linux-stable.git/net/ipv4, branch v4.9.261

net: icmp: pass zeroed opts from icmp{,v6}_ndo_send before sending

2021-03-03T16:44:46+00:00

commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream.

The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting
it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the
inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially
when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that
point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory
contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one
reported by a user:

    panic+0x108/0x2ea
    __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20
    __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0
    icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160

In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read
from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can
induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen
in __ip_options_echo. For example:

    // sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes
    sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
    // dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send
    dptr = dopt->__data;
    // sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question
    if (sopt->rr) {
        optlen  = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
        soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
	// this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over
	// flowing the stack:
        memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
    }

In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only
IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is
worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does
a bit of bounds checking on the value.

This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,
sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by
good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've
avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:

    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
    Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89
    CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5
    Call Trace:
     dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc
     print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160
     __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
     kasan_report+0x32/0x40
     check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0
     memcpy+0x39/0x60
     __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
     __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700

Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for
the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the
gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the
shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to
the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was
already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function.
For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it
behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward.

Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")
Reported-by: SinYu 
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

icmp: introduce helper for nat'd source address in network device context

2021-03-03T16:44:45+00:00

commit 0b41713b606694257b90d61ba7e2712d8457648b upstream.

This introduces a helper function to be called only by network drivers
that wraps calls to icmp[v6]_send in a conntrack transformation, in case
NAT has been used. We don't want to pollute the non-driver path, though,
so we introduce this as a helper to be called by places that actually
make use of this, as suggested by Florian.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld 
Cc: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: rpfilter: mask ecn bits before fib lookup

2021-01-30T12:27:15+00:00

commit 2e5a6266fbb11ae93c468dfecab169aca9c27b43 upstream.

RT_TOS() only masks one of the two ECN bits. Therefore rpfilter_mt()
treats Not-ECT or ECT(1) packets in a different way than those with
ECT(0) or CE.

Reproducer:

  Create two netns, connected with a veth:
  $ ip netns add ns0
  $ ip netns add ns1
  $ ip link add name veth01 netns ns0 type veth peer name veth10 netns ns1
  $ ip -netns ns0 link set dev veth01 up
  $ ip -netns ns1 link set dev veth10 up
  $ ip -netns ns0 address add 192.0.2.10/32 dev veth01
  $ ip -netns ns1 address add 192.0.2.11/32 dev veth10

  Add a route to ns1 in ns0:
  $ ip -netns ns0 route add 192.0.2.11/32 dev veth01

  In ns1, only packets with TOS 4 can be routed to ns0:
  $ ip -netns ns1 route add 192.0.2.10/32 tos 4 dev veth10

  Ping from ns0 to ns1 works regardless of the ECN bits, as long as TOS
  is 4:
  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -Q 4 192.0.2.11   # TOS 4, Not-ECT
    ... 0% packet loss ...
  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -Q 5 192.0.2.11   # TOS 4, ECT(1)
    ... 0% packet loss ...
  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -Q 6 192.0.2.11   # TOS 4, ECT(0)
    ... 0% packet loss ...
  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -Q 7 192.0.2.11   # TOS 4, CE
    ... 0% packet loss ...

  Now use iptable's rpfilter module in ns1:
  $ ip netns exec ns1 iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -m rpfilter --invert -j DROP

  Not-ECT and ECT(1) packets still pass:
  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -Q 4 192.0.2.11   # TOS 4, Not-ECT
    ... 0% packet loss ...
  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -Q 5 192.0.2.11   # TOS 4, ECT(1)
    ... 0% packet loss ...

  But ECT(0) and ECN packets are dropped:
  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -Q 6 192.0.2.11   # TOS 4, ECT(0)
    ... 100% packet loss ...
  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -Q 7 192.0.2.11   # TOS 4, CE
    ... 100% packet loss ...

After this patch, rpfilter doesn't drop ECT(0) and CE packets anymore.

Fixes: 8f97339d3feb ("netfilter: add ipv4 reverse path filter match")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault 
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: fix pmtu check in nopmtudisc mode

2021-01-17T12:57:53+00:00

[ Upstream commit 50c661670f6a3908c273503dfa206dfc7aa54c07 ]

For some reason ip_tunnel insist on setting the DF bit anyway when the
inner header has the DF bit set, EVEN if the tunnel was configured with
'nopmtudisc'.

