linux-stable.git/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c, branch linux-4.17.y

tcp: ack immediately when a cwr packet arrives

2018-08-03T05:48:06+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9aee40006190a3cda9a4d2dbae71e92617c8c362 ]

We observed high 99 and 99.9% latencies when doing RPCs with DCTCP. The
problem is triggered when the last packet of a request arrives CE
marked. The reply will carry the ECE mark causing TCP to shrink its cwnd
to 1 (because there are no packets in flight). When the 1st packet of
the next request arrives, the ACK was sometimes delayed even though it
is CWR marked, adding up to 40ms to the RPC latency.

This patch insures that CWR marked data packets arriving will be acked
immediately.

Packetdrill script to reproduce the problem:

0.000 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
0.000 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
0.000 setsockopt(3, SOL_TCP, TCP_CONGESTION, "dctcp", 5) = 0
0.000 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
0.000 listen(3, 1) = 0

0.100 < [ect0] SEW 0:0(0) win 32792 
0.100 > SE. 0:0(0) ack 1 
0.110 < [ect0] . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257
0.200 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4

0.200 < [ect0] . 1:1001(1000) ack 1 win 257
0.200 > [ect01] . 1:1(0) ack 1001

0.200 write(4, ..., 1) = 1
0.200 > [ect01] P. 1:2(1) ack 1001

0.200 < [ect0] . 1001:2001(1000) ack 2 win 257
0.200 write(4, ..., 1) = 1
0.200 > [ect01] P. 2:3(1) ack 2001

0.200 < [ect0] . 2001:3001(1000) ack 3 win 257
0.200 < [ect0] . 3001:4001(1000) ack 3 win 257
0.200 > [ect01] . 3:3(0) ack 4001

0.210 < [ce] P. 4001:4501(500) ack 3 win 257

+0.001 read(4, ..., 4500) = 4500
+0 write(4, ..., 1) = 1
+0 > [ect01] PE. 3:4(1) ack 4501

+0.010 < [ect0] W. 4501:5501(1000) ack 4 win 257
// Previously the ACK sequence below would be 4501, causing a long RTO
+0.040~+0.045 > [ect01] . 4:4(0) ack 5501   // delayed ack

+0.311 < [ect0] . 5501:6501(1000) ack 4 win 257  // More data
+0 > [ect01] . 4:4(0) ack 6501     // now acks everything

+0.500 < F. 9501:9501(0) ack 4 win 257

Modified based on comments by Neal Cardwell 

Signed-off-by: Lawrence Brakmo 
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell 
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: add one more quick ack after after ECN events

2018-08-03T05:48:06+00:00

[ Upstream commit 15ecbe94a45ef88491ca459b26efdd02f91edb6d ]

Larry Brakmo proposal ( https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/935233/
tcp: force cwnd at least 2 in tcp_cwnd_reduction) made us rethink
about our recent patch removing ~16 quick acks after ECN events.

tcp_enter_quickack_mode(sk, 1) makes sure one immediate ack is sent,
but in the case the sender cwnd was lowered to 1, we do not want
to have a delayed ack for the next packet we will receive.

Fixes: 522040ea5fdd ("tcp: do not aggressively quick ack after ECN events")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell 
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo 
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: refactor tcp_ecn_check_ce to remove sk type cast

2018-08-03T05:48:06+00:00

[ Upstream commit f4c9f85f3b2cb7669830cd04d0be61192a4d2436 ]

Refactor tcp_ecn_check_ce and __tcp_ecn_check_ce to accept struct sock*
instead of tcp_sock* to clean up type casts. This is a pure refactor
patch.

Signed-off-by: Yousuk Seung 
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell 
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: do not aggressively quick ack after ECN events

2018-08-03T05:48:06+00:00

[ Upstream commit 522040ea5fdd1c33bbf75e1d7c7c0422b96a94ef ]

ECN signals currently forces TCP to enter quickack mode for
up to 16 (TCP_MAX_QUICKACKS) following incoming packets.

We believe this is not needed, and only sending one immediate ack
for the current packet should be enough.

This should reduce the extra load noticed in DCTCP environments,
after congestion events.

This is part 2 of our effort to reduce pure ACK packets.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: add max_quickacks param to tcp_incr_quickack and tcp_enter_quickack_mode

2018-08-03T05:48:06+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9a9c9b51e54618861420093ae6e9b50a961914c5 ]

We want to add finer control of the number of ACK packets sent after
ECN events.

This patch is not changing current behavior, it only enables following
change.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: do not force quickack when receiving out-of-order packets

2018-08-03T05:48:06+00:00

[ Upstream commit a3893637e1eb0ef5eb1bbc52b3a8d2dfa317a35d ]

As explained in commit 9f9843a751d0 ("tcp: properly handle stretch
acks in slow start"), TCP stacks have to consider how many packets
are acknowledged in one single ACK, because of GRO, but also
because of ACK compression or losses.

We plan to add SACK compression in the following patch, we
must therefore not call tcp_enter_quickack_mode()

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: add tcp_ooo_try_coalesce() helper

2018-07-28T05:57:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit 58152ecbbcc6a0ce7fddd5bf5f6ee535834ece0c ]

In case skb in out_or_order_queue is the result of
multiple skbs coalescing, we would like to get a proper gso_segs
counter tracking, so that future tcp_drop() can report an accurate
number.

I chose to not implement this tracking for skbs in receive queue,
since they are not dropped, unless socket is disconnected.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: call tcp_drop() from tcp_data_queue_ofo()

2018-07-28T05:57:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8541b21e781a22dce52a74fef0b9bed00404a1cd ]

In order to be able to give better diagnostics and detect
malicious traffic, we need to have better sk->sk_drops tracking.

Fixes: 9f5afeae5152 ("tcp: use an RB tree for ooo receive queue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: detect malicious patterns in tcp_collapse_ofo_queue()

2018-07-28T05:57:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3d4bf93ac12003f9b8e1e2de37fe27983deebdcf ]

In case an attacker feeds tiny packets completely out of order,
tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() might scan the whole rb-tree, performing
expensive copies, but not changing socket memory usage at all.

1) Do not attempt to collapse tiny skbs.
2) Add logic to exit early when too many tiny skbs are detected.

We prefer not doing aggressive collapsing (which copies packets)
for pathological flows, and revert to tcp_prune_ofo_queue() which
will be less expensive.

In the future, we might add the possibility of terminating flows
that are proven to be malicious.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: avoid collapses in tcp_prune_queue() if possible

2018-07-28T05:57:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit f4a3313d8e2ca9fd8d8f45e40a2903ba782607e7 ]

Right after a TCP flow is created, receiving tiny out of order
packets allways hit the condition :

if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
	tcp_clamp_window(sk);

tcp_clamp_window() increases sk_rcvbuf to match sk_rmem_alloc
(guarded by tcp_rmem[2])

Calling tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() in this case is not useful,
and offers a O(N^2) surface attack to malicious peers.

Better not attempt anything before full queue capacity is reached,
forcing attacker to spend lots of resource and allow us to more
easily detect the abuse.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman