<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/sctp, branch linux-rolling-lts</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:17:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Weiming Shi</name>
<email>bestswngs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-04T03:35:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ebe0a55d954fa8da383b6192edb8f763dcb002d5'/>
<id>ebe0a55d954fa8da383b6192edb8f763dcb002d5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1cd23ca80784223fa2204e16203f754da4e821f8 upstream.

When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the
COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure
of Staleness that follows the cause header:

	err   = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk-&gt;skb-&gt;data);
	stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));

err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that
caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is
present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the
4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs
past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb-&gt;tail. The value
is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,
leaking uninitialized memory.

sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so
check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which
reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too
short to hold the staleness field is discarded.

The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into
COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket
in a user and network namespace.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704033545.2438373-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1cd23ca80784223fa2204e16203f754da4e821f8 upstream.

When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the
COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure
of Staleness that follows the cause header:

	err   = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk-&gt;skb-&gt;data);
	stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));

err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that
caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is
present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the
4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs
past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb-&gt;tail. The value
is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,
leaking uninitialized memory.

sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so
check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which
reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too
short to hold the staleness field is discarded.

The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into
COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket
in a user and network namespace.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704033545.2438373-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix addr_wq_timer race in sctp_free_addr_wq()</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:16:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-29T18:31:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a8323fb2ab6cd6978f359daeed6688e0cadf32ba'/>
<id>a8323fb2ab6cd6978f359daeed6688e0cadf32ba</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 976c19de0f22a857ba0112f39635f8fd7a257568 ]

sctp_free_addr_wq() previously removed addr_wq_timer using timer_delete()
while holding addr_wq_lock. However, timer_delete() does not guarantee that
a currently running timer handler has completed.

This allows a race with sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler(), where the handler
may still run after addr_waitq has been freed, acquire addr_wq_lock, and
access freed memory, leading to a use-after-free.

Fix this by calling timer_shutdown_sync() before taking addr_wq_lock.  This
guarantees that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents the
timer from being re-armed during teardown, making subsequent cleanup safe.

Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Reported-by: Sashiko &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5dc95f295bdb5c3f60e880dd9aa5112dc5c071cc.1782757874.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 976c19de0f22a857ba0112f39635f8fd7a257568 ]

sctp_free_addr_wq() previously removed addr_wq_timer using timer_delete()
while holding addr_wq_lock. However, timer_delete() does not guarantee that
a currently running timer handler has completed.

This allows a race with sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler(), where the handler
may still run after addr_waitq has been freed, acquire addr_wq_lock, and
access freed memory, leading to a use-after-free.

Fix this by calling timer_shutdown_sync() before taking addr_wq_lock.  This
guarantees that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents the
timer from being re-armed during teardown, making subsequent cleanup safe.

Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Reported-by: Sashiko &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5dc95f295bdb5c3f60e880dd9aa5112dc5c071cc.1782757874.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:16:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-24T22:53:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bca3100f550281c2f2418652338bced3b35af0e6'/>
<id>bca3100f550281c2f2418652338bced3b35af0e6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 414c5447fe6a200613dd46d7fdc8454622076cb1 ]

In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server
and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then
returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and
reconstructs the original INIT chunk.

When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected
against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification
is safe.

However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT
can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly
validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.

Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO
processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook())
when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is
freed and the packet is discarded.

Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the
embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT
chunk.

Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using
the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk-&gt;chunk_end, since the
INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ebcbbac574815b0850f371b4bdb02f2e602b94d3.1782341592.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 414c5447fe6a200613dd46d7fdc8454622076cb1 ]

In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server
and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then
returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and
reconstructs the original INIT chunk.

When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected
against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification
is safe.

However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT
can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly
validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.

Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO
processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook())
when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is
freed and the packet is discarded.

Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the
embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT
chunk.

Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using
the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk-&gt;chunk_end, since the
INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ebcbbac574815b0850f371b4bdb02f2e602b94d3.1782341592.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix SCTP_RESET_STREAMS stream list length limit</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:16:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yousef Alhouseen</name>
<email>alhouseenyousef@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-25T14:23:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ad6215d76b644fe4cde6271ba9805ca473d40f03'/>
<id>ad6215d76b644fe4cde6271ba9805ca473d40f03</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2b9f5ef534184bd81b8a4772780626c40eed1fd5 ]

SCTP_RESET_STREAMS carries a flexible array of u16 stream IDs, but the
optlen clamps treat USHRT_MAX as a byte count and then multiply
sizeof(__u16) by the fixed header size.

That caps the copied and validated option buffer at about 64 KiB, which
rejects valid requests containing more than about half of the u16 stream
ID range.

Use struct_size_t() for the maximum struct sctp_reset_streams layout
instead, so the bound matches the flexible array described by
srs_number_streams.

Fixes: 5960cefab9df ("sctp: add a ceiling to optlen in some sockopts")
Acked-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yousef Alhouseen &lt;alhouseenyousef@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625142354.2600-1-alhouseenyousef@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2b9f5ef534184bd81b8a4772780626c40eed1fd5 ]

SCTP_RESET_STREAMS carries a flexible array of u16 stream IDs, but the
optlen clamps treat USHRT_MAX as a byte count and then multiply
sizeof(__u16) by the fixed header size.

That caps the copied and validated option buffer at about 64 KiB, which
rejects valid requests containing more than about half of the u16 stream
ID range.

Use struct_size_t() for the maximum struct sctp_reset_streams layout
instead, so the bound matches the flexible array described by
srs_number_streams.

Fixes: 5960cefab9df ("sctp: add a ceiling to optlen in some sockopts")
Acked-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yousef Alhouseen &lt;alhouseenyousef@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625142354.2600-1-alhouseenyousef@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: hold socket lock when dumping endpoints in sctp_diag</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:16:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-15T19:36:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=207bb4ce8fe7de961ae7bb33569ad2cd61f44954'/>
<id>207bb4ce8fe7de961ae7bb33569ad2cd61f44954</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7d8297e26b4e20b5d1c3c3fe51fe81a1c7fbc823 ]

SCTP_DIAG endpoint dumping was traversing endpoint address lists without
holding lock_sock(), while those lists could change concurrently via
socket operations (e.g., bindx changes). This creates a race where
nla_reserve() counts addresses under RCU protection, but the subsequent
copy may see fewer entries, potentially leaking uninitialized memory to
userspace.

Fix this by:

- Taking a reference on each endpoint during hash traversal
- Moving socket operations (lock_sock()) outside read_lock_bh()
- Serializing address list access during dump
- Reworking sctp_for_each_endpoint() to support restart-based traversal
  with (net, pos) tracking

Also:

- Add WARN_ON_ONCE() for inconsistent address counts
- Fix idiag_states filtering for LISTEN vs association cases
- Skip dumping endpoints being freed (ep-&gt;base.dead)
- Move dump position tracking into iterator, removing cb-&gt;args[4] and
  its comment for sctp_ep_dump().,
- Update the comment for cb-&gt;args[4] and remove the comment for unused
  cb-&gt;args[5] for sctp_sock_dump().

Note: traversal is restart-based and may re-scan buckets multiple times,
but this is acceptable due to small bucket sizes and required to support
sleeping-safe callbacks.

This issue was reported by Nico Yip (@_cyeaa_) working with TrendAI Zero
Day Initiative.

Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative &lt;zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com&gt;
Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4c1b49ab87e0f7d552ebd8172b364b1994e913c9.1781552190.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7d8297e26b4e20b5d1c3c3fe51fe81a1c7fbc823 ]

SCTP_DIAG endpoint dumping was traversing endpoint address lists without
holding lock_sock(), while those lists could change concurrently via
socket operations (e.g., bindx changes). This creates a race where
nla_reserve() counts addresses under RCU protection, but the subsequent
copy may see fewer entries, potentially leaking uninitialized memory to
userspace.

Fix this by:

- Taking a reference on each endpoint during hash traversal
- Moving socket operations (lock_sock()) outside read_lock_bh()
- Serializing address list access during dump
- Reworking sctp_for_each_endpoint() to support restart-based traversal
  with (net, pos) tracking

Also:

- Add WARN_ON_ONCE() for inconsistent address counts
- Fix idiag_states filtering for LISTEN vs association cases
- Skip dumping endpoints being freed (ep-&gt;base.dead)
- Move dump position tracking into iterator, removing cb-&gt;args[4] and
  its comment for sctp_ep_dump().,
- Update the comment for cb-&gt;args[4] and remove the comment for unused
  cb-&gt;args[5] for sctp_sock_dump().

Note: traversal is restart-based and may re-scan buckets multiple times,
but this is acceptable due to small bucket sizes and required to support
sleeping-safe callbacks.

This issue was reported by Nico Yip (@_cyeaa_) working with TrendAI Zero
Day Initiative.

Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative &lt;zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com&gt;
Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4c1b49ab87e0f7d552ebd8172b364b1994e913c9.1781552190.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: remove addr_len argument of recvmsg() handlers</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:16:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-27T15:11:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=073d95725269676c8b1dd6edbc156897067ef683'/>
<id>073d95725269676c8b1dd6edbc156897067ef683</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8341c989ac77d712c7d6e2bce29e8a4bcb2eeae4 ]

Use msg-&gt;msg_namelen as a place holder instead of a
temporary variable, notably in inet[6]_recvmsg().

This removes stack canaries and allows tail-calls.

$ scripts/bloat-o-meter -t vmlinux.old vmlinux
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/19 up/down: 26/-532 (-506)
Function                                     old     new   delta
rawv6_recvmsg                                744     767     +23
vsock_dgram_recvmsg                           55      58      +3
vsock_connectible_recvmsg                     50      47      -3
unix_stream_recvmsg                          161     158      -3
unix_seqpacket_recvmsg                        62      59      -3
unix_dgram_recvmsg                            42      39      -3
tcp_recvmsg                                  546     543      -3
mptcp_recvmsg                               1568    1565      -3
ping_recvmsg                                 806     800      -6
tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser                       983     974      -9
ip_recv_error                                588     576     -12
ipv6_recv_rxpmtu                             442     428     -14
udp_recvmsg                                 1243    1224     -19
ipv6_recv_error                             1046    1024     -22
udpv6_recvmsg                               1487    1461     -26
raw_recvmsg                                  465     437     -28
udp_bpf_recvmsg                             1027     984     -43
sock_common_recvmsg                          103      27     -76
inet_recvmsg                                 257     175     -82
inet6_recvmsg                                257     175     -82
tcp_bpf_recvmsg                              663     568     -95
Total: Before=25143834, After=25143328, chg -0.00%

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260227151120.1346573-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: c010995b29c8 ("sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8341c989ac77d712c7d6e2bce29e8a4bcb2eeae4 ]

Use msg-&gt;msg_namelen as a place holder instead of a
temporary variable, notably in inet[6]_recvmsg().

This removes stack canaries and allows tail-calls.

$ scripts/bloat-o-meter -t vmlinux.old vmlinux
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/19 up/down: 26/-532 (-506)
Function                                     old     new   delta
rawv6_recvmsg                                744     767     +23
vsock_dgram_recvmsg                           55      58      +3
vsock_connectible_recvmsg                     50      47      -3
unix_stream_recvmsg                          161     158      -3
unix_seqpacket_recvmsg                        62      59      -3
unix_dgram_recvmsg                            42      39      -3
tcp_recvmsg                                  546     543      -3
mptcp_recvmsg                               1568    1565      -3
ping_recvmsg                                 806     800      -6
tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser                       983     974      -9
ip_recv_error                                588     576     -12
ipv6_recv_rxpmtu                             442     428     -14
udp_recvmsg                                 1243    1224     -19
ipv6_recv_error                             1046    1024     -22
udpv6_recvmsg                               1487    1461     -26
raw_recvmsg                                  465     437     -28
udp_bpf_recvmsg                             1027     984     -43
sock_common_recvmsg                          103      27     -76
inet_recvmsg                                 257     175     -82
inet6_recvmsg                                257     175     -82
tcp_bpf_recvmsg                              663     568     -95
Total: Before=25143834, After=25143328, chg -0.00%

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260227151120.1346573-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: c010995b29c8 ("sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: validate embedded address parameter length</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:16:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-09T22:14:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ed8605c6f39b9b84f9a4631db6deb25e7f1e973c'/>
<id>ed8605c6f39b9b84f9a4631db6deb25e7f1e973c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e9361d0ca55c4af12aac09e2572852fa91046229 ]

sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP,
and SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct
sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer
parameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header,
but does not verify that the embedded address parameter's declared length
fits within the bounds of the outer parameter.

Later, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the
embedded address parameter and pass it to af-&gt;from_addr_param(), which uses
the address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload.
A malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter
length that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter.

Validate that addr_param-&gt;p.length does not exceed the space available
after the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address
parameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length
extends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds.

This prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried
in INIT or ASCONF processing paths.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: sashiko &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7838b86b69f52add28808fb59034c8f992e97b2d.1781043268.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e9361d0ca55c4af12aac09e2572852fa91046229 ]

sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP,
and SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct
sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer
parameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header,
but does not verify that the embedded address parameter's declared length
fits within the bounds of the outer parameter.

Later, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the
embedded address parameter and pass it to af-&gt;from_addr_param(), which uses
the address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload.
A malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter
length that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter.

Validate that addr_param-&gt;p.length does not exceed the space available
after the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address
parameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length
extends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds.

This prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried
in INIT or ASCONF processing paths.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: sashiko &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7838b86b69f52add28808fb59034c8f992e97b2d.1781043268.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: disable BH before calling udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()</title>
<updated>2026-06-27T10:06:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-25T07:43:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0de7db2eb27e82b983157016fa604b1ba664ae5f'/>
<id>0de7db2eb27e82b983157016fa604b1ba664ae5f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2cd7e6971fc2787408ceef17906ea152791448cf upstream.

udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() / udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb() are expected to run with
BH disabled.  After commit 6f1a9140ecda ("add xmit recursion limit to
tunnel xmit functions"), on the path:

  udp(6)_tunnel_xmit_skb() -&gt; ip(6)tunnel_xmit()

dev_xmit_recursion_inc()/dec() must stay balanced on the same CPU.

Without local_bh_disable(), the context may move between CPUs, which can
break the inc/dec pairing. This may lead to incorrect recursion level
detection and cause packets to be dropped in ip(6)_tunnel_xmit() or
__dev_queue_xmit().

Fix it by disabling BH around both IPv4 and IPv6 SCTP UDP xmit paths.

In my testing, after enabling the SCTP over UDP:

  # ip net exec ha sysctl -w net.sctp.udp_port=9899
  # ip net exec ha sysctl -w net.sctp.encap_port=9899
  # ip net exec hb sysctl -w net.sctp.udp_port=9899
  # ip net exec hb sysctl -w net.sctp.encap_port=9899

  # ip net exec ha iperf3 -s

- without this patch:

  # ip net exec hb iperf3 -c 192.168.0.1 --sctp
  [  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  37.2 MBytes  31.2 Mbits/sec  sender
  [  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  37.1 MBytes  31.1 Mbits/sec  receiver

- with this patch:

  # ip net exec hb iperf3 -c 192.168.0.1 --sctp
  [  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  3.14 GBytes  2.69 Gbits/sec  sender
  [  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  3.14 GBytes  2.69 Gbits/sec  receiver

Fixes: 6f1a9140ecda ("net: add xmit recursion limit to tunnel xmit functions")
Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c874a8548221dcd56ff03c65ba75a74e6cf99119.1776017727.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Martyniuk &lt;alexevgmart@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2cd7e6971fc2787408ceef17906ea152791448cf upstream.

udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() / udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb() are expected to run with
BH disabled.  After commit 6f1a9140ecda ("add xmit recursion limit to
tunnel xmit functions"), on the path:

  udp(6)_tunnel_xmit_skb() -&gt; ip(6)tunnel_xmit()

dev_xmit_recursion_inc()/dec() must stay balanced on the same CPU.

Without local_bh_disable(), the context may move between CPUs, which can
break the inc/dec pairing. This may lead to incorrect recursion level
detection and cause packets to be dropped in ip(6)_tunnel_xmit() or
__dev_queue_xmit().

Fix it by disabling BH around both IPv4 and IPv6 SCTP UDP xmit paths.

In my testing, after enabling the SCTP over UDP:

  # ip net exec ha sysctl -w net.sctp.udp_port=9899
  # ip net exec ha sysctl -w net.sctp.encap_port=9899
  # ip net exec hb sysctl -w net.sctp.udp_port=9899
  # ip net exec hb sysctl -w net.sctp.encap_port=9899

  # ip net exec ha iperf3 -s

- without this patch:

  # ip net exec hb iperf3 -c 192.168.0.1 --sctp
  [  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  37.2 MBytes  31.2 Mbits/sec  sender
  [  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  37.1 MBytes  31.1 Mbits/sec  receiver

- with this patch:

  # ip net exec hb iperf3 -c 192.168.0.1 --sctp
  [  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  3.14 GBytes  2.69 Gbits/sec  sender
  [  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  3.14 GBytes  2.69 Gbits/sec  receiver

Fixes: 6f1a9140ecda ("net: add xmit recursion limit to tunnel xmit functions")
Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c874a8548221dcd56ff03c65ba75a74e6cf99119.1776017727.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Martyniuk &lt;alexevgmart@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: stream: fully roll back denied add-stream state</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:44:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wyatt Feng</name>
<email>bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-05T05:53:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d5ea0b3e261fcb2cfff142675516165244cab1da'/>
<id>d5ea0b3e261fcb2cfff142675516165244cab1da</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a5f8a90ac9f77c678a9781c0a464b635e0d63e49 upstream.

When ADD_OUT_STREAMS is denied, SCTP only shrinks the queued chunks and
then lowers outcnt. That leaves removed stream metadata behind, so a
later re-add can reuse a stale ext and hit a null-pointer dereference in
the scheduler get path.

Fix the rollback by tearing down the removed stream state the same way
other stream resizes do. Unschedule the current scheduler state, drop
the removed stream ext state with sctp_stream_outq_migrate(), and then
reschedule the remaining streams.

This keeps scheduler-private RR/FC/PRIO lists consistent while fully
rolling back denied outgoing stream additions.

Fixes: 637784ade221 ("sctp: introduce priority based stream scheduler")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang &lt;zcliangcn@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng &lt;bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Acked-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/d78954ecd94954653ee299400e98d74a03a6f7d3.1780603399.git.bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a5f8a90ac9f77c678a9781c0a464b635e0d63e49 upstream.

When ADD_OUT_STREAMS is denied, SCTP only shrinks the queued chunks and
then lowers outcnt. That leaves removed stream metadata behind, so a
later re-add can reuse a stale ext and hit a null-pointer dereference in
the scheduler get path.

Fix the rollback by tearing down the removed stream state the same way
other stream resizes do. Unschedule the current scheduler state, drop
the removed stream ext state with sctp_stream_outq_migrate(), and then
reschedule the remaining streams.

This keeps scheduler-private RR/FC/PRIO lists consistent while fully
rolling back denied outgoing stream additions.

Fixes: 637784ade221 ("sctp: introduce priority based stream scheduler")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang &lt;zcliangcn@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng &lt;bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Acked-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/d78954ecd94954653ee299400e98d74a03a6f7d3.1780603399.git.bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: diag: reject stale associations in dump_one path</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:44:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhao Zhang</name>
<email>zzhan461@ucr.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-30T15:57:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=78c4f964b2f94e405721c093773f6250e1e676b2'/>
<id>78c4f964b2f94e405721c093773f6250e1e676b2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5eba3e48d78edd7551b992cb7ba687019b3a78da upstream.

The SCTP exact sock_diag lookup can hold a transport reference, block on
lock_sock(sk), and then resume after sctp_association_free() has marked
the association dead and freed its bind address list.

When that happens, inet_assoc_attr_size() and
inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() can still dereference association state
that is no longer valid for reporting. In particular,
inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() may read an empty bind-address list as a
real sctp_sockaddr_entry and trigger an out-of-bounds read from
unrelated association memory.

Reject the association after taking the socket lock if it has been
reaped or detached from the endpoint, and report the lookup as stale.
This keeps the exact dump-one path from formatting torn association
state.

Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang &lt;zcliangcn@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhang &lt;zzhan461@ucr.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Acked-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/fac6043fa20a2ff68e12958c431836f692c51268.1780113823.git.zzhan461@ucr.edu
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5eba3e48d78edd7551b992cb7ba687019b3a78da upstream.

The SCTP exact sock_diag lookup can hold a transport reference, block on
lock_sock(sk), and then resume after sctp_association_free() has marked
the association dead and freed its bind address list.

When that happens, inet_assoc_attr_size() and
inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() can still dereference association state
that is no longer valid for reporting. In particular,
inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() may read an empty bind-address list as a
real sctp_sockaddr_entry and trigger an out-of-bounds read from
unrelated association memory.

Reject the association after taking the socket lock if it has been
reaped or detached from the endpoint, and report the lookup as stale.
This keeps the exact dump-one path from formatting torn association
state.

Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang &lt;zcliangcn@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhang &lt;zzhan461@ucr.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Acked-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/fac6043fa20a2ff68e12958c431836f692c51268.1780113823.git.zzhan461@ucr.edu
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
