<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/netfilter/ipvs, branch v4.4.166</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: fix race between ip_vs_conn_new() and ip_vs_del_dest()</title>
<updated>2018-09-15T07:40:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tan Hu</name>
<email>tan.hu@zte.com.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-25T07:23:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4ebf605de623c307db846463892267671db6b58b'/>
<id>4ebf605de623c307db846463892267671db6b58b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a53b42c11815d2357e31a9403ae3950517525894 ]

We came across infinite loop in ipvs when using ipvs in docker
env.

When ipvs receives new packets and cannot find an ipvs connection,
it will create a new connection, then if the dest is unavailable
(i.e. IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE), the packet will be dropped sliently.

But if the dropped packet is the first packet of this connection,
the connection control timer never has a chance to start and the
ipvs connection cannot be released. This will lead to memory leak, or
infinite loop in cleanup_net() when net namespace is released like
this:

    ip_vs_conn_net_cleanup at ffffffffa0a9f31a [ip_vs]
    __ip_vs_cleanup at ffffffffa0a9f60a [ip_vs]
    ops_exit_list at ffffffff81567a49
    cleanup_net at ffffffff81568b40
    process_one_work at ffffffff810a851b
    worker_thread at ffffffff810a9356
    kthread at ffffffff810b0b6f
    ret_from_fork at ffffffff81697a18

race condition:
    CPU1                           CPU2
    ip_vs_in()
      ip_vs_conn_new()
                                   ip_vs_del_dest()
                                     __ip_vs_unlink_dest()
                                       ~IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE
      cp-&gt;dest &amp;&amp; !IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE
      __ip_vs_conn_put
    ...
    cleanup_net  ---&gt; infinite looping

Fix this by checking whether the timer already started.

Signed-off-by: Tan Hu &lt;tan.hu@zte.com.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiang Biao &lt;jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn&gt;
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Acked-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a53b42c11815d2357e31a9403ae3950517525894 ]

We came across infinite loop in ipvs when using ipvs in docker
env.

When ipvs receives new packets and cannot find an ipvs connection,
it will create a new connection, then if the dest is unavailable
(i.e. IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE), the packet will be dropped sliently.

But if the dropped packet is the first packet of this connection,
the connection control timer never has a chance to start and the
ipvs connection cannot be released. This will lead to memory leak, or
infinite loop in cleanup_net() when net namespace is released like
this:

    ip_vs_conn_net_cleanup at ffffffffa0a9f31a [ip_vs]
    __ip_vs_cleanup at ffffffffa0a9f60a [ip_vs]
    ops_exit_list at ffffffff81567a49
    cleanup_net at ffffffff81568b40
    process_one_work at ffffffff810a851b
    worker_thread at ffffffff810a9356
    kthread at ffffffff810b0b6f
    ret_from_fork at ffffffff81697a18

race condition:
    CPU1                           CPU2
    ip_vs_in()
      ip_vs_conn_new()
                                   ip_vs_del_dest()
                                     __ip_vs_unlink_dest()
                                       ~IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE
      cp-&gt;dest &amp;&amp; !IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE
      __ip_vs_conn_put
    ...
    cleanup_net  ---&gt; infinite looping

Fix this by checking whether the timer already started.

Signed-off-by: Tan Hu &lt;tan.hu@zte.com.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiang Biao &lt;jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn&gt;
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Acked-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: fix buffer overflow with sync daemon and service</title>
<updated>2018-07-03T09:21:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Anastasov</name>
<email>ja@ssi.bg</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-19T15:22:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=24a04933972ad73ab15544bdc2cda290171e1344'/>
<id>24a04933972ad73ab15544bdc2cda290171e1344</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 52f96757905bbf0edef47f3ee6c7c784e7f8ff8a ]

syzkaller reports for buffer overflow for interface name
when starting sync daemons [1]

What we do is that we copy user structure into larger stack
buffer but later we search NUL past the stack buffer.
The same happens for sched_name when adding/editing virtual server.

We are restricted by IP_VS_SCHEDNAME_MAXLEN and IP_VS_IFNAME_MAXLEN
being used as size in include/uapi/linux/ip_vs.h, so they
include the space for NUL.

As using strlcpy is wrong for unsafe source, replace it with
strscpy and add checks to return EINVAL if source string is not
NUL-terminated. The incomplete strlcpy fix comes from 2.6.13.

For the netlink interface reduce the len parameter for
IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_MCAST_IFN and IPVS_SVC_ATTR_SCHED_NAME,
so that we get proper EINVAL.

[1]
kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1052!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
    (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 373 Comm: syz-executor936 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #45
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051
RSP: 0018:ffff8801c976f800 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000022 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000022 RSI: ffffffff8160f6f1 RDI: ffffed00392edef6
RBP: ffff8801c976f800 R08: ffff8801cf4c62c0 R09: ffffed003b5e4fb0
R10: ffffed003b5e4fb0 R11: ffff8801daf27d87 R12: ffff8801c976fa20
R13: ffff8801c976fae4 R14: ffff8801c976fae0 R15: 000000000000048b
FS:  00007fd99f75e700(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000200001c0 CR3: 00000001d6843000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
  strlen include/linux/string.h:270 [inline]
  strlcpy include/linux/string.h:293 [inline]
  do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x31c/0x1d00 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388
  nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
  nf_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
  ip_setsockopt+0xd8/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253
  udp_setsockopt+0x62/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2487
  ipv6_setsockopt+0x149/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:917
  tcp_setsockopt+0x93/0xe0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3057
  sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3046
  __sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903
  __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline]
  __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline]
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911
  do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x447369
RSP: 002b:00007fd99f75dda8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e39e4 RCX: 0000000000447369
RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e39e0
R13: 75a1ff93f0896195 R14: 6f745f3168746576 R15: 0000000000000001
Code: 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 0f 0b 48 89 df e8 d2 8f 48 fa eb
de 55 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 60 65 64 88 48 89 e5 e8 91 dd f3 f9 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 90
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56
RIP: fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051 RSP: ffff8801c976f800

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+aac887f77319868646df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e4ff67513096 ("ipvs: add sync_maxlen parameter for the sync daemon")
Fixes: 4da62fc70d7c ("[IPVS]: Fix for overflows")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Acked-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms+renesas@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 52f96757905bbf0edef47f3ee6c7c784e7f8ff8a ]

syzkaller reports for buffer overflow for interface name
when starting sync daemons [1]

What we do is that we copy user structure into larger stack
buffer but later we search NUL past the stack buffer.
The same happens for sched_name when adding/editing virtual server.

We are restricted by IP_VS_SCHEDNAME_MAXLEN and IP_VS_IFNAME_MAXLEN
being used as size in include/uapi/linux/ip_vs.h, so they
include the space for NUL.

As using strlcpy is wrong for unsafe source, replace it with
strscpy and add checks to return EINVAL if source string is not
NUL-terminated. The incomplete strlcpy fix comes from 2.6.13.

For the netlink interface reduce the len parameter for
IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_MCAST_IFN and IPVS_SVC_ATTR_SCHED_NAME,
so that we get proper EINVAL.

[1]
kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1052!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
    (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 373 Comm: syz-executor936 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #45
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051
RSP: 0018:ffff8801c976f800 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000022 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000022 RSI: ffffffff8160f6f1 RDI: ffffed00392edef6
RBP: ffff8801c976f800 R08: ffff8801cf4c62c0 R09: ffffed003b5e4fb0
R10: ffffed003b5e4fb0 R11: ffff8801daf27d87 R12: ffff8801c976fa20
R13: ffff8801c976fae4 R14: ffff8801c976fae0 R15: 000000000000048b
FS:  00007fd99f75e700(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000200001c0 CR3: 00000001d6843000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
  strlen include/linux/string.h:270 [inline]
  strlcpy include/linux/string.h:293 [inline]
  do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x31c/0x1d00 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388
  nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
  nf_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
  ip_setsockopt+0xd8/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253
  udp_setsockopt+0x62/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2487
  ipv6_setsockopt+0x149/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:917
  tcp_setsockopt+0x93/0xe0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3057
  sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3046
  __sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903
  __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline]
  __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline]
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911
  do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x447369
RSP: 002b:00007fd99f75dda8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e39e4 RCX: 0000000000447369
RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e39e0
R13: 75a1ff93f0896195 R14: 6f745f3168746576 R15: 0000000000000001
Code: 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 0f 0b 48 89 df e8 d2 8f 48 fa eb
de 55 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 60 65 64 88 48 89 e5 e8 91 dd f3 f9 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 90
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56
RIP: fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051 RSP: ffff8801c976f800

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+aac887f77319868646df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e4ff67513096 ("ipvs: add sync_maxlen parameter for the sync daemon")
Fixes: 4da62fc70d7c ("[IPVS]: Fix for overflows")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Acked-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms+renesas@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: fix rtnl_lock lockups caused by start_sync_thread</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Anastasov</name>
<email>ja@ssi.bg</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-07T12:50:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7ae1c4cb9f1f8cf0e5473d44b31778e644ae89b1'/>
<id>7ae1c4cb9f1f8cf0e5473d44b31778e644ae89b1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5c64576a77894a50be80be0024bed27171b55989 upstream.

syzkaller reports for wrong rtnl_lock usage in sync code [1] and [2]

We have 2 problems in start_sync_thread if error path is
taken, eg. on memory allocation error or failure to configure
sockets for mcast group or addr/port binding:

1. recursive locking: holding rtnl_lock while calling sock_release
which in turn calls again rtnl_lock in ip_mc_drop_socket to leave
the mcast group, as noticed by Florian Westphal. Additionally,
sock_release can not be called while holding sync_mutex (ABBA
deadlock).

2. task hung: holding rtnl_lock while calling kthread_stop to
stop the running kthreads. As the kthreads do the same to leave
the mcast group (sock_release -&gt; ip_mc_drop_socket -&gt; rtnl_lock)
they hang.

Fix the problems by calling rtnl_unlock early in the error path,
now sock_release is called after unlocking both mutexes.

Problem 3 (task hung reported by syzkaller [2]) is variant of
problem 2: use _trylock to prevent one user to call rtnl_lock and
then while waiting for sync_mutex to block kthreads that execute
sock_release when they are stopped by stop_sync_thread.

[1]
IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4500 ...
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syzkaller688027/4497 is trying to acquire lock:
  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000bb14d7fb&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74

but task is already holding lock:
IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4495 ...
  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000bb14d7fb&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74

other info that might help us debug this:
  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0
        ----
   lock(rtnl_mutex);
   lock(rtnl_mutex);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

2 locks held by syzkaller688027/4497:
  #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000bb14d7fb&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
  #1:  (ipvs-&gt;sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000703f78e3&gt;]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 4497 Comm: syzkaller688027 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc7+ #3
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53
  print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1761 [inline]
  check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1805 [inline]
  validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2401 [inline]
  __lock_acquire+0xe8f/0x3e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3431
  lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
  __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline]
  __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893
  mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908
  rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
  ip_mc_drop_socket+0x88/0x230 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2643
  inet_release+0x4e/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:413
  sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:595
  start_sync_thread+0x2213/0x2b70 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1924
  do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x1139/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2389
  nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
  nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
  ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1261
  udp_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv4/udp.c:2406
  sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2975
  SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline]
  SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828
  do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x446a69
RSP: 002b:00007fa1c3a64da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000446a69
RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006e29fc R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e29f8
R13: 00676e697279656b R14: 00007fa1c3a659c0 R15: 00000000006e2b60

[2]
IPVS: sync thread started: state = BACKUP, mcast_ifn = syz_tun, syncid = 4,
id = 0
IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 25415 ...
INFO: task syz-executor7:25421 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
       Not tainted 4.16.0-rc6+ #284
"echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
syz-executor7   D23688 25421   4408 0x00000004
Call Trace:
  context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2862 [inline]
  __schedule+0x8fb/0x1ec0 kernel/sched/core.c:3440
  schedule+0xf5/0x430 kernel/sched/core.c:3499
  schedule_timeout+0x1a3/0x230 kernel/time/timer.c:1777
  do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:86 [inline]
  __wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:107 [inline]
  wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:118 [inline]
  wait_for_completion+0x415/0x770 kernel/sched/completion.c:139
  kthread_stop+0x14a/0x7a0 kernel/kthread.c:530
  stop_sync_thread+0x3d9/0x740 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1996
  do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x2b1/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2394
  nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
  nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
  ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253
  sctp_setsockopt+0x2ca/0x63e0 net/sctp/socket.c:4154
  sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:3039
  SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1850 [inline]
  SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1829
  do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x454889
RSP: 002b:00007fc927626c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc9276276d4 RCX: 0000000000454889
RDX: 000000000000048c RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 000000000072bf58 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 000000000000051c R14: 00000000006f9b40 R15: 0000000000000001

Showing all locks held in the system:
2 locks held by khungtaskd/868:
  #0:  (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [&lt;00000000a1a8f002&gt;]
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:175 [inline]
  #0:  (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [&lt;00000000a1a8f002&gt;] watchdog+0x1c5/0xd60
kernel/hung_task.c:249
  #1:  (tasklist_lock){.+.+}, at: [&lt;0000000037c2f8f9&gt;]
debug_show_all_locks+0xd3/0x3d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4470
1 lock held by rsyslogd/4247:
  #0:  (&amp;f-&gt;f_pos_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;000000000d8d6983&gt;]
__fdget_pos+0x12b/0x190 fs/file.c:765
2 locks held by getty/4338:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4339:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4340:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4341:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4342:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4343:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4344:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
3 locks held by kworker/0:5/6494:
  #0:  ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[&lt;00000000a062b18e&gt;] work_static include/linux/workqueue.h:198 [inline]
  #0:  ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[&lt;00000000a062b18e&gt;] set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:619 [inline]
  #0:  ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[&lt;00000000a062b18e&gt;] set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:646
[inline]
  #0:  ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[&lt;00000000a062b18e&gt;] process_one_work+0xb12/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2084
  #1:  ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000278427d5&gt;]
process_one_work+0xb89/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2088
  #2:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000066e35ac&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
1 lock held by syz-executor7/25421:
  #0:  (ipvs-&gt;sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000d414a689&gt;]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x277/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2393
2 locks held by syz-executor7/25427:
  #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000066e35ac&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
  #1:  (ipvs-&gt;sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000e6d48489&gt;]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388
1 lock held by syz-executor7/25435:
  #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000066e35ac&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
1 lock held by ipvs-b:2:0/25415:
  #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000066e35ac&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+a46d6abf9d56b1365a72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5fe074c01b2032ce9618@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e0b26cc997d5 ("ipvs: call rtnl_lock early")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Zubin Mithra &lt;zsm@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;groeck@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5c64576a77894a50be80be0024bed27171b55989 upstream.

syzkaller reports for wrong rtnl_lock usage in sync code [1] and [2]

We have 2 problems in start_sync_thread if error path is
taken, eg. on memory allocation error or failure to configure
sockets for mcast group or addr/port binding:

1. recursive locking: holding rtnl_lock while calling sock_release
which in turn calls again rtnl_lock in ip_mc_drop_socket to leave
the mcast group, as noticed by Florian Westphal. Additionally,
sock_release can not be called while holding sync_mutex (ABBA
deadlock).

2. task hung: holding rtnl_lock while calling kthread_stop to
stop the running kthreads. As the kthreads do the same to leave
the mcast group (sock_release -&gt; ip_mc_drop_socket -&gt; rtnl_lock)
they hang.

Fix the problems by calling rtnl_unlock early in the error path,
now sock_release is called after unlocking both mutexes.

Problem 3 (task hung reported by syzkaller [2]) is variant of
problem 2: use _trylock to prevent one user to call rtnl_lock and
then while waiting for sync_mutex to block kthreads that execute
sock_release when they are stopped by stop_sync_thread.

[1]
IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4500 ...
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syzkaller688027/4497 is trying to acquire lock:
  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000bb14d7fb&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74

but task is already holding lock:
IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4495 ...
  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000bb14d7fb&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74

other info that might help us debug this:
  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0
        ----
   lock(rtnl_mutex);
   lock(rtnl_mutex);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

2 locks held by syzkaller688027/4497:
  #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000bb14d7fb&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
  #1:  (ipvs-&gt;sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000703f78e3&gt;]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 4497 Comm: syzkaller688027 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc7+ #3
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53
  print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1761 [inline]
  check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1805 [inline]
  validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2401 [inline]
  __lock_acquire+0xe8f/0x3e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3431
  lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
  __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline]
  __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893
  mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908
  rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
  ip_mc_drop_socket+0x88/0x230 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2643
  inet_release+0x4e/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:413
  sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:595
  start_sync_thread+0x2213/0x2b70 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1924
  do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x1139/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2389
  nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
  nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
  ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1261
  udp_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv4/udp.c:2406
  sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2975
  SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline]
  SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828
  do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x446a69
RSP: 002b:00007fa1c3a64da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000446a69
RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006e29fc R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e29f8
R13: 00676e697279656b R14: 00007fa1c3a659c0 R15: 00000000006e2b60

[2]
IPVS: sync thread started: state = BACKUP, mcast_ifn = syz_tun, syncid = 4,
id = 0
IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 25415 ...
INFO: task syz-executor7:25421 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
       Not tainted 4.16.0-rc6+ #284
"echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
syz-executor7   D23688 25421   4408 0x00000004
Call Trace:
  context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2862 [inline]
  __schedule+0x8fb/0x1ec0 kernel/sched/core.c:3440
  schedule+0xf5/0x430 kernel/sched/core.c:3499
  schedule_timeout+0x1a3/0x230 kernel/time/timer.c:1777
  do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:86 [inline]
  __wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:107 [inline]
  wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:118 [inline]
  wait_for_completion+0x415/0x770 kernel/sched/completion.c:139
  kthread_stop+0x14a/0x7a0 kernel/kthread.c:530
  stop_sync_thread+0x3d9/0x740 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1996
  do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x2b1/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2394
  nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
  nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
  ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253
  sctp_setsockopt+0x2ca/0x63e0 net/sctp/socket.c:4154
  sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:3039
  SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1850 [inline]
  SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1829
  do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x454889
RSP: 002b:00007fc927626c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc9276276d4 RCX: 0000000000454889
RDX: 000000000000048c RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 000000000072bf58 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 000000000000051c R14: 00000000006f9b40 R15: 0000000000000001

Showing all locks held in the system:
2 locks held by khungtaskd/868:
  #0:  (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [&lt;00000000a1a8f002&gt;]
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:175 [inline]
  #0:  (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [&lt;00000000a1a8f002&gt;] watchdog+0x1c5/0xd60
kernel/hung_task.c:249
  #1:  (tasklist_lock){.+.+}, at: [&lt;0000000037c2f8f9&gt;]
debug_show_all_locks+0xd3/0x3d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4470
1 lock held by rsyslogd/4247:
  #0:  (&amp;f-&gt;f_pos_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;000000000d8d6983&gt;]
__fdget_pos+0x12b/0x190 fs/file.c:765
2 locks held by getty/4338:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4339:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4340:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4341:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4342:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4343:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4344:
  #0:  (&amp;tty-&gt;ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000bee98654&gt;]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
  #1:  (&amp;ldata-&gt;atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c1d180aa&gt;]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
3 locks held by kworker/0:5/6494:
  #0:  ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[&lt;00000000a062b18e&gt;] work_static include/linux/workqueue.h:198 [inline]
  #0:  ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[&lt;00000000a062b18e&gt;] set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:619 [inline]
  #0:  ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[&lt;00000000a062b18e&gt;] set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:646
[inline]
  #0:  ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[&lt;00000000a062b18e&gt;] process_one_work+0xb12/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2084
  #1:  ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000278427d5&gt;]
process_one_work+0xb89/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2088
  #2:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000066e35ac&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
1 lock held by syz-executor7/25421:
  #0:  (ipvs-&gt;sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000d414a689&gt;]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x277/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2393
2 locks held by syz-executor7/25427:
  #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000066e35ac&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
  #1:  (ipvs-&gt;sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000e6d48489&gt;]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388
1 lock held by syz-executor7/25435:
  #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000066e35ac&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
1 lock held by ipvs-b:2:0/25415:
  #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000066e35ac&gt;] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+a46d6abf9d56b1365a72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5fe074c01b2032ce9618@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e0b26cc997d5 ("ipvs: call rtnl_lock early")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Zubin Mithra &lt;zsm@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;groeck@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ipvs: avoid unused variable warnings</title>
<updated>2018-02-25T10:03:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-27T13:52:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=88fb56455b1acd17cfd8d484e508fa4efe4794e7'/>
<id>88fb56455b1acd17cfd8d484e508fa4efe4794e7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f6ca9f46f6615c3a87529550058d1b468c0cad89 upstream.

The proc_create() and remove_proc_entry() functions do not reference
their arguments when CONFIG_PROC_FS is disabled, so we get a couple
of warnings about unused variables in IPVS:

ipvs/ip_vs_app.c:608:14: warning: unused variable 'net' [-Wunused-variable]
ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:3950:14: warning: unused variable 'net' [-Wunused-variable]
ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:3994:14: warning: unused variable 'net' [-Wunused-variable]

This removes the local variables and instead looks them up separately
for each use, which obviously avoids the warning.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Fixes: 4c50a8ce2b63 ("netfilter: ipvs: avoid unused variable warning")
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f6ca9f46f6615c3a87529550058d1b468c0cad89 upstream.

The proc_create() and remove_proc_entry() functions do not reference
their arguments when CONFIG_PROC_FS is disabled, so we get a couple
of warnings about unused variables in IPVS:

ipvs/ip_vs_app.c:608:14: warning: unused variable 'net' [-Wunused-variable]
ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:3950:14: warning: unused variable 'net' [-Wunused-variable]
ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:3994:14: warning: unused variable 'net' [-Wunused-variable]

This removes the local variables and instead looks them up separately
for each use, which obviously avoids the warning.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Fixes: 4c50a8ce2b63 ("netfilter: ipvs: avoid unused variable warning")
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ipvs: Fix inappropriate output of procfs</title>
<updated>2017-12-20T09:04:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>KUWAZAWA Takuya</name>
<email>albatross0@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-15T11:54:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=59720463cf28d178321612de38ebc376022c7095'/>
<id>59720463cf28d178321612de38ebc376022c7095</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c5504f724c86ee925e7ffb80aa342cfd57959b13 ]

Information about ipvs in different network namespace can be seen via procfs.

How to reproduce:

  # ip netns add ns01
  # ip netns add ns02
  # ip netns exec ns01 ip a add dev lo 127.0.0.1/8
  # ip netns exec ns02 ip a add dev lo 127.0.0.1/8
  # ip netns exec ns01 ipvsadm -A -t 10.1.1.1:80
  # ip netns exec ns02 ipvsadm -A -t 10.1.1.2:80

The ipvsadm displays information about its own network namespace only.

  # ip netns exec ns01 ipvsadm -Ln
  IP Virtual Server version 1.2.1 (size=4096)
  Prot LocalAddress:Port Scheduler Flags
    -&gt; RemoteAddress:Port           Forward Weight ActiveConn InActConn
  TCP  10.1.1.1:80 wlc

  # ip netns exec ns02 ipvsadm -Ln
  IP Virtual Server version 1.2.1 (size=4096)
  Prot LocalAddress:Port Scheduler Flags
    -&gt; RemoteAddress:Port           Forward Weight ActiveConn InActConn
  TCP  10.1.1.2:80 wlc

But I can see information about other network namespace via procfs.

  # ip netns exec ns01 cat /proc/net/ip_vs
  IP Virtual Server version 1.2.1 (size=4096)
  Prot LocalAddress:Port Scheduler Flags
    -&gt; RemoteAddress:Port Forward Weight ActiveConn InActConn
  TCP  0A010101:0050 wlc
  TCP  0A010102:0050 wlc

  # ip netns exec ns02 cat /proc/net/ip_vs
  IP Virtual Server version 1.2.1 (size=4096)
  Prot LocalAddress:Port Scheduler Flags
    -&gt; RemoteAddress:Port Forward Weight ActiveConn InActConn
  TCP  0A010102:0050 wlc

Signed-off-by: KUWAZAWA Takuya &lt;albatross0@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c5504f724c86ee925e7ffb80aa342cfd57959b13 ]

Information about ipvs in different network namespace can be seen via procfs.

How to reproduce:

  # ip netns add ns01
  # ip netns add ns02
  # ip netns exec ns01 ip a add dev lo 127.0.0.1/8
  # ip netns exec ns02 ip a add dev lo 127.0.0.1/8
  # ip netns exec ns01 ipvsadm -A -t 10.1.1.1:80
  # ip netns exec ns02 ipvsadm -A -t 10.1.1.2:80

The ipvsadm displays information about its own network namespace only.

  # ip netns exec ns01 ipvsadm -Ln
  IP Virtual Server version 1.2.1 (size=4096)
  Prot LocalAddress:Port Scheduler Flags
    -&gt; RemoteAddress:Port           Forward Weight ActiveConn InActConn
  TCP  10.1.1.1:80 wlc

  # ip netns exec ns02 ipvsadm -Ln
  IP Virtual Server version 1.2.1 (size=4096)
  Prot LocalAddress:Port Scheduler Flags
    -&gt; RemoteAddress:Port           Forward Weight ActiveConn InActConn
  TCP  10.1.1.2:80 wlc

But I can see information about other network namespace via procfs.

  # ip netns exec ns01 cat /proc/net/ip_vs
  IP Virtual Server version 1.2.1 (size=4096)
  Prot LocalAddress:Port Scheduler Flags
    -&gt; RemoteAddress:Port Forward Weight ActiveConn InActConn
  TCP  0A010101:0050 wlc
  TCP  0A010102:0050 wlc

  # ip netns exec ns02 cat /proc/net/ip_vs
  IP Virtual Server version 1.2.1 (size=4096)
  Prot LocalAddress:Port Scheduler Flags
    -&gt; RemoteAddress:Port Forward Weight ActiveConn InActConn
  TCP  0A010102:0050 wlc

Signed-off-by: KUWAZAWA Takuya &lt;albatross0@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: SNAT packet replies only for NATed connections</title>
<updated>2017-07-27T22:06:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Anastasov</name>
<email>ja@ssi.bg</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-29T17:33:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=82944485937a3afbcda99f48c8375de100934697'/>
<id>82944485937a3afbcda99f48c8375de100934697</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3c5ab3f395d66a9e4e937fcfdf6ebc63894f028b upstream.

We do not check if packet from real server is for NAT
connection before performing SNAT. This causes problems
for setups that use DR/TUN and allow local clients to
access the real server directly, for example:

- local client in director creates IPVS-DR/TUN connection
CIP-&gt;VIP and the request packets are routed to RIP.
Talks are finished but IPVS connection is not expired yet.

- second local client creates non-IPVS connection CIP-&gt;RIP
with same reply tuple RIP-&gt;CIP and when replies are received
on LOCAL_IN we wrongly assign them for the first client
connection because RIP-&gt;CIP matches the reply direction.
As result, IPVS SNATs replies for non-IPVS connections.

The problem is more visible to local UDP clients but in rare
cases it can happen also for TCP or remote clients when the
real server sends the reply traffic via the director.

So, better to be more precise for the reply traffic.
As replies are not expected for DR/TUN connections, better
to not touch them.

Reported-by: Nick Moriarty &lt;nick.moriarty@york.ac.uk&gt;
Tested-by: Nick Moriarty &lt;nick.moriarty@york.ac.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3c5ab3f395d66a9e4e937fcfdf6ebc63894f028b upstream.

We do not check if packet from real server is for NAT
connection before performing SNAT. This causes problems
for setups that use DR/TUN and allow local clients to
access the real server directly, for example:

- local client in director creates IPVS-DR/TUN connection
CIP-&gt;VIP and the request packets are routed to RIP.
Talks are finished but IPVS connection is not expired yet.

- second local client creates non-IPVS connection CIP-&gt;RIP
with same reply tuple RIP-&gt;CIP and when replies are received
on LOCAL_IN we wrongly assign them for the first client
connection because RIP-&gt;CIP matches the reply direction.
As result, IPVS SNATs replies for non-IPVS connections.

The problem is more visible to local UDP clients but in rare
cases it can happen also for TCP or remote clients when the
real server sends the reply traffic via the director.

So, better to be more precise for the reply traffic.
As replies are not expected for DR/TUN connections, better
to not touch them.

Reported-by: Nick Moriarty &lt;nick.moriarty@york.ac.uk&gt;
Tested-by: Nick Moriarty &lt;nick.moriarty@york.ac.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: fix bind to link-local mcast IPv6 address in backup</title>
<updated>2016-10-07T13:23:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Quentin Armitage</name>
<email>quentin@armitage.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-16T07:00:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6ddabc7ae55a4788c05b47a9e9c1c198bd0b64d2'/>
<id>6ddabc7ae55a4788c05b47a9e9c1c198bd0b64d2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3777ed688fba82d0bd43f9fc1ebbc6abe788576d upstream.

When using HEAD from
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/kernel/ipvsadm/ipvsadm.git/,
the command:
ipvsadm --start-daemon backup --mcast-interface eth0.60 \
    --mcast-group ff02::1:81
fails with the error message:
Argument list too long

whereas both:
ipvsadm --start-daemon master --mcast-interface eth0.60 \
    --mcast-group ff02::1:81
and:
ipvsadm --start-daemon backup --mcast-interface eth0.60 \
    --mcast-group 224.0.0.81
are successful.

The error message "Argument list too long" isn't helpful. The error occurs
because an IPv6 address is given in backup mode.

The error is in make_receive_sock() in net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c,
since it fails to set the interface on the address or the socket before
calling inet6_bind() (via sock-&gt;ops-&gt;bind), where the test
'if (!sk-&gt;sk_bound_dev_if)' failed.

Setting sock-&gt;sk-&gt;sk_bound_dev_if on the socket before calling
inet6_bind() resolves the issue.

Fixes: d33288172e72 ("ipvs: add more mcast parameters for the sync daemon")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage &lt;quentin@armitage.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3777ed688fba82d0bd43f9fc1ebbc6abe788576d upstream.

When using HEAD from
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/kernel/ipvsadm/ipvsadm.git/,
the command:
ipvsadm --start-daemon backup --mcast-interface eth0.60 \
    --mcast-group ff02::1:81
fails with the error message:
Argument list too long

whereas both:
ipvsadm --start-daemon master --mcast-interface eth0.60 \
    --mcast-group ff02::1:81
and:
ipvsadm --start-daemon backup --mcast-interface eth0.60 \
    --mcast-group 224.0.0.81
are successful.

The error message "Argument list too long" isn't helpful. The error occurs
because an IPv6 address is given in backup mode.

The error is in make_receive_sock() in net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c,
since it fails to set the interface on the address or the socket before
calling inet6_bind() (via sock-&gt;ops-&gt;bind), where the test
'if (!sk-&gt;sk_bound_dev_if)' failed.

Setting sock-&gt;sk-&gt;sk_bound_dev_if on the socket before calling
inet6_bind() resolves the issue.

Fixes: d33288172e72 ("ipvs: add more mcast parameters for the sync daemon")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage &lt;quentin@armitage.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: drop first packet to redirect conntrack</title>
<updated>2016-05-11T09:21:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Anastasov</name>
<email>ja@ssi.bg</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-05T13:03:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f94ad404f8934e0cae299dd6520707dc02bbf2fc'/>
<id>f94ad404f8934e0cae299dd6520707dc02bbf2fc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f719e3754ee2f7275437e61a6afd520181fdd43b upstream.

Jiri Bohac is reporting for a problem where the attempt
to reschedule existing connection to another real server
needs proper redirect for the conntrack used by the IPVS
connection. For example, when IPVS connection is created
to NAT-ed real server we alter the reply direction of
conntrack. If we later decide to select different real
server we can not alter again the conntrack. And if we
expire the old connection, the new connection is left
without conntrack.

So, the only way to redirect both the IPVS connection and
the Netfilter's conntrack is to drop the SYN packet that
hits existing connection, to wait for the next jiffie
to expire the old connection and its conntrack and to rely
on client's retransmission to create new connection as
usually.

Jiri Bohac provided a fix that drops all SYNs on rescheduling,
I extended his patch to do such drops only for connections
that use conntrack. Here is the original report from Jiri Bohac:

Since commit dc7b3eb900aa ("ipvs: Fix reuse connection if real server
is dead"), new connections to dead servers are redistributed
immediately to new servers.  The old connection is expired using
ip_vs_conn_expire_now() which sets the connection timer to expire
immediately.

However, before the timer callback, ip_vs_conn_expire(), is run
to clean the connection's conntrack entry, the new redistributed
connection may already be established and its conntrack removed
instead.

Fix this by dropping the first packet of the new connection
instead, like we do when the destination server is not available.
The timer will have deleted the old conntrack entry long before
the first packet of the new connection is retransmitted.

Fixes: dc7b3eb900aa ("ipvs: Fix reuse connection if real server is dead")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac &lt;jbohac@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f719e3754ee2f7275437e61a6afd520181fdd43b upstream.

Jiri Bohac is reporting for a problem where the attempt
to reschedule existing connection to another real server
needs proper redirect for the conntrack used by the IPVS
connection. For example, when IPVS connection is created
to NAT-ed real server we alter the reply direction of
conntrack. If we later decide to select different real
server we can not alter again the conntrack. And if we
expire the old connection, the new connection is left
without conntrack.

So, the only way to redirect both the IPVS connection and
the Netfilter's conntrack is to drop the SYN packet that
hits existing connection, to wait for the next jiffie
to expire the old connection and its conntrack and to rely
on client's retransmission to create new connection as
usually.

Jiri Bohac provided a fix that drops all SYNs on rescheduling,
I extended his patch to do such drops only for connections
that use conntrack. Here is the original report from Jiri Bohac:

Since commit dc7b3eb900aa ("ipvs: Fix reuse connection if real server
is dead"), new connections to dead servers are redistributed
immediately to new servers.  The old connection is expired using
ip_vs_conn_expire_now() which sets the connection timer to expire
immediately.

However, before the timer callback, ip_vs_conn_expire(), is run
to clean the connection's conntrack entry, the new redistributed
connection may already be established and its conntrack removed
instead.

Fix this by dropping the first packet of the new connection
instead, like we do when the destination server is not available.
The timer will have deleted the old conntrack entry long before
the first packet of the new connection is retransmitted.

Fixes: dc7b3eb900aa ("ipvs: Fix reuse connection if real server is dead")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac &lt;jbohac@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: correct initial offset of Call-ID header search in SIP persistence engine</title>
<updated>2016-05-11T09:21:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marco Angaroni</name>
<email>marcoangaroni@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-05T11:10:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ba5e7e673624b6099640111e7366be850cf5dbe7'/>
<id>ba5e7e673624b6099640111e7366be850cf5dbe7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7617a24f83b5d67f4dab1844956be1cebc44aec8 upstream.

The IPVS SIP persistence engine is not able to parse the SIP header
"Call-ID" when such header is inserted in the first positions of
the SIP message.

When IPVS is configured with "--pe sip" option, like for example:
ipvsadm -A -u 1.2.3.4:5060 -s rr --pe sip -p 120 -o
some particular messages (see below for details) do not create entries
in the connection template table, which can be listed with:
ipvsadm -Lcn --persistent-conn

Problematic SIP messages are SIP responses having "Call-ID" header
positioned just after message first line:
SIP/2.0 200 OK
[Call-ID header here]
[rest of the headers]

When "Call-ID" header is positioned down (after a few other headers)
it is correctly recognized.

This is due to the data offset used in get_callid function call inside
ip_vs_pe_sip.c file: since dptr already points to the start of the
SIP message, the value of dataoff should be initially 0.
Otherwise the header is searched starting from some bytes after the
first character of the SIP message.

Fixes: 758ff0338722 ("IPVS: sip persistence engine")
Signed-off-by: Marco Angaroni &lt;marcoangaroni@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7617a24f83b5d67f4dab1844956be1cebc44aec8 upstream.

The IPVS SIP persistence engine is not able to parse the SIP header
"Call-ID" when such header is inserted in the first positions of
the SIP message.

When IPVS is configured with "--pe sip" option, like for example:
ipvsadm -A -u 1.2.3.4:5060 -s rr --pe sip -p 120 -o
some particular messages (see below for details) do not create entries
in the connection template table, which can be listed with:
ipvsadm -Lcn --persistent-conn

Problematic SIP messages are SIP responses having "Call-ID" header
positioned just after message first line:
SIP/2.0 200 OK
[Call-ID header here]
[rest of the headers]

When "Call-ID" header is positioned down (after a few other headers)
it is correctly recognized.

This is due to the data offset used in get_callid function call inside
ip_vs_pe_sip.c file: since dptr already points to the start of the
SIP message, the value of dataoff should be initially 0.
Otherwise the header is searched starting from some bytes after the
first character of the SIP message.

Fixes: 758ff0338722 ("IPVS: sip persistence engine")
Signed-off-by: Marco Angaroni &lt;marcoangaroni@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: handle ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off failure</title>
<updated>2016-05-11T09:21:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-27T13:52:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c6a012ba56536cac022045cab504d76d342d8c91'/>
<id>c6a012ba56536cac022045cab504d76d342d8c91</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3f20efba41916ee17ce82f0fdd02581ada2872b2 upstream.

ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off() may not find an IP header, and gcc has
determined that ip_vs_sip_fill_param() then incorrectly accesses
the protocol fields:

net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c: In function 'ip_vs_sip_fill_param':
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c:76:5: error: 'iph.protocol' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
  if (iph.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
     ^
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c:81:10: error: 'iph.len' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
  dataoff = iph.len + sizeof(struct udphdr);
          ^

This adds a check for the ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off() return code
before looking at the ip header data returned from it.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Fixes: b0e010c527de ("ipvs: replace ip_vs_fill_ip4hdr with ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off")
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3f20efba41916ee17ce82f0fdd02581ada2872b2 upstream.

ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off() may not find an IP header, and gcc has
determined that ip_vs_sip_fill_param() then incorrectly accesses
the protocol fields:

net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c: In function 'ip_vs_sip_fill_param':
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c:76:5: error: 'iph.protocol' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
  if (iph.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
     ^
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c:81:10: error: 'iph.len' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
  dataoff = iph.len + sizeof(struct udphdr);
          ^

This adds a check for the ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off() return code
before looking at the ip header data returned from it.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Fixes: b0e010c527de ("ipvs: replace ip_vs_fill_ip4hdr with ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off")
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
