linux-stable.git/net/ipv4, branch v3.10.90

inet: frags: fix defragmented packet's IP header for af_packet

2015-10-01T10:07:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0848f6428ba3a2e42db124d41ac6f548655735bf ]

When ip_frag_queue() computes positions, it assumes that the passed
sk_buff does not contain L2 headers.

However, when PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_DEFRAG is used, IP reassembly
functions can be called on outgoing packets that contain L2 headers.

Also, IPv4 checksum is not corrected after reassembly.

Fixes: 7736d33f4262 ("packet: Add pre-defragmentation support for ipv4 fanouts.")
Signed-off-by: Edward Hyunkoo Jee 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Willem de Bruijn 
Cc: Jerry Chu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: lock socket in ip6_datagram_connect()

2015-10-01T10:07:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit 03645a11a570d52e70631838cb786eb4253eb463 ]

ip6_datagram_connect() is doing a lot of socket changes without
socket being locked.

This looks wrong, at least for udp_lib_rehash() which could corrupt
lists because of concurrent udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash accesses.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm: Increase the garbage collector threshold

2015-07-04T02:48:09+00:00

commit eeb1b73378b560e00ff1da2ef09fed9254f4e128 upstream.

With the removal of the routing cache, we lost the
option to tweak the garbage collector threshold
along with the maximum routing cache size. So git
commit 703fb94ec ("xfrm: Fix the gc threshold value
for ipv4") moved back to a static threshold.

It turned out that the current threshold before we
start garbage collecting is much to small for some
workloads, so increase it from 1024 to 32768. This
means that we start the garbage collector if we have
more than 32768 dst entries in the system and refuse
new allocations if we are above 65536.

Reported-by: Wolfgang Walter 
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert 
Cc: Stephen Hemminger 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums

2015-06-22T23:55:51+00:00

[ Upstream commit beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0 ]

We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :

1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
   This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()

2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
   processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.

This patch is an attempt to make things better.

We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Willem de Bruijn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv4: Avoid crashing in ip_error

2015-06-22T23:55:51+00:00

[ Upstream commit 381c759d9916c42959515ad34a6d467e24a88e93 ]

ip_error does not check if in_dev is NULL before dereferencing it.

IThe following sequence of calls is possible:
CPU A                          CPU B
ip_rcv_finish
    ip_route_input_noref()
        ip_route_input_slow()
                               inetdev_destroy()
    dst_input()

With the result that a network device can be destroyed while processing
an input packet.

A crash was triggered with only unicast packets in flight, and
forwarding enabled on the only network device.   The error condition
was created by the removal of the network device.

As such it is likely the that error code was -EHOSTUNREACH, and the
action taken by ip_error (if in_dev had been accessible) would have
been to not increment any counters and to have tried and likely failed
to send an icmp error as the network device is going away.

Therefore handle this weird case by just dropping the packet if
!in_dev.  It will result in dropping the packet sooner, and will not
result in an actual change of behavior.

Fixes: 251da4130115b ("ipv4: Cache ip_error() routes even when not forwarding.")
Reported-by: Vittorio Gambaletta 
Tested-by: Vittorio Gambaletta 
Signed-off-by: Vittorio Gambaletta 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash().

2015-05-13T12:15:41+00:00

[ Upstream commit a134f083e79fb4c3d0a925691e732c56911b4326 ]

If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev
backlink.

This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect().

Tested-by: Linus Torvalds 
Reported-by: Wen Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: avoid looping in tcp_send_fin()

2015-05-06T19:56:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 845704a535e9b3c76448f52af1b70e4422ea03fd ]

Presence of an unbound loop in tcp_send_fin() had always been hard
to explain when analyzing crash dumps involving gigantic dying processes
with millions of sockets.

Lets try a different strategy :

In case of memory pressure, try to add the FIN flag to last packet
in write queue, even if packet was already sent. TCP stack will
be able to deliver this FIN after a timeout event. Note that this
FIN being delivered by a retransmit, it also carries a Push flag
given our current implementation.

By checking sk_under_memory_pressure(), we anticipate that cooking
many FIN packets might deplete tcp memory.

In the case we could not allocate a packet, even with __GFP_WAIT
allocation, then not sending a FIN seems quite reasonable if it allows
to get rid of this socket, free memory, and not block the process from
eventually doing other useful work.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: fix possible deadlock in tcp_send_fin()

2015-05-06T19:56:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit d83769a580f1132ac26439f50068a29b02be535e ]

Using sk_stream_alloc_skb() in tcp_send_fin() is dangerous in
case a huge process is killed by OOM, and tcp_mem[2] is hit.

To be able to free memory we need to make progress, so this
patch allows FIN packets to not care about tcp_mem[2], if
skb allocation succeeded.

In a follow-up patch, we might abort tcp_send_fin() infinite loop
in case TIF_MEMDIE is set on this thread, as memory allocator
did its best getting extra memory already.

This patch reverts d22e15371811 ("tcp: fix tcp fin memory accounting")

Fixes: d22e15371811 ("tcp: fix tcp fin memory accounting")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ip_forward: Drop frames with attached skb->sk

2015-05-06T19:56:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2ab957492d13bb819400ac29ae55911d50a82a13 ]

Initial discussion was:
[FYI] xfrm: Don't lookup sk_policy for timewait sockets

Forwarded frames should not have a socket attached. Especially
tw sockets will lead to panics later-on in the stack.

This was observed with TPROXY assigning a tw socket and broken
policy routing (misconfigured). As a result frame enters
forwarding path instead of input. We cannot solve this in
TPROXY as it cannot know that policy routing is broken.

v2:
Remove useless comment

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Poehn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: tcp_make_synack() should clear skb->tstamp

2015-04-29T08:33:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit b50edd7812852d989f2ef09dcfc729690f54a42d ]

I noticed tcpdump was giving funky timestamps for locally
generated SYNACK messages on loopback interface.

11:42:46.938990 IP 127.0.0.1.48245 > 127.0.0.2.23850: S
945476042:945476042(0) win 43690 

20:28:58.502209 IP 127.0.0.2.23850 > 127.0.0.1.48245: S
3160535375:3160535375(0) ack 945476043 win 43690 

This is because we need to clear skb->tstamp before
entering lower stack, otherwise net_timestamp_check()
does not set skb->tstamp.

Fixes: 7faee5c0d514 ("tcp: remove TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman