<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv6, branch v4.4.201</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T19:01:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-02T16:38:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=31849614f85e7603f64d533b164d94c92e48e7c2'/>
<id>31849614f85e7603f64d533b164d94c92e48e7c2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3 ]

This began with a syzbot report. syzkaller was injecting
IPv6 TCP SYN packets having a v4mapped source address.

After an unsuccessful 4-tuple lookup, TCP creates a request
socket (SYN_RECV) and calls reqsk_queue_hash_req()

reqsk_queue_hash_req() calls sk_ehashfn(sk)

At this point we have AF_INET6 sockets, and the heuristic
used by sk_ehashfn() to either hash the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses
is to use ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_v6_daddr)

For the particular spoofed packet, we end up hashing V4 addresses
which were not initialized by the TCP IPv6 stack, so KMSAN fired
a warning.

I first fixed sk_ehashfn() to test both source and destination addresses,
but then faced various problems, including user-space programs
like packetdrill that had similar assumptions.

Instead of trying to fix the whole ecosystem, it is better
to admit that we have a dual stack behavior, and that we
can not build linux kernels without V4 stack anyway.

The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4
if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes
no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3 ]

This began with a syzbot report. syzkaller was injecting
IPv6 TCP SYN packets having a v4mapped source address.

After an unsuccessful 4-tuple lookup, TCP creates a request
socket (SYN_RECV) and calls reqsk_queue_hash_req()

reqsk_queue_hash_req() calls sk_ehashfn(sk)

At this point we have AF_INET6 sockets, and the heuristic
used by sk_ehashfn() to either hash the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses
is to use ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_v6_daddr)

For the particular spoofed packet, we end up hashing V4 addresses
which were not initialized by the TCP IPv6 stack, so KMSAN fired
a warning.

I first fixed sk_ehashfn() to test both source and destination addresses,
but then faced various problems, including user-space programs
like packetdrill that had similar assumptions.

Instead of trying to fix the whole ecosystem, it is better
to admit that we have a dual stack behavior, and that we
can not build linux kernels without V4 stack anyway.

The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4
if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes
no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Fix the link time qualifier of 'ping_v6_proc_exit_net()'</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T05:12:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe JAILLET</name>
<email>christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-10T11:29:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b2786ad2c1117f553ce3071c7d25f235c9708bff'/>
<id>b2786ad2c1117f553ce3071c7d25f235c9708bff</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d23dbc479a8e813db4161a695d67da0e36557846 ]

The '.exit' functions from 'pernet_operations' structure should be marked
as __net_exit, not __net_init.

Fixes: d862e5461423 ("net: ipv6: Implement /proc/net/icmp6.")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET &lt;christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d23dbc479a8e813db4161a695d67da0e36557846 ]

The '.exit' functions from 'pernet_operations' structure should be marked
as __net_exit, not __net_init.

Fixes: d862e5461423 ("net: ipv6: Implement /proc/net/icmp6.")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET &lt;christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash</title>
<updated>2019-09-06T08:18:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-27T23:11:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=66f8c5ff8ed3d99dd21d8f24aac89410de7a4a05'/>
<id>66f8c5ff8ed3d99dd21d8f24aac89410de7a4a05</id>
<content type='text'>
commit df453700e8d81b1bdafdf684365ee2b9431fb702 upstream.

According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.

Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.

It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas &lt;benny@pinkas.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit df453700e8d81b1bdafdf684365ee2b9431fb702 upstream.

According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.

Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.

It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas &lt;benny@pinkas.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:35:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-24T08:29:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ee2f25641633ffb03fb88e4fa8a6424d24d3f295'/>
<id>ee2f25641633ffb03fb88e4fa8a6424d24d3f295</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 99253eb750fda6a644d5188fb26c43bad8d5a745 ]

Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:

  ip_mroute_setsockopt() &amp; ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
  access/set raw_sk(sk)-&gt;ipmr_table before making sure the socket
  is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP

The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.

This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().

Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 99253eb750fda6a644d5188fb26c43bad8d5a745 ]

Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:

  ip_mroute_setsockopt() &amp; ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
  access/set raw_sk(sk)-&gt;ipmr_table before making sure the socket
  is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP

The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.

This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().

Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: flowlabel: fl6_sock_lookup() must use atomic_inc_not_zero</title>
<updated>2019-06-22T06:18:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-06T21:32:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1777c35e8d475cc86854543134343a1ca4b6922b'/>
<id>1777c35e8d475cc86854543134343a1ca4b6922b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 65a3c497c0e965a552008db8bc2653f62bc925a1 ]

Before taking a refcount, make sure the object is not already
scheduled for deletion.

Same fix is needed in ipv6_flowlabel_opt()

Fixes: 18367681a10b ("ipv6 flowlabel: Convert np-&gt;ipv6_fl_list to RCU.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 65a3c497c0e965a552008db8bc2653f62bc925a1 ]

Before taking a refcount, make sure the object is not already
scheduled for deletion.

Same fix is needed in ipv6_flowlabel_opt()

Fixes: 18367681a10b ("ipv6 flowlabel: Convert np-&gt;ipv6_fl_list to RCU.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Consider sk_bound_dev_if when binding a raw socket to an address</title>
<updated>2019-06-11T10:24:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Manning</name>
<email>mmanning@vyatta.att-mail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-20T18:57:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36a7222071d1a9ae2c0e633951ffc143c88b8025'/>
<id>36a7222071d1a9ae2c0e633951ffc143c88b8025</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 72f7cfab6f93a8ea825fab8ccfb016d064269f7f ]

IPv6 does not consider if the socket is bound to a device when binding
to an address. The result is that a socket can be bound to eth0 and
then bound to the address of eth1. If the device is a VRF, the result
is that a socket can only be bound to an address in the default VRF.

Resolve by considering the device if sk_bound_dev_if is set.

Signed-off-by: Mike Manning &lt;mmanning@vyatta.att-mail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 72f7cfab6f93a8ea825fab8ccfb016d064269f7f ]

IPv6 does not consider if the socket is bound to a device when binding
to an address. The result is that a socket can be bound to eth0 and
then bound to the address of eth1. If the device is a VRF, the result
is that a socket can only be bound to an address in the default VRF.

Resolve by considering the device if sk_bound_dev_if is set.

Signed-off-by: Mike Manning &lt;mmanning@vyatta.att-mail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm6_tunnel: Fix potential panic when unloading xfrm6_tunnel module</title>
<updated>2019-06-11T10:23:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Su Yanjun</name>
<email>suyj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-14T06:59:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8fd94b65d20737b979e7d3a66d5573b91b0a9bd2'/>
<id>8fd94b65d20737b979e7d3a66d5573b91b0a9bd2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6ee02a54ef990a71bf542b6f0a4e3321de9d9c66 ]

When unloading xfrm6_tunnel module, xfrm6_tunnel_fini directly
frees the xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem. Maybe someone has gotten the
xfrm6_tunnel_spi, so need to wait it.

Fixes: 91cc3bb0b04ff("xfrm6_tunnel: RCU conversion")
Signed-off-by: Su Yanjun &lt;suyj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6ee02a54ef990a71bf542b6f0a4e3321de9d9c66 ]

When unloading xfrm6_tunnel module, xfrm6_tunnel_fini directly
frees the xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem. Maybe someone has gotten the
xfrm6_tunnel_spi, so need to wait it.

Fixes: 91cc3bb0b04ff("xfrm6_tunnel: RCU conversion")
Signed-off-by: Su Yanjun &lt;suyj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vrf: sit mtu should not be updated when vrf netdev is the link</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:45:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Suryaputra</name>
<email>ssuryaextr@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-06T19:00:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6e36b31c1b07f928ecd5847591e665d3fb1ff90c'/>
<id>6e36b31c1b07f928ecd5847591e665d3fb1ff90c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ff6ab32bd4e073976e4d8797b4d514a172cfe6cb ]

VRF netdev mtu isn't typically set and have an mtu of 65536. When the
link of a tunnel is set, the tunnel mtu is changed from 1480 to the link
mtu minus tunnel header. In the case of VRF netdev is the link, then the
tunnel mtu becomes 65516. So, fix it by not setting the tunnel mtu in
this case.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra &lt;ssuryaextr@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ff6ab32bd4e073976e4d8797b4d514a172cfe6cb ]

VRF netdev mtu isn't typically set and have an mtu of 65536. When the
link of a tunnel is set, the tunnel mtu is changed from 1480 to the link
mtu minus tunnel header. In the case of VRF netdev is the link, then the
tunnel mtu becomes 65516. So, fix it by not setting the tunnel mtu in
this case.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra &lt;ssuryaextr@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: fix a potential deadlock in do_ipv6_setsockopt()</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:45:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>WANG Cong</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-20T06:35:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=faf458605614d2be3186c82e788640fa6aa3ce93'/>
<id>faf458605614d2be3186c82e788640fa6aa3ce93</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8651be8f14a12d24f203f283601d9b0418c389ff upstream.

Baozeng reported this deadlock case:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock([  165.136033] sk_lock-AF_INET6);
                               lock([  165.136033] rtnl_mutex);
                               lock([  165.136033] sk_lock-AF_INET6);
  lock([  165.136033] rtnl_mutex);

Similar to commit 87e9f0315952
("ipv4: fix a potential deadlock in mcast getsockopt() path")
this is due to we still have a case, ipv6_sock_mc_close(),
where we acquire sk_lock before rtnl_lock. Close this deadlock
with the similar solution, that is always acquire rtnl lock first.

Fixes: baf606d9c9b1 ("ipv4,ipv6: grab rtnl before locking the socket")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Zubin Mithra &lt;zsm@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8651be8f14a12d24f203f283601d9b0418c389ff upstream.

Baozeng reported this deadlock case:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock([  165.136033] sk_lock-AF_INET6);
                               lock([  165.136033] rtnl_mutex);
                               lock([  165.136033] sk_lock-AF_INET6);
  lock([  165.136033] rtnl_mutex);

Similar to commit 87e9f0315952
("ipv4: fix a potential deadlock in mcast getsockopt() path")
this is due to we still have a case, ipv6_sock_mc_close(),
where we acquire sk_lock before rtnl_lock. Close this deadlock
with the similar solution, that is always acquire rtnl lock first.

Fixes: baf606d9c9b1 ("ipv4,ipv6: grab rtnl before locking the socket")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Zubin Mithra &lt;zsm@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: invert flowlabel sharing check in process and user mode</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:44:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-25T16:06:54+00:00</published>
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[ Upstream commit 95c169251bf734aa555a1e8043e4d88ec97a04ec ]

A request for a flowlabel fails in process or user exclusive mode must
fail if the caller pid or uid does not match. Invert the test.

Previously, the test was unsafe wrt PID recycling, but indeed tested
for inequality: fl1-&gt;owner != fl-&gt;owner

Fixes: 4f82f45730c68 ("net ip6 flowlabel: Make owner a union of struct pid* and kuid_t")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit 95c169251bf734aa555a1e8043e4d88ec97a04ec ]

A request for a flowlabel fails in process or user exclusive mode must
fail if the caller pid or uid does not match. Invert the test.

Previously, the test was unsafe wrt PID recycling, but indeed tested
for inequality: fl1-&gt;owner != fl-&gt;owner

Fixes: 4f82f45730c68 ("net ip6 flowlabel: Make owner a union of struct pid* and kuid_t")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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