<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv6, branch linux-4.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: dst_entries_init() per-net dst_ops</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Streetman</name>
<email>dan.streetman@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-29T13:51:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1bd631fc9a4515878c1bb7effd19335d2f2d87c2'/>
<id>1bd631fc9a4515878c1bb7effd19335d2f2d87c2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a8a572a6b5f2a79280d6e302cb3c1cb1fbaeb3e8 ]

Remove the dst_entries_init/destroy calls for xfrm4 and xfrm6 dst_ops
templates; their dst_entries counters will never be used.  Move the
xfrm dst_ops initialization from the common xfrm/xfrm_policy.c to
xfrm4/xfrm4_policy.c and xfrm6/xfrm6_policy.c, and call dst_entries_init
and dst_entries_destroy for each net namespace.

The ipv4 and ipv6 xfrms each create dst_ops template, and perform
dst_entries_init on the templates.  The template values are copied to each
net namespace's xfrm.xfrm*_dst_ops.  The problem there is the dst_ops
pcpuc_entries field is a percpu counter and cannot be used correctly by
simply copying it to another object.

The result of this is a very subtle bug; changes to the dst entries
counter from one net namespace may sometimes get applied to a different
net namespace dst entries counter.  This is because of how the percpu
counter works; it has a main count field as well as a pointer to the
percpu variables.  Each net namespace maintains its own main count
variable, but all point to one set of percpu variables.  When any net
namespace happens to change one of the percpu variables to outside its
small batch range, its count is moved to the net namespace's main count
variable.  So with multiple net namespaces operating concurrently, the
dst_ops entries counter can stray from the actual value that it should
be; if counts are consistently moved from one net namespace to another
(which my testing showed is likely), then one net namespace winds up
with a negative dst_ops count while another winds up with a continually
increasing count, eventually reaching its gc_thresh limit, which causes
all new traffic on the net namespace to fail with -ENOBUFS.

Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;dan.streetman@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a8a572a6b5f2a79280d6e302cb3c1cb1fbaeb3e8 ]

Remove the dst_entries_init/destroy calls for xfrm4 and xfrm6 dst_ops
templates; their dst_entries counters will never be used.  Move the
xfrm dst_ops initialization from the common xfrm/xfrm_policy.c to
xfrm4/xfrm4_policy.c and xfrm6/xfrm6_policy.c, and call dst_entries_init
and dst_entries_destroy for each net namespace.

The ipv4 and ipv6 xfrms each create dst_ops template, and perform
dst_entries_init on the templates.  The template values are copied to each
net namespace's xfrm.xfrm*_dst_ops.  The problem there is the dst_ops
pcpuc_entries field is a percpu counter and cannot be used correctly by
simply copying it to another object.

The result of this is a very subtle bug; changes to the dst entries
counter from one net namespace may sometimes get applied to a different
net namespace dst entries counter.  This is because of how the percpu
counter works; it has a main count field as well as a pointer to the
percpu variables.  Each net namespace maintains its own main count
variable, but all point to one set of percpu variables.  When any net
namespace happens to change one of the percpu variables to outside its
small batch range, its count is moved to the net namespace's main count
variable.  So with multiple net namespaces operating concurrently, the
dst_ops entries counter can stray from the actual value that it should
be; if counts are consistently moved from one net namespace to another
(which my testing showed is likely), then one net namespace winds up
with a negative dst_ops count while another winds up with a continually
increasing count, eventually reaching its gc_thresh limit, which causes
all new traffic on the net namespace to fail with -ENOBUFS.

Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;dan.streetman@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: update skb-&gt;csum when CE mark is propagated</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-15T12:56:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6553097608b5e4ae3f456a94511182349312dad3'/>
<id>6553097608b5e4ae3f456a94511182349312dad3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 34ae6a1aa0540f0f781dd265366036355fdc8930 ]

When a tunnel decapsulates the outer header, it has to comply
with RFC 6080 and eventually propagate CE mark into inner header.

It turns out IP6_ECN_set_ce() does not correctly update skb-&gt;csum
for CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packets, triggering infamous "hw csum failure"
messages and stack traces.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 34ae6a1aa0540f0f781dd265366036355fdc8930 ]

When a tunnel decapsulates the outer header, it has to comply
with RFC 6080 and eventually propagate CE mark into inner header.

It turns out IP6_ECN_set_ce() does not correctly update skb-&gt;csum
for CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packets, triggering infamous "hw csum failure"
messages and stack traces.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: disallow UFO for sockets with SO_NO_CHECK option</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Kubeček</name>
<email>mkubecek@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-11T06:50:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=84775578202e13a4f0973dc41f993ddab323fc23'/>
<id>84775578202e13a4f0973dc41f993ddab323fc23</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 40ba330227ad00b8c0cdf2f425736ff9549cc423 ]

Commit acf8dd0a9d0b ("udp: only allow UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM
sockets") disallows UFO for packets sent from raw sockets. We need to do
the same also for SOCK_DGRAM sockets with SO_NO_CHECK options, even if
for a bit different reason: while such socket would override the
CHECKSUM_PARTIAL set by ip_ufo_append_data(), gso_size is still set and
bad offloading flags warning is triggered in __skb_gso_segment().

In the IPv6 case, SO_NO_CHECK option is ignored but we need to disallow
UFO for packets sent by sockets with UDP_NO_CHECK6_TX option.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Shannon Nelson &lt;shannon.nelson@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 40ba330227ad00b8c0cdf2f425736ff9549cc423 ]

Commit acf8dd0a9d0b ("udp: only allow UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM
sockets") disallows UFO for packets sent from raw sockets. We need to do
the same also for SOCK_DGRAM sockets with SO_NO_CHECK options, even if
for a bit different reason: while such socket would override the
CHECKSUM_PARTIAL set by ip_ufo_append_data(), gso_size is still set and
bad offloading flags warning is triggered in __skb_gso_segment().

In the IPv6 case, SO_NO_CHECK option is ignored but we need to disallow
UFO for packets sent by sockets with UDP_NO_CHECK6_TX option.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Shannon Nelson &lt;shannon.nelson@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: tcp: add rcu locking in tcp_v6_send_synack()</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-08T17:35:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3999e028e05641149b3c47e1fb085debb6c4531f'/>
<id>3999e028e05641149b3c47e1fb085debb6c4531f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3e4006f0b86a5ae5eb0e8215f9a9e1db24506977 ]

When first SYNACK is sent, we already hold rcu_read_lock(), but this
is not true if a SYNACK is retransmitted, as a timer (soft) interrupt
does not hold rcu_read_lock()

Fixes: 45f6fad84cc30 ("ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np-&gt;opt")
Reported-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@codemonkey.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3e4006f0b86a5ae5eb0e8215f9a9e1db24506977 ]

When first SYNACK is sent, we already hold rcu_read_lock(), but this
is not true if a SYNACK is retransmitted, as a timer (soft) interrupt
does not hold rcu_read_lock()

Fixes: 45f6fad84cc30 ("ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np-&gt;opt")
Reported-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@codemonkey.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>addrconf: always initialize sysctl table data</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>WANG Cong</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-21T18:55:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cc72662587e40a6907326b9000182a6b6b166c43'/>
<id>cc72662587e40a6907326b9000182a6b6b166c43</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5449a5ca9bc27dd51a462de7ca0b1cd861cd2bd0 ]

When sysctl performs restrict writes, it allows to write from
a middle position of a sysctl file, which requires us to initialize
the table data before calling proc_dostring() for the write case.

Fixes: 3d1bec99320d ("ipv6: introduce secret_stable to ipv6_devconf")
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Tested-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5449a5ca9bc27dd51a462de7ca0b1cd861cd2bd0 ]

When sysctl performs restrict writes, it allows to write from
a middle position of a sysctl file, which requires us to initialize
the table data before calling proc_dostring() for the write case.

Fixes: 3d1bec99320d ("ipv6: introduce secret_stable to ipv6_devconf")
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Tested-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6/addrlabel: fix ip6addrlbl_get()</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>aryabinin@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-21T09:54:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cf918f00260aea19fb4d45142eb07cbd7999574f'/>
<id>cf918f00260aea19fb4d45142eb07cbd7999574f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e459dfeeb64008b2d23bdf600f03b3605dbb8152 ]

ip6addrlbl_get() has never worked. If ip6addrlbl_hold() succeeded,
ip6addrlbl_get() will exit with '-ESRCH'. If ip6addrlbl_hold() failed,
ip6addrlbl_get() will use about to be free ip6addrlbl_entry pointer.

Fix this by inverting ip6addrlbl_hold() check.

Fixes: 2a8cc6c89039 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Support RFC3484 configurable address selection policy table.")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e459dfeeb64008b2d23bdf600f03b3605dbb8152 ]

ip6addrlbl_get() has never worked. If ip6addrlbl_hold() succeeded,
ip6addrlbl_get() will exit with '-ESRCH'. If ip6addrlbl_hold() failed,
ip6addrlbl_get() will use about to be free ip6addrlbl_entry pointer.

Fix this by inverting ip6addrlbl_hold() check.

Fixes: 2a8cc6c89039 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Support RFC3484 configurable address selection policy table.")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: automatically enable stable privacy mode if stable_secret set</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-15T21:59:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5e31e634d98356bfde9b1057daf21da489274456'/>
<id>5e31e634d98356bfde9b1057daf21da489274456</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9b29c6962b70f232cde4076b1020191e1be0889d ]

Bjørn reported that while we switch all interfaces to privacy stable mode
when setting the secret, we don't set this mode for new interfaces. This
does not make sense, so change this behaviour.

Fixes: 622c81d57b392cc ("ipv6: generation of stable privacy addresses for link-local and autoconf")
Reported-by: Bjørn Mork &lt;bjorn@mork.no&gt;
Cc: Bjørn Mork &lt;bjorn@mork.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9b29c6962b70f232cde4076b1020191e1be0889d ]

Bjørn reported that while we switch all interfaces to privacy stable mode
when setting the secret, we don't set this mode for new interfaces. This
does not make sense, so change this behaviour.

Fixes: 622c81d57b392cc ("ipv6: generation of stable privacy addresses for link-local and autoconf")
Reported-by: Bjørn Mork &lt;bjorn@mork.no&gt;
Cc: Bjørn Mork &lt;bjorn@mork.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix IP early demux races</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-14T22:08:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7c15a1d61dd56273786b0799d4eaa940739c8d56'/>
<id>7c15a1d61dd56273786b0799d4eaa940739c8d56</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5037e9ef9454917b047f9f3a19b4dd179fbf7cd4 ]

David Wilder reported crashes caused by dst reuse.

&lt;quote David&gt;
  I am seeing a crash on a distro V4.2.3 kernel caused by a double
  release of a dst_entry.  In ipv4_dst_destroy() the call to
  list_empty() finds a poisoned next pointer, indicating the dst_entry
  has already been removed from the list and freed. The crash occurs
  18 to 24 hours into a run of a network stress exerciser.
&lt;/quote&gt;

Thanks to his detailed report and analysis, we were able to understand
the core issue.

IP early demux can associate a dst to skb, after a lookup in TCP/UDP
sockets.

When socket cache is not properly set, we want to store into
sk-&gt;sk_dst_cache the dst for future IP early demux lookups,
by acquiring a stable refcount on the dst.

Problem is this acquisition is simply using an atomic_inc(),
which works well, unless the dst was queued for destruction from
dst_release() noticing dst refcount went to zero, if DST_NOCACHE
was set on dst.

We need to make sure current refcount is not zero before incrementing
it, or risk double free as David reported.

This patch, being a stable candidate, adds two new helpers, and use
them only from IP early demux problematic paths.

It might be possible to merge in net-next skb_dst_force() and
skb_dst_force_safe(), but I prefer having the smallest patch for stable
kernels : Maybe some skb_dst_force() callers do not expect skb-&gt;dst
can suddenly be cleared.

Can probably be backported back to linux-3.6 kernels

Reported-by: David J. Wilder &lt;dwilder@us.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: David J. Wilder &lt;dwilder@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5037e9ef9454917b047f9f3a19b4dd179fbf7cd4 ]

David Wilder reported crashes caused by dst reuse.

&lt;quote David&gt;
  I am seeing a crash on a distro V4.2.3 kernel caused by a double
  release of a dst_entry.  In ipv4_dst_destroy() the call to
  list_empty() finds a poisoned next pointer, indicating the dst_entry
  has already been removed from the list and freed. The crash occurs
  18 to 24 hours into a run of a network stress exerciser.
&lt;/quote&gt;

Thanks to his detailed report and analysis, we were able to understand
the core issue.

IP early demux can associate a dst to skb, after a lookup in TCP/UDP
sockets.

When socket cache is not properly set, we want to store into
sk-&gt;sk_dst_cache the dst for future IP early demux lookups,
by acquiring a stable refcount on the dst.

Problem is this acquisition is simply using an atomic_inc(),
which works well, unless the dst was queued for destruction from
dst_release() noticing dst refcount went to zero, if DST_NOCACHE
was set on dst.

We need to make sure current refcount is not zero before incrementing
it, or risk double free as David reported.

This patch, being a stable candidate, adds two new helpers, and use
them only from IP early demux problematic paths.

It might be possible to merge in net-next skb_dst_force() and
skb_dst_force_safe(), but I prefer having the smallest patch for stable
kernels : Maybe some skb_dst_force() callers do not expect skb-&gt;dst
can suddenly be cleared.

Can probably be backported back to linux-3.6 kernels

Reported-by: David J. Wilder &lt;dwilder@us.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: David J. Wilder &lt;dwilder@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-14T21:03:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=14d44ee8fe6872c27d97ced4bd65420001c4b0ca'/>
<id>14d44ee8fe6872c27d97ced4bd65420001c4b0ca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 ]

郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:

	int socket_fd;
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	addr.sin_port = 0;
	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
	addr.sin_family = 10;

	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
	connect(socket_fd , &amp;addr,16);

AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.

This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.

kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db90e&gt;] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db9a4&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645069&gt;] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810ac51b&gt;] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810236d8&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645e0e&gt;] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81779515&gt;] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89

I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.

CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Reported-by: 郭永刚 &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 ]

郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:

	int socket_fd;
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	addr.sin_port = 0;
	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
	addr.sin_family = 10;

	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
	connect(socket_fd , &amp;addr,16);

AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.

This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.

kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db90e&gt;] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db9a4&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645069&gt;] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810ac51b&gt;] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810236d8&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645e0e&gt;] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81779515&gt;] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89

I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.

CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Reported-by: 郭永刚 &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: keep existing flags when setting IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bjørn Mork</name>
<email>bjorn@mork.no</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-04T13:15:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b15e8804446be2b8bf74b08a72db48a7d034e7f8'/>
<id>b15e8804446be2b8bf74b08a72db48a7d034e7f8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9a1ec4612c9bfc94d4185e3459055a37a685e575 ]

Commit 64236f3f3d74 ("ipv6: introduce IFA_F_STABLE_PRIVACY flag")
failed to update the setting of the IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC flag, causing
the IFA_F_STABLE_PRIVACY flag to be lost if IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC is set.

Cc: Erik Kline &lt;ek@google.com&gt;
Cc: Fernando Gont &lt;fgont@si6networks.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti &lt;lorenzo@google.com&gt;
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki/吉藤英明 &lt;hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Fixes: 64236f3f3d74 ("ipv6: introduce IFA_F_STABLE_PRIVACY flag")
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork &lt;bjorn@mork.no&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9a1ec4612c9bfc94d4185e3459055a37a685e575 ]

Commit 64236f3f3d74 ("ipv6: introduce IFA_F_STABLE_PRIVACY flag")
failed to update the setting of the IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC flag, causing
the IFA_F_STABLE_PRIVACY flag to be lost if IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC is set.

Cc: Erik Kline &lt;ek@google.com&gt;
Cc: Fernando Gont &lt;fgont@si6networks.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti &lt;lorenzo@google.com&gt;
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki/吉藤英明 &lt;hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Fixes: 64236f3f3d74 ("ipv6: introduce IFA_F_STABLE_PRIVACY flag")
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork &lt;bjorn@mork.no&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
