<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/rxrpc, branch v4.7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: fix ptr_ret.cocci warnings</title>
<updated>2016-06-07T22:30:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wu Fengguang</name>
<email>fengguang.wu@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-04T23:17:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fa54cc70ed2eddd96773ffdf4d96d23ea7483e56'/>
<id>fa54cc70ed2eddd96773ffdf4d96d23ea7483e56</id>
<content type='text'>
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c:1165:1-3: WARNING: PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO can be used

 Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO rather than if(IS_ERR(...)) + PTR_ERR

Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/ptr_ret.cocci

CC: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c:1165:1-3: WARNING: PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO can be used

 Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO rather than if(IS_ERR(...)) + PTR_ERR

Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/ptr_ret.cocci

CC: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2016-05-19T16:21:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-19T16:21:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3'/>
<id>f4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
     of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
     is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
     cryptographically via dm-verity).

     This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
     default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).

   - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
     Lots of general fixes and updates.

   - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
     finit_module().  Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
     checks.  Apply execstack check on thread stacks"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
  LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
  Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
  seccomp: Fix comment typo
  ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
  ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
  vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
  fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
  selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
  selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
  LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
  fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
  Yama: consolidate error reporting
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
  selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
  selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
  selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
  selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
     of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
     is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
     cryptographically via dm-verity).

     This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
     default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).

   - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
     Lots of general fixes and updates.

   - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
     finit_module().  Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
     checks.  Apply execstack check on thread stacks"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
  LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
  Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
  seccomp: Fix comment typo
  ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
  ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
  vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
  fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
  selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
  selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
  LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
  fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
  Yama: consolidate error reporting
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
  selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
  selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
  selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
  selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: udp: rename UDP_INC_STATS_BH()</title>
<updated>2016-04-28T02:48:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-27T23:44:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=02c223470c3cc30e5ff90217abea761679553ac3'/>
<id>02c223470c3cc30e5ff90217abea761679553ac3</id>
<content type='text'>
Rename UDP_INC_STATS_BH() to __UDP_INC_STATS(),
and UDP6_INC_STATS_BH() to __UDP6_INC_STATS()

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Rename UDP_INC_STATS_BH() to __UDP_INC_STATS(),
and UDP6_INC_STATS_BH() to __UDP6_INC_STATS()

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T21:37:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-06T15:14:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5ac7eace2d00eab5ae0e9fdee63e38aee6001f7c'/>
<id>5ac7eace2d00eab5ae0e9fdee63e38aee6001f7c</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary.  This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails.  It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.

This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.

To this end:

 (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
     the vetting function.  This is called as:

	int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
			     const struct key_type *key_type,
			     unsigned long key_flags,
			     const union key_payload *key_payload),

     where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
     key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
     AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.

     [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
     	 KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.

     The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
     error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
     link.

     The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
     through keyring_alloc().

     Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
     method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
     is called.

 (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added.  This can be passed to
     key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
     restriction check.

 (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed.  The entire contents of a keyring
     with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
     virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.

 (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
     used to set restrict_link in the new key.  This ensures that the
     pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
     of unrestrictedness.  Normally this argument will be NULL.

 (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added.  It
     should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
     setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring.  This will be replaced in
     a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
     authoritative keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary.  This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails.  It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.

This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.

To this end:

 (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
     the vetting function.  This is called as:

	int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
			     const struct key_type *key_type,
			     unsigned long key_flags,
			     const union key_payload *key_payload),

     where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
     key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
     AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.

     [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
     	 KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.

     The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
     error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
     link.

     The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
     through keyring_alloc().

     Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
     method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
     is called.

 (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added.  This can be passed to
     key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
     restriction check.

 (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed.  The entire contents of a keyring
     with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
     virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.

 (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
     used to set restrict_link in the new key.  This ensures that the
     pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
     of unrestrictedness.  Normally this argument will be NULL.

 (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added.  It
     should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
     setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring.  This will be replaced in
     a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
     authoritative keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Create a null security type and get rid of conditional calls</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T19:34:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-07T16:23:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e0e4d82f3be60cfe8b10304c6daf3ca5973ae9e3'/>
<id>e0e4d82f3be60cfe8b10304c6daf3ca5973ae9e3</id>
<content type='text'>
Create a null security type for security index 0 and get rid of all
conditional calls to the security operations.  We expect normally to be
using security, so this should be of little negative impact.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Create a null security type for security index 0 and get rid of all
conditional calls to the security operations.  We expect normally to be
using security, so this should be of little negative impact.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Absorb the rxkad security module</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T19:34:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-07T16:23:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=648af7fca15901740c7aaafd55904ebd54d01860'/>
<id>648af7fca15901740c7aaafd55904ebd54d01860</id>
<content type='text'>
Absorb the rxkad security module into the af_rxrpc module so that there's
only one module file.  This avoids a circular dependency whereby rxkad pins
af_rxrpc and cached connections pin rxkad but can't be manually evicted
(they will expire eventually and cease pinning).

With this change, af_rxrpc can just be unloaded, despite having cached
connections.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Absorb the rxkad security module into the af_rxrpc module so that there's
only one module file.  This avoids a circular dependency whereby rxkad pins
af_rxrpc and cached connections pin rxkad but can't be manually evicted
(they will expire eventually and cease pinning).

With this change, af_rxrpc can just be unloaded, despite having cached
connections.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Don't assume transport address family and size when using it</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T19:34:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-07T16:23:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6dd050f88d702e2718bd856ea014487563207756'/>
<id>6dd050f88d702e2718bd856ea014487563207756</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't assume transport address family and size when using the peer address
to send a packet.  Instead, use the start of the transport address rather
than any particular element of the union and use the transport address
length noted inside the sockaddr_rxrpc struct.

This will be necessary when IPv6 support is introduced.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Don't assume transport address family and size when using the peer address
to send a packet.  Instead, use the start of the transport address rather
than any particular element of the union and use the transport address
length noted inside the sockaddr_rxrpc struct.

This will be necessary when IPv6 support is introduced.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Don't pass gfp around in incoming call handling functions</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T19:34:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-07T16:23:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=843099cac0dbe421d7c3ea1f8662251fd7065731'/>
<id>843099cac0dbe421d7c3ea1f8662251fd7065731</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't pass gfp around in incoming call handling functions, but rather hard
code it at the points where we actually need it since the value comes from
within the rxrpc driver and is always the same.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Don't pass gfp around in incoming call handling functions, but rather hard
code it at the points where we actually need it since the value comes from
within the rxrpc driver and is always the same.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Differentiate local and remote abort codes in structs</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T19:34:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-07T16:23:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dc44b3a09aec9ac57c1e7410677c87c0e6453624'/>
<id>dc44b3a09aec9ac57c1e7410677c87c0e6453624</id>
<content type='text'>
In the rxrpc_connection and rxrpc_call structs, there's one field to hold
the abort code, no matter whether that value was generated locally to be
sent or was received from the peer via an abort packet.

Split the abort code fields in two for cleanliness sake and add an error
field to hold the Linux error number to the rxrpc_call struct too
(sometimes this is generated in a context where we can't return it to
userspace directly).

Furthermore, add a skb mark to indicate a packet that caused a local abort
to be generated so that recvmsg() can pick up the correct abort code.  A
future addition will need to be to indicate to userspace the difference
between aborts via a control message.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In the rxrpc_connection and rxrpc_call structs, there's one field to hold
the abort code, no matter whether that value was generated locally to be
sent or was received from the peer via an abort packet.

Split the abort code fields in two for cleanliness sake and add an error
field to hold the Linux error number to the rxrpc_call struct too
(sometimes this is generated in a context where we can't return it to
userspace directly).

Furthermore, add a skb mark to indicate a packet that caused a local abort
to be generated so that recvmsg() can pick up the correct abort code.  A
future addition will need to be to indicate to userspace the difference
between aborts via a control message.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Static arrays of strings should be const char *const[]</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T19:34:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-07T16:23:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5b3e87f19e71b7a2f789c40de04704886932b5cf'/>
<id>5b3e87f19e71b7a2f789c40de04704886932b5cf</id>
<content type='text'>
Static arrays of strings should be const char *const[].

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Static arrays of strings should be const char *const[].

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