This means that the script added in the previous commit
cannot be made to work by adding the 'nopmtudisc' flag to the
ip tunnel configuration. Doing so breaks connectivity even for the
without-conntrack/netfilter scenario.

When nopmtudisc is set, the tunnel will skip the mtu check, so no
icmp error is sent to client. Then, because inner header has DF set,
the outer header gets added with DF bit set as well.

IP stack then sends an error to itself because the packet exceeds
the device MTU.

Fixes: 23a3647bc4f93 ("ip_tunnels: Use skb-len to PMTU check.")
Cc: Stefano Brivio 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: ip: always refragment ip defragmented packets

2021-01-17T12:57:53+00:00

[ Upstream commit bb4cc1a18856a73f0ff5137df0c2a31f4c50f6cf ]

Conntrack reassembly records the largest fragment size seen in IPCB.
However, when this gets forwarded/transmitted, fragmentation will only
be forced if one of the fragmented packets had the DF bit set.

In that case, a flag in IPCB will force fragmentation even if the
MTU is large enough.

This should work fine, but this breaks with ip tunnels.
Consider client that sends a UDP datagram of size X to another host.

The client fragments the datagram, so two packets, of size y and z, are
sent. DF bit is not set on any of these packets.

Middlebox netfilter reassembles those packets back to single size-X
packet, before routing decision.

packet-size-vs-mtu checks in ip_forward are irrelevant, because DF bit
isn't set.  At output time, ip refragmentation is skipped as well
because x is still smaller than the mtu of the output device.

If ttransmit device is an ip tunnel, the packet size increases to
x+overhead.

Also, tunnel might be configured to force DF bit on outer header.

In this case, packet will be dropped (exceeds MTU) and an ICMP error is
generated back to sender.

But sender already respects the announced MTU, all the packets that
it sent did fit the announced mtu.

Force refragmentation as per original sizes unconditionally so ip tunnel
will encapsulate the fragments instead.

The only other solution I see is to place ip refragmentation in
the ip_tunnel code to handle this case.

Fixes: d6b915e29f4ad ("ip_fragment: don't forward defragmented DF packet")
Reported-by: Christian Perle 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv4: Ignore ECN bits for fib lookups in fib_compute_spec_dst()

2021-01-12T18:49:02+00:00

[ Upstream commit 21fdca22eb7df2a1e194b8adb812ce370748b733 ]

RT_TOS() only clears one of the ECN bits. Therefore, when
fib_compute_spec_dst() resorts to a fib lookup, it can return
different results depending on the value of the second ECN bit.

For example, ECT(0) and ECT(1) packets could be treated differently.

  $ ip netns add ns0
  $ ip netns add ns1
  $ ip link add name veth01 netns ns0 type veth peer name veth10 netns ns1
  $ ip -netns ns0 link set dev lo up
  $ ip -netns ns1 link set dev lo up
  $ ip -netns ns0 link set dev veth01 up
  $ ip -netns ns1 link set dev veth10 up

  $ ip -netns ns0 address add 192.0.2.10/24 dev veth01
  $ ip -netns ns1 address add 192.0.2.11/24 dev veth10

  $ ip -netns ns1 address add 192.0.2.21/32 dev lo
  $ ip -netns ns1 route add 192.0.2.10/32 tos 4 dev veth10 src 192.0.2.21
  $ ip netns exec ns1 sysctl -wq net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=0

With TOS 4 and ECT(1), ns1 replies using source address 192.0.2.21
(ping uses -Q to set all TOS and ECN bits):

  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -c 1 -b -Q 5 192.0.2.255
  [...]
  64 bytes from 192.0.2.21: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.544 ms

But with TOS 4 and ECT(0), ns1 replies using source address 192.0.2.11
because the "tos 4" route isn't matched:

  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -c 1 -b -Q 6 192.0.2.255
  [...]
  64 bytes from 192.0.2.11: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.597 ms

After this patch the ECN bits don't affect the result anymore:

  $ ip netns exec ns0 ping -c 1 -b -Q 6 192.0.2.255
  [...]
  64 bytes from 192.0.2.21: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.591 ms

Fixes: 35ebf65e851c ("ipv4: Create and use fib_compute_spec_dst() helper.")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: fix cwnd-limited bug for TSO deferral where we send nothing

2020-12-29T12:44:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 299bcb55ecd1412f6df606e9dc0912d55610029e ]

When cwnd is not a multiple of the TSO skb size of N*MSS, we can get
into persistent scenarios where we have the following sequence:

(1) ACK for full-sized skb of N*MSS arrives
  -> tcp_write_xmit() transmit full-sized skb with N*MSS
  -> move pacing release time forward
  -> exit tcp_write_xmit() because pacing time is in the future

(2) TSQ callback or TCP internal pacing timer fires
  -> try to transmit next skb, but TSO deferral finds remainder of
     available cwnd is not big enough to trigger an immediate send
     now, so we defer sending until the next ACK.

(3) repeat...

So we can get into a case where we never mark ourselves as
cwnd-limited for many seconds at a time, even with
bulk/infinite-backlog senders, because:

o In case (1) above, every time in tcp_write_xmit() we have enough
cwnd to send a full-sized skb, we are not fully using the cwnd
(because cwnd is not a multiple of the TSO skb size). So every time we
send data, we are not cwnd limited, and so in the cwnd-limited
tracking code in tcp_cwnd_validate() we mark ourselves as not
cwnd-limited.

o In case (2) above, every time in tcp_write_xmit() that we try to
transmit the "remainder" of the cwnd but defer, we set the local
variable is_cwnd_limited to true, but we do not send any packets, so
sent_pkts is zero, so we don't call the cwnd-limited logic to update
tp->is_cwnd_limited.

Fixes: ca8a22634381 ("tcp: make cwnd-limited checks measurement-based, and gentler")
Reported-by: Ingemar Johansson 
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell 
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209035759.1225145-1-ncardwell.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: only postpone PROBE_RTT if RTT is < current min_rtt estimate

2020-11-24T12:02:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1b9e2a8c99a5c021041bfb2d512dc3ed92a94ffd ]

During loss recovery, retransmitted packets are forced to use TCP
timestamps to calculate the RTT samples, which have a millisecond
granularity. BBR is designed using a microsecond granularity. As a
result, multiple RTT samples could be truncated to the same RTT value
during loss recovery. This is problematic, as BBR will not enter
PROBE_RTT if the RTT sample is <= the current min_rtt sample, meaning
that if there are persistent losses, PROBE_RTT will constantly be
pushed off and potentially never re-entered. This patch makes sure
that BBR enters PROBE_RTT by checking if RTT sample is < the current
min_rtt sample, rather than <=.

The Netflix transport/TCP team discovered this bug in the Linux TCP
BBR code during lab tests.

Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Sharpelletti 
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell 
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116174412.1433277-1-sharpelletti.kdev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

inet_diag: Fix error path to cancel the meseage in inet_req_diag_fill()

2020-11-24T12:02:54+00:00

[ Upstream commit e33de7c5317e2827b2ba6fd120a505e9eb727b05 ]

nlmsg_cancel() needs to be called in the error path of
inet_req_diag_fill to cancel the message.

Fixes: d545caca827b ("net: inet: diag: expose the socket mark to privileged processes.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot 
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116082018.16496-1-wanghai38@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: Update window_clamp if SOCK_RCVBUF is set

2020-11-18T17:26:29+00:00

[ Upstream commit 909172a149749242990a6e64cb55d55460d4e417 ]

When net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 and syn flood is happened,
cookie_v4_check or cookie_v6_check tries to redo what
tcp_v4_send_synack or tcp_v6_send_synack did,
rsk_window_clamp will be changed if SOCK_RCVBUF is set,
which will make rcv_wscale is different, the client
still operates with initial window scale and can overshot
granted window, the client use the initial scale but local
server use new scale to advertise window value, and session
work abnormally.

Fixes: e88c64f0a425 ("tcp: allow effective reduction of TCP's rcv-buffer via setsockopt")
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604967391-123737-1-git-send-email-wenan.mao@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman