<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv6, branch linux-2.6.32.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ipv6/addrlabel: fix ip6addrlbl_get()</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>aryabinin@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-21T09:54:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5a7fbabb106b0ba1b30921537f2e5928e153bdf3'/>
<id>5a7fbabb106b0ba1b30921537f2e5928e153bdf3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e459dfeeb64008b2d23bdf600f03b3605dbb8152 upstream.

ip6addrlbl_get() has never worked. If ip6addrlbl_hold() succeeded,
ip6addrlbl_get() will exit with '-ESRCH'. If ip6addrlbl_hold() failed,
ip6addrlbl_get() will use about to be free ip6addrlbl_entry pointer.

Fix this by inverting ip6addrlbl_hold() check.

Fixes: 2a8cc6c89039 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Support RFC3484 configurable address selection policy table.")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 39b214ba1a357359f9c0be6ef8d21f2e5187567a)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e459dfeeb64008b2d23bdf600f03b3605dbb8152 upstream.

ip6addrlbl_get() has never worked. If ip6addrlbl_hold() succeeded,
ip6addrlbl_get() will exit with '-ESRCH'. If ip6addrlbl_hold() failed,
ip6addrlbl_get() will use about to be free ip6addrlbl_entry pointer.

Fix this by inverting ip6addrlbl_hold() check.

Fixes: 2a8cc6c89039 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Support RFC3484 configurable address selection policy table.")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 39b214ba1a357359f9c0be6ef8d21f2e5187567a)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-14T21:03:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=be9b6c294668e0686e8ac69f617c6c1963a91472'/>
<id>be9b6c294668e0686e8ac69f617c6c1963a91472</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 upstream.

é­æ°¸å reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:

	int socket_fd;
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	addr.sin_port = 0;
	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
	addr.sin_family = 10;

	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
	connect(socket_fd , &amp;addr,16);

AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.

This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.

kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db90e&gt;] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db9a4&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645069&gt;] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810ac51b&gt;] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810236d8&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645e0e&gt;] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81779515&gt;] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89

I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.

CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Reported-by: é­æ°¸å &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: open-code U8_MAX; adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 upstream.

é­æ°¸å reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:

	int socket_fd;
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	addr.sin_port = 0;
	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
	addr.sin_family = 10;

	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
	connect(socket_fd , &amp;addr,16);

AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.

This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.

kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db90e&gt;] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db9a4&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645069&gt;] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810ac51b&gt;] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810236d8&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645e0e&gt;] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81779515&gt;] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89

I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.

CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Reported-by: é­æ°¸å &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: open-code U8_MAX; adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffers</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-30T13:51:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5ccf7b4d5211c75460601b6d291b5f252ab2fca2'/>
<id>5ccf7b4d5211c75460601b6d291b5f252ab2fca2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 197c949e7798fbf28cfadc69d9ca0c2abbf93191 upstream.

Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.

In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
                                 msg-&gt;msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.

This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.

For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb-&gt;ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.

This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 18a6eba2eabbcb50a78210b16f7dd43d888a537b)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 197c949e7798fbf28cfadc69d9ca0c2abbf93191 upstream.

Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.

In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
                                 msg-&gt;msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.

This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.

For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb-&gt;ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.

This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 18a6eba2eabbcb50a78210b16f7dd43d888a537b)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "net: add length argument to skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec"</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-23T10:16:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d699b47f3c87c2fb30ed548ffacae85cebf2cafe'/>
<id>d699b47f3c87c2fb30ed548ffacae85cebf2cafe</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit c507639ba963bb47e3f515670a7cace76af76ab6.
As reported by Michal Kubecek, this fix doesn't handle truncated
reads correctly. Next patch from Eric fixes it better.

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit c507639ba963bb47e3f515670a7cace76af76ab6.
As reported by Michal Kubecek, this fix doesn't handle truncated
reads correctly. Next patch from Eric fixes it better.

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip6mr: call del_timer_sync() in ip6mr_free_table()</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>WANG Cong</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-31T18:01:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=977dc430a2b849161cb4018f568e403d724d2595'/>
<id>977dc430a2b849161cb4018f568e403d724d2595</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7ba0c47c34a1ea5bc7a24ca67309996cce0569b5 upstream.

We need to wait for the flying timers, since we
are going to free the mrtable right after it.

Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
[ wt: 2.6.32 has a single table hence a single timer. ip6_mr_init() has
  the same del_timer() call on the error path, but we don't need to
  change it since at this point the timer hasn't been started yet ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7ba0c47c34a1ea5bc7a24ca67309996cce0569b5 upstream.

We need to wait for the flying timers, since we
are going to free the mrtable right after it.

Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
[ wt: 2.6.32 has a single table hence a single timer. ip6_mr_init() has
  the same del_timer() call on the error path, but we don't need to
  change it since at this point the timer hasn't been started yet ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add length argument to skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec</title>
<updated>2015-12-05T23:49:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sabrina Dubroca</name>
<email>sd@queasysnail.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-15T12:25:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c507639ba963bb47e3f515670a7cace76af76ab6'/>
<id>c507639ba963bb47e3f515670a7cace76af76ab6</id>
<content type='text'>
Without this length argument, we can read past the end of the iovec in
memcpy_toiovec because we have no way of knowing the total length of the
iovec's buffers.

This is needed for stable kernels where 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb
csum races when peeking") has been backported but that don't have the
ioviter conversion, which is almost all the stable trees &lt;= 3.18.

This also fixes a kernel crash for NFS servers when the client uses
 -onfsvers=3,proto=udp to mount the export.

Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context in include/linux/skbuff.h]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 127500d724f8c43f452610c9080444eedb5eaa6c)

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Without this length argument, we can read past the end of the iovec in
memcpy_toiovec because we have no way of knowing the total length of the
iovec's buffers.

This is needed for stable kernels where 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb
csum races when peeking") has been backported but that don't have the
ioviter conversion, which is almost all the stable trees &lt;= 3.18.

This also fixes a kernel crash for NFS servers when the client uses
 -onfsvers=3,proto=udp to mount the export.

Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context in include/linux/skbuff.h]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 127500d724f8c43f452610c9080444eedb5eaa6c)

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it</title>
<updated>2015-12-05T23:49:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Leitner</name>
<email>mleitner@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-23T14:17:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=237dfc5b712719a8be1dd9d64726428981261759'/>
<id>237dfc5b712719a8be1dd9d64726428981261759</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac upstream.

Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.

If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)

The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.

Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;mleitner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32:
 - Add a strategy for the sysctl as we don't get a default strategy
 - Adjust context, spacing]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac upstream.

Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.

If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)

The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.

Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;mleitner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32:
 - Add a strategy for the sysctl as we don't get a default strategy
 - Adjust context, spacing]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Fix return of xfrm6_tunnel_rcv()</title>
<updated>2015-09-18T11:52:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2011-05-24T05:11:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9e0d75484e14aa5256cb364db0fb49a05f6b83e9'/>
<id>9e0d75484e14aa5256cb364db0fb49a05f6b83e9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6ac3f6649223d916bbdf1e823926f8f3b34b5d99 upstream.

Like ipv4, just return xfrm6_rcv_spi()'s return value directly.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6ac3f6649223d916bbdf1e823926f8f3b34b5d99 upstream.

Like ipv4, just return xfrm6_rcv_spi()'s return value directly.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums</title>
<updated>2015-09-18T11:51:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-30T16:16:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c570ec2f868e949c952e32d95966708ee5413b76'/>
<id>c570ec2f868e949c952e32d95966708ee5413b76</id>
<content type='text'>
commit beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0 upstream.

We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :

1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
   This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()

2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
   processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.

This patch is an attempt to make things better.

We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;

CVE-2015-5364
CVE-2015-5366

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0 upstream.

We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :

1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
   This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()

2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
   processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.

This patch is an attempt to make things better.

We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;

CVE-2015-5364
CVE-2015-5366

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: only allow UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM sockets</title>
<updated>2015-05-24T08:10:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal KubeÄek</name>
<email>mkubecek@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-02T17:27:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=65f26669f828edb1d964858236bef7ea18a7c816'/>
<id>65f26669f828edb1d964858236bef7ea18a7c816</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit acf8dd0a9d0b9e4cdb597c2f74802f79c699e802 ]

If an over-MTU UDP datagram is sent through a SOCK_RAW socket to a
UFO-capable device, ip_ufo_append_data() sets skb-&gt;ip_summed to
CHECKSUM_PARTIAL unconditionally as all GSO code assumes transport layer
checksum is to be computed on segmentation. However, in this case,
skb-&gt;csum_start and skb-&gt;csum_offset are never set as raw socket
transmit path bypasses udp_send_skb() where they are usually set. As a
result, driver may access invalid memory when trying to calculate the
checksum and store the result (as observed in virtio_net driver).

Moreover, the very idea of modifying the userspace provided UDP header
is IMHO against raw socket semantics (I wasn't able to find a document
clearly stating this or the opposite, though). And while allowing
CHECKSUM_NONE in the UFO case would be more efficient, it would be a bit
too intrusive change just to handle a corner case like this. Therefore
disallowing UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM seems to be the best option.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 332640b2821f75381b1049a904d93d4fb846334f)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit acf8dd0a9d0b9e4cdb597c2f74802f79c699e802 ]

If an over-MTU UDP datagram is sent through a SOCK_RAW socket to a
UFO-capable device, ip_ufo_append_data() sets skb-&gt;ip_summed to
CHECKSUM_PARTIAL unconditionally as all GSO code assumes transport layer
checksum is to be computed on segmentation. However, in this case,
skb-&gt;csum_start and skb-&gt;csum_offset are never set as raw socket
transmit path bypasses udp_send_skb() where they are usually set. As a
result, driver may access invalid memory when trying to calculate the
checksum and store the result (as observed in virtio_net driver).

Moreover, the very idea of modifying the userspace provided UDP header
is IMHO against raw socket semantics (I wasn't able to find a document
clearly stating this or the opposite, though). And while allowing
CHECKSUM_NONE in the UFO case would be more efficient, it would be a bit
too intrusive change just to handle a corner case like this. Therefore
disallowing UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM seems to be the best option.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 332640b2821f75381b1049a904d93d4fb846334f)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
