linux-stable.git/net/netfilter, branch v4.14.73

netfilter: fix memory leaks on netlink_dump_start error

2018-09-15T07:45:28+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3e673b23b541b8e7f773b2d378d6eb99831741cd ]

Shaochun Chen points out we leak dumper filter state allocations
stored in dump_control->data in case there is an error before netlink sets
cb_running (after which ->done will be called at some point).

In order to fix this, add .start functions and move allocations there.

Same pattern as used in commit 90fd131afc565159c9e0ea742f082b337e10f8c6
("netfilter: nf_tables: move dumper state allocation into ->start").

Reported-by: shaochun chen 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipvs: fix race between ip_vs_conn_new() and ip_vs_del_dest()

2018-09-15T07:45:28+00:00

[ Upstream commit a53b42c11815d2357e31a9403ae3950517525894 ]

We came across infinite loop in ipvs when using ipvs in docker
env.

When ipvs receives new packets and cannot find an ipvs connection,
it will create a new connection, then if the dest is unavailable
(i.e. IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE), the packet will be dropped sliently.

But if the dropped packet is the first packet of this connection,
the connection control timer never has a chance to start and the
ipvs connection cannot be released. This will lead to memory leak, or
infinite loop in cleanup_net() when net namespace is released like
this:

    ip_vs_conn_net_cleanup at ffffffffa0a9f31a [ip_vs]
    __ip_vs_cleanup at ffffffffa0a9f60a [ip_vs]
    ops_exit_list at ffffffff81567a49
    cleanup_net at ffffffff81568b40
    process_one_work at ffffffff810a851b
    worker_thread at ffffffff810a9356
    kthread at ffffffff810b0b6f
    ret_from_fork at ffffffff81697a18

race condition:
    CPU1                           CPU2
    ip_vs_in()
      ip_vs_conn_new()
                                   ip_vs_del_dest()
                                     __ip_vs_unlink_dest()
                                       ~IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE
      cp->dest && !IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE
      __ip_vs_conn_put
    ...
    cleanup_net  ---> infinite looping

Fix this by checking whether the timer already started.

Signed-off-by: Tan Hu 
Reviewed-by: Jiang Biao 
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov 
Acked-by: Simon Horman 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_tables: don't allow to rename to already-pending name

2018-09-05T07:26:27+00:00

[ Upstream commit c6cc94df65c3174be92afbee638f11cbb5e606a7 ]

Its possible to rename two chains to the same name in one
transaction:

nft add chain t c1
nft add chain t c2
nft 'rename chain t c1 c3;rename chain t c2 c3'

This creates two chains named 'c3'.

Appears to be harmless, both chains can still be deleted both
by name or handle, but, nevertheless, its a bug.

Walk transaction log and also compare vs. the pending renames.

Both chains can still be deleted, but nevertheless it is a bug as
we don't allow to create chains with identical names, so we should
prevent this from happening-by-rename too.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_tables: fix memory leaks on chain rename

2018-09-05T07:26:27+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9f8aac0be21ed5f99bd5ba0ff315d710737d1794 ]

The new name is stored in the transaction metadata, on commit,
the pointers to the old and new names are swapped.

Therefore in abort and commit case we have to free the
pointer in the chain_trans container.

In commit case, the pointer can be used by another cpu that
is currently dumping the renamed chain, thus kfree needs to
happen after waiting for rcu readers to complete.

Fixes: b7263e071a ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow chain name of up to 255 chars")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nft_set_hash: add rcu_barrier() in the nft_rhash_destroy()

2018-09-05T07:26:27+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9970a8e40d4c39e23d62d32540366d1d7d2cce9b ]

GC of set uses call_rcu() to destroy elements.
So that elements would be destroyed after destroying sets and chains.
But, elements should be destroyed before destroying sets and chains.
In order to wait calling call_rcu(), a rcu_barrier() is added.

In order to test correctly, below patch should be applied.
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/940883/

test scripts:
   %cat test.nft
   table ip aa {
	   map map1 {
		   type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout;
		   elements = {
			   0 : jump a0,
			   1 : jump a0,
			   2 : jump a0,
			   3 : jump a0,
			   4 : jump a0,
			   5 : jump a0,
			   6 : jump a0,
			   7 : jump a0,
			   8 : jump a0,
			   9 : jump a0,
		   }
		   timeout 1s;
	   }
	   chain a0 {
	   }
   }
   flush ruleset

   [ ... ]

   table ip aa {
	   map map1 {
		   type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout;
		   elements = {
			   0 : jump a0,
			   1 : jump a0,
			   2 : jump a0,
			   3 : jump a0,
			   4 : jump a0,
			   5 : jump a0,
			   6 : jump a0,
			   7 : jump a0,
			   8 : jump a0,
			   9 : jump a0,
		   }
		   timeout 1s;
	   }
	   chain a0 {
	   }
   }
   flush ruleset

Splat looks like:
[  200.795603] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1363!
[  200.806944] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[  200.812253] CPU: 1 PID: 1582 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0+ #24
[  200.820297] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015
[  200.830309] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.34+0x62/0x240 [nf_tables]
[  200.838317] Code: 43 50 85 c0 74 26 48 8b 45 00 48 8b 4d 08 ba 54 05 00 00 48 c7 c6 60 6d 29 c0 48 c7 c7 c0 65 29 c0
4c 8b 40 08 e8 58 e5 fd f8 <0f> 0b 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff
[  200.860366] RSP: 0000:ffff880118dbf4d0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  200.866354] RAX: 0000000000000061 RBX: ffff88010cdeaf08 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  200.874355] RDX: 0000000000000061 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed00231b7e90
[  200.882361] RBP: ffff880118dbf4e8 R08: ffffed002373bcfb R09: ffffed002373bcfa
[  200.890354] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffed002373bcfb R12: dead000000000200
[  200.898356] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffffffffbb62af38 R15: dffffc0000000000
[  200.906354] FS:  00007fefc31fd700(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  200.915533] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  200.922355] CR2: 0000557f1c8e9128 CR3: 0000000106880000 CR4: 00000000001006e0
[  200.930353] Call Trace:
[  200.932351]  ? nf_tables_commit+0x26f6/0x2c60 [nf_tables]
[  200.939525]  ? nf_tables_setelem_notify.constprop.49+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nf_tables]
[  200.947525]  ? nf_tables_delchain+0x6e0/0x6e0 [nf_tables]
[  200.952383]  ? nft_add_set_elem+0x1700/0x1700 [nf_tables]
[  200.959532]  ? nla_parse+0xab/0x230
[  200.963529]  ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xd06/0x10d0 [nfnetlink]
[  200.968384]  ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x130/0x130 [nfnetlink]
[  200.975525]  ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290
[  200.980363]  ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290
[  200.986356]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170
[  200.990352]  ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1b0
[  200.994355]  ? sched_clock_local+0x10d/0x130
[  200.999531]  ? memset+0x1f/0x40

Fixes: 9d0982927e79 ("netfilter: nft_hash: add support for timeouts")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: conntrack: dccp: treat SYNC/SYNCACK as invalid if no prior state

2018-08-24T11:09:22+00:00

commit 6613b6173dee098997229caf1f3b961c49da75e6 upstream.

When first DCCP packet is SYNC or SYNCACK, we insert a new conntrack
that has an un-initialized timeout value, i.e. such entry could be
reaped at any time.

Mark them as INVALID and only ignore SYNC/SYNCACK when connection had
an old state.

Reported-by: syzbot+6f18401420df260e37ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_conntrack: Fix possible possible crash on module loading.

2018-08-24T11:09:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2045cdfa1b40d66f126f3fd05604fc7c754f0022 ]

Loading the nf_conntrack module with doubled hashsize parameter, i.e.
	  modprobe nf_conntrack hashsize=12345 hashsize=12345
causes NULL-ptr deref.

If 'hashsize' specified twice, the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() function
will be called also twice.
The first nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() call will set the
'nf_conntrack_htable_size' variable:

	nf_conntrack_set_hashsize()
		...
		/* On boot, we can set this without any fancy locking. */
		if (!nf_conntrack_htable_size)
			return param_set_uint(val, kp);

But on the second invocation, the nf_conntrack_htable_size is already set,
so the nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() will take a different path and call
the nf_conntrack_hash_resize() function. Which will crash on the attempt
to dereference 'nf_conntrack_hash' pointer:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
	RIP: 0010:nf_conntrack_hash_resize+0x255/0x490 [nf_conntrack]
	Call Trace:
	 nf_conntrack_set_hashsize+0xcd/0x100 [nf_conntrack]
	 parse_args+0x1f9/0x5a0
	 load_module+0x1281/0x1a50
	 __se_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0xf0
	 do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x390
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fix this, by checking !nf_conntrack_hash instead of
!nf_conntrack_htable_size. nf_conntrack_hash will be initialized only
after the module loaded, so the second invocation of the
nf_conntrack_set_hashsize() won't crash, it will just reinitialize
nf_conntrack_htable_size again.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nft_compat: explicitly reject ERROR and standard target

2018-08-24T11:09:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 21d5e078192d244df3d6049f9464fff2f72cfd68 ]

iptables-nft never requests these, but make this explicitly illegal.
If it were quested, kernel could oops as ->eval is NULL, furthermore,
the builtin targets have no owning module so its possible to rmmod
eb/ip/ip6_tables module even if they would be loaded.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_log: fix uninit read in nf_log_proc_dostring

2018-08-24T11:09:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit dffd22aed2aa1e804bccf19b30a421e89ee2ae61 ]

When proc_dostring() is called with a non-zero offset in strict mode, it
doesn't just write to the ->data buffer, it also reads. Make sure it
doesn't read uninitialized data.

Fixes: c6ac37d8d884 ("netfilter: nf_log: fix error on write NONE to [...]")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_ct_helper: Fix possible panic after nf_conntrack_helper_unregister

2018-08-24T11:08:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit ad9852af97587b8abe8102f9ddcb05c9769656f6 ]

The helper module would be unloaded after nf_conntrack_helper_unregister,
so it may cause a possible panic caused by race.

nf_ct_iterate_destroy(unhelp, me) reset the helper of conntrack as NULL,
but maybe someone has gotten the helper pointer during this period. Then
it would panic, when it accesses the helper and the module was unloaded.

Take an example as following:
CPU0                                                   CPU1
ctnetlink_dump_helpinfo
helper = rcu_dereference(help->helper);
                                                       unhelp
                                                       set helper as NULL
                                                       unload helper module
helper->to_nlattr(skb, ct);

As above, the cpu0 tries to access the helper and its module is unloaded,
then the panic happens.

Signed-off-by: Gao Feng 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman