<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/sctp/socket.c, branch linux-4.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>sctp: sctp should release assoc when sctp_make_abort_user return NULL in sctp_close</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-29T09:49:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bc09ed7acb3848685326783da943cbbd65bf04e1'/>
<id>bc09ed7acb3848685326783da943cbbd65bf04e1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 068d8bd338e855286aea54e70d1c101569284b21 ]

In sctp_close, sctp_make_abort_user may return NULL because of memory
allocation failure. If this happens, it will bypass any state change
and never free the assoc. The assoc has no chance to be freed and it
will be kept in memory with the state it had even after the socket is
closed by sctp_close().

So if sctp_make_abort_user fails to allocate memory, we should abort
the asoc via sctp_primitive_ABORT as well. Just like the annotation in
sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_abort and sctp_sf_do_9_1_prm_abort said,
"Even if we can't send the ABORT due to low memory delete the TCB.
This is a departure from our typical NOMEM handling".

But then the chunk is NULL (low memory) and the SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd would
dereference the chunk pointer, and system crash. So we should add
SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd only when the chunk is not NULL, just like other
places where it adds SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 068d8bd338e855286aea54e70d1c101569284b21 ]

In sctp_close, sctp_make_abort_user may return NULL because of memory
allocation failure. If this happens, it will bypass any state change
and never free the assoc. The assoc has no chance to be freed and it
will be kept in memory with the state it had even after the socket is
closed by sctp_close().

So if sctp_make_abort_user fails to allocate memory, we should abort
the asoc via sctp_primitive_ABORT as well. Just like the annotation in
sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_abort and sctp_sf_do_9_1_prm_abort said,
"Even if we can't send the ABORT due to low memory delete the TCB.
This is a departure from our typical NOMEM handling".

But then the chunk is NULL (low memory) and the SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd would
dereference the chunk pointer, and system crash. So we should add
SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd only when the chunk is not NULL, just like other
places where it adds SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: also copy sk_tsflags when copying the socket</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Ricardo Leitner</name>
<email>marcelo.leitner@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-04T17:14:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7914d19d35bcd2d838abcca7e39d990661e475f0'/>
<id>7914d19d35bcd2d838abcca7e39d990661e475f0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 50a5ffb1ef535e3c6989711c51b5d61b543a3b45 ]

As we are keeping timestamps on when copying the socket, we also have to
copy sk_tsflags.

This is needed since b9f40e21ef42 ("net-timestamp: move timestamp flags
out of sk_flags").

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 50a5ffb1ef535e3c6989711c51b5d61b543a3b45 ]

As we are keeping timestamps on when copying the socket, we also have to
copy sk_tsflags.

This is needed since b9f40e21ef42 ("net-timestamp: move timestamp flags
out of sk_flags").

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: update the netstamp_needed counter when copying sockets</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Ricardo Leitner</name>
<email>marcelo.leitner@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-04T17:14:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=83eb235f81c20dc413e08ebfba19d246cddea03c'/>
<id>83eb235f81c20dc413e08ebfba19d246cddea03c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 01ce63c90170283a9855d1db4fe81934dddce648 ]

Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy
related to disabling sock timestamp.

When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags
but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag
was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever
such clones were closed.

The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with
that flag on, like tcp does.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 01ce63c90170283a9855d1db4fe81934dddce648 ]

Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy
related to disabling sock timestamp.

When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags
but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag
was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever
such clones were closed.

The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with
that flag on, like tcp does.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: sctp: implement sctp_v6_destroy_sock()</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T05:41:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-01T15:20:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7a439c4a677039b91804b6779de18ddab6d6ebf9'/>
<id>7a439c4a677039b91804b6779de18ddab6d6ebf9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 602dd62dfbda3e63a2d6a3cbde953ebe82bf5087 ]

Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets.

We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release
inet6 specific fields.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 602dd62dfbda3e63a2d6a3cbde953ebe82bf5087 ]

Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets.

We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release
inet6 specific fields.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: stop spamming klog with rfc6458, 5.3.2. deprecation warnings</title>
<updated>2015-07-26T23:32:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-22T14:31:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=81296fc67319d96ea6f7f43a07494394e1236a19'/>
<id>81296fc67319d96ea6f7f43a07494394e1236a19</id>
<content type='text'>
Back then when we added support for SCTP_SNDINFO/SCTP_RCVINFO from
RFC6458 5.3.4/5.3.5, we decided to add a deprecation warning for the
(as per RFC deprecated) SCTP_SNDRCV via commit bbbea41d5e53 ("net:
sctp: deprecate rfc6458, 5.3.2. SCTP_SNDRCV support"), see [1].

Imho, it was not a good idea, and we should just revert that message
for a couple of reasons:

  1) It's uapi and therefore set in stone forever.

  2) To be able to run on older and newer kernels, an SCTP application
     would need to probe for both, SCTP_SNDRCV, but also SCTP_SNDINFO/
     SCTP_RCVINFO support, so that on older kernels, it can make use
     of SCTP_SNDRCV, and on newer kernels SCTP_SNDINFO/SCTP_RCVINFO.
     In my (limited) experience, a lot of SCTP appliances are migrating
     to newer kernels only ve(ee)ry slowly.

  3) Some people don't have the chance to change their applications,
     f.e. due to proprietary legacy stuff. So, they'll hit this warning
     in fast path and are stuck with older kernels.

But i.e. due to point 1) I really fail to see the benefit of a warning.
So just revert that for now, the issue was reported up Jamal.

  [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/321960/

Reported-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Michael Tuexen &lt;tuexen@fh-muenster.de&gt;
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Back then when we added support for SCTP_SNDINFO/SCTP_RCVINFO from
RFC6458 5.3.4/5.3.5, we decided to add a deprecation warning for the
(as per RFC deprecated) SCTP_SNDRCV via commit bbbea41d5e53 ("net:
sctp: deprecate rfc6458, 5.3.2. SCTP_SNDRCV support"), see [1].

Imho, it was not a good idea, and we should just revert that message
for a couple of reasons:

  1) It's uapi and therefore set in stone forever.

  2) To be able to run on older and newer kernels, an SCTP application
     would need to probe for both, SCTP_SNDRCV, but also SCTP_SNDINFO/
     SCTP_RCVINFO support, so that on older kernels, it can make use
     of SCTP_SNDRCV, and on newer kernels SCTP_SNDINFO/SCTP_RCVINFO.
     In my (limited) experience, a lot of SCTP appliances are migrating
     to newer kernels only ve(ee)ry slowly.

  3) Some people don't have the chance to change their applications,
     f.e. due to proprietary legacy stuff. So, they'll hit this warning
     in fast path and are stuck with older kernels.

But i.e. due to point 1) I really fail to see the benefit of a warning.
So just revert that for now, the issue was reported up Jamal.

  [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/321960/

Reported-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Michael Tuexen &lt;tuexen@fh-muenster.de&gt;
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Kill sock-&gt;sk_protinfo</title>
<updated>2015-06-28T23:55:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-25T13:19:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1830fcea5bbed2719a9dc32aebe802f72ddf14ab'/>
<id>1830fcea5bbed2719a9dc32aebe802f72ddf14ab</id>
<content type='text'>
No more users, so it can now be removed.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
No more users, so it can now be removed.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix ASCONF list handling</title>
<updated>2015-06-14T19:55:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Ricardo Leitner</name>
<email>marcelo.leitner@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-12T13:16:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2d45a02d0166caf2627fe91897c6ffc3b19514c4'/>
<id>2d45a02d0166caf2627fe91897c6ffc3b19514c4</id>
<content type='text'>
-&gt;auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.

Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
-&gt;auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
-&gt;do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.

This commit thus fixes the list handling by using -&gt;addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().

Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().

Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.

Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen &lt;jiji@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
-&gt;auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.

Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
-&gt;auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
-&gt;do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.

This commit thus fixes the list handling by using -&gt;addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().

Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().

Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.

Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen &lt;jiji@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: avoid to repeatedly declare external variables</title>
<updated>2015-03-25T15:40:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ying Xue</name>
<email>ying.xue@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-25T06:13:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7e3ea6d5c4f4880dbdf85f4083f40d8a3dc9b906'/>
<id>7e3ea6d5c4f4880dbdf85f4083f40d8a3dc9b906</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the declaration for external variables to sctp.h file avoiding
to repeatedly declare them with extern keyword.

Signed-off-by: Ying Xue &lt;ying.xue@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move the declaration for external variables to sctp.h file avoiding
to repeatedly declare them with extern keyword.

Signed-off-by: Ying Xue &lt;ying.xue@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Remove iocb argument from sendmsg and recvmsg</title>
<updated>2015-03-02T18:06:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ying Xue</name>
<email>ying.xue@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-02T07:37:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1b784140474e4fc94281a49e96c67d29df0efbde'/>
<id>1b784140474e4fc94281a49e96c67d29df0efbde</id>
<content type='text'>
After TIPC doesn't depend on iocb argument in its internal
implementations of sendmsg() and recvmsg() hooks defined in proto
structure, no any user is using iocb argument in them at all now.
Then we can drop the redundant iocb argument completely from kinds of
implementations of both sendmsg() and recvmsg() in the entire
networking stack.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue &lt;ying.xue@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
After TIPC doesn't depend on iocb argument in its internal
implementations of sendmsg() and recvmsg() hooks defined in proto
structure, no any user is using iocb argument in them at all now.
Then we can drop the redundant iocb argument completely from kinds of
implementations of both sendmsg() and recvmsg() in the entire
networking stack.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue &lt;ying.xue@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: fix race for one-to-many sockets in sendmsg's auto associate</title>
<updated>2015-01-18T04:52:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-15T15:34:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2061dcd6bff8b774b4fac8b0739b6be3f87bc9f2'/>
<id>2061dcd6bff8b774b4fac8b0739b6be3f87bc9f2</id>
<content type='text'>
I.e. one-to-many sockets in SCTP are not required to explicitly
call into connect(2) or sctp_connectx(2) prior to data exchange.
Instead, they can directly invoke sendmsg(2) and the SCTP stack
will automatically trigger connection establishment through 4WHS
via sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE(). However, this in its current
implementation is racy: INIT is being sent out immediately (as
it cannot be bundled anyway) and the rest of the DATA chunks are
queued up for later xmit when connection is established, meaning
sendmsg(2) will return successfully. This behaviour can result
in an undesired side-effect that the kernel made the application
think the data has already been transmitted, although none of it
has actually left the machine, worst case even after close(2)'ing
the socket.

Instead, when the association from client side has been shut down
e.g. first gracefully through SCTP_EOF and then close(2), the
client could afterwards still receive the server's INIT_ACK due
to a connection with higher latency. This INIT_ACK is then considered
out of the blue and hence responded with ABORT as there was no
alive assoc found anymore. This can be easily reproduced f.e.
with sctp_test application from lksctp. One way to fix this race
is to wait for the handshake to actually complete.

The fix defers waiting after sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE() and
sctp_primitive_SEND() succeeded, so that DATA chunks cooked up
from sctp_sendmsg() have already been placed into the output
queue through the side-effect interpreter, and therefore can then
be bundeled together with COOKIE_ECHO control chunks.

strace from example application (shortened):

socket(PF_INET, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP) = 3
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(0)=[], msg_controllen=48, {cmsg_len=48, cmsg_level=0x84 /* SOL_??? */, cmsg_type=, ...},
           msg_flags=0}, 0) = 0 // graceful shutdown for SOCK_SEQPACKET via SCTP_EOF
close(3) = 0

tcpdump before patch (fooling the application):

22:33:36.306142 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3879023686] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3139201684]
22:33:36.316619 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.41462: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3345394793] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3380109591]
22:33:36.317600 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [ABORT]

tcpdump after patch:

14:28:58.884116 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 438593213] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3092969729]
14:28:58.888414 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 381429855] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 2141904492]
14:28:58.888638 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969729] [...]
14:28:58.893278 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK] , (2) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969729] [a_rwnd 106491] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:58.893591 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969730] [...]
14:28:59.096963 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969730] [a_rwnd 106496] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:59.097086 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969731] [...] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969732] [...]
14:28:59.103218 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969732] [a_rwnd 106486] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:59.103330 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN]
14:28:59.107793 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN ACK]
14:28:59.107890 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN COMPLETE]

Looks like this bug is from the pre-git history museum. ;)

Fixes: 08707d5482df ("lksctp-2_5_31-0_5_1.patch")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
I.e. one-to-many sockets in SCTP are not required to explicitly
call into connect(2) or sctp_connectx(2) prior to data exchange.
Instead, they can directly invoke sendmsg(2) and the SCTP stack
will automatically trigger connection establishment through 4WHS
via sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE(). However, this in its current
implementation is racy: INIT is being sent out immediately (as
it cannot be bundled anyway) and the rest of the DATA chunks are
queued up for later xmit when connection is established, meaning
sendmsg(2) will return successfully. This behaviour can result
in an undesired side-effect that the kernel made the application
think the data has already been transmitted, although none of it
has actually left the machine, worst case even after close(2)'ing
the socket.

Instead, when the association from client side has been shut down
e.g. first gracefully through SCTP_EOF and then close(2), the
client could afterwards still receive the server's INIT_ACK due
to a connection with higher latency. This INIT_ACK is then considered
out of the blue and hence responded with ABORT as there was no
alive assoc found anymore. This can be easily reproduced f.e.
with sctp_test application from lksctp. One way to fix this race
is to wait for the handshake to actually complete.

The fix defers waiting after sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE() and
sctp_primitive_SEND() succeeded, so that DATA chunks cooked up
from sctp_sendmsg() have already been placed into the output
queue through the side-effect interpreter, and therefore can then
be bundeled together with COOKIE_ECHO control chunks.

strace from example application (shortened):

socket(PF_INET, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP) = 3
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
           msg_iov(0)=[], msg_controllen=48, {cmsg_len=48, cmsg_level=0x84 /* SOL_??? */, cmsg_type=, ...},
           msg_flags=0}, 0) = 0 // graceful shutdown for SOCK_SEQPACKET via SCTP_EOF
close(3) = 0

tcpdump before patch (fooling the application):

22:33:36.306142 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3879023686] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3139201684]
22:33:36.316619 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.41462: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3345394793] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3380109591]
22:33:36.317600 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [ABORT]

tcpdump after patch:

14:28:58.884116 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 438593213] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3092969729]
14:28:58.888414 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 381429855] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 2141904492]
14:28:58.888638 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969729] [...]
14:28:58.893278 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK] , (2) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969729] [a_rwnd 106491] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:58.893591 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969730] [...]
14:28:59.096963 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969730] [a_rwnd 106496] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:59.097086 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969731] [...] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969732] [...]
14:28:59.103218 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969732] [a_rwnd 106486] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:59.103330 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN]
14:28:59.107793 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 &gt; 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN ACK]
14:28:59.107890 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 &gt; 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN COMPLETE]

Looks like this bug is from the pre-git history museum. ;)

Fixes: 08707d5482df ("lksctp-2_5_31-0_5_1.patch")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
