<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv6, branch v5.4.192</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ip6_gre: Avoid updating tunnel-&gt;tun_hlen in __gre6_xmit()</title>
<updated>2022-05-09T07:03:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peilin Ye</name>
<email>peilin.ye@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-14T20:34:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0ecc5304e80a7d321d108355d412dfb8eb656809'/>
<id>0ecc5304e80a7d321d108355d412dfb8eb656809</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f40c064e933d7787ca7411b699504d7a2664c1f5 ]

Do not update tunnel-&gt;tun_hlen in data plane code.  Use a local variable
instead, just like "tunnel_hlen" in net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:gre_fb_xmit().

Co-developed-by: Cong Wang &lt;cong.wang@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;cong.wang@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye &lt;peilin.ye@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f40c064e933d7787ca7411b699504d7a2664c1f5 ]

Do not update tunnel-&gt;tun_hlen in data plane code.  Use a local variable
instead, just like "tunnel_hlen" in net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:gre_fb_xmit().

Co-developed-by: Cong Wang &lt;cong.wang@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;cong.wang@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye &lt;peilin.ye@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix race condition when creating child sockets from syncookies</title>
<updated>2022-04-27T11:50:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ricardo Dias</name>
<email>rdias@singlestore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T11:11:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b01b700e0c5a3d820c4884f67708112b034bd6da'/>
<id>b01b700e0c5a3d820c4884f67708112b034bd6da</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 01770a166165738a6e05c3d911fb4609cc4eb416 ]

When the TCP stack is in SYN flood mode, the server child socket is
created from the SYN cookie received in a TCP packet with the ACK flag
set.

The child socket is created when the server receives the first TCP
packet with a valid SYN cookie from the client. Usually, this packet
corresponds to the final step of the TCP 3-way handshake, the ACK
packet. But is also possible to receive a valid SYN cookie from the
first TCP data packet sent by the client, and thus create a child socket
from that SYN cookie.

Since a client socket is ready to send data as soon as it receives the
SYN+ACK packet from the server, the client can send the ACK packet (sent
by the TCP stack code), and the first data packet (sent by the userspace
program) almost at the same time, and thus the server will equally
receive the two TCP packets with valid SYN cookies almost at the same
instant.

When such event happens, the TCP stack code has a race condition that
occurs between the momement a lookup is done to the established
connections hashtable to check for the existence of a connection for the
same client, and the moment that the child socket is added to the
established connections hashtable. As a consequence, this race condition
can lead to a situation where we add two child sockets to the
established connections hashtable and deliver two sockets to the
userspace program to the same client.

This patch fixes the race condition by checking if an existing child
socket exists for the same client when we are adding the second child
socket to the established connections socket. If an existing child
socket exists, we drop the packet and discard the second child socket
to the same client.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Dias &lt;rdias@singlestore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120111133.GA67501@rdias-suse-pc.lan
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 01770a166165738a6e05c3d911fb4609cc4eb416 ]

When the TCP stack is in SYN flood mode, the server child socket is
created from the SYN cookie received in a TCP packet with the ACK flag
set.

The child socket is created when the server receives the first TCP
packet with a valid SYN cookie from the client. Usually, this packet
corresponds to the final step of the TCP 3-way handshake, the ACK
packet. But is also possible to receive a valid SYN cookie from the
first TCP data packet sent by the client, and thus create a child socket
from that SYN cookie.

Since a client socket is ready to send data as soon as it receives the
SYN+ACK packet from the server, the client can send the ACK packet (sent
by the TCP stack code), and the first data packet (sent by the userspace
program) almost at the same time, and thus the server will equally
receive the two TCP packets with valid SYN cookies almost at the same
instant.

When such event happens, the TCP stack code has a race condition that
occurs between the momement a lookup is done to the established
connections hashtable to check for the existence of a connection for the
same client, and the moment that the child socket is added to the
established connections hashtable. As a consequence, this race condition
can lead to a situation where we add two child sockets to the
established connections hashtable and deliver two sockets to the
userspace program to the same client.

This patch fixes the race condition by checking if an existing child
socket exists for the same client when we are adding the second child
socket to the established connections socket. If an existing child
socket exists, we drop the packet and discard the second child socket
to the same client.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Dias &lt;rdias@singlestore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120111133.GA67501@rdias-suse-pc.lan
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: fix panic when forwarding a pkt with no in6 dev</title>
<updated>2022-04-20T07:19:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Dichtel</name>
<email>nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-08T14:03:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ab2f5afb7af5c68389e8c7dd29e0a98fbeaaa435'/>
<id>ab2f5afb7af5c68389e8c7dd29e0a98fbeaaa435</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e3fa461d8b0e185b7da8a101fe94dfe6dd500ac0 upstream.

kongweibin reported a kernel panic in ip6_forward() when input interface
has no in6 dev associated.

The following tc commands were used to reproduce this panic:
tc qdisc del dev vxlan100 root
tc qdisc add dev vxlan100 root netem corrupt 5%

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ccd27f05ae7b ("ipv6: fix 'disable_policy' for fwd packets")
Reported-by: kongweibin &lt;kongweibin2@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e3fa461d8b0e185b7da8a101fe94dfe6dd500ac0 upstream.

kongweibin reported a kernel panic in ip6_forward() when input interface
has no in6 dev associated.

The following tc commands were used to reproduce this panic:
tc qdisc del dev vxlan100 root
tc qdisc add dev vxlan100 root netem corrupt 5%

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ccd27f05ae7b ("ipv6: fix 'disable_policy' for fwd packets")
Reported-by: kongweibin &lt;kongweibin2@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Fix stats accounting in ip6_pkt_drop</title>
<updated>2022-04-15T12:18:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Ahern</name>
<email>dsahern@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-04T15:09:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c154cf184b2c6f1ccad2ceb87b4a29c7ea7dd516'/>
<id>c154cf184b2c6f1ccad2ceb87b4a29c7ea7dd516</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1158f79f82d437093aeed87d57df0548bdd68146 ]

VRF devices are the loopbacks for VRFs, and a loopback can not be
assigned to a VRF. Accordingly, the condition in ip6_pkt_drop should
be '||' not '&amp;&amp;'.

Fixes: 1d3fd8a10bed ("vrf: Use orig netdev to count Ip6InNoRoutes and a fresh route lookup when sending dest unreach")
Reported-by: Pudak, Filip &lt;Filip.Pudak@windriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xiao, Jiguang &lt;Jiguang.Xiao@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404150908.2937-1-dsahern@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1158f79f82d437093aeed87d57df0548bdd68146 ]

VRF devices are the loopbacks for VRFs, and a loopback can not be
assigned to a VRF. Accordingly, the condition in ip6_pkt_drop should
be '||' not '&amp;&amp;'.

Fixes: 1d3fd8a10bed ("vrf: Use orig netdev to count Ip6InNoRoutes and a fresh route lookup when sending dest unreach")
Reported-by: Pudak, Filip &lt;Filip.Pudak@windriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xiao, Jiguang &lt;Jiguang.Xiao@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404150908.2937-1-dsahern@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: make mc_forwarding atomic</title>
<updated>2022-04-15T12:18:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-04T20:15:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fbb7b033209c35479d2006fceefcf9bb465e1030'/>
<id>fbb7b033209c35479d2006fceefcf9bb465e1030</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 145c7a793838add5e004e7d49a67654dc7eba147 ]

This fixes minor data-races in ip6_mc_input() and
batadv_mcast_mla_rtr_flags_softif_get_ipv6()

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 145c7a793838add5e004e7d49a67654dc7eba147 ]

This fixes minor data-races in ip6_mc_input() and
batadv_mcast_mla_rtr_flags_softif_get_ipv6()

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: call udp_encap_enable for v6 sockets when enabling encap</title>
<updated>2022-04-15T12:18:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-03T08:54:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f3ec0c9db5d3ca938c1b1a2a1c0d38b647d7b85f'/>
<id>f3ec0c9db5d3ca938c1b1a2a1c0d38b647d7b85f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a4a600dd301ccde6ea239804ec1f19364a39d643 upstream.

When enabling encap for a ipv6 socket without udp_encap_needed_key
increased, UDP GRO won't work for v4 mapped v6 address packets as
sk will be NULL in udp4_gro_receive().

This patch is to enable it by increasing udp_encap_needed_key for
v6 sockets in udp_tunnel_encap_enable(), and correspondingly
decrease udp_encap_needed_key in udpv6_destroy_sock().

v1-&gt;v2:
  - add udp_encap_disable() and export it.
v2-&gt;v3:
  - add the change for rxrpc and bareudp into one patch, as Alex
    suggested.
v3-&gt;v4:
  - move rxrpc part to another patch.

Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Antonio Quartulli &lt;antonio@openvpn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a4a600dd301ccde6ea239804ec1f19364a39d643 upstream.

When enabling encap for a ipv6 socket without udp_encap_needed_key
increased, UDP GRO won't work for v4 mapped v6 address packets as
sk will be NULL in udp4_gro_receive().

This patch is to enable it by increasing udp_encap_needed_key for
v6 sockets in udp_tunnel_encap_enable(), and correspondingly
decrease udp_encap_needed_key in udpv6_destroy_sock().

v1-&gt;v2:
  - add udp_encap_disable() and export it.
v2-&gt;v3:
  - add the change for rxrpc and bareudp into one patch, as Alex
    suggested.
v3-&gt;v4:
  - move rxrpc part to another patch.

Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Antonio Quartulli &lt;antonio@openvpn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: fix tunnel model fragmentation behavior</title>
<updated>2022-04-15T12:17:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lina Wang</name>
<email>lina.wang@mediatek.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-26T07:48:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=291efbad3d6e86c003031373895110230733dbf7'/>
<id>291efbad3d6e86c003031373895110230733dbf7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4ff2980b6bd2aa6b4ded3ce3b7c0ccfab29980af ]

in tunnel mode, if outer interface(ipv4) is less, it is easily to let
inner IPV6 mtu be less than 1280. If so, a Packet Too Big ICMPV6 message
is received. When send again, packets are fragmentized with 1280, they
are still rejected with ICMPV6(Packet Too Big) by xfrmi_xmit2().

According to RFC4213 Section3.2.2:
if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280
	if packet is larger than 1280 bytes
		Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU=1280
                Drop packet
        else
		Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment
                flag in the IPv4 header.  The resulting IPv4
                packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer
                on the encapsulator or by some router along
                the IPv4 path.
	endif
else
	if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20)
        	Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with
                MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20).
                Drop packet.
        else
                Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag
                in the IPv4 header.
        endif
endif
Packets should be fragmentized with ipv4 outer interface, so change it.

After it is fragemtized with ipv4, there will be double fragmenation.
No.48 &amp; No.51 are ipv6 fragment packets, No.48 is double fragmentized,
then tunneled with IPv4(No.49&amp; No.50), which obey spec. And received peer
cannot decrypt it rightly.

48              2002::10        2002::11 1296(length) IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50)
49   0x0000 (0) 2002::10        2002::11 1304         IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x7448042c nxt=44)
50   0x0000 (0) 2002::10        2002::11 200          ESP (SPI=0x00035000)
51              2002::10        2002::11 180          Echo (ping) request
52   0x56dc     2002::10        2002::11 248          IPv6 fragment (off=1232 more=n ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50)

xfrm6_noneed_fragment has fixed above issues. Finally, it acted like below:
1   0x6206 192.168.1.138   192.168.1.1 1316 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=Encap Security Payload 50, off=0, ID=6206) [Reassembled in #2]
2   0x6206 2002::10        2002::11    88   IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x1f440778 nxt=50)
3   0x0000 2002::10        2002::11    248  ICMPv6    Echo (ping) request

Signed-off-by: Lina Wang &lt;lina.wang@mediatek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4ff2980b6bd2aa6b4ded3ce3b7c0ccfab29980af ]

in tunnel mode, if outer interface(ipv4) is less, it is easily to let
inner IPV6 mtu be less than 1280. If so, a Packet Too Big ICMPV6 message
is received. When send again, packets are fragmentized with 1280, they
are still rejected with ICMPV6(Packet Too Big) by xfrmi_xmit2().

According to RFC4213 Section3.2.2:
if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280
	if packet is larger than 1280 bytes
		Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU=1280
                Drop packet
        else
		Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment
                flag in the IPv4 header.  The resulting IPv4
                packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer
                on the encapsulator or by some router along
                the IPv4 path.
	endif
else
	if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20)
        	Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with
                MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20).
                Drop packet.
        else
                Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag
                in the IPv4 header.
        endif
endif
Packets should be fragmentized with ipv4 outer interface, so change it.

After it is fragemtized with ipv4, there will be double fragmenation.
No.48 &amp; No.51 are ipv6 fragment packets, No.48 is double fragmentized,
then tunneled with IPv4(No.49&amp; No.50), which obey spec. And received peer
cannot decrypt it rightly.

48              2002::10        2002::11 1296(length) IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50)
49   0x0000 (0) 2002::10        2002::11 1304         IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x7448042c nxt=44)
50   0x0000 (0) 2002::10        2002::11 200          ESP (SPI=0x00035000)
51              2002::10        2002::11 180          Echo (ping) request
52   0x56dc     2002::10        2002::11 248          IPv6 fragment (off=1232 more=n ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50)

xfrm6_noneed_fragment has fixed above issues. Finally, it acted like below:
1   0x6206 192.168.1.138   192.168.1.1 1316 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=Encap Security Payload 50, off=0, ID=6206) [Reassembled in #2]
2   0x6206 2002::10        2002::11    88   IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x1f440778 nxt=50)
3   0x0000 2002::10        2002::11    248  ICMPv6    Echo (ping) request

Signed-off-by: Lina Wang &lt;lina.wang@mediatek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>esp: Fix possible buffer overflow in ESP transformation</title>
<updated>2022-03-28T06:46:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steffen Klassert</name>
<email>steffen.klassert@secunet.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-07T12:11:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fee4dfbda68ba10f3bbcf51c861d6aa32f08f9e4'/>
<id>fee4dfbda68ba10f3bbcf51c861d6aa32f08f9e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ebe48d368e97d007bfeb76fcb065d6cfc4c96645 upstream.

The maximum message size that can be send is bigger than
the  maximum site that skb_page_frag_refill can allocate.
So it is possible to write beyond the allocated buffer.

Fix this by doing a fallback to COW in that case.

v2:

Avoid get get_order() costs as suggested by Linus Torvalds.

Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Reported-by: valis &lt;sec@valis.email&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Rustagi &lt;vaibhavrustagi@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ebe48d368e97d007bfeb76fcb065d6cfc4c96645 upstream.

The maximum message size that can be send is bigger than
the  maximum site that skb_page_frag_refill can allocate.
So it is possible to write beyond the allocated buffer.

Fix this by doing a fallback to COW in that case.

v2:

Avoid get get_order() costs as suggested by Linus Torvalds.

Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Reported-by: valis &lt;sec@valis.email&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Rustagi &lt;vaibhavrustagi@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ipv6: fix skb_over_panic in __ip6_append_data</title>
<updated>2022-03-28T06:46:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tadeusz Struk</name>
<email>tadeusz.struk@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-10T23:25:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2774edd43ab1f1c0e81c353502ccd5df59bfaeae'/>
<id>2774edd43ab1f1c0e81c353502ccd5df59bfaeae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5e34af4142ffe68f01c8a9acae83300f8911e20c upstream.

Syzbot found a kernel bug in the ipv6 stack:
LINK: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=205d6f11d72329ab8d62a610c44c5e7e25415580
The reproducer triggers it by sending a crafted message via sendmmsg()
call, which triggers skb_over_panic, and crashes the kernel:

skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff84647fb4 len:65575 put:65575
head:ffff888109ff0000 data:ffff888109ff0088 tail:0x100af end:0xfec0
dev:&lt;NULL&gt;

Update the check that prevents an invalid packet with MTU equal
to the fregment header size to eat up all the space for payload.

The reproducer can be found here:
LINK: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&amp;x=1648c83fb00000

Reported-by: syzbot+e223cf47ec8ae183f2a0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk &lt;tadeusz.struk@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310232538.1044947-1-tadeusz.struk@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5e34af4142ffe68f01c8a9acae83300f8911e20c upstream.

Syzbot found a kernel bug in the ipv6 stack:
LINK: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=205d6f11d72329ab8d62a610c44c5e7e25415580
The reproducer triggers it by sending a crafted message via sendmmsg()
call, which triggers skb_over_panic, and crashes the kernel:

skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff84647fb4 len:65575 put:65575
head:ffff888109ff0000 data:ffff888109ff0088 tail:0x100af end:0xfec0
dev:&lt;NULL&gt;

Update the check that prevents an invalid packet with MTU equal
to the fregment header size to eat up all the space for payload.

The reproducer can be found here:
LINK: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&amp;x=1648c83fb00000

Reported-by: syzbot+e223cf47ec8ae183f2a0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk &lt;tadeusz.struk@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310232538.1044947-1-tadeusz.struk@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: prevent a possible race condition with lifetimes</title>
<updated>2022-03-16T12:21:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Niels Dossche</name>
<email>dossche.niels@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-23T13:19:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=090e73fb9ccebb74bd9578d1f27c1347121b0ffd'/>
<id>090e73fb9ccebb74bd9578d1f27c1347121b0ffd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6c0d8833a605e195ae219b5042577ce52bf71fff ]

valid_lft, prefered_lft and tstamp are always accessed under the lock
"lock" in other places. Reading these without taking the lock may result
in inconsistencies regarding the calculation of the valid and preferred
variables since decisions are taken on these fields for those variables.

Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche &lt;dossche.niels@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche &lt;niels.dossche@ugent.be&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220223131954.6570-1-niels.dossche@ugent.be
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6c0d8833a605e195ae219b5042577ce52bf71fff ]

valid_lft, prefered_lft and tstamp are always accessed under the lock
"lock" in other places. Reading these without taking the lock may result
in inconsistencies regarding the calculation of the valid and preferred
variables since decisions are taken on these fields for those variables.

Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche &lt;dossche.niels@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche &lt;niels.dossche@ugent.be&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220223131954.6570-1-niels.dossche@ugent.be
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
