<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/openvswitch/datapath.c, branch v6.18.50</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: openvswitch: fix flow mask use-after-free on flow deletion</title>
<updated>2026-09-07T15:22:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilya Maximets</name>
<email>i.maximets@ovn.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-15T00:58:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ac73e3af571da06c1d1cfe3f0f00dc978b851700'/>
<id>ac73e3af571da06c1d1cfe3f0f00dc978b851700</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4e30317ff67a2eb12b4d890d39f72fd7e7117d48 upstream.

The commit in the Fixes tag below made so flow-&gt;mask free is scheduled
via RCU right after it is removed from the flow table.  The pointer
stays in the flow structure and it can be accessible while in the same
RCU critical section.  This is done to avoid requiring ovs_mutex for
the ovs_flow_free().

However, while removing the flow during processing of CMD_DEL, we do
not take RCU read lock before the removal, and ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info()
uses the flow-&gt;mask pointer afterwards.  The RCU read lock is taken,
but it's already late at that point.  The comment on that line
acknowledges that the lock is cosmetic and doesn't serve a real purpose.

This leads to use-after-free if the RCU grace period passes between
removal and the filling.  It is a short race window, but it is there
and can lead to a real crash in case memory allocation for the info
takes a bit longer:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ovs_nla_put_key
             net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:1996
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovs_nla_put_key+0x2463/0x2e30
             net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:2250
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801ee89970 by task ovs_flow_del_ec/9487

 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  __ovs_nla_put_key net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:1996
  ovs_nla_put_key+0x2463/0x2e30 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:2250
  ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info+0x420/0x9c0 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:930
  ovs_flow_cmd_del+0x53a/0x970 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:1467
  ...
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 Allocated by task 9487:
  mask_alloc net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:967
  flow_mask_insert net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:1012
  ovs_flow_tbl_insert+0xea2/0x1a90 net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:1084
  ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x7e3/0xd90 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:1086
  ...
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556

 Freed by task 9485:
  rcu_free_sheaf+0x1e/0x100 mm/slub.c:5978
  rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645
  rcu_core+0x59c/0x10c0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897
  handle_softirqs+0x1e4/0x9a0 kernel/softirq.c:622
  ...
  instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062

ovs_flow_tbl_remove() must be called after the ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info()
to avoid this race.  This also helps with cleaning up the forced cast
and the cosmetic RCU read lock.  Before the commit in the Fixes tag the
order did not matter as long as the flow object itself was not freed.

A wider RCU critical section could be another option, but we have a
GFP_KERNEL allocation in the way.

Reported by Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-32042.

Fixes: 56c19868e115 ("openvswitch: Make flow mask removal symmetric.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260815005915.1097270-1-i.maximets@ovn.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4e30317ff67a2eb12b4d890d39f72fd7e7117d48 upstream.

The commit in the Fixes tag below made so flow-&gt;mask free is scheduled
via RCU right after it is removed from the flow table.  The pointer
stays in the flow structure and it can be accessible while in the same
RCU critical section.  This is done to avoid requiring ovs_mutex for
the ovs_flow_free().

However, while removing the flow during processing of CMD_DEL, we do
not take RCU read lock before the removal, and ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info()
uses the flow-&gt;mask pointer afterwards.  The RCU read lock is taken,
but it's already late at that point.  The comment on that line
acknowledges that the lock is cosmetic and doesn't serve a real purpose.

This leads to use-after-free if the RCU grace period passes between
removal and the filling.  It is a short race window, but it is there
and can lead to a real crash in case memory allocation for the info
takes a bit longer:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ovs_nla_put_key
             net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:1996
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovs_nla_put_key+0x2463/0x2e30
             net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:2250
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801ee89970 by task ovs_flow_del_ec/9487

 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  __ovs_nla_put_key net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:1996
  ovs_nla_put_key+0x2463/0x2e30 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:2250
  ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info+0x420/0x9c0 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:930
  ovs_flow_cmd_del+0x53a/0x970 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:1467
  ...
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 Allocated by task 9487:
  mask_alloc net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:967
  flow_mask_insert net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:1012
  ovs_flow_tbl_insert+0xea2/0x1a90 net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:1084
  ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x7e3/0xd90 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:1086
  ...
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556

 Freed by task 9485:
  rcu_free_sheaf+0x1e/0x100 mm/slub.c:5978
  rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645
  rcu_core+0x59c/0x10c0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897
  handle_softirqs+0x1e4/0x9a0 kernel/softirq.c:622
  ...
  instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062

ovs_flow_tbl_remove() must be called after the ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info()
to avoid this race.  This also helps with cleaning up the forced cast
and the cosmetic RCU read lock.  Before the commit in the Fixes tag the
order did not matter as long as the flow object itself was not freed.

A wider RCU critical section could be another option, but we have a
GFP_KERNEL allocation in the way.

Reported by Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-32042.

Fixes: 56c19868e115 ("openvswitch: Make flow mask removal symmetric.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260815005915.1097270-1-i.maximets@ovn.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: only skb_tx_error() a packet we are about to drop</title>
<updated>2026-09-07T15:22:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Norbert Szetei</name>
<email>norbert@doyensec.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-22T09:12:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e41a59fc056f63a7a1f42788913c53cc48d744aa'/>
<id>e41a59fc056f63a7a1f42788913c53cc48d744aa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0dbc2398fca3bb33eda963849f865ddb1b3aa05e upstream.

queue_userspace_packet() borrows the packet skb -- it only copies it into
a private netlink message (user_skb) and does not own it; on return
do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding it through the flow's remaining
actions. Its error path nevertheless calls skb_tx_error(skb), which via
skb_zcopy_clear() does skb_shinfo(skb)-&gt;flags &amp;= ~SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY,
stripping SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG from that live skb (skb_tx_error()'s kerneldoc
says "skb must be freed afterwards").

For a MSG_ZEROCOPY skb carrying page-cache frags, SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG is
what makes esp_input() skb_cow_data() before in-place AEAD; once it is
stripped a later local ESP-in-UDP delivery decrypts in place over pages
the sender does not own -- an unprivileged page-cache write (the
"Fragnesia" primitive).
do_execute_actions() ignores output_userspace()'s return value, so any
action after a failed USERSPACE upcall inherits the stripped skb.

Move the skb_tx_error() to the flow-miss drop path - the "default"
branch of ovs_dp_process_packet()'s switch(error), before kfree_skb().

The call has been here since commit 36d5fe6a0007 ("core, nfqueue,
openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors") but was
harmless until esp_input() began relying on SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to gate
in-place decrypt; only then did stripping it on a still-forwarded skb
become a page-cache write primitive.

Fixes: 36d5fe6a0007 ("core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors")
Fixes: f4c50a4034e6 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei &lt;norbert@doyensec.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jongmin Jang &lt;payload.jang@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/55A52703-7548-4A55-A9CE-2A37145BDCAD@doyensec.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0dbc2398fca3bb33eda963849f865ddb1b3aa05e upstream.

queue_userspace_packet() borrows the packet skb -- it only copies it into
a private netlink message (user_skb) and does not own it; on return
do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding it through the flow's remaining
actions. Its error path nevertheless calls skb_tx_error(skb), which via
skb_zcopy_clear() does skb_shinfo(skb)-&gt;flags &amp;= ~SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY,
stripping SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG from that live skb (skb_tx_error()'s kerneldoc
says "skb must be freed afterwards").

For a MSG_ZEROCOPY skb carrying page-cache frags, SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG is
what makes esp_input() skb_cow_data() before in-place AEAD; once it is
stripped a later local ESP-in-UDP delivery decrypts in place over pages
the sender does not own -- an unprivileged page-cache write (the
"Fragnesia" primitive).
do_execute_actions() ignores output_userspace()'s return value, so any
action after a failed USERSPACE upcall inherits the stripped skb.

Move the skb_tx_error() to the flow-miss drop path - the "default"
branch of ovs_dp_process_packet()'s switch(error), before kfree_skb().

The call has been here since commit 36d5fe6a0007 ("core, nfqueue,
openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors") but was
harmless until esp_input() began relying on SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to gate
in-place decrypt; only then did stripping it on a still-forwarded skb
become a page-cache write primitive.

Fixes: 36d5fe6a0007 ("core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors")
Fixes: f4c50a4034e6 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei &lt;norbert@doyensec.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jongmin Jang &lt;payload.jang@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/55A52703-7548-4A55-A9CE-2A37145BDCAD@doyensec.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: openvswitch: reallocate update replies for mismatched IDs</title>
<updated>2026-08-19T16:18:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhiling Zou</name>
<email>zhilinz@nebusec.ai</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-03T00:29:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=23716dd9d8d46a5908536b73dc085e62f2b5c237'/>
<id>23716dd9d8d46a5908536b73dc085e62f2b5c237</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5d1c224dd914579524a183a514c12b95095d12ce upstream.

ovs_flow_cmd_new() preallocates the optional reply skb before it takes
ovs_mutex and before it knows which existing flow will be updated.

That is normally fine because the skb is sized from the request flow
identifier.  That identifier also becomes the inserted flow's identifier.
For updates, however, a request with a UFID may miss the UFID lookup and
then fall back to the flow key lookup.  That lookup can legitimately find
an existing key-identified flow.  UFIDs are optional and the flow key is
the primary identifier.

For echoed replies, ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info() writes the matched flow's
identifier, not the request identifier used for the preallocation.  A short
request UFID can therefore leave too little room for the key identifier.
The fill can then fail with -EMSGSIZE and hit the BUG_ON(error &lt; 0) in the
update path.

Once the update target has been resolved, reallocate the reply skb if the
matched flow needs a larger reply than the request identifier allowed.  Do
this before replacing the actions so the request can still fail cleanly if
the rare extra allocation fails.

Fixes: 74ed7ab9264c ("openvswitch: Add support for unique flow IDs.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega &lt;vega@nebusec.ai&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou &lt;zhilinz@nebusec.ai&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/f7bbd3c30ce81a39156e226b3872d73abed21d2f.1785644623.git.zhilinz@nebusec.ai
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5d1c224dd914579524a183a514c12b95095d12ce upstream.

ovs_flow_cmd_new() preallocates the optional reply skb before it takes
ovs_mutex and before it knows which existing flow will be updated.

That is normally fine because the skb is sized from the request flow
identifier.  That identifier also becomes the inserted flow's identifier.
For updates, however, a request with a UFID may miss the UFID lookup and
then fall back to the flow key lookup.  That lookup can legitimately find
an existing key-identified flow.  UFIDs are optional and the flow key is
the primary identifier.

For echoed replies, ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info() writes the matched flow's
identifier, not the request identifier used for the preallocation.  A short
request UFID can therefore leave too little room for the key identifier.
The fill can then fail with -EMSGSIZE and hit the BUG_ON(error &lt; 0) in the
update path.

Once the update target has been resolved, reallocate the reply skb if the
matched flow needs a larger reply than the request identifier allowed.  Do
this before replacing the actions so the request can still fail cleanly if
the rare extra allocation fails.

Fixes: 74ed7ab9264c ("openvswitch: Add support for unique flow IDs.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega &lt;vega@nebusec.ai&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou &lt;zhilinz@nebusec.ai&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/f7bbd3c30ce81a39156e226b3872d73abed21d2f.1785644623.git.zhilinz@nebusec.ai
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: fix GSO userspace truncation underflow</title>
<updated>2026-08-03T09:22:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kyle Zeng</name>
<email>kylebot@openai.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-07T22:16:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=100a23b1613e9218e0af654ef102352c713f0263'/>
<id>100a23b1613e9218e0af654ef102352c713f0263</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4032f8ed10fcb84d41c508dfb04be96589f78dfe upstream.

OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb
length in OVS_CB(skb)-&gt;cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a
GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment.
A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater
than skb-&gt;len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy().

Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer
against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation
sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a
consumer handles it.

Fixes: f2a4d086ed4c ("openvswitch: Add packet truncation support.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;kylebot@openai.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260707221635.27489-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4032f8ed10fcb84d41c508dfb04be96589f78dfe upstream.

OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb
length in OVS_CB(skb)-&gt;cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a
GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment.
A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater
than skb-&gt;len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy().

Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer
against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation
sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a
consumer handles it.

Fixes: f2a4d086ed4c ("openvswitch: Add packet truncation support.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;kylebot@openai.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260707221635.27489-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: openvswitch: fix possible kfree_skb of ERR_PTR</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:43:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Adrian Moreno</name>
<email>amorenoz@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-04T12:19:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ecc55aad3390129a87106841f4b68bf3d70c9264'/>
<id>ecc55aad3390129a87106841f4b68bf3d70c9264</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ee30dd2909d8b98619f4341c70ec8dc8e155ab02 ]

After the patch in the "Fixes" tag, the allocation of the "reply" skb
can happen either before or after locking the ovs_mutex.

However, error cleanups still follow the classical reversed order,
assuming "reply" is allocated before locking: it is freed after unlocking.

If "reply" allocation happens after locking the mutex and it fails,
"reply" is left with an ERR_PTR, and execution jumps to the correspondent
cleanup stage which will try to free an invalid pointer.

Fix this by setting the pointer to NULL after having saved its error
value.

Fixes: 893f139b9a6c ("openvswitch: Minimize ovs_flow_cmd_new|set critical sections.")
Signed-off-by: Adrian Moreno &lt;amorenoz@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron &lt;echaudro@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604121946.942164-1-amorenoz@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ee30dd2909d8b98619f4341c70ec8dc8e155ab02 ]

After the patch in the "Fixes" tag, the allocation of the "reply" skb
can happen either before or after locking the ovs_mutex.

However, error cleanups still follow the classical reversed order,
assuming "reply" is allocated before locking: it is freed after unlocking.

If "reply" allocation happens after locking the mutex and it fails,
"reply" is left with an ERR_PTR, and execution jumps to the correspondent
cleanup stage which will try to free an invalid pointer.

Fix this by setting the pointer to NULL after having saved its error
value.

Fixes: 893f139b9a6c ("openvswitch: Minimize ovs_flow_cmd_new|set critical sections.")
Signed-off-by: Adrian Moreno &lt;amorenoz@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron &lt;echaudro@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604121946.942164-1-amorenoz@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: cap upcall PID array size and pre-size vport replies</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:07:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Weiming Shi</name>
<email>bestswngs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-16T02:46:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fa6e90bc443bed8dc0d55bc5ea5b27ffdfe37704'/>
<id>fa6e90bc443bed8dc0d55bc5ea5b27ffdfe37704</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2091c6aa0df6aba47deb5c8ab232b1cb60af3519 ]

The vport netlink reply helpers allocate a fixed-size skb with
nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, ...) but serialize the full upcall PID
array via ovs_vport_get_upcall_portids().  Since
ovs_vport_set_upcall_portids() accepts any non-zero multiple of
sizeof(u32) with no upper bound, a CAP_NET_ADMIN user can install a PID
array large enough to overflow the reply buffer, causing nla_put() to
fail with -EMSGSIZE and hitting BUG_ON(err &lt; 0).  On systems with
unprivileged user namespaces enabled (e.g., Ubuntu default), this is
reachable via unshare -Urn since OVS vport mutation operations use
GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM.

 kernel BUG at net/openvswitch/datapath.c:2414!
 Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-00195-geb216e422044 #1
 RIP: 0010:ovs_vport_cmd_set+0x34c/0x400
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1116)
  genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194)
  netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
  genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219)
  netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
  netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206)
  __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Reject attempts to set more PIDs than nr_cpu_ids in
ovs_vport_set_upcall_portids(), and pre-compute the worst-case reply
size in ovs_vport_cmd_msg_size() based on that bound, similar to the
existing ovs_dp_cmd_msg_size().  nr_cpu_ids matches the cap already
used by the per-CPU dispatch configuration on the datapath side
(ovs_dp_cmd_fill_info() serialises at most nr_cpu_ids PIDs), so the
two sides stay consistent.

Fixes: 5cd667b0a456 ("openvswitch: Allow each vport to have an array of 'port_id's.")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260416024653.153456-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2091c6aa0df6aba47deb5c8ab232b1cb60af3519 ]

The vport netlink reply helpers allocate a fixed-size skb with
nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, ...) but serialize the full upcall PID
array via ovs_vport_get_upcall_portids().  Since
ovs_vport_set_upcall_portids() accepts any non-zero multiple of
sizeof(u32) with no upper bound, a CAP_NET_ADMIN user can install a PID
array large enough to overflow the reply buffer, causing nla_put() to
fail with -EMSGSIZE and hitting BUG_ON(err &lt; 0).  On systems with
unprivileged user namespaces enabled (e.g., Ubuntu default), this is
reachable via unshare -Urn since OVS vport mutation operations use
GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM.

 kernel BUG at net/openvswitch/datapath.c:2414!
 Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-00195-geb216e422044 #1
 RIP: 0010:ovs_vport_cmd_set+0x34c/0x400
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1116)
  genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194)
  netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
  genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219)
  netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
  netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206)
  __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Reject attempts to set more PIDs than nr_cpu_ids in
ovs_vport_set_upcall_portids(), and pre-compute the worst-case reply
size in ovs_vport_cmd_msg_size() based on that bound, similar to the
existing ovs_dp_cmd_msg_size().  nr_cpu_ids matches the cap already
used by the per-CPU dispatch configuration on the datapath side
(ovs_dp_cmd_fill_info() serialises at most nr_cpu_ids PIDs), so the
two sides stay consistent.

Fixes: 5cd667b0a456 ("openvswitch: Allow each vport to have an array of 'port_id's.")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260416024653.153456-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: openvswitch: allow providing upcall pid for the 'execute' command</title>
<updated>2025-07-07T21:30:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilya Maximets</name>
<email>i.maximets@ovn.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-02T15:50:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=59f44c9ccc3bb68aa3b062b8e57ce0e1ee2fca75'/>
<id>59f44c9ccc3bb68aa3b062b8e57ce0e1ee2fca75</id>
<content type='text'>
When a packet enters OVS datapath and there is no flow to handle it,
packet goes to userspace through a MISS upcall.  With per-CPU upcall
dispatch mechanism, we're using the current CPU id to select the
Netlink PID on which to send this packet.  This allows us to send
packets from the same traffic flow through the same handler.

The handler will process the packet, install required flow into the
kernel and re-inject the original packet via OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE.

While handling OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE, however, we may hit a
recirculation action that will pass the (likely modified) packet
through the flow lookup again.  And if the flow is not found, the
packet will be sent to userspace again through another MISS upcall.

However, the handler thread in userspace is likely running on a
different CPU core, and the OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE request is handled
in the syscall context of that thread.  So, when the time comes to
send the packet through another upcall, the per-CPU dispatch will
choose a different Netlink PID, and this packet will end up processed
by a different handler thread on a different CPU.

The process continues as long as there are new recirculations, each
time the packet goes to a different handler thread before it is sent
out of the OVS datapath to the destination port.  In real setups the
number of recirculations can go up to 4 or 5, sometimes more.

There is always a chance to re-order packets while processing upcalls,
because userspace will first install the flow and then re-inject the
original packet.  So, there is a race window when the flow is already
installed and the second packet can match it and be forwarded to the
destination before the first packet is re-injected.  But the fact that
packets are going through multiple upcalls handled by different
userspace threads makes the reordering noticeably more likely, because
we not only have a race between the kernel and a userspace handler
(which is hard to avoid), but also between multiple userspace handlers.

For example, let's assume that 10 packets got enqueued through a MISS
upcall for handler-1, it will start processing them, will install the
flow into the kernel and start re-injecting packets back, from where
they will go through another MISS to handler-2.  Handler-2 will install
the flow into the kernel and start re-injecting the packets, while
handler-1 continues to re-inject the last of the 10 packets, they will
hit the flow installed by handler-2 and be forwarded without going to
the handler-2, while handler-2 still re-injects the first of these 10
packets.  Given multiple recirculations and misses, these 10 packets
may end up completely mixed up on the output from the datapath.

Let's allow userspace to specify on which Netlink PID the packets
should be upcalled while processing OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE.
This makes it possible to ensure that all the packets are processed
by the same handler thread in the userspace even with them being
upcalled multiple times in the process.  Packets will remain in order
since they will be enqueued to the same socket and re-injected in the
same order.  This doesn't eliminate re-ordering as stated above, since
we still have a race between kernel and the userspace thread, but it
allows to eliminate races between multiple userspace threads.

Userspace knows the PID of the socket on which the original upcall is
received, so there is no need to send it up from the kernel.

Solution requires storing the value somewhere for the duration of the
packet processing.  There are two potential places for this: our skb
extension or the per-CPU storage.  It's not clear which is better,
so just following currently used scheme of storing this kind of things
along the skb.  We still have a decent amount of space in the cb.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Acked-by: Flavio Leitner &lt;fbl@sysclose.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron &lt;echaudro@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250702155043.2331772-1-i.maximets@ovn.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When a packet enters OVS datapath and there is no flow to handle it,
packet goes to userspace through a MISS upcall.  With per-CPU upcall
dispatch mechanism, we're using the current CPU id to select the
Netlink PID on which to send this packet.  This allows us to send
packets from the same traffic flow through the same handler.

The handler will process the packet, install required flow into the
kernel and re-inject the original packet via OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE.

While handling OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE, however, we may hit a
recirculation action that will pass the (likely modified) packet
through the flow lookup again.  And if the flow is not found, the
packet will be sent to userspace again through another MISS upcall.

However, the handler thread in userspace is likely running on a
different CPU core, and the OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE request is handled
in the syscall context of that thread.  So, when the time comes to
send the packet through another upcall, the per-CPU dispatch will
choose a different Netlink PID, and this packet will end up processed
by a different handler thread on a different CPU.

The process continues as long as there are new recirculations, each
time the packet goes to a different handler thread before it is sent
out of the OVS datapath to the destination port.  In real setups the
number of recirculations can go up to 4 or 5, sometimes more.

There is always a chance to re-order packets while processing upcalls,
because userspace will first install the flow and then re-inject the
original packet.  So, there is a race window when the flow is already
installed and the second packet can match it and be forwarded to the
destination before the first packet is re-injected.  But the fact that
packets are going through multiple upcalls handled by different
userspace threads makes the reordering noticeably more likely, because
we not only have a race between the kernel and a userspace handler
(which is hard to avoid), but also between multiple userspace handlers.

For example, let's assume that 10 packets got enqueued through a MISS
upcall for handler-1, it will start processing them, will install the
flow into the kernel and start re-injecting packets back, from where
they will go through another MISS to handler-2.  Handler-2 will install
the flow into the kernel and start re-injecting the packets, while
handler-1 continues to re-inject the last of the 10 packets, they will
hit the flow installed by handler-2 and be forwarded without going to
the handler-2, while handler-2 still re-injects the first of these 10
packets.  Given multiple recirculations and misses, these 10 packets
may end up completely mixed up on the output from the datapath.

Let's allow userspace to specify on which Netlink PID the packets
should be upcalled while processing OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE.
This makes it possible to ensure that all the packets are processed
by the same handler thread in the userspace even with them being
upcalled multiple times in the process.  Packets will remain in order
since they will be enqueued to the same socket and re-injected in the
same order.  This doesn't eliminate re-ordering as stated above, since
we still have a race between kernel and the userspace thread, but it
allows to eliminate races between multiple userspace threads.

Userspace knows the PID of the socket on which the original upcall is
received, so there is no need to send it up from the kernel.

Solution requires storing the value somewhere for the duration of the
packet processing.  There are two potential places for this: our skb
extension or the per-CPU storage.  It's not clear which is better,
so just following currently used scheme of storing this kind of things
along the skb.  We still have a decent amount of space in the cb.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Acked-by: Flavio Leitner &lt;fbl@sysclose.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron &lt;echaudro@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250702155043.2331772-1-i.maximets@ovn.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: Allocate struct ovs_pcpu_storage dynamically</title>
<updated>2025-06-17T12:47:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-13T12:36:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7b4ac12cc929e281cf7edc22203e0533790ebc2b'/>
<id>7b4ac12cc929e281cf7edc22203e0533790ebc2b</id>
<content type='text'>
PERCPU_MODULE_RESERVE defines the maximum size that can by used for the
per-CPU data size used by modules. This is 8KiB.

Commit 035fcdc4d240c ("openvswitch: Merge three per-CPU structures into
one") restructured the per-CPU memory allocation for the module and
moved the separate alloc_percpu() invocations at module init time to a
static per-CPU variable which is allocated by the module loader.

The size of the per-CPU data section for openvswitch is 6488 bytes which
is ~80% of the available per-CPU memory. Together with a few other
modules it is easy to exhaust the available 8KiB of memory.

Allocate ovs_pcpu_storage dynamically at module init time.

Reported-by: Gal Pressman &lt;gal@nvidia.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c401e017-f8db-4f57-a1cd-89beb979a277@nvidia.com
Fixes: 035fcdc4d240c ("openvswitch: Merge three per-CPU structures into one")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250613123629.-XSoQTCu@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
PERCPU_MODULE_RESERVE defines the maximum size that can by used for the
per-CPU data size used by modules. This is 8KiB.

Commit 035fcdc4d240c ("openvswitch: Merge three per-CPU structures into
one") restructured the per-CPU memory allocation for the module and
moved the separate alloc_percpu() invocations at module init time to a
static per-CPU variable which is allocated by the module loader.

The size of the per-CPU data section for openvswitch is 6488 bytes which
is ~80% of the available per-CPU memory. Together with a few other
modules it is easy to exhaust the available 8KiB of memory.

Allocate ovs_pcpu_storage dynamically at module init time.

Reported-by: Gal Pressman &lt;gal@nvidia.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c401e017-f8db-4f57-a1cd-89beb979a277@nvidia.com
Fixes: 035fcdc4d240c ("openvswitch: Merge three per-CPU structures into one")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250613123629.-XSoQTCu@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: Use nested-BH locking for ovs_pcpu_storage</title>
<updated>2025-05-15T13:23:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-12T09:27:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=672318331b44753ab7bd8545558939c38b4c1132'/>
<id>672318331b44753ab7bd8545558939c38b4c1132</id>
<content type='text'>
ovs_pcpu_storage is a per-CPU variable and relies on disabled BH for its
locking. Without per-CPU locking in local_bh_disable() on PREEMPT_RT
this data structure requires explicit locking.
The data structure can be referenced recursive and there is a recursion
counter to avoid too many recursions.

Add a local_lock_t to the data structure and use
local_lock_nested_bh() for locking. Add an owner of the struct which is
the current task and acquire the lock only if the structure is not owned
by the current task.

Cc: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eelco Chaudron &lt;echaudro@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Cc: dev@openvswitch.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250512092736.229935-9-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ovs_pcpu_storage is a per-CPU variable and relies on disabled BH for its
locking. Without per-CPU locking in local_bh_disable() on PREEMPT_RT
this data structure requires explicit locking.
The data structure can be referenced recursive and there is a recursion
counter to avoid too many recursions.

Add a local_lock_t to the data structure and use
local_lock_nested_bh() for locking. Add an owner of the struct which is
the current task and acquire the lock only if the structure is not owned
by the current task.

Cc: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eelco Chaudron &lt;echaudro@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Cc: dev@openvswitch.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250512092736.229935-9-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: Merge three per-CPU structures into one</title>
<updated>2025-05-15T13:23:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-12T09:27:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=035fcdc4d240c873c89b76b752dd9921bc88c1ba'/>
<id>035fcdc4d240c873c89b76b752dd9921bc88c1ba</id>
<content type='text'>
exec_actions_level is a per-CPU integer allocated at compile time.
action_fifos and flow_keys are per-CPU pointer and have their data
allocated at module init time.
There is no gain in splitting it, once the module is allocated, the
structures are allocated.

Merge the three per-CPU variables into ovs_pcpu_storage, adapt callers.

Cc: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eelco Chaudron &lt;echaudro@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Cc: dev@openvswitch.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250512092736.229935-8-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
exec_actions_level is a per-CPU integer allocated at compile time.
action_fifos and flow_keys are per-CPU pointer and have their data
allocated at module init time.
There is no gain in splitting it, once the module is allocated, the
structures are allocated.

Merge the three per-CPU variables into ovs_pcpu_storage, adapt callers.

Cc: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eelco Chaudron &lt;echaudro@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Cc: dev@openvswitch.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250512092736.229935-8-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
