<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv4, branch v6.3.12</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: Linearize the skb after offloading if needed.</title>
<updated>2023-06-28T09:14:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-14T10:02:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3cb0d1406c41bdb7abedbc2ff090e373e754ac12'/>
<id>3cb0d1406c41bdb7abedbc2ff090e373e754ac12</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f015b900bc3285322029b4a7d132d6aeb0e51857 ]

With offloading enabled, esp_xmit() gets invoked very late, from within
validate_xmit_xfrm() which is after validate_xmit_skb() validates and
linearizes the skb if the underlying device does not support fragments.

esp_output_tail() may add a fragment to the skb while adding the auth
tag/ IV. Devices without the proper support will then send skb-&gt;data
points to with the correct length so the packet will have garbage at the
end. A pcap sniffer will claim that the proper data has been sent since
it parses the skb properly.

It is not affected with INET_ESP_OFFLOAD disabled.

Linearize the skb after offloading if the sending hardware requires it.
It was tested on v4, v6 has been adopted.

Fixes: 7785bba299a8d ("esp: Add a software GRO codepath")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f015b900bc3285322029b4a7d132d6aeb0e51857 ]

With offloading enabled, esp_xmit() gets invoked very late, from within
validate_xmit_xfrm() which is after validate_xmit_skb() validates and
linearizes the skb if the underlying device does not support fragments.

esp_output_tail() may add a fragment to the skb while adding the auth
tag/ IV. Devices without the proper support will then send skb-&gt;data
points to with the correct length so the packet will have garbage at the
end. A pcap sniffer will claim that the proper data has been sent since
it parses the skb properly.

It is not affected with INET_ESP_OFFLOAD disabled.

Linearize the skb after offloading if the sending hardware requires it.
It was tested on v4, v6 has been adopted.

Fixes: 7785bba299a8d ("esp: Add a software GRO codepath")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: fix inbound ipv4/udp/esp packets to UDPv6 dualstack sockets</title>
<updated>2023-06-28T09:14:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maciej Żenczykowski</name>
<email>maze@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-05T11:06:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=21ae0f8f1fec752c8224030a2a54d20df43662f4'/>
<id>21ae0f8f1fec752c8224030a2a54d20df43662f4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1166a530a84758bb9e6b448fc8c195ed413f5ded ]

Before Linux v5.8 an AF_INET6 SOCK_DGRAM (udp/udplite) socket
with SOL_UDP, UDP_ENCAP, UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP{,_NON_IKE} enabled
would just unconditionally use xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv(), afterwards
such a socket would use the newly added xfrm6_udp_encap_rcv()
which only handles IPv6 packets.

Cc: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Benedict Wong &lt;benedictwong@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yan Yan &lt;evitayan@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 0146dca70b87 ("xfrm: add support for UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@corigine.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1166a530a84758bb9e6b448fc8c195ed413f5ded ]

Before Linux v5.8 an AF_INET6 SOCK_DGRAM (udp/udplite) socket
with SOL_UDP, UDP_ENCAP, UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP{,_NON_IKE} enabled
would just unconditionally use xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv(), afterwards
such a socket would use the newly added xfrm6_udp_encap_rcv()
which only handles IPv6 packets.

Cc: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Benedict Wong &lt;benedictwong@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yan Yan &lt;evitayan@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 0146dca70b87 ("xfrm: add support for UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@corigine.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: gso: really support BIG TCP</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:16:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-05T16:16:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=679fed7e3b30e8ff8695983d3553d89b2b110059'/>
<id>679fed7e3b30e8ff8695983d3553d89b2b110059</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 82a01ab35bd02ba4b0b4e12bc95c5b69240eb7b0 ]

We missed that tcp_gso_segment() was assuming skb-&gt;len was smaller than 65535 :

oldlen = (u16)~skb-&gt;len;

This part came with commit 0718bcc09b35 ("[NET]: Fix CHECKSUM_HW GSO problems.")

This leads to wrong TCP checksum.

Adapt the code to accept arbitrary packet length.

v2:
  - use two csum_add() instead of csum_fold() (Alexander Duyck)
  - Change delta type to __wsum to reduce casts (Alexander Duyck)

Fixes: 09f3d1a3a52c ("ipv6/gso: remove temporary HBH/jumbo header")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexanderduyck@fb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@corigine.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230605161647.3624428-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 82a01ab35bd02ba4b0b4e12bc95c5b69240eb7b0 ]

We missed that tcp_gso_segment() was assuming skb-&gt;len was smaller than 65535 :

oldlen = (u16)~skb-&gt;len;

This part came with commit 0718bcc09b35 ("[NET]: Fix CHECKSUM_HW GSO problems.")

This leads to wrong TCP checksum.

Adapt the code to accept arbitrary packet length.

v2:
  - use two csum_add() instead of csum_fold() (Alexander Duyck)
  - Change delta type to __wsum to reduce casts (Alexander Duyck)

Fixes: 09f3d1a3a52c ("ipv6/gso: remove temporary HBH/jumbo header")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexanderduyck@fb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@corigine.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230605161647.3624428-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/ipv4: ping_group_range: allow GID from 2147483648 to 4294967294</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:16:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Akihiro Suda</name>
<email>suda.gitsendemail@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-01T03:13:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2c38ddb1b93663095dc79383c956a61355826765'/>
<id>2c38ddb1b93663095dc79383c956a61355826765</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e209fee4118fe9a449d4d805361eb2de6796be39 ]

With this commit, all the GIDs ("0 4294967294") can be written to the
"net.ipv4.ping_group_range" sysctl.

Note that 4294967295 (0xffffffff) is an invalid GID (see gid_valid() in
include/linux/uidgid.h), and an attempt to register this number will cause
-EINVAL.

Prior to this commit, only up to GID 2147483647 could be covered.
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst had "0 4294967295" as an example
value, but this example was wrong and causing -EINVAL.

Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Co-developed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda &lt;akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e209fee4118fe9a449d4d805361eb2de6796be39 ]

With this commit, all the GIDs ("0 4294967294") can be written to the
"net.ipv4.ping_group_range" sysctl.

Note that 4294967295 (0xffffffff) is an invalid GID (see gid_valid() in
include/linux/uidgid.h), and an attempt to register this number will cause
-EINVAL.

Prior to this commit, only up to GID 2147483647 could be covered.
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst had "0 4294967295" as an example
value, but this example was wrong and causing -EINVAL.

Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Co-developed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda &lt;akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix mishandling when the sack compression is deferred.</title>
<updated>2023-06-09T08:47:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>fuyuanli</name>
<email>fuyuanli@didiglobal.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-31T08:01:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b666755aabb34506feaf9d145c5b090a6b3e4e27'/>
<id>b666755aabb34506feaf9d145c5b090a6b3e4e27</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 30c6f0bf9579debce27e45fac34fdc97e46acacc ]

In this patch, we mainly try to handle sending a compressed ack
correctly if it's deferred.

Here are more details in the old logic:
When sack compression is triggered in the tcp_compressed_ack_kick(),
if the sock is owned by user, it will set TCP_DELACK_TIMER_DEFERRED
and then defer to the release cb phrase. Later once user releases
the sock, tcp_delack_timer_handler() should send a ack as expected,
which, however, cannot happen due to lack of ICSK_ACK_TIMER flag.
Therefore, the receiver would not sent an ack until the sender's
retransmission timeout. It definitely increases unnecessary latency.

Fixes: 5d9f4262b7ea ("tcp: add SACK compression")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: fuyuanli &lt;fuyuanli@didiglobal.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230529113804.GA20300@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000/
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230531080150.GA20424@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 30c6f0bf9579debce27e45fac34fdc97e46acacc ]

In this patch, we mainly try to handle sending a compressed ack
correctly if it's deferred.

Here are more details in the old logic:
When sack compression is triggered in the tcp_compressed_ack_kick(),
if the sock is owned by user, it will set TCP_DELACK_TIMER_DEFERRED
and then defer to the release cb phrase. Later once user releases
the sock, tcp_delack_timer_handler() should send a ack as expected,
which, however, cannot happen due to lack of ICSK_ACK_TIMER flag.
Therefore, the receiver would not sent an ack until the sender's
retransmission timeout. It definitely increases unnecessary latency.

Fixes: 5d9f4262b7ea ("tcp: add SACK compression")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: fuyuanli &lt;fuyuanli@didiglobal.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230529113804.GA20300@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000/
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230531080150.GA20424@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Return user_mss for TCP_MAXSEG in CLOSE/LISTEN state if user_mss set</title>
<updated>2023-06-09T08:47:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cambda Zhu</name>
<email>cambda@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-27T04:03:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=df04b09fce636a3e36834688ae8fdb36fe97770b'/>
<id>df04b09fce636a3e36834688ae8fdb36fe97770b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 34dfde4ad87b84d21278a7e19d92b5b2c68e6c4d ]

This patch replaces the tp-&gt;mss_cache check in getting TCP_MAXSEG
with tp-&gt;rx_opt.user_mss check for CLOSE/LISTEN sock. Since
tp-&gt;mss_cache is initialized with TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, checking if
it's zero is probably a bug.

With this change, getting TCP_MAXSEG before connecting will return
default MSS normally, and return user_mss if user_mss is set.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Jack Yang &lt;mingliang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89i+3kL9pYtkxkwxwNMzvC_w3LNUum_2=3u+UyLBmGmifHA@mail.gmail.com/#t
Signed-off-by: Cambda Zhu &lt;cambda@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/14D45862-36EA-4076-974C-EA67513C92F6@linux.alibaba.com/
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230527040317.68247-1-cambda@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 34dfde4ad87b84d21278a7e19d92b5b2c68e6c4d ]

This patch replaces the tp-&gt;mss_cache check in getting TCP_MAXSEG
with tp-&gt;rx_opt.user_mss check for CLOSE/LISTEN sock. Since
tp-&gt;mss_cache is initialized with TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, checking if
it's zero is probably a bug.

With this change, getting TCP_MAXSEG before connecting will return
default MSS normally, and return user_mss if user_mss is set.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Jack Yang &lt;mingliang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89i+3kL9pYtkxkwxwNMzvC_w3LNUum_2=3u+UyLBmGmifHA@mail.gmail.com/#t
Signed-off-by: Cambda Zhu &lt;cambda@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/14D45862-36EA-4076-974C-EA67513C92F6@linux.alibaba.com/
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230527040317.68247-1-cambda@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: deny tcp_disconnect() when threads are waiting</title>
<updated>2023-06-09T08:47:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-26T16:34:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=02364cd5e6e2db451bda084ea9f61d7e041cca14'/>
<id>02364cd5e6e2db451bda084ea9f61d7e041cca14</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4faeee0cf8a5d88d63cdbc3bab124fb0e6aed08c ]

Historically connect(AF_UNSPEC) has been abused by syzkaller
and other fuzzers to trigger various bugs.

A recent one triggers a divide-by-zero [1], and Paolo Abeni
was able to diagnose the issue.

tcp_recvmsg_locked() has tests about sk_state being not TCP_LISTEN
and TCP REPAIR mode being not used.

Then later if socket lock is released in sk_wait_data(),
another thread can call connect(AF_UNSPEC), then make this
socket a TCP listener.

When recvmsg() is resumed, it can eventually call tcp_cleanup_rbuf()
and attempt a divide by 0 in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() [1]

This patch adds a new socket field, counting number of threads
blocked in sk_wait_event() and inet_wait_for_connect().

If this counter is not zero, tcp_disconnect() returns an error.

This patch adds code in blocking socket system calls, thus should
not hurt performance of non blocking ones.

Note that we probably could revert commit 499350a5a6e7 ("tcp:
initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0") to restore
original tcpi_rcv_mss meaning (was 0 if no payload was ever
received on a socket)

[1]
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 13832 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00224-g00c7b5f4ddc5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023
RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x36e/0x9d0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:740
Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 64 24 48 8b 44 24 04 44 89 f9 41 81 c7 80 03 00 00 c1 e1 04 44 29 f0 48 63 c9 48 01 e9 48 0f af c1 &lt;49&gt; f7 f6 48 8d 04 41 48 89 44 24 40 48 8b 44 24 30 48 c1 e8 03 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900033af660 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 4a66b76cbade2c48 RBX: ffff888076640cc0 RCX: 00000000c334e4ac
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 00000000c324e86c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880766417f8
R13: ffff888028fbb980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000010344
FS: 00007f5bffbfe700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32f25000 CR3: 000000007ced0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x100e/0x22e0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2616
tcp_recvmsg+0x117/0x620 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2681
inet6_recvmsg+0x114/0x640 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:670
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1038
____sys_recvmsg+0x210/0x5a0 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg+0xf2/0x180 net/socket.c:2762
do_recvmmsg+0x25e/0x6e0 net/socket.c:2856
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x20f/0x260 net/socket.c:2951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f5c0108c0f9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f5bffbfe168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5c011ac050 RCX: 00007f5c0108c0f9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f5c010e7b39 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f5c012cfb1f R14: 00007f5bffbfe300 R15: 0000000000022000
&lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Reported-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Diagnosed-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526163458.2880232-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4faeee0cf8a5d88d63cdbc3bab124fb0e6aed08c ]

Historically connect(AF_UNSPEC) has been abused by syzkaller
and other fuzzers to trigger various bugs.

A recent one triggers a divide-by-zero [1], and Paolo Abeni
was able to diagnose the issue.

tcp_recvmsg_locked() has tests about sk_state being not TCP_LISTEN
and TCP REPAIR mode being not used.

Then later if socket lock is released in sk_wait_data(),
another thread can call connect(AF_UNSPEC), then make this
socket a TCP listener.

When recvmsg() is resumed, it can eventually call tcp_cleanup_rbuf()
and attempt a divide by 0 in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() [1]

This patch adds a new socket field, counting number of threads
blocked in sk_wait_event() and inet_wait_for_connect().

If this counter is not zero, tcp_disconnect() returns an error.

This patch adds code in blocking socket system calls, thus should
not hurt performance of non blocking ones.

Note that we probably could revert commit 499350a5a6e7 ("tcp:
initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0") to restore
original tcpi_rcv_mss meaning (was 0 if no payload was ever
received on a socket)

[1]
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 13832 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00224-g00c7b5f4ddc5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023
RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x36e/0x9d0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:740
Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 64 24 48 8b 44 24 04 44 89 f9 41 81 c7 80 03 00 00 c1 e1 04 44 29 f0 48 63 c9 48 01 e9 48 0f af c1 &lt;49&gt; f7 f6 48 8d 04 41 48 89 44 24 40 48 8b 44 24 30 48 c1 e8 03 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900033af660 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 4a66b76cbade2c48 RBX: ffff888076640cc0 RCX: 00000000c334e4ac
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 00000000c324e86c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880766417f8
R13: ffff888028fbb980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000010344
FS: 00007f5bffbfe700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32f25000 CR3: 000000007ced0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x100e/0x22e0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2616
tcp_recvmsg+0x117/0x620 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2681
inet6_recvmsg+0x114/0x640 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:670
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1038
____sys_recvmsg+0x210/0x5a0 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg+0xf2/0x180 net/socket.c:2762
do_recvmmsg+0x25e/0x6e0 net/socket.c:2856
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x20f/0x260 net/socket.c:2951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f5c0108c0f9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f5bffbfe168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5c011ac050 RCX: 00007f5c0108c0f9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f5c010e7b39 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f5c012cfb1f R14: 00007f5bffbfe300 R15: 0000000000022000
&lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Reported-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Diagnosed-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526163458.2880232-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, sockmap: Incorrectly handling copied_seq</title>
<updated>2023-06-05T07:29:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Fastabend</name>
<email>john.fastabend@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-23T02:56:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f9b4a0b537be7a6e5f002ca64b09dcca9c14e6ed'/>
<id>f9b4a0b537be7a6e5f002ca64b09dcca9c14e6ed</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e5c6de5fa025882babf89cecbed80acf49b987fa ]

The read_skb() logic is incrementing the tcp-&gt;copied_seq which is used for
among other things calculating how many outstanding bytes can be read by
the application. This results in application errors, if the application
does an ioctl(FIONREAD) we return zero because this is calculated from
the copied_seq value.

To fix this we move tcp-&gt;copied_seq accounting into the recv handler so
that we update these when the recvmsg() hook is called and data is in
fact copied into user buffers. This gives an accurate FIONREAD value
as expected and improves ACK handling. Before we were calling the
tcp_rcv_space_adjust() which would update 'number of bytes copied to
user in last RTT' which is wrong for programs returning SK_PASS. The
bytes are only copied to the user when recvmsg is handled.

Doing the fix for recvmsg is straightforward, but fixing redirect and
SK_DROP pkts is a bit tricker. Build a tcp_psock_eat() helper and then
call this from skmsg handlers. This fixes another issue where a broken
socket with a BPF program doing a resubmit could hang the receiver. This
happened because although read_skb() consumed the skb through sock_drop()
it did not update the copied_seq. Now if a single reccv socket is
redirecting to many sockets (for example for lb) the receiver sk will be
hung even though we might expect it to continue. The hang comes from
not updating the copied_seq numbers and memory pressure resulting from
that.

We have a slight layer problem of calling tcp_eat_skb even if its not
a TCP socket. To fix we could refactor and create per type receiver
handlers. I decided this is more work than we want in the fix and we
already have some small tweaks depending on caller that use the
helper skb_bpf_strparser(). So we extend that a bit and always set
the strparser bit when it is in use and then we can gate the
seq_copied updates on this.

Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-9-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e5c6de5fa025882babf89cecbed80acf49b987fa ]

The read_skb() logic is incrementing the tcp-&gt;copied_seq which is used for
among other things calculating how many outstanding bytes can be read by
the application. This results in application errors, if the application
does an ioctl(FIONREAD) we return zero because this is calculated from
the copied_seq value.

To fix this we move tcp-&gt;copied_seq accounting into the recv handler so
that we update these when the recvmsg() hook is called and data is in
fact copied into user buffers. This gives an accurate FIONREAD value
as expected and improves ACK handling. Before we were calling the
tcp_rcv_space_adjust() which would update 'number of bytes copied to
user in last RTT' which is wrong for programs returning SK_PASS. The
bytes are only copied to the user when recvmsg is handled.

Doing the fix for recvmsg is straightforward, but fixing redirect and
SK_DROP pkts is a bit tricker. Build a tcp_psock_eat() helper and then
call this from skmsg handlers. This fixes another issue where a broken
socket with a BPF program doing a resubmit could hang the receiver. This
happened because although read_skb() consumed the skb through sock_drop()
it did not update the copied_seq. Now if a single reccv socket is
redirecting to many sockets (for example for lb) the receiver sk will be
hung even though we might expect it to continue. The hang comes from
not updating the copied_seq numbers and memory pressure resulting from
that.

We have a slight layer problem of calling tcp_eat_skb even if its not
a TCP socket. To fix we could refactor and create per type receiver
handlers. I decided this is more work than we want in the fix and we
already have some small tweaks depending on caller that use the
helper skb_bpf_strparser(). So we extend that a bit and always set
the strparser bit when it is in use and then we can gate the
seq_copied updates on this.

Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-9-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, sockmap: TCP data stall on recv before accept</title>
<updated>2023-06-05T07:29:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Fastabend</name>
<email>john.fastabend@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-23T02:56:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8818b2229a15d16d9f8844e0ed51ea283d612b78'/>
<id>8818b2229a15d16d9f8844e0ed51ea283d612b78</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ea444185a6bf7da4dd0df1598ee953e4f7174858 ]

A common mechanism to put a TCP socket into the sockmap is to hook the
BPF_SOCK_OPS_{ACTIVE_PASSIVE}_ESTABLISHED_CB event with a BPF program
that can map the socket info to the correct BPF verdict parser. When
the user adds the socket to the map the psock is created and the new
ops are assigned to ensure the verdict program will 'see' the sk_buffs
as they arrive.

Part of this process hooks the sk_data_ready op with a BPF specific
handler to wake up the BPF verdict program when data is ready to read.
The logic is simple enough (posted here for easy reading)

 static void sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
 {
	struct socket *sock = sk-&gt;sk_socket;

	if (unlikely(!sock || !sock-&gt;ops || !sock-&gt;ops-&gt;read_skb))
		return;
	sock-&gt;ops-&gt;read_skb(sk, sk_psock_verdict_recv);
 }

The oversight here is sk-&gt;sk_socket is not assigned until the application
accepts() the new socket. However, its entirely ok for the peer application
to do a connect() followed immediately by sends. The socket on the receiver
is sitting on the backlog queue of the listening socket until its accepted
and the data is queued up. If the peer never accepts the socket or is slow
it will eventually hit data limits and rate limit the session. But,
important for BPF sockmap hooks when this data is received TCP stack does
the sk_data_ready() call but the read_skb() for this data is never called
because sk_socket is missing. The data sits on the sk_receive_queue.

Then once the socket is accepted if we never receive more data from the
peer there will be no further sk_data_ready calls and all the data
is still on the sk_receive_queue(). Then user calls recvmsg after accept()
and for TCP sockets in sockmap we use the tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser() handler.
The handler checks for data in the sk_msg ingress queue expecting that
the BPF program has already run from the sk_data_ready hook and enqueued
the data as needed. So we are stuck.

To fix do an unlikely check in recvmsg handler for data on the
sk_receive_queue and if it exists wake up data_ready. We have the sock
locked in both read_skb and recvmsg so should avoid having multiple
runners.

Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-7-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ea444185a6bf7da4dd0df1598ee953e4f7174858 ]

A common mechanism to put a TCP socket into the sockmap is to hook the
BPF_SOCK_OPS_{ACTIVE_PASSIVE}_ESTABLISHED_CB event with a BPF program
that can map the socket info to the correct BPF verdict parser. When
the user adds the socket to the map the psock is created and the new
ops are assigned to ensure the verdict program will 'see' the sk_buffs
as they arrive.

Part of this process hooks the sk_data_ready op with a BPF specific
handler to wake up the BPF verdict program when data is ready to read.
The logic is simple enough (posted here for easy reading)

 static void sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
 {
	struct socket *sock = sk-&gt;sk_socket;

	if (unlikely(!sock || !sock-&gt;ops || !sock-&gt;ops-&gt;read_skb))
		return;
	sock-&gt;ops-&gt;read_skb(sk, sk_psock_verdict_recv);
 }

The oversight here is sk-&gt;sk_socket is not assigned until the application
accepts() the new socket. However, its entirely ok for the peer application
to do a connect() followed immediately by sends. The socket on the receiver
is sitting on the backlog queue of the listening socket until its accepted
and the data is queued up. If the peer never accepts the socket or is slow
it will eventually hit data limits and rate limit the session. But,
important for BPF sockmap hooks when this data is received TCP stack does
the sk_data_ready() call but the read_skb() for this data is never called
because sk_socket is missing. The data sits on the sk_receive_queue.

Then once the socket is accepted if we never receive more data from the
peer there will be no further sk_data_ready calls and all the data
is still on the sk_receive_queue(). Then user calls recvmsg after accept()
and for TCP sockets in sockmap we use the tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser() handler.
The handler checks for data in the sk_msg ingress queue expecting that
the BPF program has already run from the sk_data_ready hook and enqueued
the data as needed. So we are stuck.

To fix do an unlikely check in recvmsg handler for data on the
sk_receive_queue and if it exists wake up data_ready. We have the sock
locked in both read_skb and recvmsg so should avoid having multiple
runners.

Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-7-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, sockmap: Handle fin correctly</title>
<updated>2023-06-05T07:29:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Fastabend</name>
<email>john.fastabend@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-23T02:56:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cc166415156d757918656dd07170502d07196be3'/>
<id>cc166415156d757918656dd07170502d07196be3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 901546fd8f9ca4b5c481ce00928ab425ce9aacc0 ]

The sockmap code is returning EAGAIN after a FIN packet is received and no
more data is on the receive queue. Correct behavior is to return 0 to the
user and the user can then close the socket. The EAGAIN causes many apps
to retry which masks the problem. Eventually the socket is evicted from
the sockmap because its released from sockmap sock free handling. The
issue creates a delay and can cause some errors on application side.

To fix this check on sk_msg_recvmsg side if length is zero and FIN flag
is set then set return to zero. A selftest will be added to check this
condition.

Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: William Findlay &lt;will@isovalent.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-6-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 901546fd8f9ca4b5c481ce00928ab425ce9aacc0 ]

The sockmap code is returning EAGAIN after a FIN packet is received and no
more data is on the receive queue. Correct behavior is to return 0 to the
user and the user can then close the socket. The EAGAIN causes many apps
to retry which masks the problem. Eventually the socket is evicted from
the sockmap because its released from sockmap sock free handling. The
issue creates a delay and can cause some errors on application side.

To fix this check on sk_msg_recvmsg side if length is zero and FIN flag
is set then set return to zero. A selftest will be added to check this
condition.

Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: William Findlay &lt;will@isovalent.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-6-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
