<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv4, branch v6.10</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>udp: Set SOCK_RCU_FREE earlier in udp_lib_get_port().</title>
<updated>2024-07-11T09:28:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-09T19:13:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5c0b485a8c6116516f33925b9ce5b6104a6eadfd'/>
<id>5c0b485a8c6116516f33925b9ce5b6104a6eadfd</id>
<content type='text'>
syzkaller triggered the warning [0] in udp_v4_early_demux().

In udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), we do not touch the refcount
of the looked-up sk and use sock_pfree() as skb-&gt;destructor, so we check
SOCK_RCU_FREE to ensure that the sk is safe to access during the RCU grace
period.

Currently, SOCK_RCU_FREE is flagged for a bound socket after being put
into the hash table.  Moreover, the SOCK_RCU_FREE check is done too early
in udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), so there could be a small race
window:

  CPU1                                 CPU2
  ----                                 ----
  udp_v4_early_demux()                 udp_lib_get_port()
  |                                    |- hlist_add_head_rcu()
  |- sk = __udp4_lib_demux_lookup()    |
  |- DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(sk_is_refcounted(sk));
                                       `- sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE)

We had the same bug in TCP and fixed it in commit 871019b22d1b ("net:
set SOCK_RCU_FREE before inserting socket into hashtable").

Let's apply the same fix for UDP.

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11198 at net/ipv4/udp.c:2599 udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 11198 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.9.0-g93bda33046e7 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Code: c5 7a 15 fe bb 01 00 00 00 44 89 e9 31 ff d3 e3 81 e3 bf ef ff ff 89 de e8 2c 74 15 fe 85 db 0f 85 02 06 00 00 e8 9f 7a 15 fe &lt;0f&gt; 0b e8 98 7a 15 fe 49 8d 7e 60 e8 4f 39 2f fe 49 c7 46 60 20 52
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ce3fa58 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8318c92c
RDX: ffff888036ccde00 RSI: ffffffff8318c2f1 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88805a2dd6e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0001ffffffffffff R12: ffff88805a2dd680
R13: 0000000000000007 R14: ffff88800923f900 R15: ffff88805456004e
FS:  00007fc449127640(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc449126e38 CR3: 000000003de4b002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0xbdd/0xd20 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:349
 ip_rcv_finish+0xda/0x150 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0x16c/0x180 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb3/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:5624
 __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:5738
 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5824 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb+0x271/0x300 net/core/dev.c:5884
 tun_rx_batched drivers/net/tun.c:1549 [inline]
 tun_get_user+0x24db/0x2c50 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
 tun_chr_write_iter+0x107/0x1a0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x76f/0x8d0 fs/read_write.c:590
 ksys_write+0xbf/0x190 fs/read_write.c:643
 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
 __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
 __x64_sys_write+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:652
 x64_sys_call+0xe66/0x1990 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fc44a68bc1f
Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 e9 cf f5 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 3c d0 f5 ff 48
RSP: 002b:00007fc449126c90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bc050 RCX: 00007fc44a68bc1f
RDX: 0000000000000032 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 00000000000000c8
RBP: 00000000004bc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000032 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fc44a5ec530 R15: 0000000000000000
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: 6acc9b432e67 ("bpf: Add helper to retrieve socket in BPF")
Reported-by: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240709191356.24010-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
syzkaller triggered the warning [0] in udp_v4_early_demux().

In udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), we do not touch the refcount
of the looked-up sk and use sock_pfree() as skb-&gt;destructor, so we check
SOCK_RCU_FREE to ensure that the sk is safe to access during the RCU grace
period.

Currently, SOCK_RCU_FREE is flagged for a bound socket after being put
into the hash table.  Moreover, the SOCK_RCU_FREE check is done too early
in udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), so there could be a small race
window:

  CPU1                                 CPU2
  ----                                 ----
  udp_v4_early_demux()                 udp_lib_get_port()
  |                                    |- hlist_add_head_rcu()
  |- sk = __udp4_lib_demux_lookup()    |
  |- DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(sk_is_refcounted(sk));
                                       `- sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE)

We had the same bug in TCP and fixed it in commit 871019b22d1b ("net:
set SOCK_RCU_FREE before inserting socket into hashtable").

Let's apply the same fix for UDP.

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11198 at net/ipv4/udp.c:2599 udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 11198 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.9.0-g93bda33046e7 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599
Code: c5 7a 15 fe bb 01 00 00 00 44 89 e9 31 ff d3 e3 81 e3 bf ef ff ff 89 de e8 2c 74 15 fe 85 db 0f 85 02 06 00 00 e8 9f 7a 15 fe &lt;0f&gt; 0b e8 98 7a 15 fe 49 8d 7e 60 e8 4f 39 2f fe 49 c7 46 60 20 52
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ce3fa58 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8318c92c
RDX: ffff888036ccde00 RSI: ffffffff8318c2f1 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88805a2dd6e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0001ffffffffffff R12: ffff88805a2dd680
R13: 0000000000000007 R14: ffff88800923f900 R15: ffff88805456004e
FS:  00007fc449127640(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc449126e38 CR3: 000000003de4b002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0xbdd/0xd20 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:349
 ip_rcv_finish+0xda/0x150 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0x16c/0x180 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb3/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:5624
 __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:5738
 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5824 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb+0x271/0x300 net/core/dev.c:5884
 tun_rx_batched drivers/net/tun.c:1549 [inline]
 tun_get_user+0x24db/0x2c50 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
 tun_chr_write_iter+0x107/0x1a0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x76f/0x8d0 fs/read_write.c:590
 ksys_write+0xbf/0x190 fs/read_write.c:643
 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
 __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
 __x64_sys_write+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:652
 x64_sys_call+0xe66/0x1990 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fc44a68bc1f
Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 e9 cf f5 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 3c d0 f5 ff 48
RSP: 002b:00007fc449126c90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bc050 RCX: 00007fc44a68bc1f
RDX: 0000000000000032 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 00000000000000c8
RBP: 00000000004bc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000032 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fc44a5ec530 R15: 0000000000000000
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: 6acc9b432e67 ("bpf: Add helper to retrieve socket in BPF")
Reported-by: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240709191356.24010-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: avoid too many retransmit packets</title>
<updated>2024-07-11T02:05:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-10T00:14:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=97a9063518f198ec0adb2ecb89789de342bb8283'/>
<id>97a9063518f198ec0adb2ecb89789de342bb8283</id>
<content type='text'>
If a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer
retracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can
retransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000),
for about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has 'expired'.

The fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes
icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout into account.

Before blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after
icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential
backoff for the retransmits.

Also worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 ("net: tcp:
fix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0"), the issue
would last 2 minutes instead of 4.

Fixes: b701a99e431d ("tcp: Add tcp_clamp_rto_to_user_timeout() helper to improve accuracy")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jon Maxwell &lt;jmaxwell37@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240710001402.2758273-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer
retracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can
retransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000),
for about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has 'expired'.

The fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes
icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout into account.

Before blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after
icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential
backoff for the retransmits.

Also worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 ("net: tcp:
fix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0"), the issue
would last 2 minutes instead of 4.

Fixes: b701a99e431d ("tcp: Add tcp_clamp_rto_to_user_timeout() helper to improve accuracy")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jon Maxwell &lt;jmaxwell37@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240710001402.2758273-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix incorrect undo caused by DSACK of TLP retransmit</title>
<updated>2024-07-06T01:03:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neal Cardwell</name>
<email>ncardwell@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-03T17:12:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0ec986ed7bab6801faed1440e8839dcc710331ff'/>
<id>0ec986ed7bab6801faed1440e8839dcc710331ff</id>
<content type='text'>
Loss recovery undo_retrans bookkeeping had a long-standing bug where a
DSACK from a spurious TLP retransmit packet could cause an erroneous
undo of a fast recovery or RTO recovery that repaired a single
really-lost packet (in a sequence range outside that of the TLP
retransmit). Basically, because the loss recovery state machine didn't
account for the fact that it sent a TLP retransmit, the DSACK for the
TLP retransmit could erroneously be implicitly be interpreted as
corresponding to the normal fast recovery or RTO recovery retransmit
that plugged a real hole, thus resulting in an improper undo.

For example, consider the following buggy scenario where there is a
real packet loss but the congestion control response is improperly
undone because of this bug:

+ send packets P1, P2, P3, P4
+ P1 is really lost
+ send TLP retransmit of P4
+ receive SACK for original P2, P3, P4
+ enter fast recovery, fast-retransmit P1, increment undo_retrans to 1
+ receive DSACK for TLP P4, decrement undo_retrans to 0, undo (bug!)
+ receive cumulative ACK for P1-P4 (fast retransmit plugged real hole)

The fix: when we initialize undo machinery in tcp_init_undo(), if
there is a TLP retransmit in flight, then increment tp-&gt;undo_retrans
so that we make sure that we receive a DSACK corresponding to the TLP
retransmit, as well as DSACKs for all later normal retransmits, before
triggering a loss recovery undo. Note that we also have to move the
line that clears tp-&gt;tlp_high_seq for RTO recovery, so that upon RTO
we remember the tp-&gt;tlp_high_seq value until tcp_init_undo() and clear
it only afterward.

Also note that the bug dates back to the original 2013 TLP
implementation, commit 6ba8a3b19e76 ("tcp: Tail loss probe (TLP)").

However, this patch will only compile and work correctly with kernels
that have tp-&gt;tlp_retrans, which was added only in v5.8 in 2020 in
commit 76be93fc0702 ("tcp: allow at most one TLP probe per flight").
So we associate this fix with that later commit.

Fixes: 76be93fc0702 ("tcp: allow at most one TLP probe per flight")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kevin Yang &lt;yyd@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703171246.1739561-1-ncardwell.sw@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Loss recovery undo_retrans bookkeeping had a long-standing bug where a
DSACK from a spurious TLP retransmit packet could cause an erroneous
undo of a fast recovery or RTO recovery that repaired a single
really-lost packet (in a sequence range outside that of the TLP
retransmit). Basically, because the loss recovery state machine didn't
account for the fact that it sent a TLP retransmit, the DSACK for the
TLP retransmit could erroneously be implicitly be interpreted as
corresponding to the normal fast recovery or RTO recovery retransmit
that plugged a real hole, thus resulting in an improper undo.

For example, consider the following buggy scenario where there is a
real packet loss but the congestion control response is improperly
undone because of this bug:

+ send packets P1, P2, P3, P4
+ P1 is really lost
+ send TLP retransmit of P4
+ receive SACK for original P2, P3, P4
+ enter fast recovery, fast-retransmit P1, increment undo_retrans to 1
+ receive DSACK for TLP P4, decrement undo_retrans to 0, undo (bug!)
+ receive cumulative ACK for P1-P4 (fast retransmit plugged real hole)

The fix: when we initialize undo machinery in tcp_init_undo(), if
there is a TLP retransmit in flight, then increment tp-&gt;undo_retrans
so that we make sure that we receive a DSACK corresponding to the TLP
retransmit, as well as DSACKs for all later normal retransmits, before
triggering a loss recovery undo. Note that we also have to move the
line that clears tp-&gt;tlp_high_seq for RTO recovery, so that upon RTO
we remember the tp-&gt;tlp_high_seq value until tcp_init_undo() and clear
it only afterward.

Also note that the bug dates back to the original 2013 TLP
implementation, commit 6ba8a3b19e76 ("tcp: Tail loss probe (TLP)").

However, this patch will only compile and work correctly with kernels
that have tp-&gt;tlp_retrans, which was added only in v5.8 in 2020 in
commit 76be93fc0702 ("tcp: allow at most one TLP probe per flight").
So we associate this fix with that later commit.

Fixes: 76be93fc0702 ("tcp: allow at most one TLP probe per flight")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kevin Yang &lt;yyd@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703171246.1739561-1-ncardwell.sw@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet_diag: Initialize pad field in struct inet_diag_req_v2</title>
<updated>2024-07-04T13:25:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shigeru Yoshida</name>
<email>syoshida@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-03T09:16:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=61cf1c739f08190a4cbf047b9fbb192a94d87e3f'/>
<id>61cf1c739f08190a4cbf047b9fbb192a94d87e3f</id>
<content type='text'>
KMSAN reported uninit-value access in raw_lookup() [1]. Diag for raw
sockets uses the pad field in struct inet_diag_req_v2 for the
underlying protocol. This field corresponds to the sdiag_raw_protocol
field in struct inet_diag_req_raw.

inet_diag_get_exact_compat() converts inet_diag_req to
inet_diag_req_v2, but leaves the pad field uninitialized. So the issue
occurs when raw_lookup() accesses the sdiag_raw_protocol field.

Fix this by initializing the pad field in
inet_diag_get_exact_compat(). Also, do the same fix in
inet_diag_dump_compat() to avoid the similar issue in the future.

[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
 raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
 raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
 raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
 inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
 inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
 inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
 sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
 netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
 x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 raw_sock_get+0x650/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
 raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
 inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
 inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
 inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
 sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
 netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
 x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Local variable req.i created at:
 inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1396 [inline]
 inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x2a6/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282

CPU: 1 PID: 8888 Comm: syz-executor.6 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-00217-g35bb670d65fc #32
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014

Fixes: 432490f9d455 ("net: ip, diag -- Add diag interface for raw sockets")
Reported-by: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida &lt;syoshida@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703091649.111773-1-syoshida@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
KMSAN reported uninit-value access in raw_lookup() [1]. Diag for raw
sockets uses the pad field in struct inet_diag_req_v2 for the
underlying protocol. This field corresponds to the sdiag_raw_protocol
field in struct inet_diag_req_raw.

inet_diag_get_exact_compat() converts inet_diag_req to
inet_diag_req_v2, but leaves the pad field uninitialized. So the issue
occurs when raw_lookup() accesses the sdiag_raw_protocol field.

Fix this by initializing the pad field in
inet_diag_get_exact_compat(). Also, do the same fix in
inet_diag_dump_compat() to avoid the similar issue in the future.

[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
 raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
 raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
 raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
 inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
 inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
 inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
 sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
 netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
 x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 raw_sock_get+0x650/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
 raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
 inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
 inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
 inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
 sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
 netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
 x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Local variable req.i created at:
 inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1396 [inline]
 inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x2a6/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282

CPU: 1 PID: 8888 Comm: syz-executor.6 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-00217-g35bb670d65fc #32
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014

Fixes: 432490f9d455 ("net: ip, diag -- Add diag interface for raw sockets")
Reported-by: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida &lt;syoshida@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703091649.111773-1-syoshida@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Don't flag tcp_sk(sk)-&gt;rx_opt.saw_unknown for TCP AO.</title>
<updated>2024-07-04T09:56:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-03T03:35:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4b74726c01b7a0b5e1029e1e9247fd81590da726'/>
<id>4b74726c01b7a0b5e1029e1e9247fd81590da726</id>
<content type='text'>
When we process segments with TCP AO, we don't check it in
tcp_parse_options().  Thus, opt_rx-&gt;saw_unknown is set to 1,
which unconditionally triggers the BPF TCP option parser.

Let's avoid the unnecessary BPF invocation.

Fixes: 0a3a809089eb ("net/tcp: Verify inbound TCP-AO signed segments")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703033508.6321-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When we process segments with TCP AO, we don't check it in
tcp_parse_options().  Thus, opt_rx-&gt;saw_unknown is set to 1,
which unconditionally triggers the BPF TCP option parser.

Let's avoid the unnecessary BPF invocation.

Fixes: 0a3a809089eb ("net/tcp: Verify inbound TCP-AO signed segments")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703033508.6321-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp_metrics: validate source addr length</title>
<updated>2024-07-01T08:40:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-27T21:25:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=66be40e622e177316ae81717aa30057ba9e61dff'/>
<id>66be40e622e177316ae81717aa30057ba9e61dff</id>
<content type='text'>
I don't see anything checking that TCP_METRICS_ATTR_SADDR_IPV4
is at least 4 bytes long, and the policy doesn't have an entry
for this attribute at all (neither does it for IPv6 but v6 is
manually validated).

Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 3e7013ddf55a ("tcp: metrics: Allow selective get/del of tcp-metrics based on src IP")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
I don't see anything checking that TCP_METRICS_ATTR_SADDR_IPV4
is at least 4 bytes long, and the policy doesn't have an entry
for this attribute at all (neither does it for IPv6 but v6 is
manually validated).

Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 3e7013ddf55a ("tcp: metrics: Allow selective get/del of tcp-metrics based on src IP")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>UPSTREAM: tcp: fix DSACK undo in fast recovery to call tcp_try_to_open()</title>
<updated>2024-06-28T09:28:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neal Cardwell</name>
<email>ncardwell@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-27T02:42:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a6458ab7fd4f427d4f6f54380453ad255b7fde83'/>
<id>a6458ab7fd4f427d4f6f54380453ad255b7fde83</id>
<content type='text'>
In some production workloads we noticed that connections could
sometimes close extremely prematurely with ETIMEDOUT after
transmitting only 1 TLP and RTO retransmission (when we would normally
expect roughly tcp_retries2 = TCP_RETR2 = 15 RTOs before a connection
closes with ETIMEDOUT).

From tracing we determined that these workloads can suffer from a
scenario where in fast recovery, after some retransmits, a DSACK undo
can happen at a point where the scoreboard is totally clear (we have
retrans_out == sacked_out == lost_out == 0). In such cases, calling
tcp_try_keep_open() means that we do not execute any code path that
clears tp-&gt;retrans_stamp to 0. That means that tp-&gt;retrans_stamp can
remain erroneously set to the start time of the undone fast recovery,
even after the fast recovery is undone. If minutes or hours elapse,
and then a TLP/RTO/RTO sequence occurs, then the start_ts value in
retransmits_timed_out() (which is from tp-&gt;retrans_stamp) will be
erroneously ancient (left over from the fast recovery undone via
DSACKs). Thus this ancient tp-&gt;retrans_stamp value can cause the
connection to die very prematurely with ETIMEDOUT via
tcp_write_err().

The fix: we change DSACK undo in fast recovery (TCP_CA_Recovery) to
call tcp_try_to_open() instead of tcp_try_keep_open(). This ensures
that if no retransmits are in flight at the time of DSACK undo in fast
recovery then we properly zero retrans_stamp. Note that calling
tcp_try_to_open() is more consistent with other loss recovery
behavior, since normal fast recovery (CA_Recovery) and RTO recovery
(CA_Loss) both normally end when tp-&gt;snd_una meets or exceeds
tp-&gt;high_seq and then in tcp_fastretrans_alert() the "default" switch
case executes tcp_try_to_open(). Also note that by inspection this
change to call tcp_try_to_open() implies at least one other nice bug
fix, where now an ECE-marked DSACK that causes an undo will properly
invoke tcp_enter_cwr() rather than ignoring the ECE mark.

Fixes: c7d9d6a185a7 ("tcp: undo on DSACK during recovery")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In some production workloads we noticed that connections could
sometimes close extremely prematurely with ETIMEDOUT after
transmitting only 1 TLP and RTO retransmission (when we would normally
expect roughly tcp_retries2 = TCP_RETR2 = 15 RTOs before a connection
closes with ETIMEDOUT).

From tracing we determined that these workloads can suffer from a
scenario where in fast recovery, after some retransmits, a DSACK undo
can happen at a point where the scoreboard is totally clear (we have
retrans_out == sacked_out == lost_out == 0). In such cases, calling
tcp_try_keep_open() means that we do not execute any code path that
clears tp-&gt;retrans_stamp to 0. That means that tp-&gt;retrans_stamp can
remain erroneously set to the start time of the undone fast recovery,
even after the fast recovery is undone. If minutes or hours elapse,
and then a TLP/RTO/RTO sequence occurs, then the start_ts value in
retransmits_timed_out() (which is from tp-&gt;retrans_stamp) will be
erroneously ancient (left over from the fast recovery undone via
DSACKs). Thus this ancient tp-&gt;retrans_stamp value can cause the
connection to die very prematurely with ETIMEDOUT via
tcp_write_err().

The fix: we change DSACK undo in fast recovery (TCP_CA_Recovery) to
call tcp_try_to_open() instead of tcp_try_keep_open(). This ensures
that if no retransmits are in flight at the time of DSACK undo in fast
recovery then we properly zero retrans_stamp. Note that calling
tcp_try_to_open() is more consistent with other loss recovery
behavior, since normal fast recovery (CA_Recovery) and RTO recovery
(CA_Loss) both normally end when tp-&gt;snd_una meets or exceeds
tp-&gt;high_seq and then in tcp_fastretrans_alert() the "default" switch
case executes tcp_try_to_open(). Also note that by inspection this
change to call tcp_try_to_open() implies at least one other nice bug
fix, where now an ECE-marked DSACK that causes an undo will properly
invoke tcp_enter_cwr() rather than ignoring the ECE mark.

Fixes: c7d9d6a185a7 ("tcp: undo on DSACK during recovery")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() to enter TCP_CA_Loss for failed TFO</title>
<updated>2024-06-26T00:22:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neal Cardwell</name>
<email>ncardwell@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-24T14:43:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5dfe9d273932c647bdc9d664f939af9a5a398cbc'/>
<id>5dfe9d273932c647bdc9d664f939af9a5a398cbc</id>
<content type='text'>
Testing determined that the recent commit 9e046bb111f1 ("tcp: clear
tp-&gt;retrans_stamp in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack()") has a race, and does
not always ensure retrans_stamp is 0 after a TFO payload retransmit.

If transmit completion for the SYN+data skb happens after the client
TCP stack receives the SYNACK (which sometimes happens), then
retrans_stamp can erroneously remain non-zero for the lifetime of the
connection, causing a premature ETIMEDOUT later.

Testing and tracing showed that the buggy scenario is the following
somewhat tricky sequence:

+ Client attempts a TFO handshake. tcp_send_syn_data() sends SYN + TFO
  cookie + data in a single packet in the syn_data skb. It hands the
  syn_data skb to tcp_transmit_skb(), which makes a clone. Crucially,
  it then reuses the same original (non-clone) syn_data skb,
  transforming it by advancing the seq by one byte and removing the
  FIN bit, and enques the resulting payload-only skb in the
  sk-&gt;tcp_rtx_queue.

+ Client sets retrans_stamp to the start time of the three-way
  handshake.

+ Cookie mismatches or server has TFO disabled, and server only ACKs
  SYN.

+ tcp_ack() sees SYN is acked, tcp_clean_rtx_queue() clears
  retrans_stamp.

+ Since the client SYN was acked but not the payload, the TFO failure
  code path in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() tries to retransmit the
  payload skb.  However, in some cases the transmit completion for the
  clone of the syn_data (which had SYN + TFO cookie + data) hasn't
  happened.  In those cases, skb_still_in_host_queue() returns true
  for the retransmitted TFO payload, because the clone of the syn_data
  skb has not had its tx completetion.

+ Because skb_still_in_host_queue() finds skb_fclone_busy() is true,
  it sets the TSQ_THROTTLED bit and the retransmit does not happen in
  the tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() call chain.

+ The tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() code next implicitly assumes the
  retransmit process is finished, and sets retrans_stamp to 0 to clear
  it, but this is later overwritten (see below).

+ Later, upon tx completion, tcp_tsq_write() calls
  tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(), which puts the retransmit in flight and
  sets retrans_stamp to a non-zero value.

+ The client receives an ACK for the retransmitted TFO payload data.

+ Since we're in CA_Open and there are no dupacks/SACKs/DSACKs/ECN to
  make tcp_ack_is_dubious() true and make us call
  tcp_fastretrans_alert() and reach a code path that clears
  retrans_stamp, retrans_stamp stays nonzero.

+ Later, if there is a TLP, RTO, RTO sequence, then the connection
  will suffer an early ETIMEDOUT due to the erroneously ancient
  retrans_stamp.

The fix: this commit refactors the code to have
tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() retransmit by reusing the relevant parts of
tcp_simple_retransmit() that enter CA_Loss (without changing cwnd) and
call tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(). We have tcp_simple_retransmit() and
tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() share code in this way because in both cases
we get a packet indicating non-congestion loss (MTU reduction or TFO
failure) and thus in both cases we want to retransmit as many packets
as cwnd allows, without reducing cwnd. And given that retransmits will
set retrans_stamp to a non-zero value (and may do so in a later
calling context due to TSQ), we also want to enter CA_Loss so that we
track when all retransmitted packets are ACked and clear retrans_stamp
when that happens (to ensure later recurring RTOs are using the
correct retrans_stamp and don't declare ETIMEDOUT prematurely).

Fixes: 9e046bb111f1 ("tcp: clear tp-&gt;retrans_stamp in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack()")
Fixes: a7abf3cd76e1 ("tcp: consider using standard rtx logic in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack()")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240624144323.2371403-1-ncardwell.sw@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Testing determined that the recent commit 9e046bb111f1 ("tcp: clear
tp-&gt;retrans_stamp in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack()") has a race, and does
not always ensure retrans_stamp is 0 after a TFO payload retransmit.

If transmit completion for the SYN+data skb happens after the client
TCP stack receives the SYNACK (which sometimes happens), then
retrans_stamp can erroneously remain non-zero for the lifetime of the
connection, causing a premature ETIMEDOUT later.

Testing and tracing showed that the buggy scenario is the following
somewhat tricky sequence:

+ Client attempts a TFO handshake. tcp_send_syn_data() sends SYN + TFO
  cookie + data in a single packet in the syn_data skb. It hands the
  syn_data skb to tcp_transmit_skb(), which makes a clone. Crucially,
  it then reuses the same original (non-clone) syn_data skb,
  transforming it by advancing the seq by one byte and removing the
  FIN bit, and enques the resulting payload-only skb in the
  sk-&gt;tcp_rtx_queue.

+ Client sets retrans_stamp to the start time of the three-way
  handshake.

+ Cookie mismatches or server has TFO disabled, and server only ACKs
  SYN.

+ tcp_ack() sees SYN is acked, tcp_clean_rtx_queue() clears
  retrans_stamp.

+ Since the client SYN was acked but not the payload, the TFO failure
  code path in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() tries to retransmit the
  payload skb.  However, in some cases the transmit completion for the
  clone of the syn_data (which had SYN + TFO cookie + data) hasn't
  happened.  In those cases, skb_still_in_host_queue() returns true
  for the retransmitted TFO payload, because the clone of the syn_data
  skb has not had its tx completetion.

+ Because skb_still_in_host_queue() finds skb_fclone_busy() is true,
  it sets the TSQ_THROTTLED bit and the retransmit does not happen in
  the tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() call chain.

+ The tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() code next implicitly assumes the
  retransmit process is finished, and sets retrans_stamp to 0 to clear
  it, but this is later overwritten (see below).

+ Later, upon tx completion, tcp_tsq_write() calls
  tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(), which puts the retransmit in flight and
  sets retrans_stamp to a non-zero value.

+ The client receives an ACK for the retransmitted TFO payload data.

+ Since we're in CA_Open and there are no dupacks/SACKs/DSACKs/ECN to
  make tcp_ack_is_dubious() true and make us call
  tcp_fastretrans_alert() and reach a code path that clears
  retrans_stamp, retrans_stamp stays nonzero.

+ Later, if there is a TLP, RTO, RTO sequence, then the connection
  will suffer an early ETIMEDOUT due to the erroneously ancient
  retrans_stamp.

The fix: this commit refactors the code to have
tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() retransmit by reusing the relevant parts of
tcp_simple_retransmit() that enter CA_Loss (without changing cwnd) and
call tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(). We have tcp_simple_retransmit() and
tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() share code in this way because in both cases
we get a packet indicating non-congestion loss (MTU reduction or TFO
failure) and thus in both cases we want to retransmit as many packets
as cwnd allows, without reducing cwnd. And given that retransmits will
set retrans_stamp to a non-zero value (and may do so in a later
calling context due to TSQ), we also want to enter CA_Loss so that we
track when all retransmitted packets are ACked and clear retrans_stamp
when that happens (to ensure later recurring RTOs are using the
correct retrans_stamp and don't declare ETIMEDOUT prematurely).

Fixes: 9e046bb111f1 ("tcp: clear tp-&gt;retrans_stamp in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack()")
Fixes: a7abf3cd76e1 ("tcp: consider using standard rtx logic in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack()")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240624144323.2371403-1-ncardwell.sw@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix race for duplicate reqsk on identical SYN</title>
<updated>2024-06-25T09:37:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>luoxuanqiang</name>
<email>luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-21T01:39:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ff46e3b4421923937b7f6e44ffcd3549a074f321'/>
<id>ff46e3b4421923937b7f6e44ffcd3549a074f321</id>
<content type='text'>
When bonding is configured in BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode, if two identical
SYN packets are received at the same time and processed on different CPUs,
it can potentially create the same sk (sock) but two different reqsk
(request_sock) in tcp_conn_request().

These two different reqsk will respond with two SYNACK packets, and since
the generation of the seq (ISN) incorporates a timestamp, the final two
SYNACK packets will have different seq values.

The consequence is that when the Client receives and replies with an ACK
to the earlier SYNACK packet, we will reset(RST) it.

========================================================================

This behavior is consistently reproducible in my local setup,
which comprises:

                  | NETA1 ------ NETB1 |
PC_A --- bond --- |                    | --- bond --- PC_B
                  | NETA2 ------ NETB2 |

- PC_A is the Server and has two network cards, NETA1 and NETA2. I have
  bonded these two cards using BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode and configured
  them to be handled by different CPU.

- PC_B is the Client, also equipped with two network cards, NETB1 and
  NETB2, which are also bonded and configured in BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode.

If the client attempts a TCP connection to the server, it might encounter
a failure. Capturing packets from the server side reveals:

10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [S], seq 320236027,
10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [S], seq 320236027,
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [S.], seq 2967855116,
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [S.], seq 2967855123, &lt;==
10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [.], ack 4294967290,
10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [.], ack 4294967290,
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [R], seq 2967855117, &lt;==
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [R], seq 2967855117,

Two SYNACKs with different seq numbers are sent by localhost,
resulting in an anomaly.

========================================================================

The attempted solution is as follows:
Add a return value to inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add() to confirm if the
ehash insertion is successful (Up to now, the reason for unsuccessful
insertion is that a reqsk for the same connection has already been
inserted). If the insertion fails, release the reqsk.

Due to the refcnt, Kuniyuki suggests also adding a return value check
for the DCCP module; if ehash insertion fails, indicating a successful
insertion of the same connection, simply release the reqsk as well.

Simultaneously, In the reqsk_queue_hash_req(), the start of the
req-&gt;rsk_timer is adjusted to be after successful insertion.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: luoxuanqiang &lt;luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240621013929.1386815-1-luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When bonding is configured in BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode, if two identical
SYN packets are received at the same time and processed on different CPUs,
it can potentially create the same sk (sock) but two different reqsk
(request_sock) in tcp_conn_request().

These two different reqsk will respond with two SYNACK packets, and since
the generation of the seq (ISN) incorporates a timestamp, the final two
SYNACK packets will have different seq values.

The consequence is that when the Client receives and replies with an ACK
to the earlier SYNACK packet, we will reset(RST) it.

========================================================================

This behavior is consistently reproducible in my local setup,
which comprises:

                  | NETA1 ------ NETB1 |
PC_A --- bond --- |                    | --- bond --- PC_B
                  | NETA2 ------ NETB2 |

- PC_A is the Server and has two network cards, NETA1 and NETA2. I have
  bonded these two cards using BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode and configured
  them to be handled by different CPU.

- PC_B is the Client, also equipped with two network cards, NETB1 and
  NETB2, which are also bonded and configured in BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode.

If the client attempts a TCP connection to the server, it might encounter
a failure. Capturing packets from the server side reveals:

10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [S], seq 320236027,
10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [S], seq 320236027,
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [S.], seq 2967855116,
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [S.], seq 2967855123, &lt;==
10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [.], ack 4294967290,
10.10.10.10.45182 &gt; localhost: Flags [.], ack 4294967290,
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [R], seq 2967855117, &lt;==
localhost &gt; 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [R], seq 2967855117,

Two SYNACKs with different seq numbers are sent by localhost,
resulting in an anomaly.

========================================================================

The attempted solution is as follows:
Add a return value to inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add() to confirm if the
ehash insertion is successful (Up to now, the reason for unsuccessful
insertion is that a reqsk for the same connection has already been
inserted). If the insertion fails, release the reqsk.

Due to the refcnt, Kuniyuki suggests also adding a return value check
for the DCCP module; if ehash insertion fails, indicating a successful
insertion of the same connection, simply release the reqsk as well.

Simultaneously, In the reqsk_queue_hash_req(), the start of the
req-&gt;rsk_timer is adjusted to be after successful insertion.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: luoxuanqiang &lt;luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240621013929.1386815-1-luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tcp_ao: Don't leak ao_info on error-path</title>
<updated>2024-06-20T00:30:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Safonov</name>
<email>0x7f454c46@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-19T00:29:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f9ae848904289ddb16c7c9e4553ed4c64300de49'/>
<id>f9ae848904289ddb16c7c9e4553ed4c64300de49</id>
<content type='text'>
It seems I introduced it together with TCP_AO_CMDF_AO_REQUIRED, on
version 5 [1] of TCP-AO patches. Quite frustrative that having all these
selftests that I've written, running kmemtest &amp; kcov was always in todo.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230215183335.800122-5-dima@arista.com/

Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240617072451.1403e1d2@kernel.org/
Fixes: 0aadc73995d0 ("net/tcp: Prevent TCP-MD5 with TCP-AO being set")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240619-tcp-ao-required-leak-v1-1-6408f3c94247@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It seems I introduced it together with TCP_AO_CMDF_AO_REQUIRED, on
version 5 [1] of TCP-AO patches. Quite frustrative that having all these
selftests that I've written, running kmemtest &amp; kcov was always in todo.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230215183335.800122-5-dima@arista.com/

Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240617072451.1403e1d2@kernel.org/
Fixes: 0aadc73995d0 ("net/tcp: Prevent TCP-MD5 with TCP-AO being set")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240619-tcp-ao-required-leak-v1-1-6408f3c94247@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
