<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/mac80211, branch v4.9.232</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: allow rx of mesh eapol frames with default rx key</title>
<updated>2020-07-31T14:44:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Markus Theil</name>
<email>markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-25T10:42:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=12b513804a7692205de0d104e60bbf5eb47d024e'/>
<id>12b513804a7692205de0d104e60bbf5eb47d024e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0b467b63870d9c05c81456aa9bfee894ab2db3b6 ]

Without this patch, eapol frames cannot be received in mesh
mode, when 802.1X should be used. Initially only a MGTK is
defined, which is found and set as rx-&gt;key, when there are
no other keys set. ieee80211_drop_unencrypted would then
drop these eapol frames, as they are data frames without
encryption and there exists some rx-&gt;key.

Fix this by differentiating between mesh eapol frames and
other data frames with existing rx-&gt;key. Allow mesh mesh
eapol frames only if they are for our vif address.

With this patch in-place, ieee80211_rx_h_mesh_fwding continues
after the ieee80211_drop_unencrypted check and notices, that
these eapol frames have to be delivered locally, as they should.

Signed-off-by: Markus Theil &lt;markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200625104214.50319-1-markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de
[small code cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0b467b63870d9c05c81456aa9bfee894ab2db3b6 ]

Without this patch, eapol frames cannot be received in mesh
mode, when 802.1X should be used. Initially only a MGTK is
defined, which is found and set as rx-&gt;key, when there are
no other keys set. ieee80211_drop_unencrypted would then
drop these eapol frames, as they are data frames without
encryption and there exists some rx-&gt;key.

Fix this by differentiating between mesh eapol frames and
other data frames with existing rx-&gt;key. Allow mesh mesh
eapol frames only if they are for our vif address.

With this patch in-place, ieee80211_rx_h_mesh_fwding continues
after the ieee80211_drop_unencrypted check and notices, that
these eapol frames have to be delivered locally, as they should.

Signed-off-by: Markus Theil &lt;markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200625104214.50319-1-markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de
[small code cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: mesh: fix discovery timer re-arming issue / crash</title>
<updated>2020-06-03T06:16:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Lüssing</name>
<email>ll@simonwunderlich.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-22T17:04:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a3e733886b59a7484d3f586b5ae77fd80b810b4c'/>
<id>a3e733886b59a7484d3f586b5ae77fd80b810b4c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e2d4a80f93fcfaf72e2e20daf6a28e39c3b90677 upstream.

On a non-forwarding 802.11s link between two fairly busy
neighboring nodes (iperf with -P 16 at ~850MBit/s TCP;
1733.3 MBit/s VHT-MCS 9 80MHz short GI VHT-NSS 4), so with
frequent PREQ retries, usually after around 30-40 seconds the
following crash would occur:

[ 1110.822428] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 00000000
[ 1110.830786] Mem abort info:
[ 1110.833573]   Exception class = IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1110.839494]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1110.842546]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1110.845678] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgd = ffff800076386000
[ 1110.852204] [0000000000000000] *pgd=00000000f6322003, *pud=00000000f62de003, *pmd=0000000000000000
[ 1110.861167] Internal error: Oops: 86000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 1110.866730] Modules linked in: pppoe ppp_async batman_adv ath10k_pci ath10k_core ath pppox ppp_generic nf_conntrack_ipv6 mac80211 iptable_nat ipt_REJECT ipt_MASQUERADE cfg80211 xt_time xt_tcpudp xt_state xt_nat xt_multiport xt_mark xt_mac xt_limit xt_conntrack xt_comment xt_TCPMSS xt_REDIRECT xt_LOG xt_FLOWOFFLOAD slhc nf_reject_ipv4 nf_nat_redirect nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_log_ipv4 nf_flow_table_hw nf_flow_table nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_conntrack_rtcache nf_conntrack iptable_mangle iptable_filter ip_tables crc_ccitt compat nf_log_ipv6 nf_log_common ip6table_mangle ip6table_filter ip6_tables ip6t_REJECT x_tables nf_reject_ipv6 usb_storage xhci_plat_hcd xhci_pci xhci_hcd dwc3 usbcore usb_common
[ 1110.932190] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0xffff0000090c8000)
[ 1110.938884] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.14.162 #0
[ 1110.944965] Hardware name: LS1043A RGW Board (DT)
[ 1110.949658] task: ffff8000787a81c0 task.stack: ffff0000090c8000
[ 1110.955568] PC is at 0x0
[ 1110.958097] LR is at call_timer_fn.isra.27+0x24/0x78
[ 1110.963055] pc : [&lt;0000000000000000&gt;] lr : [&lt;ffff0000080ff29c&gt;] pstate: 00400145
[ 1110.970440] sp : ffff00000801be10
[ 1110.973744] x29: ffff00000801be10 x28: ffff000008bf7018
[ 1110.979047] x27: ffff000008bf87c8 x26: ffff000008c160c0
[ 1110.984352] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 1110.989657] x23: dead000000000200 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 1110.994959] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000101
[ 1111.000262] x19: ffff8000787a81c0 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 1111.005565] x17: ffff0000089167b0 x16: 0000000000000058
[ 1111.010868] x15: ffff0000089167b0 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 1111.016172] x13: ffff000008916788 x12: 0000000000000040
[ 1111.021475] x11: ffff80007fda9af0 x10: 0000000000000001
[ 1111.026777] x9 : ffff00000801bea0 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 1111.032080] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80007fda9aa8
[ 1111.037383] x5 : ffff00000801bea0 x4 : 0000000000000010
[ 1111.042685] x3 : ffff00000801be98 x2 : 0000000000000614
[ 1111.047988] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 1111.053290] Call trace:
[ 1111.055728] Exception stack(0xffff00000801bcd0 to 0xffff00000801be10)
[ 1111.062158] bcc0:                                   0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 1111.069978] bce0: 0000000000000614 ffff00000801be98 0000000000000010 ffff00000801bea0
[ 1111.077798] bd00: ffff80007fda9aa8 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 ffff00000801bea0
[ 1111.085618] bd20: 0000000000000001 ffff80007fda9af0 0000000000000040 ffff000008916788
[ 1111.093437] bd40: 0000000000000000 ffff0000089167b0 0000000000000058 ffff0000089167b0
[ 1111.101256] bd60: 0000000000000000 ffff8000787a81c0 0000000000000101 0000000000000000
[ 1111.109075] bd80: 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 1111.116895] bda0: ffff000008c160c0 ffff000008bf87c8 ffff000008bf7018 ffff00000801be10
[ 1111.124715] bdc0: ffff0000080ff29c ffff00000801be10 0000000000000000 0000000000400145
[ 1111.132534] bde0: ffff8000787a81c0 ffff00000801bde8 0000ffffffffffff 000001029eb19be8
[ 1111.140353] be00: ffff00000801be10 0000000000000000
[ 1111.145220] [&lt;          (null)&gt;]           (null)
[ 1111.149917] [&lt;ffff0000080ff77c&gt;] run_timer_softirq+0x184/0x398
[ 1111.155741] [&lt;ffff000008081938&gt;] __do_softirq+0x100/0x1fc
[ 1111.161130] [&lt;ffff0000080a2e28&gt;] irq_exit+0x80/0xd8
[ 1111.166002] [&lt;ffff0000080ea708&gt;] __handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xb0
[ 1111.171825] [&lt;ffff000008081678&gt;] gic_handle_irq+0x68/0xb0
[ 1111.177213] Exception stack(0xffff0000090cbe30 to 0xffff0000090cbf70)
[ 1111.183642] be20:                                   0000000000000020 0000000000000000
[ 1111.191461] be40: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00008000771af000 0000000000000000
[ 1111.199281] be60: ffff000008c95180 0000000000000000 ffff000008c19360 ffff0000090cbef0
[ 1111.207101] be80: 0000000000000810 0000000000000400 0000000000000098 ffff000000000000
[ 1111.214920] bea0: 0000000000000001 ffff0000089167b0 0000000000000000 ffff0000089167b0
[ 1111.222740] bec0: 0000000000000000 ffff000008c198e8 ffff000008bf7018 ffff000008c19000
[ 1111.230559] bee0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8000787a81c0 ffff000008018000
[ 1111.238380] bf00: ffff00000801c000 ffff00000913ba34 ffff8000787a81c0 ffff0000090cbf70
[ 1111.246199] bf20: ffff0000080857cc ffff0000090cbf70 ffff0000080857d0 0000000000400145
[ 1111.254020] bf40: ffff000008018000 ffff00000801c000 ffffffffffffffff ffff0000080fa574
[ 1111.261838] bf60: ffff0000090cbf70 ffff0000080857d0
[ 1111.266706] [&lt;ffff0000080832e8&gt;] el1_irq+0xe8/0x18c
[ 1111.271576] [&lt;ffff0000080857d0&gt;] arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x18
[ 1111.276880] [&lt;ffff0000080d7de4&gt;] do_idle+0xec/0x1b8
[ 1111.281748] [&lt;ffff0000080d8020&gt;] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x28
[ 1111.287399] [&lt;ffff00000808f81c&gt;] secondary_start_kernel+0x104/0x110
[ 1111.293662] Code: bad PC value
[ 1111.296710] ---[ end trace 555b6ca4363c3edd ]---
[ 1111.301318] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 1111.307661] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1111.311574] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1111.315053] CPU features: 0x0002000
[ 1111.318530] Memory Limit: none
[ 1111.321575] Rebooting in 3 seconds..

With some added debug output / delays we were able to push the crash from
the timer callback runner into the callback function and by that shedding
some light on which object holding the timer gets corrupted:

[  401.720899] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 00000868
[...]
[  402.335836] [&lt;ffff0000088fafa4&gt;] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x14/0x48
[  402.341548] [&lt;ffff000000dbe684&gt;] mesh_path_timer+0x10c/0x248 [mac80211]
[  402.348154] [&lt;ffff0000080ff29c&gt;] call_timer_fn.isra.27+0x24/0x78
[  402.354150] [&lt;ffff0000080ff77c&gt;] run_timer_softirq+0x184/0x398
[  402.359974] [&lt;ffff000008081938&gt;] __do_softirq+0x100/0x1fc
[  402.365362] [&lt;ffff0000080a2e28&gt;] irq_exit+0x80/0xd8
[  402.370231] [&lt;ffff0000080ea708&gt;] __handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xb0
[  402.376053] [&lt;ffff000008081678&gt;] gic_handle_irq+0x68/0xb0

The issue happens due to the following sequence of events:

1) mesh_path_start_discovery():
-&gt; spin_unlock_bh(&amp;mpath-&gt;state_lock) before mesh_path_sel_frame_tx()

2) mesh_path_free_rcu()
-&gt; del_timer_sync(&amp;mpath-&gt;timer)
   [...]
-&gt; kfree_rcu(mpath)

3) mesh_path_start_discovery():
-&gt; mod_timer(&amp;mpath-&gt;timer, ...)
   [...]
-&gt; rcu_read_unlock()

4) mesh_path_free_rcu()'s kfree_rcu():
-&gt; kfree(mpath)

5) mesh_path_timer() starts after timeout, using freed mpath object

So a use-after-free issue due to a timer re-arming bug caused by an
early spin-unlocking.

This patch fixes this issue by re-checking if mpath is about to be
free'd and if so bails out of re-arming the timer.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 050ac52cbe1f ("mac80211: code for on-demand Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol")
Cc: Simon Wunderlich &lt;sw@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing &lt;ll@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200522170413.14973-1-linus.luessing@c0d3.blue
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e2d4a80f93fcfaf72e2e20daf6a28e39c3b90677 upstream.

On a non-forwarding 802.11s link between two fairly busy
neighboring nodes (iperf with -P 16 at ~850MBit/s TCP;
1733.3 MBit/s VHT-MCS 9 80MHz short GI VHT-NSS 4), so with
frequent PREQ retries, usually after around 30-40 seconds the
following crash would occur:

[ 1110.822428] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 00000000
[ 1110.830786] Mem abort info:
[ 1110.833573]   Exception class = IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1110.839494]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1110.842546]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1110.845678] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgd = ffff800076386000
[ 1110.852204] [0000000000000000] *pgd=00000000f6322003, *pud=00000000f62de003, *pmd=0000000000000000
[ 1110.861167] Internal error: Oops: 86000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 1110.866730] Modules linked in: pppoe ppp_async batman_adv ath10k_pci ath10k_core ath pppox ppp_generic nf_conntrack_ipv6 mac80211 iptable_nat ipt_REJECT ipt_MASQUERADE cfg80211 xt_time xt_tcpudp xt_state xt_nat xt_multiport xt_mark xt_mac xt_limit xt_conntrack xt_comment xt_TCPMSS xt_REDIRECT xt_LOG xt_FLOWOFFLOAD slhc nf_reject_ipv4 nf_nat_redirect nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_log_ipv4 nf_flow_table_hw nf_flow_table nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_conntrack_rtcache nf_conntrack iptable_mangle iptable_filter ip_tables crc_ccitt compat nf_log_ipv6 nf_log_common ip6table_mangle ip6table_filter ip6_tables ip6t_REJECT x_tables nf_reject_ipv6 usb_storage xhci_plat_hcd xhci_pci xhci_hcd dwc3 usbcore usb_common
[ 1110.932190] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0xffff0000090c8000)
[ 1110.938884] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.14.162 #0
[ 1110.944965] Hardware name: LS1043A RGW Board (DT)
[ 1110.949658] task: ffff8000787a81c0 task.stack: ffff0000090c8000
[ 1110.955568] PC is at 0x0
[ 1110.958097] LR is at call_timer_fn.isra.27+0x24/0x78
[ 1110.963055] pc : [&lt;0000000000000000&gt;] lr : [&lt;ffff0000080ff29c&gt;] pstate: 00400145
[ 1110.970440] sp : ffff00000801be10
[ 1110.973744] x29: ffff00000801be10 x28: ffff000008bf7018
[ 1110.979047] x27: ffff000008bf87c8 x26: ffff000008c160c0
[ 1110.984352] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 1110.989657] x23: dead000000000200 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 1110.994959] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000101
[ 1111.000262] x19: ffff8000787a81c0 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 1111.005565] x17: ffff0000089167b0 x16: 0000000000000058
[ 1111.010868] x15: ffff0000089167b0 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 1111.016172] x13: ffff000008916788 x12: 0000000000000040
[ 1111.021475] x11: ffff80007fda9af0 x10: 0000000000000001
[ 1111.026777] x9 : ffff00000801bea0 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 1111.032080] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80007fda9aa8
[ 1111.037383] x5 : ffff00000801bea0 x4 : 0000000000000010
[ 1111.042685] x3 : ffff00000801be98 x2 : 0000000000000614
[ 1111.047988] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 1111.053290] Call trace:
[ 1111.055728] Exception stack(0xffff00000801bcd0 to 0xffff00000801be10)
[ 1111.062158] bcc0:                                   0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 1111.069978] bce0: 0000000000000614 ffff00000801be98 0000000000000010 ffff00000801bea0
[ 1111.077798] bd00: ffff80007fda9aa8 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 ffff00000801bea0
[ 1111.085618] bd20: 0000000000000001 ffff80007fda9af0 0000000000000040 ffff000008916788
[ 1111.093437] bd40: 0000000000000000 ffff0000089167b0 0000000000000058 ffff0000089167b0
[ 1111.101256] bd60: 0000000000000000 ffff8000787a81c0 0000000000000101 0000000000000000
[ 1111.109075] bd80: 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 1111.116895] bda0: ffff000008c160c0 ffff000008bf87c8 ffff000008bf7018 ffff00000801be10
[ 1111.124715] bdc0: ffff0000080ff29c ffff00000801be10 0000000000000000 0000000000400145
[ 1111.132534] bde0: ffff8000787a81c0 ffff00000801bde8 0000ffffffffffff 000001029eb19be8
[ 1111.140353] be00: ffff00000801be10 0000000000000000
[ 1111.145220] [&lt;          (null)&gt;]           (null)
[ 1111.149917] [&lt;ffff0000080ff77c&gt;] run_timer_softirq+0x184/0x398
[ 1111.155741] [&lt;ffff000008081938&gt;] __do_softirq+0x100/0x1fc
[ 1111.161130] [&lt;ffff0000080a2e28&gt;] irq_exit+0x80/0xd8
[ 1111.166002] [&lt;ffff0000080ea708&gt;] __handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xb0
[ 1111.171825] [&lt;ffff000008081678&gt;] gic_handle_irq+0x68/0xb0
[ 1111.177213] Exception stack(0xffff0000090cbe30 to 0xffff0000090cbf70)
[ 1111.183642] be20:                                   0000000000000020 0000000000000000
[ 1111.191461] be40: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00008000771af000 0000000000000000
[ 1111.199281] be60: ffff000008c95180 0000000000000000 ffff000008c19360 ffff0000090cbef0
[ 1111.207101] be80: 0000000000000810 0000000000000400 0000000000000098 ffff000000000000
[ 1111.214920] bea0: 0000000000000001 ffff0000089167b0 0000000000000000 ffff0000089167b0
[ 1111.222740] bec0: 0000000000000000 ffff000008c198e8 ffff000008bf7018 ffff000008c19000
[ 1111.230559] bee0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8000787a81c0 ffff000008018000
[ 1111.238380] bf00: ffff00000801c000 ffff00000913ba34 ffff8000787a81c0 ffff0000090cbf70
[ 1111.246199] bf20: ffff0000080857cc ffff0000090cbf70 ffff0000080857d0 0000000000400145
[ 1111.254020] bf40: ffff000008018000 ffff00000801c000 ffffffffffffffff ffff0000080fa574
[ 1111.261838] bf60: ffff0000090cbf70 ffff0000080857d0
[ 1111.266706] [&lt;ffff0000080832e8&gt;] el1_irq+0xe8/0x18c
[ 1111.271576] [&lt;ffff0000080857d0&gt;] arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x18
[ 1111.276880] [&lt;ffff0000080d7de4&gt;] do_idle+0xec/0x1b8
[ 1111.281748] [&lt;ffff0000080d8020&gt;] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x28
[ 1111.287399] [&lt;ffff00000808f81c&gt;] secondary_start_kernel+0x104/0x110
[ 1111.293662] Code: bad PC value
[ 1111.296710] ---[ end trace 555b6ca4363c3edd ]---
[ 1111.301318] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 1111.307661] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1111.311574] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1111.315053] CPU features: 0x0002000
[ 1111.318530] Memory Limit: none
[ 1111.321575] Rebooting in 3 seconds..

With some added debug output / delays we were able to push the crash from
the timer callback runner into the callback function and by that shedding
some light on which object holding the timer gets corrupted:

[  401.720899] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 00000868
[...]
[  402.335836] [&lt;ffff0000088fafa4&gt;] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x14/0x48
[  402.341548] [&lt;ffff000000dbe684&gt;] mesh_path_timer+0x10c/0x248 [mac80211]
[  402.348154] [&lt;ffff0000080ff29c&gt;] call_timer_fn.isra.27+0x24/0x78
[  402.354150] [&lt;ffff0000080ff77c&gt;] run_timer_softirq+0x184/0x398
[  402.359974] [&lt;ffff000008081938&gt;] __do_softirq+0x100/0x1fc
[  402.365362] [&lt;ffff0000080a2e28&gt;] irq_exit+0x80/0xd8
[  402.370231] [&lt;ffff0000080ea708&gt;] __handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xb0
[  402.376053] [&lt;ffff000008081678&gt;] gic_handle_irq+0x68/0xb0

The issue happens due to the following sequence of events:

1) mesh_path_start_discovery():
-&gt; spin_unlock_bh(&amp;mpath-&gt;state_lock) before mesh_path_sel_frame_tx()

2) mesh_path_free_rcu()
-&gt; del_timer_sync(&amp;mpath-&gt;timer)
   [...]
-&gt; kfree_rcu(mpath)

3) mesh_path_start_discovery():
-&gt; mod_timer(&amp;mpath-&gt;timer, ...)
   [...]
-&gt; rcu_read_unlock()

4) mesh_path_free_rcu()'s kfree_rcu():
-&gt; kfree(mpath)

5) mesh_path_timer() starts after timeout, using freed mpath object

So a use-after-free issue due to a timer re-arming bug caused by an
early spin-unlocking.

This patch fixes this issue by re-checking if mpath is about to be
free'd and if so bails out of re-arming the timer.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 050ac52cbe1f ("mac80211: code for on-demand Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol")
Cc: Simon Wunderlich &lt;sw@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing &lt;ll@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200522170413.14973-1-linus.luessing@c0d3.blue
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: add ieee80211_is_any_nullfunc()</title>
<updated>2020-05-10T08:28:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Pedersen</name>
<email>thomas@adapt-ip.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-14T05:59:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9bb734d994dbed7dcc5beacc70e2886c520d1e26'/>
<id>9bb734d994dbed7dcc5beacc70e2886c520d1e26</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 30b2f0be23fb40e58d0ad2caf8702c2a44cda2e1 upstream.

commit 08a5bdde3812 ("mac80211: consider QoS Null frames for STA_NULLFUNC_ACKED")
Fixed a bug where we failed to take into account a
nullfunc frame can be either non-QoS or QoS. It turns out
there is at least one more bug in
ieee80211_sta_tx_notify(), introduced in
commit 7b6ddeaf27ec ("mac80211: use QoS NDP for AP probing"),
where we forgot to check for the QoS variant and so
assumed the QoS nullfunc frame never went out

Fix this by adding a helper ieee80211_is_any_nullfunc()
which consolidates the check for non-QoS and QoS nullfunc
frames. Replace existing compound conditionals and add a
couple more missing checks for QoS variant.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen &lt;thomas@adapt-ip.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200114055940.18502-3-thomas@adapt-ip.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 30b2f0be23fb40e58d0ad2caf8702c2a44cda2e1 upstream.

commit 08a5bdde3812 ("mac80211: consider QoS Null frames for STA_NULLFUNC_ACKED")
Fixed a bug where we failed to take into account a
nullfunc frame can be either non-QoS or QoS. It turns out
there is at least one more bug in
ieee80211_sta_tx_notify(), introduced in
commit 7b6ddeaf27ec ("mac80211: use QoS NDP for AP probing"),
where we forgot to check for the QoS variant and so
assumed the QoS nullfunc frame never went out

Fix this by adding a helper ieee80211_is_any_nullfunc()
which consolidates the check for non-QoS and QoS nullfunc
frames. Replace existing compound conditionals and add a
couple more missing checks for QoS variant.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen &lt;thomas@adapt-ip.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200114055940.18502-3-thomas@adapt-ip.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: fix authentication with iwlwifi/mvm</title>
<updated>2020-04-02T15:20:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-29T20:50:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2839f7afb8cc9f949070bd5b510d3de37c8084a7'/>
<id>2839f7afb8cc9f949070bd5b510d3de37c8084a7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit be8c827f50a0bcd56361b31ada11dc0a3c2fd240 upstream.

The original patch didn't copy the ieee80211_is_data() condition
because on most drivers the management frames don't go through
this path. However, they do on iwlwifi/mvm, so we do need to keep
the condition here.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ce2e1ca70307 ("mac80211: Check port authorization in the ieee80211_tx_dequeue() case")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Woody Suwalski &lt;terraluna977@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit be8c827f50a0bcd56361b31ada11dc0a3c2fd240 upstream.

The original patch didn't copy the ieee80211_is_data() condition
because on most drivers the management frames don't go through
this path. However, they do on iwlwifi/mvm, so we do need to keep
the condition here.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ce2e1ca70307 ("mac80211: Check port authorization in the ieee80211_tx_dequeue() case")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Woody Suwalski &lt;terraluna977@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: Check port authorization in the ieee80211_tx_dequeue() case</title>
<updated>2020-04-02T15:20:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jouni Malinen</name>
<email>jouni@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-26T14:51:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=76685e1c142c65f66e9aa776c8f25137e4145c3e'/>
<id>76685e1c142c65f66e9aa776c8f25137e4145c3e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ce2e1ca703071723ca2dd94d492a5ab6d15050da upstream.

mac80211 used to check port authorization in the Data frame enqueue case
when going through start_xmit(). However, that authorization status may
change while the frame is waiting in a queue. Add a similar check in the
dequeue case to avoid sending previously accepted frames after
authorization change. This provides additional protection against
potential leaking of frames after a station has been disconnected and
the keys for it are being removed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen &lt;jouni@codeaurora.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326155133.ced84317ea29.I34d4c47cd8cc8a4042b38a76f16a601fbcbfd9b3@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ce2e1ca703071723ca2dd94d492a5ab6d15050da upstream.

mac80211 used to check port authorization in the Data frame enqueue case
when going through start_xmit(). However, that authorization status may
change while the frame is waiting in a queue. Add a similar check in the
dequeue case to avoid sending previously accepted frames after
authorization change. This provides additional protection against
potential leaking of frames after a station has been disconnected and
the keys for it are being removed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen &lt;jouni@codeaurora.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326155133.ced84317ea29.I34d4c47cd8cc8a4042b38a76f16a601fbcbfd9b3@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: mark station unauthorized before key removal</title>
<updated>2020-04-02T15:20:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-26T14:51:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e52d8aff25010f4744022fca72d104ae7f074e19'/>
<id>e52d8aff25010f4744022fca72d104ae7f074e19</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b16798f5b907733966fd1a558fca823b3c67e4a1 upstream.

If a station is still marked as authorized, mark it as no longer
so before removing its keys. This allows frames transmitted to it
to be rejected, providing additional protection against leaking
plain text data during the disconnection flow.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326155133.ccb4fb0bb356.If48f0f0504efdcf16b8921f48c6d3bb2cb763c99@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b16798f5b907733966fd1a558fca823b3c67e4a1 upstream.

If a station is still marked as authorized, mark it as no longer
so before removing its keys. This allows frames transmitted to it
to be rejected, providing additional protection against leaking
plain text data during the disconnection flow.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326155133.ccb4fb0bb356.If48f0f0504efdcf16b8921f48c6d3bb2cb763c99@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: Do not send mesh HWMP PREQ if HWMP is disabled</title>
<updated>2020-04-02T15:20:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Cavallari</name>
<email>nicolas.cavallari@green-communications.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-05T14:04:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a8351c8a9eb24c664290098fc97df6573c1a6468'/>
<id>a8351c8a9eb24c664290098fc97df6573c1a6468</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ba32679cac50c38fdf488296f96b1f3175532b8e ]

When trying to transmit to an unknown destination, the mesh code would
unconditionally transmit a HWMP PREQ even if HWMP is not the current
path selection algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Cavallari &lt;nicolas.cavallari@green-communications.fr&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200305140409.12204-1-cavallar@lri.fr
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ba32679cac50c38fdf488296f96b1f3175532b8e ]

When trying to transmit to an unknown destination, the mesh code would
unconditionally transmit a HWMP PREQ even if HWMP is not the current
path selection algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Cavallari &lt;nicolas.cavallari@green-communications.fr&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200305140409.12204-1-cavallar@lri.fr
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: rx: avoid RCU list traversal under mutex</title>
<updated>2020-03-20T08:07:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Madhuparna Bhowmik</name>
<email>madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-23T14:33:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d2a49017c249c3e02897c4471a7b3bd967301158'/>
<id>d2a49017c249c3e02897c4471a7b3bd967301158</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 253216ffb2a002a682c6f68bd3adff5b98b71de8 ]

local-&gt;sta_mtx is held in __ieee80211_check_fast_rx_iface().
No need to use list_for_each_entry_rcu() as it also requires
a cond argument to avoid false lockdep warnings when not used in
RCU read-side section (with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST).
Therefore use list_for_each_entry();

Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik &lt;madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200223143302.15390-1-madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 253216ffb2a002a682c6f68bd3adff5b98b71de8 ]

local-&gt;sta_mtx is held in __ieee80211_check_fast_rx_iface().
No need to use list_for_each_entry_rcu() as it also requires
a cond argument to avoid false lockdep warnings when not used in
RCU read-side section (with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST).
Therefore use list_for_each_entry();

Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik &lt;madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200223143302.15390-1-madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: consider more elements in parsing CRC</title>
<updated>2020-03-11T06:53:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-31T11:12:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1ecf7f0e09477a424026f8bdf279b20a5965f7e4'/>
<id>1ecf7f0e09477a424026f8bdf279b20a5965f7e4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a04564c99bb4a92f805a58e56b2d22cc4978f152 ]

We only use the parsing CRC for checking if a beacon changed,
and elements with an ID &gt; 63 cannot be represented in the
filter. Thus, like we did before with WMM and Cisco vendor
elements, just statically add these forgotten items to the
CRC:
 - WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION
 - WLAN_EID_OPMODE_NOTIF

I guess that in most cases when VHT/HE operation change, the HT
operation also changed, and so the change was picked up, but we
did notice that pure operating mode notification changes were
ignored.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho &lt;luciano.coelho@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200131111300.891737-22-luca@coelho.fi
[restrict to VHT for the mac80211 branch]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a04564c99bb4a92f805a58e56b2d22cc4978f152 ]

We only use the parsing CRC for checking if a beacon changed,
and elements with an ID &gt; 63 cannot be represented in the
filter. Thus, like we did before with WMM and Cisco vendor
elements, just statically add these forgotten items to the
CRC:
 - WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION
 - WLAN_EID_OPMODE_NOTIF

I guess that in most cases when VHT/HE operation change, the HT
operation also changed, and so the change was picked up, but we
did notice that pure operating mode notification changes were
ignored.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho &lt;luciano.coelho@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200131111300.891737-22-luca@coelho.fi
[restrict to VHT for the mac80211 branch]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: Fix TKIP replay protection immediately after key setup</title>
<updated>2020-02-05T13:05:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jouni Malinen</name>
<email>j@w1.fi</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-07T15:35:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a98051bb43a742fe89732caa2e7a15dae17fcf9a'/>
<id>a98051bb43a742fe89732caa2e7a15dae17fcf9a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6f601265215a421f425ba3a4850a35861d024643 ]

TKIP replay protection was skipped for the very first frame received
after a new key is configured. While this is potentially needed to avoid
dropping a frame in some cases, this does leave a window for replay
attacks with group-addressed frames at the station side. Any earlier
frame sent by the AP using the same key would be accepted as a valid
frame and the internal RSC would then be updated to the TSC from that
frame. This would allow multiple previously transmitted group-addressed
frames to be replayed until the next valid new group-addressed frame
from the AP is received by the station.

Fix this by limiting the no-replay-protection exception to apply only
for the case where TSC=0, i.e., when this is for the very first frame
protected using the new key, and the local RSC had not been set to a
higher value when configuring the key (which may happen with GTK).

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen &lt;j@w1.fi&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107153545.10934-1-j@w1.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6f601265215a421f425ba3a4850a35861d024643 ]

TKIP replay protection was skipped for the very first frame received
after a new key is configured. While this is potentially needed to avoid
dropping a frame in some cases, this does leave a window for replay
attacks with group-addressed frames at the station side. Any earlier
frame sent by the AP using the same key would be accepted as a valid
frame and the internal RSC would then be updated to the TSC from that
frame. This would allow multiple previously transmitted group-addressed
frames to be replayed until the next valid new group-addressed frame
from the AP is received by the station.

Fix this by limiting the no-replay-protection exception to apply only
for the case where TSC=0, i.e., when this is for the very first frame
protected using the new key, and the local RSC had not been set to a
higher value when configuring the key (which may happen with GTK).

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen &lt;j@w1.fi&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107153545.10934-1-j@w1.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
