linux-stable.git/net/mac80211, branch v3.18.97

cfg80211: fix cfg80211_beacon_dup

2018-02-28T09:16:17+00:00

commit bee92d06157fc39d5d7836a061c7d41289a55797 upstream.

gcc-8 warns about some obviously incorrect code:

net/mac80211/cfg.c: In function 'cfg80211_beacon_dup':
net/mac80211/cfg.c:2896:3: error: 'memcpy' source argument is the same as destination [-Werror=restrict]

From the context, I conclude that we want to copy from beacon into
new_beacon, as we do in the rest of the function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 73da7d5bab79 ("mac80211: add channel switch command and beacon callbacks")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: fix the update of path metric for RANN frame

2018-02-07T19:07:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit fbbdad5edf0bb59786a51b94a9d006bc8c2da9a2 ]

The previous path metric update from RANN frame has not considered
the own link metric toward the transmitting mesh STA. Fix this.

Reported-by: Michael65535
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yeow Yeoh 
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: Fix addition of mesh configuration element

2017-12-20T09:01:29+00:00

commit 57629915d568c522ac1422df7bba4bee5b5c7a7c upstream.

The code was setting the capabilities byte to zero,
after it was already properly set previously. Fix it.

The bug was found while debugging hwsim mesh tests failures
that happened since the commit mentioned below.

Fixes: 76f43b4c0a93 ("mac80211: Remove invalid flag operations in mesh TSF synchronization")
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer 
Reviewed-by: Masashi Honma 
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Cc: Richard Schütz 
Cc: Mathias Kretschmer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: Suppress NEW_PEER_CANDIDATE event if no room

2017-11-30T08:35:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit 11197d006bcfabf0173a7820a163fcaac420d10e ]

Previously, kernel sends NEW_PEER_CANDIDATE event to user land even if
the found peer does not have any room to accept other peer. This causes
continuous connection trials.

Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma 
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: Remove invalid flag operations in mesh TSF synchronization

2017-11-30T08:35:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit 76f43b4c0a9337af22827d78de4f2b8fd5328489 ]

mesh_sync_offset_adjust_tbtt() implements Extensible synchronization
framework ([1] 13.13.2 Extensible synchronization framework). It shall
not operate the flag "TBTT Adjusting subfield" ([1] 8.4.2.100.8 Mesh
Capability), since it is used only for MBCA ([1] 13.13.4 Mesh beacon
collision avoidance, see 13.13.4.4.3 TBTT scanning and adjustment
procedures for detail). So this patch remove the flag operations.

[1] IEEE Std 802.11 2012

Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma 
[remove adjusting_tbtt entirely, since it's now unused]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: don't compare TKIP TX MIC key in reinstall prevention

2017-11-18T10:06:29+00:00

commit cfbb0d90a7abb289edc91833d0905931f8805f12 upstream.

For the reinstall prevention, the code I had added compares the
whole key. It turns out though that iwlwifi firmware doesn't
provide the TKIP TX MIC key as it's not needed in client mode,
and thus the comparison will always return false.

For client mode, thus always zero out the TX MIC key part before
doing the comparison in order to avoid accepting the reinstall
of the key with identical encryption and RX MIC key, but not the
same TX MIC key (since the supplicant provides the real one.)

Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: use constant time comparison with keys

2017-11-18T10:06:29+00:00

commit 2bdd713b92a9cade239d3c7d15205a09f556624d upstream.

Otherwise we risk leaking information via timing side channel.

Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld 
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything

2017-11-18T10:06:29+00:00

commit fdf7cb4185b60c68e1a75e61691c4afdc15dea0e upstream.

When a key is reinstalled we can reset the replay counters
etc. which can lead to nonce reuse and/or replay detection
being impossible, breaking security properties, as described
in the "KRACK attacks".

In particular, CVE-2017-13080 applies to GTK rekeying that
happened in firmware while the host is in D3, with the second
part of the attack being done after the host wakes up. In
this case, the wpa_supplicant mitigation isn't sufficient
since wpa_supplicant doesn't know the GTK material.

In case this happens, simply silently accept the new key
coming from userspace but don't take any action on it since
it's the same key; this keeps the PN replay counters intact.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: flush hw_roc_start work before cancelling the ROC

2017-10-05T07:35:50+00:00

commit 6e46d8ce894374fc135c96a8d1057c6af1fef237 upstream.

When HW ROC is supported it is possible that after the HW notified
that the ROC has started, the ROC was cancelled and another ROC was
added while the hw_roc_start worker is waiting on the mutex (since
cancelling the ROC and adding another one also holds the same mutex).
As a result, the hw_roc_start worker will continue to run after the
new ROC is added but before it is actually started by the HW.
This may result in notifying userspace that the ROC has started before
it actually does, or in case of management tx ROC, in an attempt to
tx while not on the right channel.

In addition, when the driver will notify mac80211 that the second ROC
has started, mac80211 will warn that this ROC has already been
notified.

Fix this by flushing the hw_roc_start work before cancelling an ROC.

Signed-off-by: Avraham Stern 
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho 
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211/wpa: use constant time memory comparison for MACs

2017-06-29T07:12:24+00:00

commit 98c67d187db7808b1f3c95f2110dd4392d034182 upstream.

Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld 
Cc: Johannes Berg 
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman