<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv6, branch v3.2.65</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tcp: be more strict before accepting ECN negociation</title>
<updated>2014-12-14T16:24:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-04T05:14:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=69cff65c8e35c2dc8763249e758ff55538809d27'/>
<id>69cff65c8e35c2dc8763249e758ff55538809d27</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bd14b1b2e29bd6812597f896dde06eaf7c6d2f24 upstream.

It appears some networks play bad games with the two bits reserved for
ECN. This can trigger false congestion notifications and very slow
transferts.

Since RFC 3168 (6.1.1) forbids SYN packets to carry CT bits, we can
disable TCP ECN negociation if it happens we receive mangled CT bits in
the SYN packet.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Perry Lorier &lt;perryl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Mathis &lt;mattmathis@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Wilmer van der Gaast &lt;wilmer@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ankur Jain &lt;jankur@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;therbert@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Täht &lt;dave.taht@bufferbloat.net&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bd14b1b2e29bd6812597f896dde06eaf7c6d2f24 upstream.

It appears some networks play bad games with the two bits reserved for
ECN. This can trigger false congestion notifications and very slow
transferts.

Since RFC 3168 (6.1.1) forbids SYN packets to carry CT bits, we can
disable TCP ECN negociation if it happens we receive mangled CT bits in
the SYN packet.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Perry Lorier &lt;perryl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Mathis &lt;mattmathis@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Wilmer van der Gaast &lt;wilmer@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ankur Jain &lt;jankur@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;therbert@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Täht &lt;dave.taht@bufferbloat.net&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: reuse ip6_frag_id from ip6_ufo_append_data</title>
<updated>2014-11-05T20:27:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-21T01:55:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8db33010af3020af7f4904b2dfffc9841ffc42e4'/>
<id>8db33010af3020af7f4904b2dfffc9841ffc42e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 916e4cf46d0204806c062c8c6c4d1f633852c5b6 upstream.

Currently we generate a new fragmentation id on UFO segmentation. It
is pretty hairy to identify the correct net namespace and dst there.
Especially tunnels use IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE and thus have no skb_dst
available at all.

This causes unreliable or very predictable ipv6 fragmentation id
generation while segmentation.

Luckily we already have pregenerated the ip6_frag_id in
ip6_ufo_append_data and can use it here.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 916e4cf46d0204806c062c8c6c4d1f633852c5b6 upstream.

Currently we generate a new fragmentation id on UFO segmentation. It
is pretty hairy to identify the correct net namespace and dst there.
Especially tunnels use IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE and thus have no skb_dst
available at all.

This causes unreliable or very predictable ipv6 fragmentation id
generation while segmentation.

Luckily we already have pregenerated the ip6_frag_id in
ip6_ufo_append_data and can use it here.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: reallocate addrconf router for ipv6 address when lo device up</title>
<updated>2014-11-05T20:27:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>chenweilong</name>
<email>chenweilong@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-06T08:18:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a0a8667a54a43250f962bf778c031c50c31e9142'/>
<id>a0a8667a54a43250f962bf778c031c50c31e9142</id>
<content type='text'>
It fix the bug 67951 on bugzilla
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67951

The patch can't be applied directly, as it' used the function introduced
by "commit 94e187c0" ip6_rt_put(), that patch can't be applied directly
either.

====================

From: Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;

commit 33d99113b1102c2d2f8603b9ba72d89d915c13f5 upstream.

This commit don't have a stable tag, but it fix the bug
no reply after loopback down-up.It's very worthy to be
applied to stable 3.4 kernels.

The bug is 67951 on bugzilla
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67951


CC: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
CC: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Reported-by: Weilong Chen &lt;chenweilong@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Weilong Chen &lt;chenweilong@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[weilong: s/ip6_rt_put/dst_release]
Signed-off-by: Chen Weilong &lt;chenweilong@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It fix the bug 67951 on bugzilla
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67951

The patch can't be applied directly, as it' used the function introduced
by "commit 94e187c0" ip6_rt_put(), that patch can't be applied directly
either.

====================

From: Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;

commit 33d99113b1102c2d2f8603b9ba72d89d915c13f5 upstream.

This commit don't have a stable tag, but it fix the bug
no reply after loopback down-up.It's very worthy to be
applied to stable 3.4 kernels.

The bug is 67951 on bugzilla
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67951


CC: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
CC: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Reported-by: Weilong Chen &lt;chenweilong@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Weilong Chen &lt;chenweilong@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[weilong: s/ip6_rt_put/dst_release]
Signed-off-by: Chen Weilong &lt;chenweilong@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip: make IP identifiers less predictable</title>
<updated>2014-09-13T22:41:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-26T06:58:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bf63acfdbf5c15e482a0b31043d666f3d3b1cf30'/>
<id>bf63acfdbf5c15e482a0b31043d666f3d3b1cf30</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75 ]

In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and
Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to
infer whether two machines are exchanging packets.

With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we
changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this
side-channel technique.

This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers
for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after
an idle period.

Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most
once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not
increase collision probability.

This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can
rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine.

We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash
on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be
used to infer information for other protocols.

For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr.

If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict.

21:57:11.008086 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64
21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64

21:57:12.013133 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64
21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64

21:57:13.016580 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64
21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64

[1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel &lt;jeffk@cs.unm.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall &lt;crandall@cs.unm.edu&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75 ]

In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and
Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to
infer whether two machines are exchanging packets.

With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we
changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this
side-channel technique.

This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers
for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after
an idle period.

Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most
once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not
increase collision probability.

This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can
rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine.

We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash
on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be
used to infer information for other protocols.

For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr.

If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict.

21:57:11.008086 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64
21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64

21:57:12.013133 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64
21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64

21:57:13.016580 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64
21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64

[1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel &lt;jeffk@cs.unm.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall &lt;crandall@cs.unm.edu&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count</title>
<updated>2014-09-13T22:41:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-02T12:26:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=64b5c251d5b2cee4a0f697bfb90d79263f6dd517'/>
<id>64b5c251d5b2cee4a0f697bfb90d79263f6dd517</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ]

Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP
generator.

linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge
cost on servers disabling MTU discovery.

1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes

2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs,
   with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load.

3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth
   is about 20.

4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of
   not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in
   the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id())

5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively.

IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect'

Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time,
so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of
fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments
with a recycled ID.

We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP
as a key.

ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it
belongs (it is only used from this file)

secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed.

Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid
unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ]

Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP
generator.

linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge
cost on servers disabling MTU discovery.

1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes

2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs,
   with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load.

3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth
   is about 20.

4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of
   not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in
   the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id())

5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively.

IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect'

Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time,
so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of
fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments
with a recycled ID.

We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP
as a key.

ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it
belongs (it is only used from this file)

secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed.

Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid
unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "net: ip, ipv6: handle gso skbs in forwarding path"</title>
<updated>2014-08-06T17:07:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-12T20:00:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3d4a1eea8aac05f347bbfbf41b9e2f8d6f116926'/>
<id>3d4a1eea8aac05f347bbfbf41b9e2f8d6f116926</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit caa5344994778a2b4725b2d75c74430f76925e4a, which
was commit fe6cc55f3a9a053482a76f5a6b2257cee51b4663 upstream.  In 3.2,
the transport header length is not calculated in the forwarding path,
so skb_gso_network_seglen() returns an incorrect result.  We also have
problems due to the local_df flag not being set correctly.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit caa5344994778a2b4725b2d75c74430f76925e4a, which
was commit fe6cc55f3a9a053482a76f5a6b2257cee51b4663 upstream.  In 3.2,
the transport header length is not calculated in the forwarding path,
so skb_gso_network_seglen() returns an incorrect result.  We also have
problems due to the local_df flag not being set correctly.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix inet_getid() and ipv6_select_ident() bugs</title>
<updated>2014-07-11T12:33:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-29T15:45:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bd89ed9b75277f5a16f91a2331539dd34a8cf852'/>
<id>bd89ed9b75277f5a16f91a2331539dd34a8cf852</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 39c36094d78c39e038c1e499b2364e13bce36f54 ]

I noticed we were sending wrong IPv4 ID in TCP flows when MTU discovery
is disabled.
Note how GSO/TSO packets do not have monotonically incrementing ID.

06:37:41.575531 IP (id 14227, proto: TCP (6), length: 4396)
06:37:41.575534 IP (id 14272, proto: TCP (6), length: 65212)
06:37:41.575544 IP (id 14312, proto: TCP (6), length: 57972)
06:37:41.575678 IP (id 14317, proto: TCP (6), length: 7292)
06:37:41.575683 IP (id 14361, proto: TCP (6), length: 63764)

It appears I introduced this bug in linux-3.1.

inet_getid() must return the old value of peer-&gt;ip_id_count,
not the new one.

Lets revert this part, and remove the prevention of
a null identification field in IPv6 Fragment Extension Header,
which is dubious and not even done properly.

Fixes: 87c48fa3b463 ("ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 39c36094d78c39e038c1e499b2364e13bce36f54 ]

I noticed we were sending wrong IPv4 ID in TCP flows when MTU discovery
is disabled.
Note how GSO/TSO packets do not have monotonically incrementing ID.

06:37:41.575531 IP (id 14227, proto: TCP (6), length: 4396)
06:37:41.575534 IP (id 14272, proto: TCP (6), length: 65212)
06:37:41.575544 IP (id 14312, proto: TCP (6), length: 57972)
06:37:41.575678 IP (id 14317, proto: TCP (6), length: 7292)
06:37:41.575683 IP (id 14361, proto: TCP (6), length: 63764)

It appears I introduced this bug in linux-3.1.

inet_getid() must return the old value of peer-&gt;ip_id_count,
not the new one.

Lets revert this part, and remove the prevention of
a null identification field in IPv6 Fragment Extension Header,
which is dubious and not even done properly.

Fixes: 87c48fa3b463 ("ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: tunnels - enable module autoloading</title>
<updated>2014-07-11T12:33:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Gundersen</name>
<email>teg@jklm.no</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-15T21:21:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=30080eb2ea49bff4101b0a3587ae26a590b32c54'/>
<id>30080eb2ea49bff4101b0a3587ae26a590b32c54</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f98f89a0104454f35a62d681683c844f6dbf4043 ]

Enable the module alias hookup to allow tunnel modules to be autoloaded on demand.

This is in line with how most other netdev kinds work, and will allow userspace
to create tunnels without having CAP_SYS_MODULE.

Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen &lt;teg@jklm.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f98f89a0104454f35a62d681683c844f6dbf4043 ]

Enable the module alias hookup to allow tunnel modules to be autoloaded on demand.

This is in line with how most other netdev kinds work, and will allow userspace
to create tunnels without having CAP_SYS_MODULE.

Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen &lt;teg@jklm.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Limit mtu to 65575 bytes</title>
<updated>2014-06-09T12:28:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-11T04:23:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5976aed862c07c698554edb89955f3f554a0921e'/>
<id>5976aed862c07c698554edb89955f3f554a0921e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 30f78d8ebf7f514801e71b88a10c948275168518 ]

Francois reported that setting big mtu on loopback device could prevent
tcp sessions making progress.

We do not support (yet ?) IPv6 Jumbograms and cook corrupted packets.

We must limit the IPv6 MTU to (65535 + 40) bytes in theory.

Tested:

ifconfig lo mtu 70000
netperf -H ::1

Before patch : Throughput :   0.05 Mbits

After patch : Throughput : 35484 Mbits

Reported-by: Francois WELLENREITER &lt;f.wellenreiter@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 30f78d8ebf7f514801e71b88a10c948275168518 ]

Francois reported that setting big mtu on loopback device could prevent
tcp sessions making progress.

We do not support (yet ?) IPv6 Jumbograms and cook corrupted packets.

We must limit the IPv6 MTU to (65535 + 40) bytes in theory.

Tested:

ifconfig lo mtu 70000
netperf -H ::1

Before patch : Throughput :   0.05 Mbits

After patch : Throughput : 35484 Mbits

Reported-by: Francois WELLENREITER &lt;f.wellenreiter@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: Can't fail and free after table replacement</title>
<updated>2014-06-09T12:28:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Graf</name>
<email>tgraf@suug.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-04T15:57:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a3bc0f8ea439762aa62d40a295157410498cbea7'/>
<id>a3bc0f8ea439762aa62d40a295157410498cbea7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c58dd2dd443c26d856a168db108a0cd11c285bf3 upstream.

All xtables variants suffer from the defect that the copy_to_user()
to copy the counters to user memory may fail after the table has
already been exchanged and thus exposed. Return an error at this
point will result in freeing the already exposed table. Any
subsequent packet processing will result in a kernel panic.

We can't copy the counters before exposing the new tables as we
want provide the counter state after the old table has been
unhooked. Therefore convert this into a silent error.

Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c58dd2dd443c26d856a168db108a0cd11c285bf3 upstream.

All xtables variants suffer from the defect that the copy_to_user()
to copy the counters to user memory may fail after the table has
already been exchanged and thus exposed. Return an error at this
point will result in freeing the already exposed table. Any
subsequent packet processing will result in a kernel panic.

We can't copy the counters before exposing the new tables as we
want provide the counter state after the old table has been
unhooked. Therefore convert this into a silent error.

Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
