linux-stable.git/net/packet, branch v6.1.76 Linux kernel stable tree packet: Move reference count in packet_sock to atomic_long_t 2023-12-13T17:39:20+00:00 Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net 2023-12-01T13:10:21+00:00 6a71d7785643835e39570877606beb14faa8fc2a commit db3fadacaf0c817b222090290d06ca2a338422d0 upstream. In some potential instances the reference count on struct packet_sock could be saturated and cause overflows which gets the kernel a bit confused. To prevent this, move to a 64-bit atomic reference count on 64-bit architectures to prevent the possibility of this type to overflow. Because we can not handle saturation, using refcount_t is not possible in this place. Maybe someday in the future if it changes it could be used. Also, instead of using plain atomic64_t, use atomic_long_t instead. 32-bit machines tend to be memory-limited (i.e. anything that increases a reference uses so much memory that you can't actually get to 2**32 references). 32-bit architectures also tend to have serious problems with 64-bit atomics. Hence, atomic_long_t is the more natural solution. Reported-by: "The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)" <security@ncsc.gov.uk> Co-developed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201131021.19999-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit db3fadacaf0c817b222090290d06ca2a338422d0 upstream.

In some potential instances the reference count on struct packet_sock
could be saturated and cause overflows which gets the kernel a bit
confused. To prevent this, move to a 64-bit atomic reference count on
64-bit architectures to prevent the possibility of this type to overflow.

Because we can not handle saturation, using refcount_t is not possible
in this place. Maybe someday in the future if it changes it could be
used. Also, instead of using plain atomic64_t, use atomic_long_t instead.
32-bit machines tend to be memory-limited (i.e. anything that increases
a reference uses so much memory that you can't actually get to 2**32
references). 32-bit architectures also tend to have serious problems
with 64-bit atomics. Hence, atomic_long_t is the more natural solution.

Reported-by: "The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)" <security@ncsc.gov.uk>
Co-developed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201131021.19999-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net/packet: annotate data-races around tp->status 2023-08-16T16:27:26+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-08-03T14:56:00+00:00 584a783270c1b1fc83036b570e6d91acfd7d9b6a commit 8a9896177784063d01068293caea3f74f6830ff6 upstream. Another syzbot report [1] is about tp->status lockless reads from __packet_get_status() [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __packet_rcv_has_room / __packet_set_status write to 0xffff888117d7c080 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: __packet_set_status+0x78/0xa0 net/packet/af_packet.c:407 tpacket_rcv+0x18bb/0x1a60 net/packet/af_packet.c:2483 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:2173 [inline] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x408/0x1e80 net/core/dev.c:5337 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5491 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:5607 process_backlog+0x21f/0x380 net/core/dev.c:5935 __napi_poll+0x60/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:6498 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6565 [inline] net_rx_action+0x32b/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6698 __do_softirq+0xc1/0x265 kernel/softirq.c:571 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:445 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0x57/0xa0 kernel/softirq.c:650 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1106 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:645 smpboot_thread_fn+0x33c/0x4a0 kernel/smpboot.c:112 kthread+0x1d7/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:379 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 read to 0xffff888117d7c080 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1: __packet_get_status net/packet/af_packet.c:436 [inline] packet_lookup_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:524 [inline] __tpacket_has_room net/packet/af_packet.c:1255 [inline] __packet_rcv_has_room+0x3f9/0x450 net/packet/af_packet.c:1298 tpacket_rcv+0x275/0x1a60 net/packet/af_packet.c:2285 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:2173 [inline] dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x38a/0x5e0 net/core/dev.c:2243 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3574 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xcf/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:3594 __dev_queue_xmit+0xefb/0x1d10 net/core/dev.c:4244 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3088 [inline] can_send+0x4eb/0x5d0 net/can/af_can.c:276 bcm_can_tx+0x314/0x410 net/can/bcm.c:302 bcm_tx_timeout_handler+0xdb/0x260 __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1685 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x217/0x700 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1749 hrtimer_run_softirq+0xd6/0x120 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1766 __do_softirq+0xc1/0x265 kernel/softirq.c:571 run_ksoftirqd+0x17/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:939 smpboot_thread_fn+0x30a/0x4a0 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x1d7/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:379 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000020000081 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023 Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803145600.2937518-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 8a9896177784063d01068293caea3f74f6830ff6 upstream.

Another syzbot report [1] is about tp->status lockless reads
from __packet_get_status()

[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __packet_rcv_has_room / __packet_set_status

write to 0xffff888117d7c080 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
__packet_set_status+0x78/0xa0 net/packet/af_packet.c:407
tpacket_rcv+0x18bb/0x1a60 net/packet/af_packet.c:2483
deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:2173 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x408/0x1e80 net/core/dev.c:5337
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5491 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:5607
process_backlog+0x21f/0x380 net/core/dev.c:5935
__napi_poll+0x60/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:6498
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6565 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x32b/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6698
__do_softirq+0xc1/0x265 kernel/softirq.c:571
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:445 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0x57/0xa0 kernel/softirq.c:650
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1106
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:645
smpboot_thread_fn+0x33c/0x4a0 kernel/smpboot.c:112
kthread+0x1d7/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:379
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308

read to 0xffff888117d7c080 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
__packet_get_status net/packet/af_packet.c:436 [inline]
packet_lookup_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:524 [inline]
__tpacket_has_room net/packet/af_packet.c:1255 [inline]
__packet_rcv_has_room+0x3f9/0x450 net/packet/af_packet.c:1298
tpacket_rcv+0x275/0x1a60 net/packet/af_packet.c:2285
deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:2173 [inline]
dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x38a/0x5e0 net/core/dev.c:2243
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3574 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xcf/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:3594
__dev_queue_xmit+0xefb/0x1d10 net/core/dev.c:4244
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3088 [inline]
can_send+0x4eb/0x5d0 net/can/af_can.c:276
bcm_can_tx+0x314/0x410 net/can/bcm.c:302
bcm_tx_timeout_handler+0xdb/0x260
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1685 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x217/0x700 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1749
hrtimer_run_softirq+0xd6/0x120 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1766
__do_softirq+0xc1/0x265 kernel/softirq.c:571
run_ksoftirqd+0x17/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:939
smpboot_thread_fn+0x30a/0x4a0 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x1d7/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:379
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308

value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000020000081

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023

Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803145600.2937518-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: annotate data-races around sk->sk_priority 2023-08-11T10:08:15+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-07-28T15:03:18+00:00 12d4ba18142434949977f7de9225847fd7147876 [ Upstream commit 8bf43be799d4b242ea552a14db10456446be843e ] sk_getsockopt() runs locklessly. This means sk->sk_priority can be read while other threads are changing its value. Other reads also happen without socket lock being held. Add missing annotations where needed. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 8bf43be799d4b242ea552a14db10456446be843e ]

sk_getsockopt() runs locklessly. This means sk->sk_priority
can be read while other threads are changing its value.

Other reads also happen without socket lock being held.

Add missing annotations where needed.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: annotate data-races around sk->sk_mark 2023-08-11T10:08:14+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-07-28T15:03:15+00:00 b53468041d20177c8b8808d1891c0145718ceadf [ Upstream commit 3c5b4d69c358a9275a8de98f87caf6eda644b086 ] sk->sk_mark is often read while another thread could change the value. Fixes: 4a19ec5800fc ("[NET]: Introducing socket mark socket option.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 3c5b4d69c358a9275a8de98f87caf6eda644b086 ]

sk->sk_mark is often read while another thread could change the value.

Fixes: 4a19ec5800fc ("[NET]: Introducing socket mark socket option.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
af_packet: do not use READ_ONCE() in packet_bind() 2023-06-09T08:34:02+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-05-26T15:43:42+00:00 0dec22a09da1e93126258a1e89812caa80a4b8a0 [ Upstream commit 6ffc57ea004234d9373c57b204fd10370a69f392 ] A recent patch added READ_ONCE() in packet_bind() and packet_bind_spkt() This is better handled by reading pkt_sk(sk)->num later in packet_do_bind() while appropriate lock is held. READ_ONCE() in writers are often an evidence of something being wrong. Fixes: 822b5a1c17df ("af_packet: Fix data-races of pkt_sk(sk)->num.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526154342.2533026-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 6ffc57ea004234d9373c57b204fd10370a69f392 ]

A recent patch added READ_ONCE() in packet_bind() and packet_bind_spkt()

This is better handled by reading pkt_sk(sk)->num later
in packet_do_bind() while appropriate lock is held.

READ_ONCE() in writers are often an evidence of something being wrong.

Fixes: 822b5a1c17df ("af_packet: Fix data-races of pkt_sk(sk)->num.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526154342.2533026-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
af_packet: Fix data-races of pkt_sk(sk)->num. 2023-06-09T08:34:01+00:00 Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com 2023-05-24T23:29:34+00:00 0b64a2bf169965da0273ef29919b2a6b76a9c68b [ Upstream commit 822b5a1c17df7e338b9f05d1cfe5764e37c7f74f ] syzkaller found a data race of pkt_sk(sk)->num. The value is changed under lock_sock() and po->bind_lock, so we need READ_ONCE() to access pkt_sk(sk)->num without these locks in packet_bind_spkt(), packet_bind(), and sk_diag_fill(). Note that WRITE_ONCE() is already added by commit c7d2ef5dd4b0 ("net/packet: annotate accesses to po->bind"). BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_bind / packet_do_bind write (marked) to 0xffff88802ffd1cee of 2 bytes by task 7322 on cpu 0: packet_do_bind+0x446/0x640 net/packet/af_packet.c:3236 packet_bind+0x99/0xe0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3321 __sys_bind+0x19b/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1803 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1814 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1812 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1812 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc read to 0xffff88802ffd1cee of 2 bytes by task 7318 on cpu 1: packet_bind+0xbf/0xe0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3322 __sys_bind+0x19b/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1803 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1814 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1812 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1812 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc value changed: 0x0300 -> 0x0000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 7318 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.3.0-13380-g7fddb5b5300c #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 96ec6327144e ("packet: Diag core and basic socket info dumping") Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230524232934.50950-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 822b5a1c17df7e338b9f05d1cfe5764e37c7f74f ]

syzkaller found a data race of pkt_sk(sk)->num.

The value is changed under lock_sock() and po->bind_lock, so we
need READ_ONCE() to access pkt_sk(sk)->num without these locks in
packet_bind_spkt(), packet_bind(), and sk_diag_fill().

Note that WRITE_ONCE() is already added by commit c7d2ef5dd4b0
("net/packet: annotate accesses to po->bind").

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_bind / packet_do_bind

write (marked) to 0xffff88802ffd1cee of 2 bytes by task 7322 on cpu 0:
 packet_do_bind+0x446/0x640 net/packet/af_packet.c:3236
 packet_bind+0x99/0xe0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3321
 __sys_bind+0x19b/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1803
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1814 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1812 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1812
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

read to 0xffff88802ffd1cee of 2 bytes by task 7318 on cpu 1:
 packet_bind+0xbf/0xe0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3322
 __sys_bind+0x19b/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1803
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1814 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1812 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1812
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

value changed: 0x0300 -> 0x0000

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 7318 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.3.0-13380-g7fddb5b5300c #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014

Fixes: 96ec6327144e ("packet: Diag core and basic socket info dumping")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230524232934.50950-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: add vlan_get_protocol_and_depth() helper 2023-05-24T16:32:32+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-05-09T13:18:57+00:00 55caf900e13cd04466def08173a14b41d18c19c3 [ Upstream commit 4063384ef762cc5946fc7a3f89879e76c6ec51e2 ] Before blamed commit, pskb_may_pull() was used instead of skb_header_pointer() in __vlan_get_protocol() and friends. Few callers depended on skb->head being populated with MAC header, syzbot caught one of them (skb_mac_gso_segment()) Add vlan_get_protocol_and_depth() to make the intent clearer and use it where sensible. This is a more generic fix than commit e9d3f80935b6 ("net/af_packet: make sure to pull mac header") which was dealing with a similar issue. kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2655 ! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 1441 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.1.24-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/14/2023 RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2655 [inline] RIP: 0010:skb_mac_gso_segment+0x68f/0x6a0 net/core/gro.c:136 Code: fd 48 8b 5c 24 10 44 89 6b 70 48 c7 c7 c0 ae 0d 86 44 89 e6 e8 a1 91 d0 00 48 c7 c7 00 af 0d 86 48 89 de 31 d2 e8 d1 4a e9 ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001bd7520 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffffffff8469736a RBX: ffff88810f31dac0 RCX: ffff888115a18b00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc90001bd75e8 R08: ffffffff84697183 R09: fffff5200037adf9 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: 0000000000000012 R13: 000000000000fee5 R14: 0000000000005865 R15: 000000000000fed7 FS: 000055555633f300(0000) GS:ffff8881f6a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 0000000116fea000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> [<ffffffff847018dd>] __skb_gso_segment+0x32d/0x4c0 net/core/dev.c:3419 [<ffffffff8470398a>] skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4819 [inline] [<ffffffff8470398a>] validate_xmit_skb+0x3aa/0xee0 net/core/dev.c:3725 [<ffffffff84707042>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1332/0x3300 net/core/dev.c:4313 [<ffffffff851a9ec7>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 include/linux/netdevice.h:3029 [<ffffffff851b4a82>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3111 [inline] [<ffffffff851b4a82>] packet_sendmsg+0x49d2/0x6470 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142 [<ffffffff84669a12>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] [<ffffffff84669a12>] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline] [<ffffffff84669a12>] __sys_sendto+0x472/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2139 [<ffffffff84669c75>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2151 [inline] [<ffffffff84669c75>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2147 [inline] [<ffffffff84669c75>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x100 net/socket.c:2147 [<ffffffff8551d40f>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] [<ffffffff8551d40f>] do_syscall_64+0x2f/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [<ffffffff85600087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Fixes: 469aceddfa3e ("vlan: consolidate VLAN parsing code and limit max parsing depth") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 4063384ef762cc5946fc7a3f89879e76c6ec51e2 ]

Before blamed commit, pskb_may_pull() was used instead
of skb_header_pointer() in __vlan_get_protocol() and friends.

Few callers depended on skb->head being populated with MAC header,
syzbot caught one of them (skb_mac_gso_segment())

Add vlan_get_protocol_and_depth() to make the intent clearer
and use it where sensible.

This is a more generic fix than commit e9d3f80935b6
("net/af_packet: make sure to pull mac header") which was
dealing with a similar issue.

kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2655 !
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 1441 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.1.24-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/14/2023
RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_gso_segment+0x68f/0x6a0 net/core/gro.c:136
Code: fd 48 8b 5c 24 10 44 89 6b 70 48 c7 c7 c0 ae 0d 86 44 89 e6 e8 a1 91 d0 00 48 c7 c7 00 af 0d 86 48 89 de 31 d2 e8 d1 4a e9 ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001bd7520 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffffffff8469736a RBX: ffff88810f31dac0 RCX: ffff888115a18b00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90001bd75e8 R08: ffffffff84697183 R09: fffff5200037adf9
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: 0000000000000012
R13: 000000000000fee5 R14: 0000000000005865 R15: 000000000000fed7
FS: 000055555633f300(0000) GS:ffff8881f6a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 0000000116fea000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
[<ffffffff847018dd>] __skb_gso_segment+0x32d/0x4c0 net/core/dev.c:3419
[<ffffffff8470398a>] skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4819 [inline]
[<ffffffff8470398a>] validate_xmit_skb+0x3aa/0xee0 net/core/dev.c:3725
[<ffffffff84707042>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1332/0x3300 net/core/dev.c:4313
[<ffffffff851a9ec7>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 include/linux/netdevice.h:3029
[<ffffffff851b4a82>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3111 [inline]
[<ffffffff851b4a82>] packet_sendmsg+0x49d2/0x6470 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142
[<ffffffff84669a12>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669a12>] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669a12>] __sys_sendto+0x472/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2139
[<ffffffff84669c75>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2151 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669c75>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2147 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669c75>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x100 net/socket.c:2147
[<ffffffff8551d40f>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff8551d40f>] do_syscall_64+0x2f/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff85600087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fixes: 469aceddfa3e ("vlan: consolidate VLAN parsing code and limit max parsing depth")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
af_packet: Don't send zero-byte data in packet_sendmsg_spkt(). 2023-05-17T09:53:37+00:00 Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com 2023-05-01T20:28:57+00:00 f2e8e338622b1a842374dcf85957e76b759cfdd9 [ Upstream commit 6a341729fb31b4c5df9f74f24b4b1c98410c9b87 ] syzkaller reported a warning below [0]. We can reproduce it by sending 0-byte data from the (AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET) socket via some devices whose dev->hard_header_len is 0. struct sockaddr_pkt addr = { .spkt_family = AF_PACKET, .spkt_device = "tun0", }; int fd; fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, 0); sendto(fd, NULL, 0, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); We have a similar fix for the (AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW) socket as commit dc633700f00f ("net/af_packet: check len when min_header_len equals to 0"). Let's add the same test for the SOCK_PACKET socket. [0]: skb_assert_len WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 19945 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 19945 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f26/0x31d0 net/core/dev.c:4159 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 19945 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-02330-gca6270c12e20 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 [inline] RIP: 0010:__dev_queue_xmit+0x1f26/0x31d0 net/core/dev.c:4159 Code: 89 de e8 1d a2 85 fd 84 db 75 21 e8 64 a9 85 fd 48 c7 c6 80 2a 1f 86 48 c7 c7 c0 06 1f 86 c6 05 23 cf 27 04 01 e8 fa ee 56 fd <0f> 0b e8 43 a9 85 fd 0f b6 1d 0f cf 27 04 31 ff 89 de e8 e3 a1 85 RSP: 0018:ffff8880217af6e0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90001133000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff81186922 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff8880217af8b0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888030045640 R13: ffff8880300456b0 R14: ffff888030045650 R15: ffff888030045718 FS: 00007fc5864da640(0000) GS:ffff88806cd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020005740 CR3: 000000003f856003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3085 [inline] packet_sendmsg_spkt+0xc4b/0x1230 net/packet/af_packet.c:2066 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x1b4/0x200 net/socket.c:747 ____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x970 net/socket.c:2503 ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2557 __sys_sendmmsg+0x18c/0x430 net/socket.c:2643 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9c/0x100 net/socket.c:2669 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fc58791de5d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fc5864d9cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007fc58791de5d RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020005740 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fc58797e530 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- skb len=0 headroom=16 headlen=0 tailroom=304 mac=(16,0) net=(16,-1) trans=-1 shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0)) csum(0x0 ip_summed=0 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0) hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x0000 pkttype=0 iif=0 dev name=sit0 feat=0x00000006401d7869 sk family=17 type=10 proto=0 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 6a341729fb31b4c5df9f74f24b4b1c98410c9b87 ]

syzkaller reported a warning below [0].

We can reproduce it by sending 0-byte data from the (AF_PACKET,
SOCK_PACKET) socket via some devices whose dev->hard_header_len
is 0.

    struct sockaddr_pkt addr = {
        .spkt_family = AF_PACKET,
        .spkt_device = "tun0",
    };
    int fd;

    fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, 0);
    sendto(fd, NULL, 0, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));

We have a similar fix for the (AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW) socket as
commit dc633700f00f ("net/af_packet: check len when min_header_len
equals to 0").

Let's add the same test for the SOCK_PACKET socket.

[0]:
skb_assert_len
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 19945 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 19945 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f26/0x31d0 net/core/dev.c:4159
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 19945 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-02330-gca6270c12e20 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__dev_queue_xmit+0x1f26/0x31d0 net/core/dev.c:4159
Code: 89 de e8 1d a2 85 fd 84 db 75 21 e8 64 a9 85 fd 48 c7 c6 80 2a 1f 86 48 c7 c7 c0 06 1f 86 c6 05 23 cf 27 04 01 e8 fa ee 56 fd <0f> 0b e8 43 a9 85 fd 0f b6 1d 0f cf 27 04 31 ff 89 de e8 e3 a1 85
RSP: 0018:ffff8880217af6e0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90001133000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff81186922 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8880217af8b0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888030045640
R13: ffff8880300456b0 R14: ffff888030045650 R15: ffff888030045718
FS:  00007fc5864da640(0000) GS:ffff88806cd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020005740 CR3: 000000003f856003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3085 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg_spkt+0xc4b/0x1230 net/packet/af_packet.c:2066
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x1b4/0x200 net/socket.c:747
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x970 net/socket.c:2503
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2557
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x18c/0x430 net/socket.c:2643
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9c/0x100 net/socket.c:2669
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7fc58791de5d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fc5864d9cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007fc58791de5d
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020005740 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fc58797e530 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
skb len=0 headroom=16 headlen=0 tailroom=304
mac=(16,0) net=(16,-1) trans=-1
shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0))
csum(0x0 ip_summed=0 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0)
hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x0000 pkttype=0 iif=0
dev name=sit0 feat=0x00000006401d7869
sk family=17 type=10 proto=0

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net/packet: convert po->auxdata to an atomic flag 2023-05-11T14:03:18+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-03-16T01:10:08+00:00 382310d9c82e07d8328e9c9d35a96922e22afd32 [ Upstream commit fd53c297aa7b077ae98a3d3d2d3aa278a1686ba6 ] po->auxdata can be read while another thread is changing its value, potentially raising KCSAN splat. Convert it to PACKET_SOCK_AUXDATA flag. Fixes: 8dc419447415 ("[PACKET]: Add optional checksum computation for recvmsg") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit fd53c297aa7b077ae98a3d3d2d3aa278a1686ba6 ]

po->auxdata can be read while another thread
is changing its value, potentially raising KCSAN splat.

Convert it to PACKET_SOCK_AUXDATA flag.

Fixes: 8dc419447415 ("[PACKET]: Add optional checksum computation for recvmsg")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net/packet: convert po->origdev to an atomic flag 2023-05-11T14:03:18+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-03-16T01:10:07+00:00 3eae0f4c3129d728b280dad4510f0b37f0b2069e [ Upstream commit ee5675ecdf7a4e713ed21d98a70c2871d6ebed01 ] syzbot/KCAN reported that po->origdev can be read while another thread is changing its value. We can avoid this splat by converting this field to an actual bit. Following patches will convert remaining 1bit fields. Fixes: 80feaacb8a64 ("[AF_PACKET]: Add option to return orig_dev to userspace.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit ee5675ecdf7a4e713ed21d98a70c2871d6ebed01 ]

syzbot/KCAN reported that po->origdev can be read
while another thread is changing its value.

We can avoid this splat by converting this field
to an actual bit.

Following patches will convert remaining 1bit fields.

Fixes: 80feaacb8a64 ("[AF_PACKET]: Add option to return orig_dev to userspace.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>