<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv4, branch linux-4.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: dst_entries_init() per-net dst_ops</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Streetman</name>
<email>dan.streetman@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-29T13:51:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1bd631fc9a4515878c1bb7effd19335d2f2d87c2'/>
<id>1bd631fc9a4515878c1bb7effd19335d2f2d87c2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a8a572a6b5f2a79280d6e302cb3c1cb1fbaeb3e8 ]

Remove the dst_entries_init/destroy calls for xfrm4 and xfrm6 dst_ops
templates; their dst_entries counters will never be used.  Move the
xfrm dst_ops initialization from the common xfrm/xfrm_policy.c to
xfrm4/xfrm4_policy.c and xfrm6/xfrm6_policy.c, and call dst_entries_init
and dst_entries_destroy for each net namespace.

The ipv4 and ipv6 xfrms each create dst_ops template, and perform
dst_entries_init on the templates.  The template values are copied to each
net namespace's xfrm.xfrm*_dst_ops.  The problem there is the dst_ops
pcpuc_entries field is a percpu counter and cannot be used correctly by
simply copying it to another object.

The result of this is a very subtle bug; changes to the dst entries
counter from one net namespace may sometimes get applied to a different
net namespace dst entries counter.  This is because of how the percpu
counter works; it has a main count field as well as a pointer to the
percpu variables.  Each net namespace maintains its own main count
variable, but all point to one set of percpu variables.  When any net
namespace happens to change one of the percpu variables to outside its
small batch range, its count is moved to the net namespace's main count
variable.  So with multiple net namespaces operating concurrently, the
dst_ops entries counter can stray from the actual value that it should
be; if counts are consistently moved from one net namespace to another
(which my testing showed is likely), then one net namespace winds up
with a negative dst_ops count while another winds up with a continually
increasing count, eventually reaching its gc_thresh limit, which causes
all new traffic on the net namespace to fail with -ENOBUFS.

Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;dan.streetman@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a8a572a6b5f2a79280d6e302cb3c1cb1fbaeb3e8 ]

Remove the dst_entries_init/destroy calls for xfrm4 and xfrm6 dst_ops
templates; their dst_entries counters will never be used.  Move the
xfrm dst_ops initialization from the common xfrm/xfrm_policy.c to
xfrm4/xfrm4_policy.c and xfrm6/xfrm6_policy.c, and call dst_entries_init
and dst_entries_destroy for each net namespace.

The ipv4 and ipv6 xfrms each create dst_ops template, and perform
dst_entries_init on the templates.  The template values are copied to each
net namespace's xfrm.xfrm*_dst_ops.  The problem there is the dst_ops
pcpuc_entries field is a percpu counter and cannot be used correctly by
simply copying it to another object.

The result of this is a very subtle bug; changes to the dst entries
counter from one net namespace may sometimes get applied to a different
net namespace dst entries counter.  This is because of how the percpu
counter works; it has a main count field as well as a pointer to the
percpu variables.  Each net namespace maintains its own main count
variable, but all point to one set of percpu variables.  When any net
namespace happens to change one of the percpu variables to outside its
small batch range, its count is moved to the net namespace's main count
variable.  So with multiple net namespaces operating concurrently, the
dst_ops entries counter can stray from the actual value that it should
be; if counts are consistently moved from one net namespace to another
(which my testing showed is likely), then one net namespace winds up
with a negative dst_ops count while another winds up with a continually
increasing count, eventually reaching its gc_thresh limit, which causes
all new traffic on the net namespace to fail with -ENOBUFS.

Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;dan.streetman@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: preserve IP control block during GSO segmentation</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>koct9i@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-08T12:21:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d37c1234ee6d8ba1706b8c24bbd6db6569f61154'/>
<id>d37c1234ee6d8ba1706b8c24bbd6db6569f61154</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9207f9d45b0ad071baa128e846d7e7ed85016df3 ]

Skb_gso_segment() uses skb control block during segmentation.
This patch adds 32-bytes room for previous control block which
will be copied into all resulting segments.

This patch fixes kernel crash during fragmenting forwarded packets.
Fragmentation requires valid IP CB in skb for clearing ip options.
Also patch removes custom save/restore in ovs code, now it's redundant.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;koct9i@gmail.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALYGNiP-0MZ-FExV2HutTvE9U-QQtkKSoE--KN=JQE5STYsjAA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9207f9d45b0ad071baa128e846d7e7ed85016df3 ]

Skb_gso_segment() uses skb control block during segmentation.
This patch adds 32-bytes room for previous control block which
will be copied into all resulting segments.

This patch fixes kernel crash during fragmenting forwarded packets.
Fragmentation requires valid IP CB in skb for clearing ip options.
Also patch removes custom save/restore in ovs code, now it's redundant.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;koct9i@gmail.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALYGNiP-0MZ-FExV2HutTvE9U-QQtkKSoE--KN=JQE5STYsjAA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: disallow UFO for sockets with SO_NO_CHECK option</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Kubeček</name>
<email>mkubecek@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-11T06:50:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=84775578202e13a4f0973dc41f993ddab323fc23'/>
<id>84775578202e13a4f0973dc41f993ddab323fc23</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 40ba330227ad00b8c0cdf2f425736ff9549cc423 ]

Commit acf8dd0a9d0b ("udp: only allow UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM
sockets") disallows UFO for packets sent from raw sockets. We need to do
the same also for SOCK_DGRAM sockets with SO_NO_CHECK options, even if
for a bit different reason: while such socket would override the
CHECKSUM_PARTIAL set by ip_ufo_append_data(), gso_size is still set and
bad offloading flags warning is triggered in __skb_gso_segment().

In the IPv6 case, SO_NO_CHECK option is ignored but we need to disallow
UFO for packets sent by sockets with UDP_NO_CHECK6_TX option.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Shannon Nelson &lt;shannon.nelson@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 40ba330227ad00b8c0cdf2f425736ff9549cc423 ]

Commit acf8dd0a9d0b ("udp: only allow UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM
sockets") disallows UFO for packets sent from raw sockets. We need to do
the same also for SOCK_DGRAM sockets with SO_NO_CHECK options, even if
for a bit different reason: while such socket would override the
CHECKSUM_PARTIAL set by ip_ufo_append_data(), gso_size is still set and
bad offloading flags warning is triggered in __skb_gso_segment().

In the IPv6 case, SO_NO_CHECK option is ignored but we need to disallow
UFO for packets sent by sockets with UDP_NO_CHECK6_TX option.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Shannon Nelson &lt;shannon.nelson@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp_yeah: don't set ssthresh below 2</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neal Cardwell</name>
<email>ncardwell@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-11T18:42:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7f00ec71bd0d4fcd1b8eb56058424cb197cb4b04'/>
<id>7f00ec71bd0d4fcd1b8eb56058424cb197cb4b04</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 83d15e70c4d8909d722c0d64747d8fb42e38a48f ]

For tcp_yeah, use an ssthresh floor of 2, the same floor used by Reno
and CUBIC, per RFC 5681 (equation 4).

tcp_yeah_ssthresh() was sometimes returning a 0 or negative ssthresh
value if the intended reduction is as big or bigger than the current
cwnd. Congestion control modules should never return a zero or
negative ssthresh. A zero ssthresh generally results in a zero cwnd,
causing the connection to stall. A negative ssthresh value will be
interpreted as a u32 and will set a target cwnd for PRR near 4
billion.

Oleksandr Natalenko reported that a system using tcp_yeah with ECN
could see a warning about a prior_cwnd of 0 in
tcp_cwnd_reduction(). Testing verified that this was due to
tcp_yeah_ssthresh() misbehaving in this way.

Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko &lt;oleksandr@natalenko.name&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 83d15e70c4d8909d722c0d64747d8fb42e38a48f ]

For tcp_yeah, use an ssthresh floor of 2, the same floor used by Reno
and CUBIC, per RFC 5681 (equation 4).

tcp_yeah_ssthresh() was sometimes returning a 0 or negative ssthresh
value if the intended reduction is as big or bigger than the current
cwnd. Congestion control modules should never return a zero or
negative ssthresh. A zero ssthresh generally results in a zero cwnd,
causing the connection to stall. A negative ssthresh value will be
interpreted as a u32 and will set a target cwnd for PRR near 4
billion.

Oleksandr Natalenko reported that a system using tcp_yeah with ECN
could see a warning about a prior_cwnd of 0 in
tcp_cwnd_reduction(). Testing verified that this was due to
tcp_yeah_ssthresh() misbehaving in this way.

Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko &lt;oleksandr@natalenko.name&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction</title>
<updated>2016-01-31T19:25:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yuchung Cheng</name>
<email>ycheng@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-06T20:42:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=018f0282a78aac26430b7212cb2ee01348ba06d2'/>
<id>018f0282a78aac26430b7212cb2ee01348ba06d2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8b8a321ff72c785ed5e8b4cf6eda20b35d427390 ]

Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp-&gt;prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().

To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:

1) The proportional reduction mode
   inflight &gt; ssthresh &gt; 0

2) The reduction bound mode
  a) inflight == ssthresh &gt; 0

  b) inflight &lt; ssthresh
     sndcnt &gt; 0 since newly_acked_sacked &gt; 0 and inflight &lt; ssthresh

Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp-&gt;prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.

In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events.  For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.

Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko &lt;oleksandr@natalenko.name&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8b8a321ff72c785ed5e8b4cf6eda20b35d427390 ]

Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp-&gt;prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().

To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:

1) The proportional reduction mode
   inflight &gt; ssthresh &gt; 0

2) The reduction bound mode
  a) inflight == ssthresh &gt; 0

  b) inflight &lt; ssthresh
     sndcnt &gt; 0 since newly_acked_sacked &gt; 0 and inflight &lt; ssthresh

Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp-&gt;prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.

In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events.  For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.

Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko &lt;oleksandr@natalenko.name&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: restore fastopen with no data in SYN packet</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-16T21:53:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0dcec07ab11d3d4c444a058f2a6c0896a4c26eb8'/>
<id>0dcec07ab11d3d4c444a058f2a6c0896a4c26eb8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 07e100f984975cb0417a7d5e626d0409efbad478 ]

Yuchung tracked a regression caused by commit 57be5bdad759 ("ip: convert
tcp_sendmsg() to iov_iter primitives") for TCP Fast Open.

Some Fast Open users do not actually add any data in the SYN packet.

Fixes: 57be5bdad759 ("ip: convert tcp_sendmsg() to iov_iter primitives")
Reported-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 07e100f984975cb0417a7d5e626d0409efbad478 ]

Yuchung tracked a regression caused by commit 57be5bdad759 ("ip: convert
tcp_sendmsg() to iov_iter primitives") for TCP Fast Open.

Some Fast Open users do not actually add any data in the SYN packet.

Fixes: 57be5bdad759 ("ip: convert tcp_sendmsg() to iov_iter primitives")
Reported-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fou: clean up socket with kfree_rcu</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-15T20:01:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1dc0f7538f3985522397587e10eb1a0eb29d7342'/>
<id>1dc0f7538f3985522397587e10eb1a0eb29d7342</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3036facbb7be3a169e35be3b271162b0fa564a2d ]

fou-&gt;udp_offloads is managed by RCU. As it is actually included inside
the fou sockets, we cannot let the memory go out of scope before a grace
period. We either can synchronize_rcu or switch over to kfree_rcu to
manage the sockets. kfree_rcu seems appropriate as it is used by vxlan
and geneve.

Fixes: 23461551c00628c ("fou: Support for foo-over-udp RX path")
Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;tom@herbertland.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3036facbb7be3a169e35be3b271162b0fa564a2d ]

fou-&gt;udp_offloads is managed by RCU. As it is actually included inside
the fou sockets, we cannot let the memory go out of scope before a grace
period. We either can synchronize_rcu or switch over to kfree_rcu to
manage the sockets. kfree_rcu seems appropriate as it is used by vxlan
and geneve.

Fixes: 23461551c00628c ("fou: Support for foo-over-udp RX path")
Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;tom@herbertland.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix IP early demux races</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-14T22:08:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7c15a1d61dd56273786b0799d4eaa940739c8d56'/>
<id>7c15a1d61dd56273786b0799d4eaa940739c8d56</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5037e9ef9454917b047f9f3a19b4dd179fbf7cd4 ]

David Wilder reported crashes caused by dst reuse.

&lt;quote David&gt;
  I am seeing a crash on a distro V4.2.3 kernel caused by a double
  release of a dst_entry.  In ipv4_dst_destroy() the call to
  list_empty() finds a poisoned next pointer, indicating the dst_entry
  has already been removed from the list and freed. The crash occurs
  18 to 24 hours into a run of a network stress exerciser.
&lt;/quote&gt;

Thanks to his detailed report and analysis, we were able to understand
the core issue.

IP early demux can associate a dst to skb, after a lookup in TCP/UDP
sockets.

When socket cache is not properly set, we want to store into
sk-&gt;sk_dst_cache the dst for future IP early demux lookups,
by acquiring a stable refcount on the dst.

Problem is this acquisition is simply using an atomic_inc(),
which works well, unless the dst was queued for destruction from
dst_release() noticing dst refcount went to zero, if DST_NOCACHE
was set on dst.

We need to make sure current refcount is not zero before incrementing
it, or risk double free as David reported.

This patch, being a stable candidate, adds two new helpers, and use
them only from IP early demux problematic paths.

It might be possible to merge in net-next skb_dst_force() and
skb_dst_force_safe(), but I prefer having the smallest patch for stable
kernels : Maybe some skb_dst_force() callers do not expect skb-&gt;dst
can suddenly be cleared.

Can probably be backported back to linux-3.6 kernels

Reported-by: David J. Wilder &lt;dwilder@us.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: David J. Wilder &lt;dwilder@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5037e9ef9454917b047f9f3a19b4dd179fbf7cd4 ]

David Wilder reported crashes caused by dst reuse.

&lt;quote David&gt;
  I am seeing a crash on a distro V4.2.3 kernel caused by a double
  release of a dst_entry.  In ipv4_dst_destroy() the call to
  list_empty() finds a poisoned next pointer, indicating the dst_entry
  has already been removed from the list and freed. The crash occurs
  18 to 24 hours into a run of a network stress exerciser.
&lt;/quote&gt;

Thanks to his detailed report and analysis, we were able to understand
the core issue.

IP early demux can associate a dst to skb, after a lookup in TCP/UDP
sockets.

When socket cache is not properly set, we want to store into
sk-&gt;sk_dst_cache the dst for future IP early demux lookups,
by acquiring a stable refcount on the dst.

Problem is this acquisition is simply using an atomic_inc(),
which works well, unless the dst was queued for destruction from
dst_release() noticing dst refcount went to zero, if DST_NOCACHE
was set on dst.

We need to make sure current refcount is not zero before incrementing
it, or risk double free as David reported.

This patch, being a stable candidate, adds two new helpers, and use
them only from IP early demux problematic paths.

It might be possible to merge in net-next skb_dst_force() and
skb_dst_force_safe(), but I prefer having the smallest patch for stable
kernels : Maybe some skb_dst_force() callers do not expect skb-&gt;dst
can suddenly be cleared.

Can probably be backported back to linux-3.6 kernels

Reported-by: David J. Wilder &lt;dwilder@us.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: David J. Wilder &lt;dwilder@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument</title>
<updated>2016-01-23T04:55:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-14T21:03:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=14d44ee8fe6872c27d97ced4bd65420001c4b0ca'/>
<id>14d44ee8fe6872c27d97ced4bd65420001c4b0ca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 ]

郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:

	int socket_fd;
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	addr.sin_port = 0;
	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
	addr.sin_family = 10;

	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
	connect(socket_fd , &amp;addr,16);

AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.

This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.

kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db90e&gt;] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db9a4&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645069&gt;] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810ac51b&gt;] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810236d8&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645e0e&gt;] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81779515&gt;] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89

I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.

CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Reported-by: 郭永刚 &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 ]

郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:

	int socket_fd;
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	addr.sin_port = 0;
	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
	addr.sin_family = 10;

	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
	connect(socket_fd , &amp;addr,16);

AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.

This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.

kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db90e&gt;] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db9a4&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645069&gt;] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810ac51b&gt;] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810236d8&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645e0e&gt;] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81779515&gt;] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89

I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.

CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Reported-by: 郭永刚 &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table destruction</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T05:41:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikolay Aleksandrov</name>
<email>nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-20T12:54:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=47f706657d85e1fbfb2e5ed8c7b90ff880bd4d6e'/>
<id>47f706657d85e1fbfb2e5ed8c7b90ff880bd4d6e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0e615e9601a15efeeb8942cf7cd4dadba0c8c5a7 ]

When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static
devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed
(because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example:
unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192):
  comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff  .S.4.....S.4....
    ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [&lt;ffffffff815c1b9e&gt;] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
    [&lt;ffffffff811ea6e0&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300
    [&lt;ffffffff815931cb&gt;] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910
    [&lt;ffffffff8153d575&gt;] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0
    [&lt;ffffffff8153e490&gt;] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
    [&lt;ffffffff81564e13&gt;] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90
    [&lt;ffffffff814d1e14&gt;] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
    [&lt;ffffffff814d0b51&gt;] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0
    [&lt;ffffffff815cdbf6&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
    [&lt;ffffffffffffffff&gt;] 0xffffffffffffffff

Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction.

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0e615e9601a15efeeb8942cf7cd4dadba0c8c5a7 ]

When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static
devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed
(because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example:
unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192):
  comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff  .S.4.....S.4....
    ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [&lt;ffffffff815c1b9e&gt;] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
    [&lt;ffffffff811ea6e0&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300
    [&lt;ffffffff815931cb&gt;] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910
    [&lt;ffffffff8153d575&gt;] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0
    [&lt;ffffffff8153e490&gt;] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
    [&lt;ffffffff81564e13&gt;] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90
    [&lt;ffffffff814d1e14&gt;] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
    [&lt;ffffffff814d0b51&gt;] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0
    [&lt;ffffffff815cdbf6&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
    [&lt;ffffffffffffffff&gt;] 0xffffffffffffffff

Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction.

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
