linux-stable.git/net/packet, branch v4.14.78

net/packet: fix packet drop as of virtio gso

2018-10-18T07:16:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9d2f67e43b73e8af7438be219b66a5de0cfa8bd9 ]

When we use raw socket as the vhost backend, a packet from virito with
gso offloading information, cannot be sent out in later validaton at
xmit path, as we did not set correct skb->protocol which is further used
for looking up the gso function.

To fix this, we set this field according to virito hdr information.

Fixes: e858fae2b0b8f4 ("virtio_net: use common code for virtio_net_hdr and skb GSO conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jianfeng Tan 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

packet: refine ring v3 block size test to hold one frame

2018-08-24T11:09:22+00:00

commit 4576cd469d980317c4edd9173f8b694aa71ea3a3 upstream.

TPACKET_V3 stores variable length frames in fixed length blocks.
Blocks must be able to store a block header, optional private space
and at least one minimum sized frame.

Frames, even for a zero snaplen packet, store metadata headers and
optional reserved space.

In the block size bounds check, ensure that the frame of the
chosen configuration fits. This includes sockaddr_ll and optional
tp_reserve.

Syzbot was able to construct a ring with insuffient room for the
sockaddr_ll in the header of a zero-length frame, triggering an
out-of-bounds write in dev_parse_header.

Convert the comparison to less than, as zero is a valid snap len.
This matches the test for minimum tp_frame_size immediately below.

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Fixes: eb73190f4fbe ("net/packet: refine check for priv area size")
Reported-by: syzbot 
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

packet: reset network header if packet shorter than ll reserved space

2018-08-24T11:09:17+00:00

[ Upstream commit 993675a3100b16a4c80dfd70cbcde8ea7127b31d ]

If variable length link layer headers result in a packet shorter
than dev->hard_header_len, reset the network header offset. Else
skb->mac_len may exceed skb->len after skb_mac_reset_len.

packet_sendmsg_spkt already has similar logic.

Fixes: b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/packet: fix use-after-free

2018-07-22T12:28:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit 945d015ee0c3095d2290e845565a23dedfd8027c ]

We should put copy_skb in receive_queue only after
a successful call to virtio_net_hdr_from_skb().

syzbot report :

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1843 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:1863 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_dequeue+0x16a/0x180 net/core/skbuff.c:2815
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801b044ecc0 by task syz-executor217/4553

CPU: 0 PID: 4553 Comm: syz-executor217 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #111
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
 __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1843 [inline]
 __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:1863 [inline]
 skb_dequeue+0x16a/0x180 net/core/skbuff.c:2815
 skb_queue_purge+0x26/0x40 net/core/skbuff.c:2852
 packet_set_ring+0x675/0x1da0 net/packet/af_packet.c:4331
 packet_release+0x630/0xd90 net/packet/af_packet.c:2991
 __sock_release+0xd7/0x260 net/socket.c:603
 sock_close+0x19/0x20 net/socket.c:1186
 __fput+0x35b/0x8b0 fs/file_table.c:209
 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243
 task_work_run+0x1ec/0x2a0 kernel/task_work.c:113
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
 do_exit+0x1b08/0x2750 kernel/exit.c:865
 do_group_exit+0x177/0x440 kernel/exit.c:968
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:979 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:977 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:977
 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4448e9
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007ffd5f777ca8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000004448e9
RDX: 00000000004448e9 RSI: 000000000000fcfb RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 00000000006cf018 R08: 00007ffd0000a45b R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007ffd5f777e48 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00000000004021f0
R13: 0000000000402280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Allocated by task 4553:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x760 mm/slab.c:3554
 skb_clone+0x1f5/0x500 net/core/skbuff.c:1282
 tpacket_rcv+0x28f7/0x3200 net/packet/af_packet.c:2221
 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1925 [inline]
 deliver_ptype_list_skb net/core/dev.c:1940 [inline]
 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1bfb/0x3680 net/core/dev.c:4611
 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:4693
 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x12e/0x7d0 net/core/dev.c:4767
 netif_receive_skb+0xbf/0x420 net/core/dev.c:4791
 tun_rx_batched.isra.55+0x4ba/0x8c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1571
 tun_get_user+0x2af1/0x42f0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981
 tun_chr_write_iter+0xb9/0x154 drivers/net/tun.c:2009
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1795 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:474 [inline]
 __vfs_write+0x6c6/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:487
 vfs_write+0x1f8/0x560 fs/read_write.c:549
 ksys_write+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598
 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline]
 __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline]
 __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607
 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 4553:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x2d0 mm/slab.c:3756
 kfree_skbmem+0x154/0x230 net/core/skbuff.c:582
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:642 [inline]
 kfree_skb+0x1a5/0x580 net/core/skbuff.c:659
 tpacket_rcv+0x189e/0x3200 net/packet/af_packet.c:2385
 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1925 [inline]
 deliver_ptype_list_skb net/core/dev.c:1940 [inline]
 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1bfb/0x3680 net/core/dev.c:4611
 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:4693
 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x12e/0x7d0 net/core/dev.c:4767
 netif_receive_skb+0xbf/0x420 net/core/dev.c:4791
 tun_rx_batched.isra.55+0x4ba/0x8c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1571
 tun_get_user+0x2af1/0x42f0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981
 tun_chr_write_iter+0xb9/0x154 drivers/net/tun.c:2009
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1795 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:474 [inline]
 __vfs_write+0x6c6/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:487
 vfs_write+0x1f8/0x560 fs/read_write.c:549
 ksys_write+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598
 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline]
 __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline]
 __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607
 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801b044ecc0
 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
 232-byte region [ffff8801b044ecc0, ffff8801b044eda8)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0006c11380 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801d9be96c0 index:0x0
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0006c17988 ffff8801d9bec248 ffff8801d9be96c0
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8801b044e040 000000010000000c 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8801b044eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8801b044ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc
>ffff8801b044ec80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                           ^
 ffff8801b044ed00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8801b044ed80: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: 58d19b19cd99 ("packet: vnet_hdr support for tpacket_rcv")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Cc: Willem de Bruijn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: in virtio_net_hdr only add VLAN_HLEN to csum_start if payload holds vlan

2018-06-26T00:06:28+00:00

[ Upstream commit fd3a88625844907151737fc3b4201676effa6d27 ]

Tun, tap, virtio, packet and uml vector all use struct virtio_net_hdr
to communicate packet metadata to userspace.

For skbuffs with vlan, the first two return the packet as it may have
existed on the wire, inserting the VLAN tag in the user buffer.  Then
virtio_net_hdr.csum_start needs to be adjusted by VLAN_HLEN bytes.

Commit f09e2249c4f5 ("macvtap: restore vlan header on user read")
added this feature to macvtap. Commit 3ce9b20f1971 ("macvtap: Fix
csum_start when VLAN tags are present") then fixed up csum_start.

Virtio, packet and uml do not insert the vlan header in the user
buffer.

When introducing virtio_net_hdr_from_skb to deduplicate filling in
the virtio_net_hdr, the variant from macvtap which adds VLAN_HLEN was
applied uniformly, breaking csum offset for packets with vlan on
virtio and packet.

Make insertion of VLAN_HLEN optional. Convert the callers to pass it
when needed.

Fixes: e858fae2b0b8f4 ("virtio_net: use common code for virtio_net_hdr and skb GSO conversion")
Fixes: 1276f24eeef2 ("packet: use common code for virtio_net_hdr and skb GSO conversion")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

packet: fix reserve calculation

2018-06-11T20:49:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9aad13b087ab0a588cd68259de618f100053360e ]

Commit b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link
layer allocation") ensures that packet_snd always starts writing
the link layer header in reserved headroom allocated for this
purpose.

This is needed because packets may be shorter than hard_header_len,
in which case the space up to hard_header_len may be zeroed. But
that necessary padding is not accounted for in skb->len.

The fix, however, is buggy. It calls skb_push, which grows skb->len
when moving skb->data back. But in this case packet length should not
change.

Instead, call skb_reserve, which moves both skb->data and skb->tail
back, without changing length.

Fixes: b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation")
Reported-by: Tariq Toukan 
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/packet: refine check for priv area size

2018-06-11T20:49:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit eb73190f4fbeedf762394e92d6a4ec9ace684c88 ]

syzbot was able to trick af_packet again [1]

Various commits tried to address the problem in the past,
but failed to take into account V3 header size.

[1]

tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from 72 to 4294967224. macoff=96
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
Write of size 2 at addr ffff8801cb62000e by task kworker/1:2/2106

CPU: 1 PID: 2106 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc7+ #77
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
 __asan_report_store2_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:436
 prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
 prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
 __packet_lookup_frame_in_block net/packet/af_packet.c:1094 [inline]
 packet_current_rx_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:1117 [inline]
 tpacket_rcv+0x1866/0x3340 net/packet/af_packet.c:2282
 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x891/0xb90 net/core/dev.c:2018
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3049 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xc10 net/core/dev.c:3069
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2724/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3584
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3617
 neigh_resolve_output+0x679/0xad0 net/core/neighbour.c:1358
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:482 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0xc9c/0x2810 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120
 ip6_finish_output+0x5fe/0xbc0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:154
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:277 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x227/0x9b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:171
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
 ndisc_send_skb+0x100d/0x1570 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:491
 ndisc_send_ns+0x3c1/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:633
 addrconf_dad_work+0xbef/0x1340 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4033
 process_one_work+0xc1e/0x1b50 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
 worker_thread+0x1cc/0x1440 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
 kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00072d8800 count:0 mapcount:-127 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff8801cb620e80
flags: 0x2fffc0000000000()
raw: 02fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8801cb620e80 00000000ffffff80
raw: ffffea00072e3820 ffffea0007132d20 0000000000000002 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8801cb61ff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8801cb61ff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8801cb620000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                      ^
 ffff8801cb620080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff8801cb620100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

Fixes: 2b6867c2ce76 ("net/packet: fix overflow in check for priv area size")
Fixes: dc808110bb62 ("packet: handle too big packets for PACKET_V3")
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation

2018-05-25T14:17:24+00:00

[ Upstream commit b84bbaf7a6c8cca24f8acf25a2c8e46913a947ba ]

Packet sockets allow construction of packets shorter than
dev->hard_header_len to accommodate protocols with variable length
link layer headers. These packets are padded to dev->hard_header_len,
because some device drivers interpret that as a minimum packet size.

packet_snd reserves dev->hard_header_len bytes on allocation.
SOCK_DGRAM sockets call skb_push in dev_hard_header() to ensure that
link layer headers are stored in the reserved range. SOCK_RAW sockets
do the same in tpacket_snd, but not in packet_snd.

Syzbot was able to send a zero byte packet to a device with massive
116B link layer header, causing padding to cross over into skb_shinfo.
Fix this by writing from the start of the llheader reserved range also
in the case of packet_snd/SOCK_RAW.

Update skb_set_network_header to the new offset. This also corrects
it for SOCK_DGRAM, where it incorrectly double counted reserve due to
the skb_push in dev_hard_header.

Fixes: 9ed988cd5915 ("packet: validate variable length ll headers")
Reported-by: syzbot+71d74a5406d02057d559@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

packet: fix bitfield update race

2018-04-29T09:33:12+00:00

[ Upstream commit a6361f0ca4b25460f2cdf3235ebe8115f622901e ]

Updates to the bitfields in struct packet_sock are not atomic.
Serialize these read-modify-write cycles.

Move po->running into a separate variable. Its writes are protected by
po->bind_lock (except for one startup case at packet_create). Also
replace a textual precondition warning with lockdep annotation.

All others are set only in packet_setsockopt. Serialize these
updates by holding the socket lock. Analogous to other field updates,
also hold the lock when testing whether a ring is active (pg_vec).

Fixes: 8dc419447415 ("[PACKET]: Add optional checksum computation for recvmsg")
Reported-by: DaeRyong Jeong 
Reported-by: Byoungyoung Lee 
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: af_packet: fix race in PACKET_{R|T}X_RING

2018-04-29T09:33:11+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5171b37d959641bbc619781caf62e61f7b940871 ]

In order to remove the race caught by syzbot [1], we need
to lock the socket before using po->tp_version as this could
change under us otherwise.

This means lock_sock() and release_sock() must be done by
packet_set_ring() callers.

[1] :
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249
CPU: 0 PID: 20195 Comm: syzkaller707632 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #83
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676
 packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249
 packet_setsockopt+0x12c6/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3662
 SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849
 SyS_setsockopt+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:1828
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x449099
RSP: 002b:00007f42b5307ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000070003c RCX: 0000000000449099
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000000000107 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000700038 R08: 000000000000001c R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000080eecf R14: 00007f42b53089c0 R15: 0000000000000001

Local variable description: ----req_u@packet_setsockopt
Variable was created at:
 packet_setsockopt+0x13f/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3612
 SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman