linux-stable.git/net/rxrpc/key.c, branch linux-rolling-stable

rxrpc: Fix key/keyring checks in setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY/KEYRING)

2026-04-18T08:46:47+00:00

commit 2afd86ccbb2082a3c4258aea8c07e5bb6267bc2f upstream.

An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time.  When
sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx->key to set the
security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server),
it uses rx->securities.

setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx->key to point to an rxrpc-type key
and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx->securities to point to a
keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys.

Now, it should be possible to use both rx->key and rx->securities on the
same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt()
prevents that.

Fix this by:

 (1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING)
     makes on rx->key.

 (2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on
     rx->key down into rxrpc_request_key().

 (3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx->securities.

This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the
functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent
both key and keyring being set.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Anderson Nascimento 
cc: Luxiao Xu 
cc: Yuan Tan 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-16-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds

2026-04-18T08:46:47+00:00

commit d179a868dd755b0cfcf7582e00943d702b9943b8 upstream.

rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() reads the raw key length and ticket length
from the XDR token as u32 values and passes each through round_up(x, 4)
before using the rounded value for validation and allocation.  When the raw
length is >= 0xfffffffd, round_up() wraps to 0, so the bounds check and
kzalloc both use 0 while the subsequent memcpy still copies the original
~4 GiB value, producing a heap buffer overflow reachable from an
unprivileged add_key() call.

Fix this by:

 (1) Rejecting raw key lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX and raw ticket
     lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX before rounding, consistent with
     the caps that the RxKAD path already enforces via AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX.

 (2) Sizing the flexible-array allocation from the validated raw key
     length via struct_size_t() instead of the rounded value.

 (3) Caching the raw lengths so that the later field assignments and
     memcpy calls do not re-read from the token, eliminating a class of
     TOCTOU re-parse.

The control path (valid token with lengths within bounds) is unaffected.

Fixes: 0ca100ff4df6 ("rxrpc: Add YFS RxGK (GSSAPI) security class")
Signed-off-by: Oleh Konko 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-6-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: Fix key parsing memleak

2026-04-18T08:46:46+00:00

commit b555912b9b21075e8298015f888ffe3ff60b1a97 upstream.

In rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(), the memory attached to token->rxgk can be
leaked in a few error paths after it's allocated.

Fix this by freeing it in the "reject_token:" case.

Fixes: 0ca100ff4df6 ("rxrpc: Add YFS RxGK (GSSAPI) security class")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Jeffrey Altman 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: Fix key quota calculation for multitoken keys

2026-04-18T08:46:46+00:00

commit bdbfead6d38979475df0c2f4bad2b19394fe9bdc upstream.

In the rxrpc key preparsing, every token extracted sets the proposed quota
value, but for multitoken keys, this will overwrite the previous proposed
quota, losing it.

Fix this by adding to the proposed quota instead.

Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Jeffrey Altman 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: Add YFS RxGK (GSSAPI) security class

2025-04-15T00:36:41+00:00

Add support for the YFS-variant RxGK security class to support
GSSAPI-derived authentication.  This also allows the use of better crypto
over the rxkad security class.

The key payload is XDR encoded of the form:

    typedef int64_t opr_time;

    const AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX = 12000; 	/* Matches entry in rxkad.h */

    struct token_rxkad {
	afs_int32 viceid;
	afs_int32 kvno;
	afs_int64 key;
	afs_int32 begintime;
	afs_int32 endtime;
	afs_int32 primary_flag;
	opaque ticket;
    };

    struct token_rxgk {
	opr_time begintime;
	opr_time endtime;
	afs_int64 level;
	afs_int64 lifetime;
	afs_int64 bytelife;
	afs_int64 enctype;
	opaque key<>;
	opaque ticket<>;
    };

    const AFSTOKEN_UNION_NOAUTH = 0;
    const AFSTOKEN_UNION_KAD = 2;
    const AFSTOKEN_UNION_YFSGK = 6;

    union ktc_tokenUnion switch (afs_int32 type) {
	case AFSTOKEN_UNION_KAD:
	    token_rxkad kad;
	case AFSTOKEN_UNION_YFSGK:
	    token_rxgk  gk;
    };

    const AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX = 16384;
    typedef opaque token_opaque;

    const AFSTOKEN_MAX = 8;
    const AFSTOKEN_CELL_MAX = 64;

    struct ktc_setTokenData {
	afs_int32 flags;
	string cell;
	token_opaque tokens;
    };

The parser for the basic token struct is already present, as is the rxkad
token type.  This adds a parser for the rxgk token type.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Herbert Xu 
cc: Chuck Lever 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250411095303.2316168-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: kdoc: Update function descriptions and add link from rxrpc.rst

2025-04-15T00:36:40+00:00

Update the kerneldoc function descriptions to add "Return:" sections for
AF_RXRPC exported functions that have return values to stop the kdoc
builder from throwing warnings.

Also add links from the rxrpc.rst API doc to add a function API reference
at the end.  (Note that the API doc really needs updating, but that's
beyond this patchset).

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250411095303.2316168-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: Fix error when reading rxrpc tokens

2023-04-23T12:38:28+00:00

When converting from ASSERTCMP to WARN_ON, the tested condition must
be inverted, which was missed for this case.

This would cause an EIO error when trying to read an rxrpc token, for
instance when trying to display tokens with AuriStor's "tokens" command.

Fixes: 84924aac08a4 ("rxrpc: Fix checker warning")
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: "David S. Miller" 
cc: Eric Dumazet 
cc: Jakub Kicinski 
cc: Paolo Abeni 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

rxrpc: Drop rxrpc_conn_parameters from rxrpc_connection and rxrpc_bundle

2022-12-01T13:36:38+00:00

Remove the rxrpc_conn_parameters struct from the rxrpc_connection and
rxrpc_bundle structs and emplace the members directly.  These are going to
get filled in from the rxrpc_call struct in future.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org

rxrpc: Fix checker warning

2022-12-01T13:36:37+00:00

Fix the following checker warning:

../net/rxrpc/key.c:692:9: error: subtraction of different types can't work (different address spaces)

Checker is wrong in this case, but cast the pointers to unsigned long to
avoid the warning.

Whilst we're at it, reduce the assertions to WARN_ON() and return an error.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org

rxrpc: Fix handling of an unsupported token type in rxrpc_read()

2021-01-13T18:38:00+00:00

Clang static analysis reports the following:

net/rxrpc/key.c:657:11: warning: Assigned value is garbage or undefined
                toksize = toksizes[tok++];
                        ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

rxrpc_read() contains two consecutive loops.  The first loop calculates the
token sizes and stores the results in toksizes[] and the second one uses
the array.  When there is an error in identifying the token in the first
loop, the token is skipped, no change is made to the toksizes[] array.
When the same error happens in the second loop, the token is not skipped.
This will cause the toksizes[] array to be out of step and will overrun
past the calculated sizes.

Fix this by making both loops log a message and return an error in this
case.  This should only happen if a new token type is incompletely
implemented, so it should normally be impossible to trigger this.

Fixes: 9a059cd5ca7d ("rxrpc: Downgrade the BUG() for unsupported token type in rxrpc_read()")
Reported-by: Tom Rix 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Reviewed-by: Tom Rix 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161046503122.2445787.16714129930607546635.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski