946c0c6e1f41419e69f86f436ae838d0d commit c889a99a21bf124c3db08d09df919f0eccc5ea4c upstream. Similar to the change in commit 0bdf399342c5("net: Avoid address overwrite in kernel_connect"), BPF hooks run on bind may rewrite the address passed to kernel_bind(). This change 1) Makes a copy of the bind address in kernel_bind() to insulate callers. 2) Replaces direct calls to sock->ops->bind() in net with kernel_bind() Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/ Fixes: 4fbac77d2d09 ("bpf: Hooks for sys_bind") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c889a99a21bf124c3db08d09df919f0eccc5ea4c upstream.

Similar to the change in commit 0bdf399342c5("net: Avoid address
overwrite in kernel_connect"), BPF hooks run on bind may rewrite the
address passed to kernel_bind(). This change

1) Makes a copy of the bind address in kernel_bind() to insulate
   callers.
2) Replaces direct calls to sock->ops->bind() in net with kernel_bind()

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/
Fixes: 4fbac77d2d09 ("bpf: Hooks for sys_bind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: prevent rewrite of msg_name in sock_sendmsg() 2023-10-10T20:00:39+00:00 Jordan Rife jrife@google.com 2023-09-21T23:46:41+00:00 fc8d9630c80b1dd7f6e8dd8e90aff11090f1b2a8 commit 86a7e0b69bd5b812e48a20c66c2161744f3caa16 upstream. Callers of sock_sendmsg(), and similarly kernel_sendmsg(), in kernel space may observe their value of msg_name change in cases where BPF sendmsg hooks rewrite the send address. This has been confirmed to break NFS mounts running in UDP mode and has the potential to break other systems. This patch: 1) Creates a new function called __sock_sendmsg() with same logic as the old sock_sendmsg() function. 2) Replaces calls to sock_sendmsg() made by __sys_sendto() and __sys_sendmsg() with __sock_sendmsg() to avoid an unnecessary copy, as these system calls are already protected. 3) Modifies sock_sendmsg() so that it makes a copy of msg_name if present before passing it down the stack to insulate callers from changes to the send address. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/ Fixes: 1cedee13d25a ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 86a7e0b69bd5b812e48a20c66c2161744f3caa16 upstream.

Callers of sock_sendmsg(), and similarly kernel_sendmsg(), in kernel
space may observe their value of msg_name change in cases where BPF
sendmsg hooks rewrite the send address. This has been confirmed to break
NFS mounts running in UDP mode and has the potential to break other
systems.

This patch:

1) Creates a new function called __sock_sendmsg() with same logic as the
   old sock_sendmsg() function.
2) Replaces calls to sock_sendmsg() made by __sys_sendto() and
   __sys_sendmsg() with __sock_sendmsg() to avoid an unnecessary copy,
   as these system calls are already protected.
3) Modifies sock_sendmsg() so that it makes a copy of msg_name if
   present before passing it down the stack to insulate callers from
   changes to the send address.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/
Fixes: 1cedee13d25a ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: Avoid address overwrite in kernel_connect 2023-09-13T07:42:26+00:00 Jordan Rife jrife@google.com 2023-08-21T21:45:23+00:00 8f965b5b525d50c9cf7601de55c9918346ec7cf6 commit 0bdf399342c5acbd817c9098b6c7ed21f1974312 upstream. BPF programs that run on connect can rewrite the connect address. For the connect system call this isn't a problem, because a copy of the address is made when it is moved into kernel space. However, kernel_connect simply passes through the address it is given, so the caller may observe its address value unexpectedly change. A practical example where this is problematic is where NFS is combined with a system such as Cilium which implements BPF-based load balancing. A common pattern in software-defined storage systems is to have an NFS mount that connects to a persistent virtual IP which in turn maps to an ephemeral server IP. This is usually done to achieve high availability: if your server goes down you can quickly spin up a replacement and remap the virtual IP to that endpoint. With BPF-based load balancing, mounts will forget the virtual IP address when the address rewrite occurs because a pointer to the only copy of that address is passed down the stack. Server failover then breaks, because clients have forgotten the virtual IP address. Reconnects fail and mounts remain broken. This patch was tested by setting up a scenario like this and ensuring that NFS reconnects worked after applying the patch. Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 0bdf399342c5acbd817c9098b6c7ed21f1974312 upstream.

BPF programs that run on connect can rewrite the connect address. For
the connect system call this isn't a problem, because a copy of the address
is made when it is moved into kernel space. However, kernel_connect
simply passes through the address it is given, so the caller may observe
its address value unexpectedly change.

A practical example where this is problematic is where NFS is combined
with a system such as Cilium which implements BPF-based load balancing.
A common pattern in software-defined storage systems is to have an NFS
mount that connects to a persistent virtual IP which in turn maps to an
ephemeral server IP. This is usually done to achieve high availability:
if your server goes down you can quickly spin up a replacement and remap
the virtual IP to that endpoint. With BPF-based load balancing, mounts
will forget the virtual IP address when the address rewrite occurs
because a pointer to the only copy of that address is passed down the
stack. Server failover then breaks, because clients have forgotten the
virtual IP address. Reconnects fail and mounts remain broken. This patch
was tested by setting up a scenario like this and ensuring that NFS
reconnects worked after applying the patch.

Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: annotate sk->sk_err write from do_recvmmsg() 2023-05-24T16:32:32+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-05-09T16:35:53+00:00 bd0f360ee86494037fbffcac28dbb47c438b33df [ Upstream commit e05a5f510f26607616fecdd4ac136310c8bea56b ] do_recvmmsg() can write to sk->sk_err from multiple threads. As said before, many other points reading or writing sk_err need annotations. Fixes: 34b88a68f26a ("net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit e05a5f510f26607616fecdd4ac136310c8bea56b ]

do_recvmmsg() can write to sk->sk_err from multiple threads.

As said before, many other points reading or writing sk_err
need annotations.

Fixes: 34b88a68f26a ("net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: avoid double iput when sock_alloc_file fails 2023-03-10T08:34:34+00:00 Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo cascardo@canonical.com 2023-03-07T17:37:07+00:00 7c7570791b15c3b78e3229ae97825e7eb869c7da commit 649c15c7691e9b13cbe9bf6c65c365350e056067 upstream. When sock_alloc_file fails to allocate a file, it will call sock_release. __sys_socket_file should then not call sock_release again, otherwise there will be a double free. [ 89.319884] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 89.320286] kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:1764! [ 89.320656] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 89.321051] CPU: 7 PID: 125 Comm: iou-sqp-124 Not tainted 6.2.0+ #361 [ 89.321535] RIP: 0010:iput+0x1ff/0x240 [ 89.321808] Code: d1 83 e1 03 48 83 f9 02 75 09 48 81 fa 00 10 00 00 77 05 83 e2 01 75 1f 4c 89 ef e8 fb d2 ba 00 e9 80 fe ff ff c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 0f 0b e9 d0 fe ff ff 0f 0b eb 8d 49 8d b4 24 08 01 00 00 48 [ 89.322760] RSP: 0018:ffffbdd60068bd50 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 89.323036] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d7ad3cacac0 RCX: 0000000000001107 [ 89.323412] RDX: 000000000003af00 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9d7ad3cacb40 [ 89.323785] RBP: ffffbdd60068bd68 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: ffffffffab606438 [ 89.324157] R10: ffffffffacb3dfa0 R11: 6465686361657256 R12: ffff9d7ad3cacb40 [ 89.324529] R13: 0000000080000001 R14: 0000000080000001 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 89.324904] FS: 00007f7b28516740(0000) GS:ffff9d7aeb1c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 89.325328] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 89.325629] CR2: 00007f0af52e96c0 CR3: 0000000002a02006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 89.326004] PKRU: 55555554 [ 89.326161] Call Trace: [ 89.326298] <TASK> [ 89.326419] __sock_release+0xb5/0xc0 [ 89.326632] __sys_socket_file+0xb2/0xd0 [ 89.326844] io_socket+0x88/0x100 [ 89.327039] ? io_issue_sqe+0x6a/0x430 [ 89.327258] io_issue_sqe+0x67/0x430 [ 89.327450] io_submit_sqes+0x1fe/0x670 [ 89.327661] io_sq_thread+0x2e6/0x530 [ 89.327859] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [ 89.328145] ? __pfx_io_sq_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 89.328367] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 [ 89.328576] RIP: 0033:0x0 [ 89.328732] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. [ 89.329073] RSP: 002b:0000000000000000 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001a9 [ 89.329477] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7b28637a3d [ 89.329845] RDX: 00007fff4e4318a8 RSI: 00007fff4e4318b0 RDI: 0000000000000400 [ 89.330216] RBP: 00007fff4e431830 R08: 00007fff4e431711 R09: 00007fff4e4318b0 [ 89.330584] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff4e441b38 [ 89.330950] R13: 0000563835e3e725 R14: 0000563835e40d10 R15: 00007f7b28784040 [ 89.331318] </TASK> [ 89.331441] Modules linked in: [ 89.331617] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: da214a475f8b ("net: add __sys_socket_file()") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230307173707.468744-1-cascardo@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 649c15c7691e9b13cbe9bf6c65c365350e056067 upstream.

When sock_alloc_file fails to allocate a file, it will call sock_release.
__sys_socket_file should then not call sock_release again, otherwise there
will be a double free.

[   89.319884] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   89.320286] kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:1764!
[   89.320656] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[   89.321051] CPU: 7 PID: 125 Comm: iou-sqp-124 Not tainted 6.2.0+ #361
[   89.321535] RIP: 0010:iput+0x1ff/0x240
[   89.321808] Code: d1 83 e1 03 48 83 f9 02 75 09 48 81 fa 00 10 00 00 77 05 83 e2 01 75 1f 4c 89 ef e8 fb d2 ba 00 e9 80 fe ff ff c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 0f 0b e9 d0 fe ff ff 0f 0b eb 8d 49 8d b4 24 08 01 00 00 48
[   89.322760] RSP: 0018:ffffbdd60068bd50 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   89.323036] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d7ad3cacac0 RCX: 0000000000001107
[   89.323412] RDX: 000000000003af00 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9d7ad3cacb40
[   89.323785] RBP: ffffbdd60068bd68 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: ffffffffab606438
[   89.324157] R10: ffffffffacb3dfa0 R11: 6465686361657256 R12: ffff9d7ad3cacb40
[   89.324529] R13: 0000000080000001 R14: 0000000080000001 R15: 0000000000000002
[   89.324904] FS:  00007f7b28516740(0000) GS:ffff9d7aeb1c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   89.325328] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   89.325629] CR2: 00007f0af52e96c0 CR3: 0000000002a02006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[   89.326004] PKRU: 55555554
[   89.326161] Call Trace:
[   89.326298]  <TASK>
[   89.326419]  __sock_release+0xb5/0xc0
[   89.326632]  __sys_socket_file+0xb2/0xd0
[   89.326844]  io_socket+0x88/0x100
[   89.327039]  ? io_issue_sqe+0x6a/0x430
[   89.327258]  io_issue_sqe+0x67/0x430
[   89.327450]  io_submit_sqes+0x1fe/0x670
[   89.327661]  io_sq_thread+0x2e6/0x530
[   89.327859]  ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[   89.328145]  ? __pfx_io_sq_thread+0x10/0x10
[   89.328367]  ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[   89.328576] RIP: 0033:0x0
[   89.328732] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[   89.329073] RSP: 002b:0000000000000000 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001a9
[   89.329477] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7b28637a3d
[   89.329845] RDX: 00007fff4e4318a8 RSI: 00007fff4e4318b0 RDI: 0000000000000400
[   89.330216] RBP: 00007fff4e431830 R08: 00007fff4e431711 R09: 00007fff4e4318b0
[   89.330584] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff4e441b38
[   89.330950] R13: 0000563835e3e725 R14: 0000563835e40d10 R15: 00007f7b28784040
[   89.331318]  </TASK>
[   89.331441] Modules linked in:
[   89.331617] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: da214a475f8b ("net: add __sys_socket_file()")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230307173707.468744-1-cascardo@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: use a bounce buffer for copying skb->mark 2023-02-22T11:59:53+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-02-13T16:00:59+00:00 863a7de987f02a901bf215509276a7de0370e0f9 commit 2558b8039d059342197610498c8749ad294adee5 upstream. syzbot found arm64 builds would crash in sock_recv_mark() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y x86 and powerpc are not detecting the issue because they define user_access_begin. This will be handled in a different patch, because a check_object_size() is missing. Only data from skb->cb[] can be copied directly to/from user space, as explained in commit 79a8a642bf05 ("net: Whitelist the skbuff_head_cache "cb" field") syzbot report was: usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_head_cache' (offset 168, size 4)! ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4410 Comm: syz-executor533 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc7-syzkaller-17907-g2d3827b3f393 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/21/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90 lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90 sp : ffff80000fb9b9a0 x29: ffff80000fb9b9b0 x28: ffff0000c6073400 x27: 0000000020001a00 x26: 0000000000000014 x25: ffff80000cf52000 x24: fffffc0000000000 x23: 05ffc00000000200 x22: fffffc000324bf80 x21: ffff0000c92fe1a8 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 0000000000000004 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 656a626f2042554c x16: ffff0000c6073dd0 x15: ffff80000dbd2118 x14: ffff0000c6073400 x13: 00000000ffffffff x12: ffff0000c6073400 x11: ff808000081bbb4c x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 7b0572d7cc0ccf00 x8 : 7b0572d7cc0ccf00 x7 : ffff80000bf650d4 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff0001fefbff08 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000006c Call trace: usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90 __check_heap_object+0xa8/0x100 mm/slub.c:4761 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:196 [inline] __check_object_size+0x208/0x6b8 mm/usercopy.c:251 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline] __copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:115 [inline] put_cmsg+0x408/0x464 net/core/scm.c:238 sock_recv_mark net/socket.c:975 [inline] __sock_recv_cmsgs+0x1fc/0x248 net/socket.c:984 sock_recv_cmsgs include/net/sock.h:2728 [inline] packet_recvmsg+0x2d8/0x678 net/packet/af_packet.c:3482 ____sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x3a0 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2737 [inline] __sys_recvmsg+0x194/0x210 net/socket.c:2767 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2777 [inline] __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2774 [inline] __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x2c/0x3c net/socket.c:2774 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x64/0x178 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0xbc/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:193 el0_svc+0x58/0x14c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:637 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:655 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: 91388800 aa0903e1 f90003e8 94e6d752 (d4210000) Fixes: 6fd1d51cfa25 ("net: SO_RCVMARK socket option for SO_MARK with recvmsg()") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Erin MacNeil <lnx.erin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213160059.3829741-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 2558b8039d059342197610498c8749ad294adee5 upstream.

syzbot found arm64 builds would crash in sock_recv_mark()
when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y

x86 and powerpc are not detecting the issue because
they define user_access_begin.
This will be handled in a different patch,
because a check_object_size() is missing.

Only data from skb->cb[] can be copied directly to/from user space,
as explained in commit 79a8a642bf05 ("net: Whitelist
the skbuff_head_cache "cb" field")

syzbot report was:
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_head_cache' (offset 168, size 4)!
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102 !
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 4410 Comm: syz-executor533 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc7-syzkaller-17907-g2d3827b3f393 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/21/2023
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90
lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90
sp : ffff80000fb9b9a0
x29: ffff80000fb9b9b0 x28: ffff0000c6073400 x27: 0000000020001a00
x26: 0000000000000014 x25: ffff80000cf52000 x24: fffffc0000000000
x23: 05ffc00000000200 x22: fffffc000324bf80 x21: ffff0000c92fe1a8
x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 0000000000000004 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 656a626f2042554c x16: ffff0000c6073dd0 x15: ffff80000dbd2118
x14: ffff0000c6073400 x13: 00000000ffffffff x12: ffff0000c6073400
x11: ff808000081bbb4c x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 7b0572d7cc0ccf00
x8 : 7b0572d7cc0ccf00 x7 : ffff80000bf650d4 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffff0001fefbff08 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000006c
Call trace:
usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90
__check_heap_object+0xa8/0x100 mm/slub.c:4761
check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:196 [inline]
__check_object_size+0x208/0x6b8 mm/usercopy.c:251
check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline]
__copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:115 [inline]
put_cmsg+0x408/0x464 net/core/scm.c:238
sock_recv_mark net/socket.c:975 [inline]
__sock_recv_cmsgs+0x1fc/0x248 net/socket.c:984
sock_recv_cmsgs include/net/sock.h:2728 [inline]
packet_recvmsg+0x2d8/0x678 net/packet/af_packet.c:3482
____sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x3a0
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2737 [inline]
__sys_recvmsg+0x194/0x210 net/socket.c:2767
__do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2777 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2774 [inline]
__arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x2c/0x3c net/socket.c:2774
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x64/0x178 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
el0_svc_common+0xbc/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:193
el0_svc+0x58/0x14c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:637
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:655
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Code: 91388800 aa0903e1 f90003e8 94e6d752 (d4210000)

Fixes: 6fd1d51cfa25 ("net: SO_RCVMARK socket option for SO_MARK with recvmsg()")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Erin MacNeil <lnx.erin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213160059.3829741-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializers 2023-02-09T10:28:04+00:00 Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk 2022-09-16T00:25:47+00:00 5a1909510387ddf6c2bf58836dc844f66e8a9efb [ Upstream commit de4eda9de2d957ef2d6a8365a01e26a435e958cb ] READ/WRITE proved to be actively confusing - the meanings are "data destination, as used with read(2)" and "data source, as used with write(2)", but people keep interpreting those as "we read data from it" and "we write data to it", i.e. exactly the wrong way. Call them ITER_DEST and ITER_SOURCE - at least that is harder to misinterpret... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Stable-dep-of: 6dd88fd59da8 ("vhost-scsi: unbreak any layout for response") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit de4eda9de2d957ef2d6a8365a01e26a435e958cb ]

READ/WRITE proved to be actively confusing - the meanings are
"data destination, as used with read(2)" and "data source, as
used with write(2)", but people keep interpreting those as
"we read data from it" and "we write data to it", i.e. exactly
the wrong way.

Call them ITER_DEST and ITER_SOURCE - at least that is harder
to misinterpret...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Stable-dep-of: 6dd88fd59da8 ("vhost-scsi: unbreak any layout for response")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Merge tag 'pull-d_path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs 2022-10-06T23:55:41+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2022-10-06T23:55:41+00:00 70df64d6c6c2f76be47311fa6630d6edbefa711e Pull vfs d_path updates from Al Viro. * tag 'pull-d_path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: d_path.c: typo fix... dynamic_dname(): drop unused dentry argument 
Pull vfs d_path updates from Al Viro.

* tag 'pull-d_path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  d_path.c: typo fix...
  dynamic_dname(): drop unused dentry argument
net: Fix a data-race around sysctl_somaxconn. 2022-08-24T12:46:58+00:00 Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com 2022-08-23T17:47:00+00:00 3c9ba81d72047f2e81bb535d42856517b613aba7 While reading sysctl_somaxconn, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
While reading sysctl_somaxconn, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
dynamic_dname(): drop unused dentry argument 2022-08-20T15:34:04+00:00 Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk 2022-01-30T20:03:49+00:00 0f60d28828dd94779c6527440289e1c36a05115a Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>