<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/socket.c, branch v4.15</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2018-01-11T01:55:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-11T01:55:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cbd0a6a2cc4327681edc61f6f47f47e276ea81d6'/>
<id>cbd0a6a2cc4327681edc61f6f47f47e276ea81d6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs regression fix from Al Viro/

Fix a leak in socket() introduced by commit 8e1611e23579 ("make
sock_alloc_file() do sock_release() on failures").

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  Fix a leak in socket(2) when we fail to allocate a file descriptor.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull vfs regression fix from Al Viro/

Fix a leak in socket() introduced by commit 8e1611e23579 ("make
sock_alloc_file() do sock_release() on failures").

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  Fix a leak in socket(2) when we fail to allocate a file descriptor.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix a leak in socket(2) when we fail to allocate a file descriptor.</title>
<updated>2018-01-10T23:47:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-10T23:47:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ce4bb04cae8924792ed92f4af2793b77fc986f0e'/>
<id>ce4bb04cae8924792ed92f4af2793b77fc986f0e</id>
<content type='text'>
Got broken by "make sock_alloc_file() do sock_release() on failures" -
cleanup after sock_map_fd() failure got pulled all the way into
sock_alloc_file(), but it used to serve the case when sock_map_fd()
failed *before* getting to sock_alloc_file() as well, and that got
lost.  Trivial to fix, fortunately.

Fixes: 8e1611e23579 (make sock_alloc_file() do sock_release() on failures)
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Got broken by "make sock_alloc_file() do sock_release() on failures" -
cleanup after sock_map_fd() failure got pulled all the way into
sock_alloc_file(), but it used to serve the case when sock_map_fd()
failed *before* getting to sock_alloc_file() as well, and that got
lost.  Trivial to fix, fortunately.

Fixes: 8e1611e23579 (make sock_alloc_file() do sock_release() on failures)
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config</title>
<updated>2018-01-09T21:25:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-09T18:04:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb'/>
<id>290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb</id>
<content type='text'>
The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.

A quote from goolge project zero blog:
"At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in
the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading
from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result
appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an
attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together
and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying.
So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into
the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside
a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient
to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."

To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode.
So far eBPF JIT is supported by:
x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64

The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only.
In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden

v2-&gt;v3:
- move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)

v1-&gt;v2:
- fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback)
- fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback)
- add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog-&gt;bpf_func
- retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk.
  It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next

Considered doing:
  int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT;
but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove
bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place
and remove this jit_init() function.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.

A quote from goolge project zero blog:
"At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in
the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading
from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result
appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an
attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together
and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying.
So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into
the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside
a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient
to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."

To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode.
So far eBPF JIT is supported by:
x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64

The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only.
In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden

v2-&gt;v3:
- move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)

v1-&gt;v2:
- fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback)
- fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback)
- add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog-&gt;bpf_func
- retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk.
  It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next

Considered doing:
  int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT;
but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove
bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place
and remove this jit_init() function.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>make sock_alloc_file() do sock_release() on failures</title>
<updated>2017-12-05T23:39:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-05T23:29:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8e1611e2357927b22892ecc062d65c99d0d89066'/>
<id>8e1611e2357927b22892ecc062d65c99d0d89066</id>
<content type='text'>
This changes calling conventions (and simplifies the hell out
the callers).  New rules: once struct socket had been passed
to sock_alloc_file(), it's been consumed either by struct file
or by sock_release() done by sock_alloc_file().  Either way
the caller should not do sock_release() after that point.

Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This changes calling conventions (and simplifies the hell out
the callers).  New rules: once struct socket had been passed
to sock_alloc_file(), it's been consumed either by struct file
or by sock_release() done by sock_alloc_file().  Either way
the caller should not do sock_release() after that point.

Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>socketpair(): allocate descriptors first</title>
<updated>2017-12-05T23:39:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-05T23:28:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=016a266bdfeda268afb2228b6217fd4771334635'/>
<id>016a266bdfeda268afb2228b6217fd4771334635</id>
<content type='text'>
simplifies failure exits considerably...

Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
simplifies failure exits considerably...

Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kmemcheck: remove annotations</title>
<updated>2017-11-16T02:21:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)</name>
<email>alexander.levin@verizon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-16T01:35:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4950276672fce5c241857540f8561c440663673d'/>
<id>4950276672fce5c241857540f8561c440663673d</id>
<content type='text'>
Patch series "kmemcheck: kill kmemcheck", v2.

As discussed at LSF/MM, kill kmemcheck.

KASan is a replacement that is able to work without the limitation of
kmemcheck (single CPU, slow).  KASan is already upstream.

We are also not aware of any users of kmemcheck (or users who don't
consider KASan as a suitable replacement).

The only objection was that since KASAN wasn't supported by all GCC
versions provided by distros at that time we should hold off for 2
years, and try again.

Now that 2 years have passed, and all distros provide gcc that supports
KASAN, kill kmemcheck again for the very same reasons.

This patch (of 4):

Remove kmemcheck annotations, and calls to kmemcheck from the kernel.

[alexander.levin@verizon.com: correctly remove kmemcheck call from dma_map_sg_attrs]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171012192151.26531-1-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-2-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tim Hansen &lt;devtimhansen@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegardno@ifi.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Patch series "kmemcheck: kill kmemcheck", v2.

As discussed at LSF/MM, kill kmemcheck.

KASan is a replacement that is able to work without the limitation of
kmemcheck (single CPU, slow).  KASan is already upstream.

We are also not aware of any users of kmemcheck (or users who don't
consider KASan as a suitable replacement).

The only objection was that since KASAN wasn't supported by all GCC
versions provided by distros at that time we should hold off for 2
years, and try again.

Now that 2 years have passed, and all distros provide gcc that supports
KASAN, kill kmemcheck again for the very same reasons.

This patch (of 4):

Remove kmemcheck annotations, and calls to kmemcheck from the kernel.

[alexander.levin@verizon.com: correctly remove kmemcheck call from dma_map_sg_attrs]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171012192151.26531-1-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-2-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tim Hansen &lt;devtimhansen@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegardno@ifi.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fixes for skb_send_sock</title>
<updated>2017-08-16T18:27:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Fastabend</name>
<email>john.fastabend@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-16T05:31:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=db5980d804d7158917ad4b9186c78b2a3f1db4ef'/>
<id>db5980d804d7158917ad4b9186c78b2a3f1db4ef</id>
<content type='text'>
A couple fixes to new skb_send_sock infrastructure. However, no users
currently exist for this code (adding user in next handful of patches)
so it should not be possible to trigger a panic with existing in-kernel
code.

Fixes: 306b13eb3cf9 ("proto_ops: Add locked held versions of sendmsg and sendpage")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A couple fixes to new skb_send_sock infrastructure. However, no users
currently exist for this code (adding user in next handful of patches)
so it should not be possible to trigger a panic with existing in-kernel
code.

Fixes: 306b13eb3cf9 ("proto_ops: Add locked held versions of sendmsg and sendpage")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proto_ops: Add locked held versions of sendmsg and sendpage</title>
<updated>2017-08-01T22:26:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Herbert</name>
<email>tom@quantonium.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-28T23:22:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=306b13eb3cf9515a8214bbf5d69d811371d05792'/>
<id>306b13eb3cf9515a8214bbf5d69d811371d05792</id>
<content type='text'>
Add new proto_ops sendmsg_locked and sendpage_locked that can be
called when the socket lock is already held. Correspondingly, add
kernel_sendmsg_locked and kernel_sendpage_locked as front end
functions.

These functions will be used in zero proxy so that we can take
the socket lock in a ULP sendmsg/sendpage and then directly call the
backend transport proto_ops functions.

Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert &lt;tom@quantonium.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add new proto_ops sendmsg_locked and sendpage_locked that can be
called when the socket lock is already held. Correspondingly, add
kernel_sendmsg_locked and kernel_sendpage_locked as front end
functions.

These functions will be used in zero proxy so that we can take
the socket lock in a ULP sendmsg/sendpage and then directly call the
backend transport proto_ops functions.

Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert &lt;tom@quantonium.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net</title>
<updated>2017-08-01T17:07:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-01T17:07:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=29fda25a2d31098044f8dfa177c4d2834071828e'/>
<id>29fda25a2d31098044f8dfa177c4d2834071828e</id>
<content type='text'>
Two minor conflicts in virtio_net driver (bug fix overlapping addition
of a helper) and MAINTAINERS (new driver edit overlapping revamp of
PHY entry).

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Two minor conflicts in virtio_net driver (bug fix overlapping addition
of a helper) and MAINTAINERS (new driver edit overlapping revamp of
PHY entry).

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>socket: fix set not used warning</title>
<updated>2017-07-25T19:31:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>stephen hemminger</name>
<email>stephen@networkplumber.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-24T17:25:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=614d79c09e03d4a421f6d7eab1804600db33e04e'/>
<id>614d79c09e03d4a421f6d7eab1804600db33e04e</id>
<content type='text'>
The variable owned_by_user is always set, but only used
when kernel is configured with LOCKDEP enabled.

Get rid of the warning by moving the code to put the call
to owned_by_user into the the rcu_protected call.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;sthemmin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The variable owned_by_user is always set, but only used
when kernel is configured with LOCKDEP enabled.

Get rid of the warning by moving the code to put the call
to owned_by_user into the the rcu_protected call.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;sthemmin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
