linux-stable.git/net/netfilter, branch v4.18 Linux kernel stable tree netfilter: nf_tables: move dumper state allocation into ->start 2018-07-23T22:36:33+00:00 Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de 2018-07-23T10:47:14+00:00 90fd131afc565159c9e0ea742f082b337e10f8c6 Shaochun Chen points out we leak dumper filter state allocations stored in dump_control->data in case there is an error before netlink sets cb_running (after which ->done will be called at some point). In order to fix this, add .start functions and do the allocations there. ->done is going to clean up, and in case error occurs before ->start invocation no cleanups need to be done anymore. Reported-by: shaochun chen <cscnull@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
Shaochun Chen points out we leak dumper filter state allocations
stored in dump_control->data in case there is an error before netlink sets
cb_running (after which ->done will be called at some point).

In order to fix this, add .start functions and do the allocations
there.

->done is going to clean up, and in case error occurs before
->start invocation no cleanups need to be done anymore.

Reported-by: shaochun chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
netfilter: conntrack: dccp: treat SYNC/SYNCACK as invalid if no prior state 2018-07-20T13:31:44+00:00 Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de 2018-07-17T19:03:15+00:00 6613b6173dee098997229caf1f3b961c49da75e6 When first DCCP packet is SYNC or SYNCACK, we insert a new conntrack that has an un-initialized timeout value, i.e. such entry could be reaped at any time. Mark them as INVALID and only ignore SYNC/SYNCACK when connection had an old state. Reported-by: syzbot+6f18401420df260e37ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
When first DCCP packet is SYNC or SYNCACK, we insert a new conntrack
that has an un-initialized timeout value, i.e. such entry could be
reaped at any time.

Mark them as INVALID and only ignore SYNC/SYNCACK when connection had
an old state.

Reported-by: syzbot+6f18401420df260e37ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
netfilter: nf_tables: don't allow to rename to already-pending name 2018-07-20T13:31:44+00:00 Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de 2018-07-17T05:17:56+00:00 c6cc94df65c3174be92afbee638f11cbb5e606a7 Its possible to rename two chains to the same name in one transaction: nft add chain t c1 nft add chain t c2 nft 'rename chain t c1 c3;rename chain t c2 c3' This creates two chains named 'c3'. Appears to be harmless, both chains can still be deleted both by name or handle, but, nevertheless, its a bug. Walk transaction log and also compare vs. the pending renames. Both chains can still be deleted, but nevertheless it is a bug as we don't allow to create chains with identical names, so we should prevent this from happening-by-rename too. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
Its possible to rename two chains to the same name in one
transaction:

nft add chain t c1
nft add chain t c2
nft 'rename chain t c1 c3;rename chain t c2 c3'

This creates two chains named 'c3'.

Appears to be harmless, both chains can still be deleted both
by name or handle, but, nevertheless, its a bug.

Walk transaction log and also compare vs. the pending renames.

Both chains can still be deleted, but nevertheless it is a bug as
we don't allow to create chains with identical names, so we should
prevent this from happening-by-rename too.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
netfilter: nf_tables: fix memory leaks on chain rename 2018-07-20T13:31:43+00:00 Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de 2018-07-17T05:17:55+00:00 9f8aac0be21ed5f99bd5ba0ff315d710737d1794 The new name is stored in the transaction metadata, on commit, the pointers to the old and new names are swapped. Therefore in abort and commit case we have to free the pointer in the chain_trans container. In commit case, the pointer can be used by another cpu that is currently dumping the renamed chain, thus kfree needs to happen after waiting for rcu readers to complete. Fixes: b7263e071a ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow chain name of up to 255 chars") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
The new name is stored in the transaction metadata, on commit,
the pointers to the old and new names are swapped.

Therefore in abort and commit case we have to free the
pointer in the chain_trans container.

In commit case, the pointer can be used by another cpu that
is currently dumping the renamed chain, thus kfree needs to
happen after waiting for rcu readers to complete.

Fixes: b7263e071a ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow chain name of up to 255 chars")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
netfilter: nf_tables: free flow table struct too 2018-07-20T13:31:43+00:00 Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de 2018-07-17T05:17:54+00:00 a12486ebe104190a6c10557134014290afa98370 Fixes: 3b49e2e94e6ebb ("netfilter: nf_tables: add flow table netlink frontend") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
Fixes: 3b49e2e94e6ebb ("netfilter: nf_tables: add flow table netlink frontend")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
netfilter: nf_tables: use dev->name directly 2018-07-20T13:31:43+00:00 Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de 2018-07-17T05:17:53+00:00 b8088dda98b9064a2b3007fe54b03ede70a15602 no need to store the name in separate area. Furthermore, it uses kmalloc but not kfree and most accesses seem to treat it as char[IFNAMSIZ] not char *. Remove this and use dev->name instead. In case event zeroed dev, just omit the name in the dump. Fixes: d92191aa84e5f1 ("netfilter: nf_tables: cache device name in flowtable object") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
no need to store the name in separate area.

Furthermore, it uses kmalloc but not kfree and most accesses seem to treat
it as char[IFNAMSIZ] not char *.

Remove this and use dev->name instead.

In case event zeroed dev, just omit the name in the dump.

Fixes: d92191aa84e5f1 ("netfilter: nf_tables: cache device name in flowtable object")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: fix panic when destroying set by GC 2018-07-18T15:12:05+00:00 Taehee Yoo ap420073@gmail.com 2018-07-10T14:22:01+00:00 c293ac959f809ee1cd31609d9e62bccf6804b2e6 This patch fixes below. 1. check null pointer of rb_next. rb_next can return null. so null check routine should be added. 2. add rcu_barrier in destroy routine. GC uses call_rcu to remove elements. but all elements should be removed before destroying set and chains. so that rcu_barrier is added. test script: %cat test.nft table inet aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags interval, timeout; elements = { 0-1 : jump a0, 3-4 : jump a0, 6-7 : jump a0, 9-10 : jump a0, 12-13 : jump a0, 15-16 : jump a0, 18-19 : jump a0, 21-22 : jump a0, 24-25 : jump a0, 27-28 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset table inet aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags interval, timeout; elements = { 0-1 : jump a0, 3-4 : jump a0, 6-7 : jump a0, 9-10 : jump a0, 12-13 : jump a0, 15-16 : jump a0, 18-19 : jump a0, 21-22 : jump a0, 24-25 : jump a0, 27-28 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset splat looks like: [ 2402.419838] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ 2402.428433] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 2402.429343] CPU: 1 PID: 1350 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc2+ #1 [ 2402.429343] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 03/23/2017 [ 2402.429343] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rbtree_gc [nft_set_rbtree] [ 2402.429343] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x1e/0x130 [ 2402.429343] Code: e9 de f2 ff ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 55 48 89 fa 41 54 55 53 48 c1 ea 03 48 b8 00 00 00 0 [ 2402.429343] RSP: 0018:ffff880105f77678 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 2402.429343] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801143e3428 RCX: 1ffff1002287c69c [ 2402.429343] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 2402.429343] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffed0016aabc24 R09: ffffed0016aabc24 [ 2402.429343] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0016aabc23 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 2402.429343] R13: ffff8800b6933388 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801143e3440 [ 2402.534486] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled [ 2402.534212] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2402.534212] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2402.534212] CR2: 0000000000863008 CR3: 00000000a3c16000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 2402.534212] Call Trace: [ 2402.534212] nft_rbtree_gc+0x2b5/0x5f0 [nft_set_rbtree] [ 2402.534212] process_one_work+0xc1b/0x1ee0 [ 2402.540329] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ 2402.534212] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 [ 2402.534212] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x3e0/0x3e0 [ 2402.534212] ? set_load_weight+0x270/0x270 [ 2402.534212] ? __schedule+0x6ea/0x1fb0 [ 2402.534212] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8 [ 2402.534212] ? save_trace+0x320/0x320 [ 2402.534212] ? sched_clock_local+0xe2/0x150 [ 2402.534212] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0 [ 2402.534212] ? worker_thread+0x35f/0x1150 [ 2402.534212] ? lock_contended+0xe90/0xe90 [ 2402.534212] ? __lock_acquire+0x4520/0x4520 [ 2402.534212] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xb1/0x350 [ 2402.534212] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x111/0x1b0 [ 2402.534212] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 2402.534212] worker_thread+0x169/0x1150 Fixes: 8d8540c4f5e0("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: add timeout support") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
This patch fixes below.
1. check null pointer of rb_next.
 rb_next can return null. so null check routine should be added.
2. add rcu_barrier in destroy routine.
 GC uses call_rcu to remove elements. but all elements should be
 removed before destroying set and chains. so that rcu_barrier is added.

test script:
   %cat test.nft
   table inet aa {
	   map map1 {
		   type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags interval, timeout;
		   elements = {
			   0-1 : jump a0,
			   3-4 : jump a0,
			   6-7 : jump a0,
			   9-10 : jump a0,
			   12-13 : jump a0,
			   15-16 : jump a0,
			   18-19 : jump a0,
			   21-22 : jump a0,
			   24-25 : jump a0,
			   27-28 : jump a0,
		   }
		   timeout 1s;
	   }
	   chain a0 {
	   }
   }
   flush ruleset
   table inet aa {
	   map map1 {
		   type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags interval, timeout;
		   elements = {
			   0-1 : jump a0,
			   3-4 : jump a0,
			   6-7 : jump a0,
			   9-10 : jump a0,
			   12-13 : jump a0,
			   15-16 : jump a0,
			   18-19 : jump a0,
			   21-22 : jump a0,
			   24-25 : jump a0,
			   27-28 : jump a0,
		   }
		   timeout 1s;
	   }
	   chain a0 {
	   }
   }
   flush ruleset

splat looks like:
[ 2402.419838] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
[ 2402.428433] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[ 2402.429343] CPU: 1 PID: 1350 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc2+ #1
[ 2402.429343] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 03/23/2017
[ 2402.429343] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rbtree_gc [nft_set_rbtree]
[ 2402.429343] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x1e/0x130
[ 2402.429343] Code: e9 de f2 ff ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 55 48 89 fa 41 54 55 53 48 c1 ea 03 48 b8 00 00 00 0
[ 2402.429343] RSP: 0018:ffff880105f77678 EFLAGS: 00010296
[ 2402.429343] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801143e3428 RCX: 1ffff1002287c69c
[ 2402.429343] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 2402.429343] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffed0016aabc24 R09: ffffed0016aabc24
[ 2402.429343] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0016aabc23 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 2402.429343] R13: ffff8800b6933388 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801143e3440
[ 2402.534486] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
[ 2402.534212] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2402.534212] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2402.534212] CR2: 0000000000863008 CR3: 00000000a3c16000 CR4: 00000000001006e0
[ 2402.534212] Call Trace:
[ 2402.534212]  nft_rbtree_gc+0x2b5/0x5f0 [nft_set_rbtree]
[ 2402.534212]  process_one_work+0xc1b/0x1ee0
[ 2402.540329] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
[ 2402.534212]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
[ 2402.534212]  ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x3e0/0x3e0
[ 2402.534212]  ? set_load_weight+0x270/0x270
[ 2402.534212]  ? __schedule+0x6ea/0x1fb0
[ 2402.534212]  ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[ 2402.534212]  ? save_trace+0x320/0x320
[ 2402.534212]  ? sched_clock_local+0xe2/0x150
[ 2402.534212]  ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
[ 2402.534212]  ? worker_thread+0x35f/0x1150
[ 2402.534212]  ? lock_contended+0xe90/0xe90
[ 2402.534212]  ? __lock_acquire+0x4520/0x4520
[ 2402.534212]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xb1/0x350
[ 2402.534212]  ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x111/0x1b0
[ 2402.534212]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 2402.534212]  worker_thread+0x169/0x1150

Fixes: 8d8540c4f5e0("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: add timeout support")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
netfilter: nft_set_hash: add rcu_barrier() in the nft_rhash_destroy() 2018-07-18T15:09:53+00:00 Taehee Yoo ap420073@gmail.com 2018-07-10T14:21:08+00:00 9970a8e40d4c39e23d62d32540366d1d7d2cce9b GC of set uses call_rcu() to destroy elements. So that elements would be destroyed after destroying sets and chains. But, elements should be destroyed before destroying sets and chains. In order to wait calling call_rcu(), a rcu_barrier() is added. In order to test correctly, below patch should be applied. https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/940883/ test scripts: %cat test.nft table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset [ ... ] table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset Splat looks like: [ 200.795603] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1363! [ 200.806944] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 200.812253] CPU: 1 PID: 1582 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0+ #24 [ 200.820297] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015 [ 200.830309] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.34+0x62/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 200.838317] Code: 43 50 85 c0 74 26 48 8b 45 00 48 8b 4d 08 ba 54 05 00 00 48 c7 c6 60 6d 29 c0 48 c7 c7 c0 65 29 c0 4c 8b 40 08 e8 58 e5 fd f8 <0f> 0b 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff [ 200.860366] RSP: 0000:ffff880118dbf4d0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 200.866354] RAX: 0000000000000061 RBX: ffff88010cdeaf08 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 200.874355] RDX: 0000000000000061 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed00231b7e90 [ 200.882361] RBP: ffff880118dbf4e8 R08: ffffed002373bcfb R09: ffffed002373bcfa [ 200.890354] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffed002373bcfb R12: dead000000000200 [ 200.898356] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffffffffbb62af38 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 200.906354] FS: 00007fefc31fd700(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 200.915533] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 200.922355] CR2: 0000557f1c8e9128 CR3: 0000000106880000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 200.930353] Call Trace: [ 200.932351] ? nf_tables_commit+0x26f6/0x2c60 [nf_tables] [ 200.939525] ? nf_tables_setelem_notify.constprop.49+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nf_tables] [ 200.947525] ? nf_tables_delchain+0x6e0/0x6e0 [nf_tables] [ 200.952383] ? nft_add_set_elem+0x1700/0x1700 [nf_tables] [ 200.959532] ? nla_parse+0xab/0x230 [ 200.963529] ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xd06/0x10d0 [nfnetlink] [ 200.968384] ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x130/0x130 [nfnetlink] [ 200.975525] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.980363] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.986356] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170 [ 200.990352] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1b0 [ 200.994355] ? sched_clock_local+0x10d/0x130 [ 200.999531] ? memset+0x1f/0x40 Fixes: 9d0982927e79 ("netfilter: nft_hash: add support for timeouts") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
GC of set uses call_rcu() to destroy elements.
So that elements would be destroyed after destroying sets and chains.
But, elements should be destroyed before destroying sets and chains.
In order to wait calling call_rcu(), a rcu_barrier() is added.

In order to test correctly, below patch should be applied.
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/940883/

test scripts:
   %cat test.nft
   table ip aa {
	   map map1 {
		   type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout;
		   elements = {
			   0 : jump a0,
			   1 : jump a0,
			   2 : jump a0,
			   3 : jump a0,
			   4 : jump a0,
			   5 : jump a0,
			   6 : jump a0,
			   7 : jump a0,
			   8 : jump a0,
			   9 : jump a0,
		   }
		   timeout 1s;
	   }
	   chain a0 {
	   }
   }
   flush ruleset

   [ ... ]

   table ip aa {
	   map map1 {
		   type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout;
		   elements = {
			   0 : jump a0,
			   1 : jump a0,
			   2 : jump a0,
			   3 : jump a0,
			   4 : jump a0,
			   5 : jump a0,
			   6 : jump a0,
			   7 : jump a0,
			   8 : jump a0,
			   9 : jump a0,
		   }
		   timeout 1s;
	   }
	   chain a0 {
	   }
   }
   flush ruleset

Splat looks like:
[  200.795603] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1363!
[  200.806944] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[  200.812253] CPU: 1 PID: 1582 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0+ #24
[  200.820297] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015
[  200.830309] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.34+0x62/0x240 [nf_tables]
[  200.838317] Code: 43 50 85 c0 74 26 48 8b 45 00 48 8b 4d 08 ba 54 05 00 00 48 c7 c6 60 6d 29 c0 48 c7 c7 c0 65 29 c0
4c 8b 40 08 e8 58 e5 fd f8 <0f> 0b 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff
[  200.860366] RSP: 0000:ffff880118dbf4d0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  200.866354] RAX: 0000000000000061 RBX: ffff88010cdeaf08 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  200.874355] RDX: 0000000000000061 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed00231b7e90
[  200.882361] RBP: ffff880118dbf4e8 R08: ffffed002373bcfb R09: ffffed002373bcfa
[  200.890354] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffed002373bcfb R12: dead000000000200
[  200.898356] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffffffffbb62af38 R15: dffffc0000000000
[  200.906354] FS:  00007fefc31fd700(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  200.915533] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  200.922355] CR2: 0000557f1c8e9128 CR3: 0000000106880000 CR4: 00000000001006e0
[  200.930353] Call Trace:
[  200.932351]  ? nf_tables_commit+0x26f6/0x2c60 [nf_tables]
[  200.939525]  ? nf_tables_setelem_notify.constprop.49+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nf_tables]
[  200.947525]  ? nf_tables_delchain+0x6e0/0x6e0 [nf_tables]
[  200.952383]  ? nft_add_set_elem+0x1700/0x1700 [nf_tables]
[  200.959532]  ? nla_parse+0xab/0x230
[  200.963529]  ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xd06/0x10d0 [nfnetlink]
[  200.968384]  ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x130/0x130 [nfnetlink]
[  200.975525]  ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290
[  200.980363]  ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290
[  200.986356]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170
[  200.990352]  ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1b0
[  200.994355]  ? sched_clock_local+0x10d/0x130
[  200.999531]  ? memset+0x1f/0x40

Fixes: 9d0982927e79 ("netfilter: nft_hash: add support for timeouts")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
netfilter: nf_tables: fix jumpstack depth validation 2018-07-17T18:48:24+00:00 Taehee Yoo ap420073@gmail.com 2018-07-12T16:38:08+00:00 26b2f552525cf98fad08515bd6faa427f2f22038 The level of struct nft_ctx is updated by nf_tables_check_loops(). That is used to validate jumpstack depth. But jumpstack validation routine doesn't update and validate recursively. So, in some cases, chain depth can be bigger than the NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE. After this patch, The jumpstack validation routine is located in the nft_chain_validate(). When new rules or new set elements are added, the nft_table_validate() is called by the nf_tables_newrule and the nf_tables_newsetelem. The nft_table_validate() calls the nft_chain_validate() that visit all their children chains recursively. So it can update depth of chain certainly. Reproducer: %cat ./test.sh #!/bin/bash nft add table ip filter nft add chain ip filter input { type filter hook input priority 0\; } for ((i=0;i<20;i++)); do nft add chain ip filter a$i done nft add rule ip filter input jump a1 for ((i=0;i<10;i++)); do nft add rule ip filter a$i jump a$((i+1)) done for ((i=11;i<19;i++)); do nft add rule ip filter a$i jump a$((i+1)) done nft add rule ip filter a10 jump a11 Result: [ 253.931782] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:186 nft_do_chain+0xacc/0xdf0 [nf_tables] [ 253.931915] Modules linked in: nf_tables nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables [ 253.932153] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #48 [ 253.932153] RIP: 0010:nft_do_chain+0xacc/0xdf0 [nf_tables] [ 253.932153] Code: 83 f8 fb 0f 84 c7 00 00 00 e9 d0 00 00 00 83 f8 fd 74 0e 83 f8 ff 0f 84 b4 00 00 00 e9 bd 00 00 00 83 bd 64 fd ff ff 0f 76 09 <0f> 0b 31 c0 e9 bc 02 00 00 44 8b ad 64 fd [ 253.933807] RSP: 0018:ffff88011b807570 EFLAGS: 00010212 [ 253.933807] RAX: 00000000fffffffd RBX: ffff88011b807660 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 253.933807] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff880112b39d78 RDI: ffff88011b807670 [ 253.933807] RBP: ffff88011b807850 R08: ffffed0023700ece R09: ffffed0023700ecd [ 253.933807] R10: ffff88011b80766f R11: ffffed0023700ece R12: ffff88011b807898 [ 253.933807] R13: ffff880112b39d80 R14: ffff880112b39d60 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 253.933807] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 253.933807] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 253.933807] CR2: 00000000014f1008 CR3: 000000006b216000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 253.933807] Call Trace: [ 253.933807] <IRQ> [ 253.933807] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170 [ 253.933807] ? __nft_trace_packet+0x180/0x180 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170 [ 253.933807] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 253.933807] ? __lock_acquire+0x4835/0x4af0 [ 253.933807] ? inet_ehash_locks_alloc+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 253.933807] ? unwind_next_frame+0x159e/0x1840 [ 253.933807] ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.4+0x5/0x10 [ 253.933807] ? nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x197/0x1e0 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] ? nft_do_chain+0x5/0xdf0 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x197/0x1e0 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] ? nft_do_chain_arp+0xb0/0xb0 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] ? __lock_is_held+0x9d/0x130 [ 253.933807] nf_hook_slow+0xc4/0x150 [ 253.933807] ip_local_deliver+0x28b/0x380 [ 253.933807] ? ip_call_ra_chain+0x3e0/0x3e0 [ 253.933807] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x1610/0x1610 [ 253.933807] ip_rcv+0xbcc/0xcc0 [ 253.933807] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 253.933807] ? ip_local_deliver+0x380/0x380 [ 253.933807] ? __lock_is_held+0x9d/0x130 [ 253.933807] ? ip_local_deliver+0x380/0x380 [ 253.933807] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1c9c/0x2240 Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
The level of struct nft_ctx is updated by nf_tables_check_loops().  That
is used to validate jumpstack depth. But jumpstack validation routine
doesn't update and validate recursively.  So, in some cases, chain depth
can be bigger than the NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE.

After this patch, The jumpstack validation routine is located in the
nft_chain_validate(). When new rules or new set elements are added, the
nft_table_validate() is called by the nf_tables_newrule and the
nf_tables_newsetelem. The nft_table_validate() calls the
nft_chain_validate() that visit all their children chains recursively.
So it can update depth of chain certainly.

Reproducer:
   %cat ./test.sh
   #!/bin/bash
   nft add table ip filter
   nft add chain ip filter input { type filter hook input priority 0\; }
   for ((i=0;i<20;i++)); do
	nft add chain ip filter a$i
   done

   nft add rule ip filter input jump a1

   for ((i=0;i<10;i++)); do
	nft add rule ip filter a$i jump a$((i+1))
   done

   for ((i=11;i<19;i++)); do
	nft add rule ip filter a$i jump a$((i+1))
   done

   nft add rule ip filter a10 jump a11

Result:
[  253.931782] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:186 nft_do_chain+0xacc/0xdf0 [nf_tables]
[  253.931915] Modules linked in: nf_tables nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables
[  253.932153] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #48
[  253.932153] RIP: 0010:nft_do_chain+0xacc/0xdf0 [nf_tables]
[  253.932153] Code: 83 f8 fb 0f 84 c7 00 00 00 e9 d0 00 00 00 83 f8 fd 74 0e 83 f8 ff 0f 84 b4 00 00 00 e9 bd 00 00 00 83 bd 64 fd ff ff 0f 76 09 <0f> 0b 31 c0 e9 bc 02 00 00 44 8b ad 64 fd
[  253.933807] RSP: 0018:ffff88011b807570 EFLAGS: 00010212
[  253.933807] RAX: 00000000fffffffd RBX: ffff88011b807660 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  253.933807] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff880112b39d78 RDI: ffff88011b807670
[  253.933807] RBP: ffff88011b807850 R08: ffffed0023700ece R09: ffffed0023700ecd
[  253.933807] R10: ffff88011b80766f R11: ffffed0023700ece R12: ffff88011b807898
[  253.933807] R13: ffff880112b39d80 R14: ffff880112b39d60 R15: dffffc0000000000
[  253.933807] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  253.933807] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  253.933807] CR2: 00000000014f1008 CR3: 000000006b216000 CR4: 00000000001006e0
[  253.933807] Call Trace:
[  253.933807]  <IRQ>
[  253.933807]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170
[  253.933807]  ? __nft_trace_packet+0x180/0x180 [nf_tables]
[  253.933807]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170
[  253.933807]  ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290
[  253.933807]  ? __lock_acquire+0x4835/0x4af0
[  253.933807]  ? inet_ehash_locks_alloc+0x1a0/0x1a0
[  253.933807]  ? unwind_next_frame+0x159e/0x1840
[  253.933807]  ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.4+0x5/0x10
[  253.933807]  ? nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x197/0x1e0 [nf_tables]
[  253.933807]  ? nft_do_chain+0x5/0xdf0 [nf_tables]
[  253.933807]  nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x197/0x1e0 [nf_tables]
[  253.933807]  ? nft_do_chain_arp+0xb0/0xb0 [nf_tables]
[  253.933807]  ? __lock_is_held+0x9d/0x130
[  253.933807]  nf_hook_slow+0xc4/0x150
[  253.933807]  ip_local_deliver+0x28b/0x380
[  253.933807]  ? ip_call_ra_chain+0x3e0/0x3e0
[  253.933807]  ? ip_rcv_finish+0x1610/0x1610
[  253.933807]  ip_rcv+0xbcc/0xcc0
[  253.933807]  ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290
[  253.933807]  ? ip_local_deliver+0x380/0x380
[  253.933807]  ? __lock_is_held+0x9d/0x130
[  253.933807]  ? ip_local_deliver+0x380/0x380
[  253.933807]  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1c9c/0x2240

Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
netfilter: nf_conntrack: Fix possible possible crash on module loading. 2018-07-09T16:04:11+00:00 Andrey Ryabinin aryabinin@virtuozzo.com 2018-07-06T13:38:53+00:00 2045cdfa1b40d66f126f3fd05604fc7c754f0022 Loading the nf_conntrack module with doubled hashsize parameter, i.e. modprobe nf_conntrack hashsize=12345 hashsize=12345 causes NULL-ptr deref. If 'hashsize' specified twice, the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() function will be called also twice. The first nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() call will set the 'nf_conntrack_htable_size' variable: nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() ... /* On boot, we can set this without any fancy locking. */ if (!nf_conntrack_htable_size) return param_set_uint(val, kp); But on the second invocation, the nf_conntrack_htable_size is already set, so the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() will take a different path and call the nf_conntrack_hash_resize() function. Which will crash on the attempt to dereference 'nf_conntrack_hash' pointer: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:nf_conntrack_hash_resize+0x255/0x490 [nf_conntrack] Call Trace: nf_conntrack_set_hashsize+0xcd/0x100 [nf_conntrack] parse_args+0x1f9/0x5a0 load_module+0x1281/0x1a50 __se_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fix this, by checking !nf_conntrack_hash instead of !nf_conntrack_htable_size. nf_conntrack_hash will be initialized only after the module loaded, so the second invocation of the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() won't crash, it will just reinitialize nf_conntrack_htable_size again. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> 
Loading the nf_conntrack module with doubled hashsize parameter, i.e.
	  modprobe nf_conntrack hashsize=12345 hashsize=12345
causes NULL-ptr deref.

If 'hashsize' specified twice, the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() function
will be called also twice.
The first nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() call will set the
'nf_conntrack_htable_size' variable:

	nf_conntrack_set_hashsize()
		...
		/* On boot, we can set this without any fancy locking. */
		if (!nf_conntrack_htable_size)
			return param_set_uint(val, kp);

But on the second invocation, the nf_conntrack_htable_size is already set,
so the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() will take a different path and call
the nf_conntrack_hash_resize() function. Which will crash on the attempt
to dereference 'nf_conntrack_hash' pointer:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
	RIP: 0010:nf_conntrack_hash_resize+0x255/0x490 [nf_conntrack]
	Call Trace:
	 nf_conntrack_set_hashsize+0xcd/0x100 [nf_conntrack]
	 parse_args+0x1f9/0x5a0
	 load_module+0x1281/0x1a50
	 __se_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0xf0
	 do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x390
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fix this, by checking !nf_conntrack_hash instead of
!nf_conntrack_htable_size. nf_conntrack_hash will be initialized only
after the module loaded, so the second invocation of the
nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() won't crash, it will just reinitialize
nf_conntrack_htable_size again.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>