linux-stable.git/net/netfilter, branch v5.4.259

netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: .deactivate fails if element has expired

2023-10-25T09:53:22+00:00

commit d111692a59c1470ae530cbb39bcf0346c950ecc7 upstream.

This allows to remove an expired element which is not possible in other
existing set backends, this is more noticeable if gc-interval is high so
expired elements remain in the tree. On-demand gc also does not help in
this case, because this is delete element path. Return NULL if element
has expired.

Fixes: 8d8540c4f5e0 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: add timeout support")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nft_payload: fix wrong mac header matching

2023-10-25T09:53:21+00:00

commit d351c1ea2de3e36e608fc355d8ae7d0cc80e6cd6 upstream.

mcast packets get looped back to the local machine.
Such packets have a 0-length mac header, we should treat
this like "mac header not set" and abort rule evaluation.

As-is, we just copy data from the network header instead.

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Reported-by: Blažej Krajňák 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: prevent address rewrite in kernel_bind()

2023-10-25T09:53:18+00:00

commit c889a99a21bf124c3db08d09df919f0eccc5ea4c upstream.

Similar to the change in commit 0bdf399342c5("net: Avoid address
overwrite in kernel_connect"), BPF hooks run on bind may rewrite the
address passed to kernel_bind(). This change

1) Makes a copy of the bind address in kernel_bind() to insulate
   callers.
2) Replaces direct calls to sock->ops->bind() in net with kernel_bind()

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/
Fixes: 4fbac77d2d09 ("bpf: Hooks for sys_bind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife 
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: handle the connecting collision properly in nf_conntrack_proto_sctp

2023-10-10T19:46:44+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8e56b063c86569e51eed1c5681ce6361fa97fc7a ]

In Scenario A and B below, as the delayed INIT_ACK always changes the peer
vtag, SCTP ct with the incorrect vtag may cause packet loss.

Scenario A: INIT_ACK is delayed until the peer receives its own INIT_ACK

  192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [INIT] [init tag: 1328086772]
    192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: [INIT] [init tag: 1414468151]
    192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [INIT ACK] [init tag: 1328086772]
  192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: [INIT ACK] [init tag: 1650211246] *
  192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [COOKIE ECHO]
    192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: [COOKIE ECHO]
    192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [COOKIE ACK]

Scenario B: INIT_ACK is delayed until the peer completes its own handshake

  192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3922216408]
    192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 144230885]
    192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3922216408]
    192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
    192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
  192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3914796021] *

This patch fixes it as below:

In SCTP_CID_INIT processing:
- clear ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] if ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] &&
  ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir]. (Scenario E)
- set ct->proto.sctp.init[dir].

In SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK processing:
- drop it if !ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] && ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] &&
  ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] != ih->init_tag. (Scenario B, Scenario C)
- drop it if ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] && ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] &&
  ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] != ih->init_tag. (Scenario A)

In SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK processing:
- clear ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] and ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir].
  (Scenario D)

Also, it's important to allow the ct state to move forward with cookie_echo
and cookie_ack from the opposite dir for the collision scenarios.

There are also other Scenarios where it should allow the packet through,
addressed by the processing above:

Scenario C: new CT is created by INIT_ACK.

Scenario D: start INIT on the existing ESTABLISHED ct.

Scenario E: start INIT after the old collision on the existing ESTABLISHED
ct.

  192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3922216408]
  192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 144230885]
  (both side are stopped, then start new connection again in hours)
  192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 242308742]

Fixes: 9fb9cbb1082d ("[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem.")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: replace calls to sock->ops->connect() with kernel_connect()

2023-10-10T19:46:43+00:00

commit 26297b4ce1ce4ea40bc9a48ec99f45da3f64d2e2 upstream.

commit 0bdf399342c5 ("net: Avoid address overwrite in kernel_connect")
ensured that kernel_connect() will not overwrite the address parameter
in cases where BPF connect hooks perform an address rewrite. This change
replaces direct calls to sock->ops->connect() in net with kernel_connect()
to make these call safe.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/
Fixes: d74bad4e74ee ("bpf: Hooks for sys_connect")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife 
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: ipset: Fix race between IPSET_CMD_CREATE and IPSET_CMD_SWAP

2023-10-10T19:46:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7433b6d2afd512d04398c73aa984d1e285be125b ]

Kyle Zeng reported that there is a race between IPSET_CMD_ADD and IPSET_CMD_SWAP
in netfilter/ip_set, which can lead to the invocation of `__ip_set_put` on a
wrong `set`, triggering the `BUG_ON(set->ref == 0);` check in it.

The race is caused by using the wrong reference counter, i.e. the ref counter instead
of ref_netlink.

Fixes: 24e227896bbf ("netfilter: ipset: Add schedule point in call_ad().")
Reported-by: Kyle Zeng 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/ZPZqetxOmH+w%2Fmyc@westworld/#r
Tested-by: Kyle Zeng 
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

netfilter: nf_tables: disallow element removal on anonymous sets

2023-10-10T19:46:36+00:00

[ Upstream commit 23a3bfd4ba7acd36abf52b78605f61b21bdac216 ]

Anonymous sets need to be populated once at creation and then they are
bound to rule since 938154b93be8 ("netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound
anonymous set before commit phase"), otherwise transaction reports
EINVAL.

Userspace does not need to delete elements of anonymous sets that are
not yet bound, reject this with EOPNOTSUPP.

From flush command path, skip anonymous sets, they are expected to be
bound already. Otherwise, EINVAL is hit at the end of this transaction
for unbound sets.

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: avoid OOB read

2023-09-23T08:59:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit f4f8a7803119005e87b716874bec07c751efafec ]

The opt_num field is controlled by user mode and is not currently
validated inside the kernel. An attacker can take advantage of this to
trigger an OOB read and potentially leak information.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88804bc64272 by task poc/6431

CPU: 1 PID: 6431 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #1
Call Trace:
 nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88
 nf_osf_find+0x186/0x2f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:281
 nft_osf_eval+0x37f/0x590 net/netfilter/nft_osf.c:47
 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:214
 nft_do_chain+0x2b0/0x1490 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:264
 nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x17c/0x1f0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
 [..]

Also add validation to genre, subtype and version fields.

Fixes: 11eeef41d5f6 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match")
Reported-by: Lucas Leong 
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

netfilter: xt_sctp: validate the flag_info count

2023-09-23T08:59:54+00:00

commit e99476497687ef9e850748fe6d232264f30bc8f9 upstream.

sctp_mt_check doesn't validate the flag_count field. An attacker can
take advantage of that to trigger a OOB read and leak memory
information.

Add the field validation in the checkentry function.

Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Lucas Leong 
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input

2023-09-23T08:59:53+00:00

commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 upstream.

The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure.
An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting
the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries.

Add a checkentry function to validate the structure.

This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408).

Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman