<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/netfilter, branch v3.16.40</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nfnetlink: correctly validate length of batch messages</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Phil Turnbull</name>
<email>phil.turnbull@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-02T18:36:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8a984a4795fd4432da09e170efe7d9766d0e91cf'/>
<id>8a984a4795fd4432da09e170efe7d9766d0e91cf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c58d6c93680f28ac58984af61d0a7ebf4319c241 upstream.

If nlh-&gt;nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because
'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes.

The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh-&gt;nlmsg_len &lt;
NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later
trigger an out-of-bound read.

If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is
copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the
nlh-&gt;nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in
netlink_ack:

    [   41.455421] ==================================================================
    [   41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340
    [   41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987
    [   41.456431] =============================================================================
    [   41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    [   41.456431] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ...
    [   41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00  ................
    [   41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ...............
    [   41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05  .......@EV."3...
    [   41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb  ................
                                            ^^ start of batch nlmsg with
                                               nlmsg_len=4294967280
    ...
    [   41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address:
    [   41.456431]  ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    [   41.456431]  ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    [   41.456431] &gt;ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    [   41.456431]                                ^
    [   41.456431]  ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    [   41.456431]  ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
    [   41.456431] ==================================================================

Fix this with better validation of nlh-&gt;nlmsg_len and by setting
NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation.

CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs.

Fixes: 9ea2aa8b7dba ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch")
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull &lt;phil.turnbull@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - We don't have an error list so don't call nfnl_err_reset()
 - Set 'success' variable instead of 'status']
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c58d6c93680f28ac58984af61d0a7ebf4319c241 upstream.

If nlh-&gt;nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because
'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes.

The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh-&gt;nlmsg_len &lt;
NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later
trigger an out-of-bound read.

If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is
copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the
nlh-&gt;nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in
netlink_ack:

    [   41.455421] ==================================================================
    [   41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340
    [   41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987
    [   41.456431] =============================================================================
    [   41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    [   41.456431] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ...
    [   41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00  ................
    [   41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ...............
    [   41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05  .......@EV."3...
    [   41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb  ................
                                            ^^ start of batch nlmsg with
                                               nlmsg_len=4294967280
    ...
    [   41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address:
    [   41.456431]  ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    [   41.456431]  ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    [   41.456431] &gt;ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    [   41.456431]                                ^
    [   41.456431]  ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    [   41.456431]  ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
    [   41.456431] ==================================================================

Fix this with better validation of nlh-&gt;nlmsg_len and by setting
NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation.

CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs.

Fixes: 9ea2aa8b7dba ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch")
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull &lt;phil.turnbull@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - We don't have an error list so don't call nfnl_err_reset()
 - Set 'success' variable instead of 'status']
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: destroy the set if fail to add transaction</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Liping Zhang</name>
<email>zlpnobody@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-29T14:03:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6ca68d9535acf388b07d141a743316632d8b3cbe'/>
<id>6ca68d9535acf388b07d141a743316632d8b3cbe</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c17c3cdff10b9f59ef1244a14604f10949f17117 upstream.

When the memory is exhausted, then we will fail to add the NFT_MSG_NEWSET
transaction. In such case, we should destroy the set before we free it.

Fixes: 958bee14d071 ("netfilter: nf_tables: use new transaction infrastructure to handle sets")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang &lt;zlpnobody@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c17c3cdff10b9f59ef1244a14604f10949f17117 upstream.

When the memory is exhausted, then we will fail to add the NFT_MSG_NEWSET
transaction. In such case, we should destroy the set before we free it.

Fixes: 958bee14d071 ("netfilter: nf_tables: use new transaction infrastructure to handle sets")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang &lt;zlpnobody@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: fix type mismatch with error return from nft_parse_u32_check</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John W. Linville</name>
<email>linville@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-25T19:56:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=768071f432eee4448a1c064a2032e9c58830c748'/>
<id>768071f432eee4448a1c064a2032e9c58830c748</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f1d505bb762e30bf316ff5d3b604914649d6aed3 upstream.

Commit 36b701fae12ac ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate maximum value of
u32 netlink attributes") introduced nft_parse_u32_check with a return
value of "unsigned int", yet on error it returns "-ERANGE".

This patch corrects the mismatch by changing the return value to "int",
which happens to match the actual users of nft_parse_u32_check already.

Found by Coverity, CID 1373930.

Note that commit 21a9e0f1568ea ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: fix error
handling in nft_exthdr_init()) attempted to address the issue, but
did not address the return type of nft_parse_u32_check.

Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Cc: Laura Garcia Liebana &lt;nevola@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Fixes: 36b701fae12ac ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate maximum value...")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f1d505bb762e30bf316ff5d3b604914649d6aed3 upstream.

Commit 36b701fae12ac ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate maximum value of
u32 netlink attributes") introduced nft_parse_u32_check with a return
value of "unsigned int", yet on error it returns "-ERANGE".

This patch corrects the mismatch by changing the return value to "int",
which happens to match the actual users of nft_parse_u32_check already.

Found by Coverity, CID 1373930.

Note that commit 21a9e0f1568ea ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: fix error
handling in nft_exthdr_init()) attempted to address the issue, but
did not address the return type of nft_parse_u32_check.

Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Cc: Laura Garcia Liebana &lt;nevola@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Fixes: 36b701fae12ac ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate maximum value...")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: extend request line validation</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ulrich Weber</name>
<email>ulrich.weber@riverbed.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-24T16:07:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e01234be2260e1fc9d14328989fc483051dfc56f'/>
<id>e01234be2260e1fc9d14328989fc483051dfc56f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 444f901742d054a4cd5ff045871eac5131646cfb upstream.

on SIP requests, so a fragmented TCP SIP packet from an allow header starting with
 INVITE,NOTIFY,OPTIONS,REFER,REGISTER,UPDATE,SUBSCRIBE
 Content-Length: 0

will not bet interpreted as an INVITE request. Also Request-URI must start with an alphabetic character.

Confirm with RFC 3261
 Request-Line   =  Method SP Request-URI SP SIP-Version CRLF

Fixes: 30f33e6dee80 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_sip: support method specific request/response handling")
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber &lt;ulrich.weber@riverbed.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marco Angaroni &lt;marcoangaroni@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 444f901742d054a4cd5ff045871eac5131646cfb upstream.

on SIP requests, so a fragmented TCP SIP packet from an allow header starting with
 INVITE,NOTIFY,OPTIONS,REFER,REGISTER,UPDATE,SUBSCRIBE
 Content-Length: 0

will not bet interpreted as an INVITE request. Also Request-URI must start with an alphabetic character.

Confirm with RFC 3261
 Request-Line   =  Method SP Request-URI SP SIP-Version CRLF

Fixes: 30f33e6dee80 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_sip: support method specific request/response handling")
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber &lt;ulrich.weber@riverbed.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marco Angaroni &lt;marcoangaroni@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: underflow in nft_parse_u32_check()</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-12T09:14:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1ba27ad9a4f434ae470b73955e1e111c4b075ac6'/>
<id>1ba27ad9a4f434ae470b73955e1e111c4b075ac6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 09525a09ad3099efd9ba49b0b90bddc350d6b53a upstream.

We don't want to allow negatives here.

Fixes: 36b701fae12a ('netfilter: nf_tables: validate maximum value of u32 netlink attributes')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 09525a09ad3099efd9ba49b0b90bddc350d6b53a upstream.

We don't want to allow negatives here.

Fixes: 36b701fae12a ('netfilter: nf_tables: validate maximum value of u32 netlink attributes')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: validate maximum value of u32 netlink attributes</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Laura Garcia Liebana</name>
<email>nevola@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-14T13:00:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4f00b3d78eaaf05193567df939b19aae3c708976'/>
<id>4f00b3d78eaaf05193567df939b19aae3c708976</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 36b701fae12ac763a568037e4e7c96b5727a8b3e upstream.

Fetch value and validate u32 netlink attribute. This validation is
usually required when the u32 netlink attributes are being stored in a
field whose size is smaller.

This patch revisits 4da449ae1df9 ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: Add size check
on u8 nft_exthdr attributes").

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Suggested-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Laura Garcia Liebana &lt;nevola@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 36b701fae12ac763a568037e4e7c96b5727a8b3e upstream.

Fetch value and validate u32 netlink attribute. This validation is
usually required when the u32 netlink attributes are being stored in a
field whose size is smaller.

This patch revisits 4da449ae1df9 ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: Add size check
on u8 nft_exthdr attributes").

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Suggested-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Laura Garcia Liebana &lt;nevola@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nft_exthdr: Add size check on u8 nft_exthdr attributes</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Laura Garcia Liebana</name>
<email>nevola@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-09T18:46:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aaf2bb422c25859fad0a66fb722bc47866004ab8'/>
<id>aaf2bb422c25859fad0a66fb722bc47866004ab8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4da449ae1df9cfeb167e78f250b250eff64bc65e upstream.

Fix the direct assignment of offset and length attributes included in
nft_exthdr structure from u32 data to u8.

Signed-off-by: Laura Garcia Liebana &lt;nevola@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4da449ae1df9cfeb167e78f250b250eff64bc65e upstream.

Fix the direct assignment of offset and length attributes included in
nft_exthdr structure from u32 data to u8.

Signed-off-by: Laura Garcia Liebana &lt;nevola@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: restart search if moved to other chain</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:53:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-25T13:33:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=737766466e1f3d5c192c9ec9da72c086f2c9bef5'/>
<id>737766466e1f3d5c192c9ec9da72c086f2c9bef5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 95a8d19f28e6b29377a880c6264391a62e07fccc upstream.

In case nf_conntrack_tuple_taken did not find a conflicting entry
check that all entries in this hash slot were tested and restart
in case an entry was moved to another chain.

Reported-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Fixes: ea781f197d6a ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU and get rid of call_rcu()")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Adjust context
 - Use NF_CT_STAT_INC(), not the _ATOMIC variant, since we disable BHs]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 95a8d19f28e6b29377a880c6264391a62e07fccc upstream.

In case nf_conntrack_tuple_taken did not find a conflicting entry
check that all entries in this hash slot were tested and restart
in case an entry was moved to another chain.

Reported-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Fixes: ea781f197d6a ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU and get rid of call_rcu()")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Adjust context
 - Use NF_CT_STAT_INC(), not the _ATOMIC variant, since we disable BHs]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: reject verdict request from different portid</title>
<updated>2016-11-20T01:17:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Liping Zhang</name>
<email>liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-08T14:07:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=523dee12582fea60725afbbf560b50ca94d98cf9'/>
<id>523dee12582fea60725afbbf560b50ca94d98cf9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 00a3101f561816e58de054a470484996f78eb5eb upstream.

Like NFQNL_MSG_VERDICT_BATCH do, we should also reject the verdict
request when the portid is not same with the initial portid(maybe
from another process).

Fixes: 97d32cf9440d ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: batch verdict support")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang &lt;liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
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commit 00a3101f561816e58de054a470484996f78eb5eb upstream.

Like NFQNL_MSG_VERDICT_BATCH do, we should also reject the verdict
request when the portid is not same with the initial portid(maybe
from another process).

Fixes: 97d32cf9440d ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: batch verdict support")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang &lt;liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
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<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_ct_expect: remove the redundant slash when policy name is empty</title>
<updated>2016-11-20T01:17:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Liping Zhang</name>
<email>liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-08T13:57:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7bd848a9281212f1a022fcbb8049cb551e15506e'/>
<id>7bd848a9281212f1a022fcbb8049cb551e15506e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b173a28f62cf929324a8a6adcc45adadce311d16 upstream.

The 'name' filed in struct nf_conntrack_expect_policy{} is not a
pointer, so check it is NULL or not will always return true. Even if the
name is empty, slash will always be displayed like follows:
  # cat /proc/net/nf_conntrack_expect
  297 l3proto = 2 proto=6 src=1.1.1.1 dst=2.2.2.2 sport=1 dport=1025 ftp/
                                                                        ^

Fixes: 3a8fc53a45c4 ("netfilter: nf_ct_helper: allocate 16 bytes for the helper and policy names")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang &lt;liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
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<pre>
commit b173a28f62cf929324a8a6adcc45adadce311d16 upstream.

The 'name' filed in struct nf_conntrack_expect_policy{} is not a
pointer, so check it is NULL or not will always return true. Even if the
name is empty, slash will always be displayed like follows:
  # cat /proc/net/nf_conntrack_expect
  297 l3proto = 2 proto=6 src=1.1.1.1 dst=2.2.2.2 sport=1 dport=1025 ftp/
                                                                        ^

Fixes: 3a8fc53a45c4 ("netfilter: nf_ct_helper: allocate 16 bytes for the helper and policy names")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang &lt;liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
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