<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv4, branch linux-6.13.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: fix geneve_opt length integer overflow</title>
<updated>2025-04-10T12:41:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lin Ma</name>
<email>linma@zju.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-02T16:56:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=738ae5712215fe9181587d582b23333f02c62ca6'/>
<id>738ae5712215fe9181587d582b23333f02c62ca6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b27055a08ad4b415dcf15b63034f9cb236f7fb40 ]

struct geneve_opt uses 5 bit length for each single option, which
means every vary size option should be smaller than 128 bytes.

However, all current related Netlink policies cannot promise this
length condition and the attacker can exploit a exact 128-byte size
option to *fake* a zero length option and confuse the parsing logic,
further achieve heap out-of-bounds read.

One example crash log is like below:

[    3.905425] ==================================================================
[    3.905925] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put+0xa9/0xe0
[    3.906255] Read of size 124 at addr ffff888005f291cc by task poc/177
[    3.906646]
[    3.906775] CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm: poc-oob-read Not tainted 6.1.132 #1
[    3.907131] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[    3.907784] Call Trace:
[    3.907925]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[    3.908048]  dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c
[    3.908258]  print_report+0x184/0x4be
[    3.909151]  kasan_report+0xc5/0x100
[    3.909539]  kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0
[    3.909794]  memcpy+0x1f/0x60
[    3.909968]  nla_put+0xa9/0xe0
[    3.910147]  tunnel_key_dump+0x945/0xba0
[    3.911536]  tcf_action_dump_1+0x1c1/0x340
[    3.912436]  tcf_action_dump+0x101/0x180
[    3.912689]  tcf_exts_dump+0x164/0x1e0
[    3.912905]  fw_dump+0x18b/0x2d0
[    3.913483]  tcf_fill_node+0x2ee/0x460
[    3.914778]  tfilter_notify+0xf4/0x180
[    3.915208]  tc_new_tfilter+0xd51/0x10d0
[    3.918615]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4a2/0x560
[    3.919118]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xcd/0x200
[    3.919787]  netlink_unicast+0x395/0x530
[    3.921032]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3d0/0x6d0
[    3.921987]  __sock_sendmsg+0x99/0xa0
[    3.922220]  __sys_sendto+0x1b7/0x240
[    3.922682]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x90
[    3.922906]  do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x90
[    3.923814]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[    3.924122] RIP: 0033:0x7e83eab84407
[    3.924331] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 &lt;5b&gt; c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 faf
[    3.925330] RSP: 002b:00007ffff505e370 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[    3.925752] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007e83eaafa740 RCX: 00007e83eab84407
[    3.926173] RDX: 00000000000001a8 RSI: 00007ffff505e3c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[    3.926587] RBP: 00007ffff505f460 R08: 00007e83eace1000 R09: 000000000000000c
[    3.926977] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffff505f3c0
[    3.927367] R13: 00007ffff505f5c8 R14: 00007e83ead1b000 R15: 00005d4fbbe6dcb8

Fix these issues by enforing correct length condition in related
policies.

Fixes: 925d844696d9 ("netfilter: nft_tunnel: add support for geneve opts")
Fixes: 4ece47787077 ("lwtunnel: add options setting and dumping for geneve")
Fixes: 0ed5269f9e41 ("net/sched: add tunnel option support to act_tunnel_key")
Fixes: 0a6e77784f49 ("net/sched: allow flower to match tunnel options")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma &lt;linma@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402165632.6958-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b27055a08ad4b415dcf15b63034f9cb236f7fb40 ]

struct geneve_opt uses 5 bit length for each single option, which
means every vary size option should be smaller than 128 bytes.

However, all current related Netlink policies cannot promise this
length condition and the attacker can exploit a exact 128-byte size
option to *fake* a zero length option and confuse the parsing logic,
further achieve heap out-of-bounds read.

One example crash log is like below:

[    3.905425] ==================================================================
[    3.905925] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put+0xa9/0xe0
[    3.906255] Read of size 124 at addr ffff888005f291cc by task poc/177
[    3.906646]
[    3.906775] CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm: poc-oob-read Not tainted 6.1.132 #1
[    3.907131] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[    3.907784] Call Trace:
[    3.907925]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[    3.908048]  dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c
[    3.908258]  print_report+0x184/0x4be
[    3.909151]  kasan_report+0xc5/0x100
[    3.909539]  kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0
[    3.909794]  memcpy+0x1f/0x60
[    3.909968]  nla_put+0xa9/0xe0
[    3.910147]  tunnel_key_dump+0x945/0xba0
[    3.911536]  tcf_action_dump_1+0x1c1/0x340
[    3.912436]  tcf_action_dump+0x101/0x180
[    3.912689]  tcf_exts_dump+0x164/0x1e0
[    3.912905]  fw_dump+0x18b/0x2d0
[    3.913483]  tcf_fill_node+0x2ee/0x460
[    3.914778]  tfilter_notify+0xf4/0x180
[    3.915208]  tc_new_tfilter+0xd51/0x10d0
[    3.918615]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4a2/0x560
[    3.919118]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xcd/0x200
[    3.919787]  netlink_unicast+0x395/0x530
[    3.921032]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3d0/0x6d0
[    3.921987]  __sock_sendmsg+0x99/0xa0
[    3.922220]  __sys_sendto+0x1b7/0x240
[    3.922682]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x90
[    3.922906]  do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x90
[    3.923814]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[    3.924122] RIP: 0033:0x7e83eab84407
[    3.924331] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 &lt;5b&gt; c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 faf
[    3.925330] RSP: 002b:00007ffff505e370 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[    3.925752] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007e83eaafa740 RCX: 00007e83eab84407
[    3.926173] RDX: 00000000000001a8 RSI: 00007ffff505e3c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[    3.926587] RBP: 00007ffff505f460 R08: 00007e83eace1000 R09: 000000000000000c
[    3.926977] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffff505f3c0
[    3.927367] R13: 00007ffff505f5c8 R14: 00007e83ead1b000 R15: 00005d4fbbe6dcb8

Fix these issues by enforing correct length condition in related
policies.

Fixes: 925d844696d9 ("netfilter: nft_tunnel: add support for geneve opts")
Fixes: 4ece47787077 ("lwtunnel: add options setting and dumping for geneve")
Fixes: 0ed5269f9e41 ("net/sched: add tunnel option support to act_tunnel_key")
Fixes: 0a6e77784f49 ("net/sched: allow flower to match tunnel options")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma &lt;linma@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402165632.6958-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tunnels: Accept PACKET_HOST in skb_tunnel_check_pmtu().</title>
<updated>2025-04-10T12:41:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guillaume Nault</name>
<email>gnault@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-29T00:33:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d867af864efe7ef9072c7be9249d38c612d6095f'/>
<id>d867af864efe7ef9072c7be9249d38c612d6095f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8930424777e43257f5bf6f0f0f53defd0d30415c ]

Because skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() doesn't handle PACKET_HOST packets,
commit 30a92c9e3d6b ("openvswitch: Set the skbuff pkt_type for proper
pmtud support.") forced skb-&gt;pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for
openvswitch packets that are sent using the OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT
action. This allowed such packets to invoke the
iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() or iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmpv6() helpers
and thus trigger PMTU update on the input device.

However, this also broke other parts of PMTU discovery. Since these
packets don't have the PACKET_HOST type anymore, they won't trigger the
sending of ICMP Fragmentation Needed or Packet Too Big messages to
remote hosts when oversized (see the skb_in-&gt;pkt_type condition in
__icmp_send() for example).

These two skb-&gt;pkt_type checks are therefore incompatible as one
requires skb-&gt;pkt_type to be PACKET_HOST, while the other requires it
to be anything but PACKET_HOST.

It makes sense to not trigger ICMP messages for non-PACKET_HOST packets
as these messages should be generated only for incoming l2-unicast
packets. However there doesn't seem to be any reason for
skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() to ignore PACKET_HOST packets.

Allow both cases to work by allowing skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() to work on
PACKET_HOST packets and not overriding skb-&gt;pkt_type in openvswitch
anymore.

Fixes: 30a92c9e3d6b ("openvswitch: Set the skbuff pkt_type for proper pmtud support.")
Fixes: 4cb47a8644cc ("tunnels: PMTU discovery support for directly bridged IP packets")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;gnault@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio &lt;sbrivio@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/eac941652b86fddf8909df9b3bf0d97bc9444793.1743208264.git.gnault@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8930424777e43257f5bf6f0f0f53defd0d30415c ]

Because skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() doesn't handle PACKET_HOST packets,
commit 30a92c9e3d6b ("openvswitch: Set the skbuff pkt_type for proper
pmtud support.") forced skb-&gt;pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for
openvswitch packets that are sent using the OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT
action. This allowed such packets to invoke the
iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() or iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmpv6() helpers
and thus trigger PMTU update on the input device.

However, this also broke other parts of PMTU discovery. Since these
packets don't have the PACKET_HOST type anymore, they won't trigger the
sending of ICMP Fragmentation Needed or Packet Too Big messages to
remote hosts when oversized (see the skb_in-&gt;pkt_type condition in
__icmp_send() for example).

These two skb-&gt;pkt_type checks are therefore incompatible as one
requires skb-&gt;pkt_type to be PACKET_HOST, while the other requires it
to be anything but PACKET_HOST.

It makes sense to not trigger ICMP messages for non-PACKET_HOST packets
as these messages should be generated only for incoming l2-unicast
packets. However there doesn't seem to be any reason for
skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() to ignore PACKET_HOST packets.

Allow both cases to work by allowing skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() to work on
PACKET_HOST packets and not overriding skb-&gt;pkt_type in openvswitch
anymore.

Fixes: 30a92c9e3d6b ("openvswitch: Set the skbuff pkt_type for proper pmtud support.")
Fixes: 4cb47a8644cc ("tunnels: PMTU discovery support for directly bridged IP packets")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;gnault@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio &lt;sbrivio@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/eac941652b86fddf8909df9b3bf0d97bc9444793.1743208264.git.gnault@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: Fix memory accounting leak.</title>
<updated>2025-04-10T12:41:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-01T18:44:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c4bac6c398118fba79e32b1cd01db22dbfe29fbf'/>
<id>c4bac6c398118fba79e32b1cd01db22dbfe29fbf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit df207de9d9e7a4d92f8567e2c539d9c8c12fd99d ]

Matt Dowling reported a weird UDP memory usage issue.

Under normal operation, the UDP memory usage reported in /proc/net/sockstat
remains close to zero.  However, it occasionally spiked to 524,288 pages
and never dropped.  Moreover, the value doubled when the application was
terminated.  Finally, it caused intermittent packet drops.

We can reproduce the issue with the script below [0]:

  1. /proc/net/sockstat reports 0 pages

    # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
    UDP: inuse 1 mem 0

  2. Run the script till the report reaches 524,288

    # python3 test.py &amp; sleep 5
    # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
    UDP: inuse 3 mem 524288  &lt;-- (INT_MAX + 1) &gt;&gt; PAGE_SHIFT

  3. Kill the socket and confirm the number never drops

    # pkill python3 &amp;&amp; sleep 5
    # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
    UDP: inuse 1 mem 524288

  4. (necessary since v6.0) Trigger proto_memory_pcpu_drain()

    # python3 test.py &amp; sleep 1 &amp;&amp; pkill python3

  5. The number doubles

    # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
    UDP: inuse 1 mem 1048577

The application set INT_MAX to SO_RCVBUF, which triggered an integer
overflow in udp_rmem_release().

When a socket is close()d, udp_destruct_common() purges its receive
queue and sums up skb-&gt;truesize in the queue.  This total is calculated
and stored in a local unsigned integer variable.

The total size is then passed to udp_rmem_release() to adjust memory
accounting.  However, because the function takes a signed integer
argument, the total size can wrap around, causing an overflow.

Then, the released amount is calculated as follows:

  1) Add size to sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc.
  2) Round down sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc to the nearest lower multiple of
      PAGE_SIZE and assign it to amount.
  3) Subtract amount from sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc.
  4) Pass amount &gt;&gt; PAGE_SHIFT to __sk_mem_reduce_allocated().

When the issue occurred, the total in udp_destruct_common() was 2147484480
(INT_MAX + 833), which was cast to -2147482816 in udp_rmem_release().

At 1) sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc is changed from 3264 to -2147479552, and
2) sets -2147479552 to amount.  3) reverts the wraparound, so we don't
see a warning in inet_sock_destruct().  However, udp_memory_allocated
ends up doubling at 4).

Since commit 3cd3399dd7a8 ("net: implement per-cpu reserves for
memory_allocated"), memory usage no longer doubles immediately after
a socket is close()d because __sk_mem_reduce_allocated() caches the
amount in udp_memory_per_cpu_fw_alloc.  However, the next time a UDP
socket receives a packet, the subtraction takes effect, causing UDP
memory usage to double.

This issue makes further memory allocation fail once the socket's
sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc exceeds net.ipv4.udp_rmem_min, resulting in packet
drops.

To prevent this issue, let's use unsigned int for the calculation and
call sk_forward_alloc_add() only once for the small delta.

Note that first_packet_length() also potentially has the same problem.

[0]:
from socket import *

SO_RCVBUFFORCE = 33
INT_MAX = (2 ** 31) - 1

s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
s.bind(('', 0))
s.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUFFORCE, INT_MAX)

c = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
c.connect(s.getsockname())

data = b'a' * 100

while True:
    c.send(data)

Fixes: f970bd9e3a06 ("udp: implement memory accounting helpers")
Reported-by: Matt Dowling &lt;madowlin@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250401184501.67377-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit df207de9d9e7a4d92f8567e2c539d9c8c12fd99d ]

Matt Dowling reported a weird UDP memory usage issue.

Under normal operation, the UDP memory usage reported in /proc/net/sockstat
remains close to zero.  However, it occasionally spiked to 524,288 pages
and never dropped.  Moreover, the value doubled when the application was
terminated.  Finally, it caused intermittent packet drops.

We can reproduce the issue with the script below [0]:

  1. /proc/net/sockstat reports 0 pages

    # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
    UDP: inuse 1 mem 0

  2. Run the script till the report reaches 524,288

    # python3 test.py &amp; sleep 5
    # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
    UDP: inuse 3 mem 524288  &lt;-- (INT_MAX + 1) &gt;&gt; PAGE_SHIFT

  3. Kill the socket and confirm the number never drops

    # pkill python3 &amp;&amp; sleep 5
    # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
    UDP: inuse 1 mem 524288

  4. (necessary since v6.0) Trigger proto_memory_pcpu_drain()

    # python3 test.py &amp; sleep 1 &amp;&amp; pkill python3

  5. The number doubles

    # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
    UDP: inuse 1 mem 1048577

The application set INT_MAX to SO_RCVBUF, which triggered an integer
overflow in udp_rmem_release().

When a socket is close()d, udp_destruct_common() purges its receive
queue and sums up skb-&gt;truesize in the queue.  This total is calculated
and stored in a local unsigned integer variable.

The total size is then passed to udp_rmem_release() to adjust memory
accounting.  However, because the function takes a signed integer
argument, the total size can wrap around, causing an overflow.

Then, the released amount is calculated as follows:

  1) Add size to sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc.
  2) Round down sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc to the nearest lower multiple of
      PAGE_SIZE and assign it to amount.
  3) Subtract amount from sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc.
  4) Pass amount &gt;&gt; PAGE_SHIFT to __sk_mem_reduce_allocated().

When the issue occurred, the total in udp_destruct_common() was 2147484480
(INT_MAX + 833), which was cast to -2147482816 in udp_rmem_release().

At 1) sk-&gt;sk_forward_alloc is changed from 3264 to -2147479552, and
2) sets -2147479552 to amount.  3) reverts the wraparound, so we don't
see a warning in inet_sock_destruct().  However, udp_memory_allocated
ends up doubling at 4).

Since commit 3cd3399dd7a8 ("net: implement per-cpu reserves for
memory_allocated"), memory usage no longer doubles immediately after
a socket is close()d because __sk_mem_reduce_allocated() caches the
amount in udp_memory_per_cpu_fw_alloc.  However, the next time a UDP
socket receives a packet, the subtraction takes effect, causing UDP
memory usage to double.

This issue makes further memory allocation fail once the socket's
sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc exceeds net.ipv4.udp_rmem_min, resulting in packet
drops.

To prevent this issue, let's use unsigned int for the calculation and
call sk_forward_alloc_add() only once for the small delta.

Note that first_packet_length() also potentially has the same problem.

[0]:
from socket import *

SO_RCVBUFFORCE = 33
INT_MAX = (2 ** 31) - 1

s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
s.bind(('', 0))
s.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUFFORCE, INT_MAX)

c = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
c.connect(s.getsockname())

data = b'a' * 100

while True:
    c.send(data)

Fixes: f970bd9e3a06 ("udp: implement memory accounting helpers")
Reported-by: Matt Dowling &lt;madowlin@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250401184501.67377-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: Fix multiple wraparounds of sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc.</title>
<updated>2025-04-10T12:41:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-01T18:44:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1f529988efe9870db802cb79d01d8f473099b4d7'/>
<id>1f529988efe9870db802cb79d01d8f473099b4d7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5a465a0da13ee9fbd7d3cd0b2893309b0fe4b7e3 ]

__udp_enqueue_schedule_skb() has the following condition:

  if (atomic_read(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc) &gt; sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf)
          goto drop;

sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf is initialised by net.core.rmem_default and later can
be configured by SO_RCVBUF, which is limited by net.core.rmem_max,
or SO_RCVBUFFORCE.

If we set INT_MAX to sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf, the condition is always false
as sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc is also signed int.

Then, the size of the incoming skb is added to sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc
unconditionally.

This results in integer overflow (possibly multiple times) on
sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc and allows a single socket to have skb up to
net.core.udp_mem[1].

For example, if we set a large value to udp_mem[1] and INT_MAX to
sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf and flood packets to the socket, we can see multiple
overflows:

  # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
  UDP: inuse 3 mem 7956736  &lt;-- (7956736 &lt;&lt; 12) bytes &gt; INT_MAX * 15
                                             ^- PAGE_SHIFT
  # ss -uam
  State  Recv-Q      ...
  UNCONN -1757018048 ...    &lt;-- flipping the sign repeatedly
         skmem:(r2537949248,rb2147483646,t0,tb212992,f1984,w0,o0,bl0,d0)

Previously, we had a boundary check for INT_MAX, which was removed by
commit 6a1f12dd85a8 ("udp: relax atomic operation on sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc").

A complete fix would be to revert it and cap the right operand by
INT_MAX:

  rmem = atomic_add_return(size, &amp;sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc);
  if (rmem &gt; min(size + (unsigned int)sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf, INT_MAX))
          goto uncharge_drop;

but we do not want to add the expensive atomic_add_return() back just
for the corner case.

Casting rmem to unsigned int prevents multiple wraparounds, but we still
allow a single wraparound.

  # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
  UDP: inuse 3 mem 524288  &lt;-- (INT_MAX + 1) &gt;&gt; 12

  # ss -uam
  State  Recv-Q      ...
  UNCONN -2147482816 ...   &lt;-- INT_MAX + 831 bytes
         skmem:(r2147484480,rb2147483646,t0,tb212992,f3264,w0,o0,bl0,d14468947)

So, let's define rmem and rcvbuf as unsigned int and check skb-&gt;truesize
only when rcvbuf is large enough to lower the overflow possibility.

Note that we still have a small chance to see overflow if multiple skbs
to the same socket are processed on different core at the same time and
each size does not exceed the limit but the total size does.

Note also that we must ignore skb-&gt;truesize for a small buffer as
explained in commit 363dc73acacb ("udp: be less conservative with
sock rmem accounting").

Fixes: 6a1f12dd85a8 ("udp: relax atomic operation on sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250401184501.67377-2-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5a465a0da13ee9fbd7d3cd0b2893309b0fe4b7e3 ]

__udp_enqueue_schedule_skb() has the following condition:

  if (atomic_read(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc) &gt; sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf)
          goto drop;

sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf is initialised by net.core.rmem_default and later can
be configured by SO_RCVBUF, which is limited by net.core.rmem_max,
or SO_RCVBUFFORCE.

If we set INT_MAX to sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf, the condition is always false
as sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc is also signed int.

Then, the size of the incoming skb is added to sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc
unconditionally.

This results in integer overflow (possibly multiple times) on
sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc and allows a single socket to have skb up to
net.core.udp_mem[1].

For example, if we set a large value to udp_mem[1] and INT_MAX to
sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf and flood packets to the socket, we can see multiple
overflows:

  # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
  UDP: inuse 3 mem 7956736  &lt;-- (7956736 &lt;&lt; 12) bytes &gt; INT_MAX * 15
                                             ^- PAGE_SHIFT
  # ss -uam
  State  Recv-Q      ...
  UNCONN -1757018048 ...    &lt;-- flipping the sign repeatedly
         skmem:(r2537949248,rb2147483646,t0,tb212992,f1984,w0,o0,bl0,d0)

Previously, we had a boundary check for INT_MAX, which was removed by
commit 6a1f12dd85a8 ("udp: relax atomic operation on sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc").

A complete fix would be to revert it and cap the right operand by
INT_MAX:

  rmem = atomic_add_return(size, &amp;sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc);
  if (rmem &gt; min(size + (unsigned int)sk-&gt;sk_rcvbuf, INT_MAX))
          goto uncharge_drop;

but we do not want to add the expensive atomic_add_return() back just
for the corner case.

Casting rmem to unsigned int prevents multiple wraparounds, but we still
allow a single wraparound.

  # cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
  UDP: inuse 3 mem 524288  &lt;-- (INT_MAX + 1) &gt;&gt; 12

  # ss -uam
  State  Recv-Q      ...
  UNCONN -2147482816 ...   &lt;-- INT_MAX + 831 bytes
         skmem:(r2147484480,rb2147483646,t0,tb212992,f3264,w0,o0,bl0,d14468947)

So, let's define rmem and rcvbuf as unsigned int and check skb-&gt;truesize
only when rcvbuf is large enough to lower the overflow possibility.

Note that we still have a small chance to see overflow if multiple skbs
to the same socket are processed on different core at the same time and
each size does not exceed the limit but the total size does.

Note also that we must ignore skb-&gt;truesize for a small buffer as
explained in commit 363dc73acacb ("udp: be less conservative with
sock rmem accounting").

Fixes: 6a1f12dd85a8 ("udp: relax atomic operation on sk-&gt;sk_rmem_alloc")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250401184501.67377-2-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net-timestamp: support TCP GSO case for a few missing flags</title>
<updated>2025-03-13T12:07:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Xing</name>
<email>kerneljasonxing@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-04T00:44:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4c36bcb34ac0d889f2854c9a190ea2f7174e5ee1'/>
<id>4c36bcb34ac0d889f2854c9a190ea2f7174e5ee1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3c9231ea6497dfc50ac0ef69fff484da27d0df66 ]

When I read through the TSO codes, I found out that we probably
miss initializing the tx_flags of last seg when TSO is turned
off, which means at the following points no more timestamp
(for this last one) will be generated. There are three flags
to be handled in this patch:
1. SKBTX_HW_TSTAMP
2. SKBTX_BPF
3. SKBTX_SCHED_TSTAMP
Note that SKBTX_BPF[1] was added in 6.14.0-rc2 by commit
6b98ec7e882af ("bpf: Add BPF_SOCK_OPS_TSTAMP_SCHED_CB callback")
and only belongs to net-next branch material for now. The common
issue of the above three flags can be fixed by this single patch.

This patch initializes the tx_flags to SKBTX_ANY_TSTAMP like what
the UDP GSO does to make the newly segmented last skb inherit the
tx_flags so that requested timestamp will be generated in each
certain layer, or else that last one has zero value of tx_flags
which leads to no timestamp at all.

Fixes: 4ed2d765dfacc ("net-timestamp: TCP timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3c9231ea6497dfc50ac0ef69fff484da27d0df66 ]

When I read through the TSO codes, I found out that we probably
miss initializing the tx_flags of last seg when TSO is turned
off, which means at the following points no more timestamp
(for this last one) will be generated. There are three flags
to be handled in this patch:
1. SKBTX_HW_TSTAMP
2. SKBTX_BPF
3. SKBTX_SCHED_TSTAMP
Note that SKBTX_BPF[1] was added in 6.14.0-rc2 by commit
6b98ec7e882af ("bpf: Add BPF_SOCK_OPS_TSTAMP_SCHED_CB callback")
and only belongs to net-next branch material for now. The common
issue of the above three flags can be fixed by this single patch.

This patch initializes the tx_flags to SKBTX_ANY_TSTAMP like what
the UDP GSO does to make the newly segmented last skb inherit the
tx_flags so that requested timestamp will be generated in each
certain layer, or else that last one has zero value of tx_flags
which leads to no timestamp at all.

Fixes: 4ed2d765dfacc ("net-timestamp: TCP timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: gso: fix ownership in __udp_gso_segment</title>
<updated>2025-03-13T12:07:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Antoine Tenart</name>
<email>atenart@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-26T17:13:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c32da44cc9298eaa6109e3fc2c2b4e07cc4bf11b'/>
<id>c32da44cc9298eaa6109e3fc2c2b4e07cc4bf11b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ee01b2f2d7d0010787c2343463965bbc283a497f ]

In __udp_gso_segment the skb destructor is removed before segmenting the
skb but the socket reference is kept as-is. This is an issue if the
original skb is later orphaned as we can hit the following bug:

  kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3312!  (skb_orphan)
  RIP: 0010:ip_rcv_core+0x8b2/0xca0
  Call Trace:
   ip_rcv+0xab/0x6e0
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x168/0x1b0
   process_backlog+0x384/0x1100
   __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa1/0x370
   net_rx_action+0x925/0xe50

The above can happen following a sequence of events when using
OpenVSwitch, when an OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE action precedes an
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT action:

1. OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE is handled (in do_execute_actions): the skb
   goes through queue_gso_packets and then __udp_gso_segment, where its
   destructor is removed.
2. The segments' data are copied and sent to userspace.
3. OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT is handled (in do_execute_actions) and the
   same original skb is sent to its path.
4. If it later hits skb_orphan, we hit the bug.

Fix this by also removing the reference to the socket in
__udp_gso_segment.

Fixes: ad405857b174 ("udp: better wmem accounting on gso")
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart &lt;atenart@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250226171352.258045-1-atenart@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ee01b2f2d7d0010787c2343463965bbc283a497f ]

In __udp_gso_segment the skb destructor is removed before segmenting the
skb but the socket reference is kept as-is. This is an issue if the
original skb is later orphaned as we can hit the following bug:

  kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3312!  (skb_orphan)
  RIP: 0010:ip_rcv_core+0x8b2/0xca0
  Call Trace:
   ip_rcv+0xab/0x6e0
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x168/0x1b0
   process_backlog+0x384/0x1100
   __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa1/0x370
   net_rx_action+0x925/0xe50

The above can happen following a sequence of events when using
OpenVSwitch, when an OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE action precedes an
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT action:

1. OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE is handled (in do_execute_actions): the skb
   goes through queue_gso_packets and then __udp_gso_segment, where its
   destructor is removed.
2. The segments' data are copied and sent to userspace.
3. OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT is handled (in do_execute_actions) and the
   same original skb is sent to its path.
4. If it later hits skb_orphan, we hit the bug.

Fix this by also removing the reference to the socket in
__udp_gso_segment.

Fixes: ad405857b174 ("udp: better wmem accounting on gso")
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart &lt;atenart@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250226171352.258045-1-atenart@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Defer ts_recent changes until req is owned</title>
<updated>2025-03-07T17:27:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wang Hai</name>
<email>wanghai38@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-24T09:00:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1a1405f2bc88ced9beac66737732c8c9fef6092a'/>
<id>1a1405f2bc88ced9beac66737732c8c9fef6092a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8d52da23b6c68a0f6bad83959ebb61a2cf623c4e ]

Recently a bug was discovered where the server had entered TCP_ESTABLISHED
state, but the upper layers were not notified.

The same 5-tuple packet may be processed by different CPUSs, so two
CPUs may receive different ack packets at the same time when the
state is TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV.

In that case, req-&gt;ts_recent in tcp_check_req may be changed concurrently,
which will probably cause the newsk's ts_recent to be incorrectly large.
So that tcp_validate_incoming will fail. At this point, newsk will not be
able to enter the TCP_ESTABLISHED.

cpu1                                    cpu2
tcp_check_req
                                        tcp_check_req
 req-&gt;ts_recent = rcv_tsval = t1
                                         req-&gt;ts_recent = rcv_tsval = t2

 syn_recv_sock
  tcp_sk(child)-&gt;rx_opt.ts_recent = req-&gt;ts_recent = t2 // t1 &lt; t2
tcp_child_process
 tcp_rcv_state_process
  tcp_validate_incoming
   tcp_paws_check
    if ((s32)(rx_opt-&gt;ts_recent - rx_opt-&gt;rcv_tsval) &lt;= paws_win)
        // t2 - t1 &gt; paws_win, failed
                                        tcp_v4_do_rcv
                                         tcp_rcv_state_process
                                         // TCP_ESTABLISHED

The cpu2's skb or a newly received skb will call tcp_v4_do_rcv to get
the newsk into the TCP_ESTABLISHED state, but at this point it is no
longer possible to notify the upper layer application. A notification
mechanism could be added here, but the fix is more complex, so the
current fix is used.

In tcp_check_req, req-&gt;ts_recent is used to assign a value to
tcp_sk(child)-&gt;rx_opt.ts_recent, so removing the change in req-&gt;ts_recent
and changing tcp_sk(child)-&gt;rx_opt.ts_recent directly after owning the
req fixes this bug.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai &lt;wanghai38@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8d52da23b6c68a0f6bad83959ebb61a2cf623c4e ]

Recently a bug was discovered where the server had entered TCP_ESTABLISHED
state, but the upper layers were not notified.

The same 5-tuple packet may be processed by different CPUSs, so two
CPUs may receive different ack packets at the same time when the
state is TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV.

In that case, req-&gt;ts_recent in tcp_check_req may be changed concurrently,
which will probably cause the newsk's ts_recent to be incorrectly large.
So that tcp_validate_incoming will fail. At this point, newsk will not be
able to enter the TCP_ESTABLISHED.

cpu1                                    cpu2
tcp_check_req
                                        tcp_check_req
 req-&gt;ts_recent = rcv_tsval = t1
                                         req-&gt;ts_recent = rcv_tsval = t2

 syn_recv_sock
  tcp_sk(child)-&gt;rx_opt.ts_recent = req-&gt;ts_recent = t2 // t1 &lt; t2
tcp_child_process
 tcp_rcv_state_process
  tcp_validate_incoming
   tcp_paws_check
    if ((s32)(rx_opt-&gt;ts_recent - rx_opt-&gt;rcv_tsval) &lt;= paws_win)
        // t2 - t1 &gt; paws_win, failed
                                        tcp_v4_do_rcv
                                         tcp_rcv_state_process
                                         // TCP_ESTABLISHED

The cpu2's skb or a newly received skb will call tcp_v4_do_rcv to get
the newsk into the TCP_ESTABLISHED state, but at this point it is no
longer possible to notify the upper layer application. A notification
mechanism could be added here, but the fix is more complex, so the
current fix is used.

In tcp_check_req, req-&gt;ts_recent is used to assign a value to
tcp_sk(child)-&gt;rx_opt.ts_recent, so removing the change in req-&gt;ts_recent
and changing tcp_sk(child)-&gt;rx_opt.ts_recent directly after owning the
req fixes this bug.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai &lt;wanghai38@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing &lt;kerneljasonxing@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: devmem: don't write truncated dmabuf CMSGs to userspace</title>
<updated>2025-03-07T17:27:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stanislav Fomichev</name>
<email>sdf@fomichev.me</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-24T17:44:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0af4760881666b0569bae1b2e845eafd44292e40'/>
<id>0af4760881666b0569bae1b2e845eafd44292e40</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 18912c520674ec4d920fe3826e7e4fefeecdf5ae ]

Currently, we report -ETOOSMALL (err) only on the first iteration
(!sent). When we get put_cmsg error after a bunch of successful
put_cmsg calls, we don't signal the error at all. This might be
confusing on the userspace side which will see truncated CMSGs
but no MSG_CTRUNC signal.

Consider the following case:
- sizeof(struct cmsghdr) = 16
- sizeof(struct dmabuf_cmsg) = 24
- total cmsg size (CMSG_LEN) = 40 (16+24)

When calling recvmsg with msg_controllen=60, the userspace
will receive two(!) dmabuf_cmsg(s), the first one will
be a valid one and the second one will be silently truncated. There is no
easy way to discover the truncation besides doing something like
"cm-&gt;cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(dmabuf_cmsg))".

Introduce new put_devmem_cmsg wrapper that reports an error instead
of doing the truncation. Mina suggests that it's the intended way
this API should work.

Note that we might now report MSG_CTRUNC when the users (incorrectly)
call us with msg_control == NULL.

Fixes: 8f0b3cc9a4c1 ("tcp: RX path for devmem TCP")
Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry &lt;almasrymina@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@fomichev.me&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250224174401.3582695-1-sdf@fomichev.me
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 18912c520674ec4d920fe3826e7e4fefeecdf5ae ]

Currently, we report -ETOOSMALL (err) only on the first iteration
(!sent). When we get put_cmsg error after a bunch of successful
put_cmsg calls, we don't signal the error at all. This might be
confusing on the userspace side which will see truncated CMSGs
but no MSG_CTRUNC signal.

Consider the following case:
- sizeof(struct cmsghdr) = 16
- sizeof(struct dmabuf_cmsg) = 24
- total cmsg size (CMSG_LEN) = 40 (16+24)

When calling recvmsg with msg_controllen=60, the userspace
will receive two(!) dmabuf_cmsg(s), the first one will
be a valid one and the second one will be silently truncated. There is no
easy way to discover the truncation besides doing something like
"cm-&gt;cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(dmabuf_cmsg))".

Introduce new put_devmem_cmsg wrapper that reports an error instead
of doing the truncation. Mina suggests that it's the intended way
this API should work.

Note that we might now report MSG_CTRUNC when the users (incorrectly)
call us with msg_control == NULL.

Fixes: 8f0b3cc9a4c1 ("tcp: RX path for devmem TCP")
Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry &lt;almasrymina@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@fomichev.me&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250224174401.3582695-1-sdf@fomichev.me
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: drop secpath at the same time as we currently drop dst</title>
<updated>2025-02-27T12:34:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sabrina Dubroca</name>
<email>sd@queasysnail.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-17T10:23:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=69cafd9413084cd5012cf5d7c7ec6f3d493726d9'/>
<id>69cafd9413084cd5012cf5d7c7ec6f3d493726d9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9b6412e6979f6f9e0632075f8f008937b5cd4efd ]

Xiumei reported hitting the WARN in xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit while
running tests that boil down to:
 - create a pair of netns
 - run a basic TCP test over ipcomp6
 - delete the pair of netns

The xfrm_state found on spi_byaddr was not deleted at the time we
delete the netns, because we still have a reference on it. This
lingering reference comes from a secpath (which holds a ref on the
xfrm_state), which is still attached to an skb. This skb is not
leaked, it ends up on sk_receive_queue and then gets defer-free'd by
skb_attempt_defer_free.

The problem happens when we defer freeing an skb (push it on one CPU's
defer_list), and don't flush that list before the netns is deleted. In
that case, we still have a reference on the xfrm_state that we don't
expect at this point.

We already drop the skb's dst in the TCP receive path when it's no
longer needed, so let's also drop the secpath. At this point,
tcp_filter has already called into the LSM hooks that may require the
secpath, so it should not be needed anymore. However, in some of those
places, the MPTCP extension has just been attached to the skb, so we
cannot simply drop all extensions.

Fixes: 68822bdf76f1 ("net: generalize skb freeing deferral to per-cpu lists")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu &lt;xmu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5055ba8f8f72bdcb602faa299faca73c280b7735.1739743613.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9b6412e6979f6f9e0632075f8f008937b5cd4efd ]

Xiumei reported hitting the WARN in xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit while
running tests that boil down to:
 - create a pair of netns
 - run a basic TCP test over ipcomp6
 - delete the pair of netns

The xfrm_state found on spi_byaddr was not deleted at the time we
delete the netns, because we still have a reference on it. This
lingering reference comes from a secpath (which holds a ref on the
xfrm_state), which is still attached to an skb. This skb is not
leaked, it ends up on sk_receive_queue and then gets defer-free'd by
skb_attempt_defer_free.

The problem happens when we defer freeing an skb (push it on one CPU's
defer_list), and don't flush that list before the netns is deleted. In
that case, we still have a reference on the xfrm_state that we don't
expect at this point.

We already drop the skb's dst in the TCP receive path when it's no
longer needed, so let's also drop the secpath. At this point,
tcp_filter has already called into the LSM hooks that may require the
secpath, so it should not be needed anymore. However, in some of those
places, the MPTCP extension has just been attached to the skb, so we
cannot simply drop all extensions.

Fixes: 68822bdf76f1 ("net: generalize skb freeing deferral to per-cpu lists")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu &lt;xmu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5055ba8f8f72bdcb602faa299faca73c280b7735.1739743613.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arp: switch to dev_getbyhwaddr() in arp_req_set_public()</title>
<updated>2025-02-27T12:34:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Breno Leitao</name>
<email>leitao@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-18T13:49:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c021a11158043092d8585e196f27f07a3439604b'/>
<id>c021a11158043092d8585e196f27f07a3439604b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4eae0ee0f1e6256d0b0b9dd6e72f1d9cf8f72e08 ]

The arp_req_set_public() function is called with the rtnl lock held,
which provides enough synchronization protection. This makes the RCU
variant of dev_getbyhwaddr() unnecessary. Switch to using the simpler
dev_getbyhwaddr() function since we already have the required rtnl
locking.

This change helps maintain consistency in the networking code by using
the appropriate helper function for the existing locking context.
Since we're not holding the RCU read lock in arp_req_set_public()
existing code could trigger false positive locking warnings.

Fixes: 941666c2e3e0 ("net: RCU conversion of dev_getbyhwaddr() and arp_ioctl()")
Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250218-arm_fix_selftest-v5-2-d3d6892db9e1@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4eae0ee0f1e6256d0b0b9dd6e72f1d9cf8f72e08 ]

The arp_req_set_public() function is called with the rtnl lock held,
which provides enough synchronization protection. This makes the RCU
variant of dev_getbyhwaddr() unnecessary. Switch to using the simpler
dev_getbyhwaddr() function since we already have the required rtnl
locking.

This change helps maintain consistency in the networking code by using
the appropriate helper function for the existing locking context.
Since we're not holding the RCU read lock in arp_req_set_public()
existing code could trigger false positive locking warnings.

Fixes: 941666c2e3e0 ("net: RCU conversion of dev_getbyhwaddr() and arp_ioctl()")
Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250218-arm_fix_selftest-v5-2-d3d6892db9e1@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
