<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/ipv4/proc.c, branch v4.4.232</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:54:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-16T00:40:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ad472d3a9483abc155e1644ad740cd8c039b5170'/>
<id>ad472d3a9483abc155e1644ad740cd8c039b5170</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f070ef2ac66716357066b683fb0baf55f8191a2e upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.

TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
of retransmit queue.

A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.

Note that this counter might increase in the case applications
use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf.

CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the
	socket is already using more than half the allowed space

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f070ef2ac66716357066b683fb0baf55f8191a2e upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.

TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
of retransmit queue.

A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.

Note that this counter might increase in the case applications
use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf.

CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the
	socket is already using more than half the allowed space

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip: discard IPv4 datagrams with overlapping segments.</title>
<updated>2019-02-08T10:25:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Oskolkov</name>
<email>posk@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-10T19:30:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ef0f963de1d2c5bc99d3d6ace3dd44a7d6002717'/>
<id>ef0f963de1d2c5bc99d3d6ace3dd44a7d6002717</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7969e5c40dfd04799d4341f1b7cd266b6e47f227 upstream.

This behavior is required in IPv6, and there is little need
to tolerate overlapping fragments in IPv4. This change
simplifies the code and eliminates potential DDoS attack vectors.

Tested: ran ip_defrag selftest (not yet available uptream).

Suggested-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Oskolkov &lt;posk@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;stephen@networkplumber.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan &lt;maowenan@huawei.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - s/__IP_INC_STATS/IP_INC_STATS_BH/
 - Deleted code is slightly different]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7969e5c40dfd04799d4341f1b7cd266b6e47f227 upstream.

This behavior is required in IPv6, and there is little need
to tolerate overlapping fragments in IPv4. This change
simplifies the code and eliminates potential DDoS attack vectors.

Tested: ran ip_defrag selftest (not yet available uptream).

Suggested-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Oskolkov &lt;posk@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;stephen@networkplumber.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan &lt;maowenan@huawei.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - s/__IP_INC_STATS/IP_INC_STATS_BH/
 - Deleted code is slightly different]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: frags: break the 2GB limit for frags storage</title>
<updated>2019-02-08T10:25:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-10T19:30:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=567ef0554b91de121e9c1ad6b30d0077a5ea1fbf'/>
<id>567ef0554b91de121e9c1ad6b30d0077a5ea1fbf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3e67f106f619dcfaf6f4e2039599bdb69848c714 upstream.

Some users are willing to provision huge amounts of memory to be able
to perform reassembly reasonnably well under pressure.

Current memory tracking is using one atomic_t and integers.

Switch to atomic_long_t so that 64bit arches can use more than 2GB,
without any cost for 32bit arches.

Note that this patch avoids an overflow error, if high_thresh was set
to ~2GB, since this test in inet_frag_alloc() was never true :

if (... || frag_mem_limit(nf) &gt; nf-&gt;high_thresh)

Tested:

$ echo 16000000000 &gt;/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ipfrag_high_thresh

&lt;frag DDOS&gt;

$ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat
FRAG: inuse 14705885 memory 16000002880

$ nstat -n ; sleep 1 ; nstat | grep Reas
IpReasmReqds                    3317150            0.0
IpReasmFails                    3317112            0.0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3e67f106f619dcfaf6f4e2039599bdb69848c714 upstream.

Some users are willing to provision huge amounts of memory to be able
to perform reassembly reasonnably well under pressure.

Current memory tracking is using one atomic_t and integers.

Switch to atomic_long_t so that 64bit arches can use more than 2GB,
without any cost for 32bit arches.

Note that this patch avoids an overflow error, if high_thresh was set
to ~2GB, since this test in inet_frag_alloc() was never true :

if (... || frag_mem_limit(nf) &gt; nf-&gt;high_thresh)

Tested:

$ echo 16000000000 &gt;/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ipfrag_high_thresh

&lt;frag DDOS&gt;

$ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat
FRAG: inuse 14705885 memory 16000002880

$ nstat -n ; sleep 1 ; nstat | grep Reas
IpReasmReqds                    3317150            0.0
IpReasmFails                    3317112            0.0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: frags: remove some helpers</title>
<updated>2019-02-08T10:25:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-10T19:29:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cf2b9e68a684bf8dd6c1a7671f59faaab8e4ca2c'/>
<id>cf2b9e68a684bf8dd6c1a7671f59faaab8e4ca2c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6befe4a78b1553edb6eed3a78b4bcd9748526672 upstream.

Remove sum_frag_mem_limit(), ip_frag_mem() &amp; ip6_frag_mem()

Also since we use rhashtable we can bring back the number of fragments
in "grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat /proc/net/sockstat6" that was
removed in commit 434d305405ab ("inet: frag: don't account number
of fragment queues")

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6befe4a78b1553edb6eed3a78b4bcd9748526672 upstream.

Remove sum_frag_mem_limit(), ip_frag_mem() &amp; ip6_frag_mem()

Also since we use rhashtable we can bring back the number of fragments
in "grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat /proc/net/sockstat6" that was
removed in commit 434d305405ab ("inet: frag: don't account number
of fragment queues")

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: track success and failure of TCP PMTU probing</title>
<updated>2015-07-22T05:36:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rick Jones</name>
<email>rick.jones2@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-21T23:14:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b56ea2985d389a3676638203323ebe22c261b7fe'/>
<id>b56ea2985d389a3676638203323ebe22c261b7fe</id>
<content type='text'>
Track success and failure of TCP PMTU probing.

Signed-off-by: Rick Jones &lt;rick.jones2@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Track success and failure of TCP PMTU probing.

Signed-off-by: Rick Jones &lt;rick.jones2@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: add TCPWinProbe and TCPKeepAlive SNMP counters</title>
<updated>2015-05-09T20:42:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-06T21:26:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e520af48c7e5acae5f17f82a79ba7ab7cf156f3b'/>
<id>e520af48c7e5acae5f17f82a79ba7ab7cf156f3b</id>
<content type='text'>
Diagnosing problems related to Window Probes has been hard because
we lack a counter.

TCPWinProbe counts the number of ACK packets a sender has to send
at regular intervals to make sure a reverse ACK packet opening back
a window had not been lost.

TCPKeepAlive counts the number of ACK packets sent to keep TCP
flows alive (SO_KEEPALIVE)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nandita Dukkipati &lt;nanditad@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Diagnosing problems related to Window Probes has been hard because
we lack a counter.

TCPWinProbe counts the number of ACK packets a sender has to send
at regular intervals to make sure a reverse ACK packet opening back
a window had not been lost.

TCPKeepAlive counts the number of ACK packets sent to keep TCP
flows alive (SO_KEEPALIVE)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nandita Dukkipati &lt;nanditad@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp/dccp: get rid of central timewait timer</title>
<updated>2015-04-13T20:40:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-13T01:51:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=789f558cfb3680aeb52de137418637f6b04b7d22'/>
<id>789f558cfb3680aeb52de137418637f6b04b7d22</id>
<content type='text'>
Using a timer wheel for timewait sockets was nice ~15 years ago when
memory was expensive and machines had a single processor.

This does not scale, code is ugly and source of huge latencies
(Typically 30 ms have been seen, cpus spinning on death_lock spinlock.)

We can afford to use an extra 64 bytes per timewait sock and spread
timewait load to all cpus to have better behavior.

Tested:

On following test, /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tw_recycle is set to 1
on the target (lpaa24)

Before patch :

lpaa23:~# ./super_netperf 200 -H lpaa24 -t TCP_CC -l 60 -- -p0,0
419594

lpaa23:~# ./super_netperf 200 -H lpaa24 -t TCP_CC -l 60 -- -p0,0
437171

While test is running, we can observe 25 or even 33 ms latencies.

lpaa24:~# ping -c 1000 -i 0.02 -qn lpaa23
...
1000 packets transmitted, 1000 received, 0% packet loss, time 20601ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.020/0.217/25.771/1.535 ms, pipe 2

lpaa24:~# ping -c 1000 -i 0.02 -qn lpaa23
...
1000 packets transmitted, 1000 received, 0% packet loss, time 20702ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.019/0.183/33.761/1.441 ms, pipe 2

After patch :

About 90% increase of throughput :

lpaa23:~# ./super_netperf 200 -H lpaa24 -t TCP_CC -l 60 -- -p0,0
810442

lpaa23:~# ./super_netperf 200 -H lpaa24 -t TCP_CC -l 60 -- -p0,0
800992

And latencies are kept to minimal values during this load, even
if network utilization is 90% higher :

lpaa24:~# ping -c 1000 -i 0.02 -qn lpaa23
...
1000 packets transmitted, 1000 received, 0% packet loss, time 19991ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.023/0.064/0.360/0.042 ms

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Using a timer wheel for timewait sockets was nice ~15 years ago when
memory was expensive and machines had a single processor.

This does not scale, code is ugly and source of huge latencies
(Typically 30 ms have been seen, cpus spinning on death_lock spinlock.)

We can afford to use an extra 64 bytes per timewait sock and spread
timewait load to all cpus to have better behavior.

Tested:

On following test, /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tw_recycle is set to 1
on the target (lpaa24)

Before patch :

lpaa23:~# ./super_netperf 200 -H lpaa24 -t TCP_CC -l 60 -- -p0,0
419594

lpaa23:~# ./super_netperf 200 -H lpaa24 -t TCP_CC -l 60 -- -p0,0
437171

While test is running, we can observe 25 or even 33 ms latencies.

lpaa24:~# ping -c 1000 -i 0.02 -qn lpaa23
...
1000 packets transmitted, 1000 received, 0% packet loss, time 20601ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.020/0.217/25.771/1.535 ms, pipe 2

lpaa24:~# ping -c 1000 -i 0.02 -qn lpaa23
...
1000 packets transmitted, 1000 received, 0% packet loss, time 20702ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.019/0.183/33.761/1.441 ms, pipe 2

After patch :

About 90% increase of throughput :

lpaa23:~# ./super_netperf 200 -H lpaa24 -t TCP_CC -l 60 -- -p0,0
810442

lpaa23:~# ./super_netperf 200 -H lpaa24 -t TCP_CC -l 60 -- -p0,0
800992

And latencies are kept to minimal values during this load, even
if network utilization is 90% higher :

lpaa24:~# ping -c 1000 -i 0.02 -qn lpaa23
...
1000 packets transmitted, 1000 received, 0% packet loss, time 19991ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.023/0.064/0.360/0.042 ms

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: helpers to mitigate ACK loops by rate-limiting out-of-window dupacks</title>
<updated>2015-02-08T09:03:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neal Cardwell</name>
<email>ncardwell@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-06T21:04:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=032ee4236954eb214651cb9bfc1b38ffa8fd7a01'/>
<id>032ee4236954eb214651cb9bfc1b38ffa8fd7a01</id>
<content type='text'>
Helpers for mitigating ACK loops by rate-limiting dupacks sent in
response to incoming out-of-window packets.

This patch includes:

- rate-limiting logic
- sysctl to control how often we allow dupacks to out-of-window packets
- SNMP counter for cases where we rate-limited our dupack sending

The rate-limiting logic in this patch decides to not send dupacks in
response to out-of-window segments if (a) they are SYNs or pure ACKs
and (b) the remote endpoint is sending them faster than the configured
rate limit.

We rate-limit our responses rather than blocking them entirely or
resetting the connection, because legitimate connections can rely on
dupacks in response to some out-of-window segments. For example, zero
window probes are typically sent with a sequence number that is below
the current window, and ZWPs thus expect to thus elicit a dupack in
response.

We allow dupacks in response to TCP segments with data, because these
may be spurious retransmissions for which the remote endpoint wants to
receive DSACKs. This is safe because segments with data can't
realistically be part of ACK loops, which by their nature consist of
each side sending pure/data-less ACKs to each other.

The dupack interval is controlled by a new sysctl knob,
tcp_invalid_ratelimit, given in milliseconds, in case an administrator
needs to dial this upward in the face of a high-rate DoS attack. The
name and units are chosen to be analogous to the existing analogous
knob for ICMP, icmp_ratelimit.

The default value for tcp_invalid_ratelimit is 500ms, which allows at
most one such dupack per 500ms. This is chosen to be 2x faster than
the 1-second minimum RTO interval allowed by RFC 6298 (section 2, rule
2.4). We allow the extra 2x factor because network delay variations
can cause packets sent at 1 second intervals to be compressed and
arrive much closer.

Reported-by: Avery Fay &lt;avery@mixpanel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Helpers for mitigating ACK loops by rate-limiting dupacks sent in
response to incoming out-of-window packets.

This patch includes:

- rate-limiting logic
- sysctl to control how often we allow dupacks to out-of-window packets
- SNMP counter for cases where we rate-limited our dupack sending

The rate-limiting logic in this patch decides to not send dupacks in
response to out-of-window segments if (a) they are SYNs or pure ACKs
and (b) the remote endpoint is sending them faster than the configured
rate limit.

We rate-limit our responses rather than blocking them entirely or
resetting the connection, because legitimate connections can rely on
dupacks in response to some out-of-window segments. For example, zero
window probes are typically sent with a sequence number that is below
the current window, and ZWPs thus expect to thus elicit a dupack in
response.

We allow dupacks in response to TCP segments with data, because these
may be spurious retransmissions for which the remote endpoint wants to
receive DSACKs. This is safe because segments with data can't
realistically be part of ACK loops, which by their nature consist of
each side sending pure/data-less ACKs to each other.

The dupack interval is controlled by a new sysctl knob,
tcp_invalid_ratelimit, given in milliseconds, in case an administrator
needs to dial this upward in the face of a high-rate DoS attack. The
name and units are chosen to be analogous to the existing analogous
knob for ICMP, icmp_ratelimit.

The default value for tcp_invalid_ratelimit is 500ms, which allows at
most one such dupack per 500ms. This is chosen to be 2x faster than
the 1-second minimum RTO interval allowed by RFC 6298 (section 2, rule
2.4). We allow the extra 2x factor because network delay variations
can cause packets sent at 1 second intervals to be compressed and
arrive much closer.

Reported-by: Avery Fay &lt;avery@mixpanel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp_cubic: add SNMP counters to track how effective is Hystart</title>
<updated>2014-12-09T19:58:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-05T00:13:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6e3a8a937c2f86ee0b2d354808fc026a143b4518'/>
<id>6e3a8a937c2f86ee0b2d354808fc026a143b4518</id>
<content type='text'>
When deploying FQ pacing, one thing we noticed is that CUBIC Hystart
triggers too soon.

Having SNMP counters to have an idea of how often the various Hystart
methods trigger is useful prior to any modifications.

This patch adds SNMP counters tracking, how many time "ack train" or
"Delay" based Hystart triggers, and cumulative sum of cwnd at the time
Hystart decided to end SS (Slow Start)

myhost:~# nstat -a | grep Hystart
TcpExtTCPHystartTrainDetect     9                  0.0
TcpExtTCPHystartTrainCwnd       20650              0.0
TcpExtTCPHystartDelayDetect     10                 0.0
TcpExtTCPHystartDelayCwnd       360                0.0

-&gt;
 Train detection was triggered 9 times, and average cwnd was
 20650/9=2294,
 Delay detection was triggered 10 times and average cwnd was 36

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When deploying FQ pacing, one thing we noticed is that CUBIC Hystart
triggers too soon.

Having SNMP counters to have an idea of how often the various Hystart
methods trigger is useful prior to any modifications.

This patch adds SNMP counters tracking, how many time "ack train" or
"Delay" based Hystart triggers, and cumulative sum of cwnd at the time
Hystart decided to end SS (Slow Start)

myhost:~# nstat -a | grep Hystart
TcpExtTCPHystartTrainDetect     9                  0.0
TcpExtTCPHystartTrainCwnd       20650              0.0
TcpExtTCPHystartDelayDetect     10                 0.0
TcpExtTCPHystartDelayCwnd       360                0.0

-&gt;
 Train detection was triggered 9 times, and average cwnd was
 20650/9=2294,
 Delay detection was triggered 10 times and average cwnd was 36

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: Increment UDP_MIB_IGNOREDMULTI for arriving unmatched multicasts</title>
<updated>2014-11-07T20:45:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rick Jones</name>
<email>rick.jones2@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-06T18:37:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36cbb2452cbafca64dcdd3578047433787900cf0'/>
<id>36cbb2452cbafca64dcdd3578047433787900cf0</id>
<content type='text'>
As NIC multicast filtering isn't perfect, and some platforms are
quite content to spew broadcasts, we should not trigger an event
for skb:kfree_skb when we do not have a match for such an incoming
datagram.  We do though want to avoid sweeping the matter under the
rug entirely, so increment a suitable statistic.

This incorporates feedback from David L. Stevens, Karl Neiss and Eric
Dumazet.

V3 - use bool per David Miller

Signed-off-by: Rick Jones &lt;rick.jones2@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As NIC multicast filtering isn't perfect, and some platforms are
quite content to spew broadcasts, we should not trigger an event
for skb:kfree_skb when we do not have a match for such an incoming
datagram.  We do though want to avoid sweeping the matter under the
rug entirely, so increment a suitable statistic.

This incorporates feedback from David L. Stevens, Karl Neiss and Eric
Dumazet.

V3 - use bool per David Miller

Signed-off-by: Rick Jones &lt;rick.jones2@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
