linux-stable.git/net/ipv4/ipmr.c, branch linux-4.9.y

ipmr,ip6mr: acquire RTNL before calling ip[6]mr_free_table() on failure path

2022-02-16T11:43:53+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5611a00697c8ecc5aad04392bea629e9d6a20463 ]

ip[6]mr_free_table() can only be called under RTNL lock.

RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (10367)
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5890 at net/core/dev.c:10367 unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5890 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller-11627-g422ee58dc0ef #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367
Code: 0f 85 9b ee ff ff e8 69 07 4b fa ba 7f 28 00 00 48 c7 c6 00 90 ae 8a 48 c7 c7 40 90 ae 8a c6 05 6d b1 51 06 01 e8 8c 90 d8 01 <0f> 0b e9 70 ee ff ff e8 3e 07 4b fa 4c 89 e7 e8 86 2a 59 fa e9 ee
RSP: 0018:ffffc900046ff6e0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888050f51d00 RSI: ffffffff815fa008 RDI: fffff520008dfece
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815f3d6e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff4
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc900046ff750 R15: ffff88807b7dc000
FS:  00007f4ab736e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fee0b4f8990 CR3: 000000001e7d2000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 
 mroute_clean_tables+0x244/0xb40 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1509
 ip6mr_free_table net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:389 [inline]
 ip6mr_rules_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:246 [inline]
 ip6mr_net_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1306 [inline]
 ip6mr_net_init+0x3f0/0x4e0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1298
 ops_init+0xaf/0x470 net/core/net_namespace.c:140
 setup_net+0x54f/0xbb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:331
 copy_net_ns+0x318/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:475
 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
 copy_namespaces+0x391/0x450 kernel/nsproxy.c:178
 copy_process+0x2e0c/0x7300 kernel/fork.c:2167
 kernel_clone+0xe7/0xab0 kernel/fork.c:2555
 __do_sys_clone+0xc8/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2672
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f4ab89f9059
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7f4ab89f902f.
RSP: 002b:00007f4ab736e118 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4ab8b0bf60 RCX: 00007f4ab89f9059
RDX: 0000000020000280 RSI: 0000000020000270 RDI: 0000000040200000
RBP: 00007f4ab8a5308d R08: 0000000020000300 R09: 0000000020000300
R10: 00000000200002c0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc3977cc1f R14: 00007f4ab736e300 R15: 0000000000022000
 

Fixes: f243e5a7859a ("ipmr,ip6mr: call ip6mr_free_table() on failure path")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Cong Wang 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220208053451.2885398-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ipv4: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability

2019-01-09T15:16:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5648451e30a0d13d11796574919a359025d52cce ]

vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table'

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipmr: vrf: Find VIFs using the actual device

2018-04-13T17:47:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit bcfc7d33110b0f33069d74138eeb7ca9acbb3c85 ]

The skb->dev that is passed into ip_mr_input is
the loX device for VRFs. When we lookup a vif
for this dev, none is found as we do not create
vifs for loopbacks. Instead lookup a vif for the
actual device that the packet was received on,
eg the vlan.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Winter 
cc: David Ahern 
cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov 
cc: roopa 
Acked-by: David Ahern 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv4: allow local fragmentation in ip_finish_output_gso()

2016-11-03T20:10:26+00:00

Some configurations (e.g. geneve interface with default
MTU of 1500 over an ethernet interface with 1500 MTU) result
in the transmission of packets that exceed the configured MTU.
While this should be considered to be a "bad" configuration,
it is still allowed and should not result in the sending
of packets that exceed the configured MTU.

Fix by dropping the assumption in ip_finish_output_gso() that
locally originated gso packets will never need fragmentation.
Basic testing using iperf (observing CPU usage and bandwidth)
have shown no measurable performance impact for traffic not
requiring fragmentation.

Fixes: c7ba65d7b649 ("net: ip: push gso skb forwarding handling down the stack")
Reported-by: Jan Tluka 
Signed-off-by: Lance Richardson 
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

ipmr, ip6mr: fix scheduling while atomic and a deadlock with ipmr_get_route

2016-09-26T03:41:39+00:00

Since the commit below the ipmr/ip6mr rtnl_unicast() code uses the portid
instead of the previous dst_pid which was copied from in_skb's portid.
Since the skb is new the portid is 0 at that point so the packets are sent
to the kernel and we get scheduling while atomic or a deadlock (depending
on where it happens) by trying to acquire rtnl two times.
Also since this is RTM_GETROUTE, it can be triggered by a normal user.

Here's the sleeping while atomic trace:
[ 7858.212557] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620
[ 7858.212748] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/0
[ 7858.212881] 2 locks held by swapper/0/0:
[ 7858.213013]  #0:  (((&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer))){+.-...}, at: [] call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350
[ 7858.213422]  #1:  (mfc_unres_lock){+.....}, at: [] ipmr_expire_process+0x25/0x130
[ 7858.213807] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc7+ #179
[ 7858.213934] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[ 7858.214108]  0000000000000000 ffff88005b403c50 ffffffff813a7804 0000000000000000
[ 7858.214412]  ffffffff81a1338e ffff88005b403c78 ffffffff810a4a72 ffffffff81a1338e
[ 7858.214716]  000000000000026c 0000000000000000 ffff88005b403ca8 ffffffff810a4b9f
[ 7858.215251] Call Trace:
[ 7858.215412]    [] dump_stack+0x85/0xc1
[ 7858.215662]  [] ___might_sleep+0x192/0x250
[ 7858.215868]  [] __might_sleep+0x6f/0x100
[ 7858.216072]  [] mutex_lock_nested+0x33/0x4d0
[ 7858.216279]  [] ? netlink_lookup+0x25f/0x460
[ 7858.216487]  [] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1b/0x40
[ 7858.216687]  [] netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x260
[ 7858.216900]  [] rtnl_unicast+0x20/0x30
[ 7858.217128]  [] ipmr_destroy_unres+0xa9/0xf0
[ 7858.217351]  [] ipmr_expire_process+0x8f/0x130
[ 7858.217581]  [] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180
[ 7858.217785]  [] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180
[ 7858.217990]  [] call_timer_fn+0xa5/0x350
[ 7858.218192]  [] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350
[ 7858.218415]  [] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180
[ 7858.218656]  [] run_timer_softirq+0x260/0x640
[ 7858.218865]  [] ? __do_softirq+0xbb/0x54f
[ 7858.219068]  [] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x54f
[ 7858.219269]  [] irq_exit+0xb8/0xc0
[ 7858.219463]  [] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x50
[ 7858.219678]  [] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0
[ 7858.219897]    [] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10
[ 7858.220165]  [] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 7858.220373]  [] default_idle+0x23/0x190
[ 7858.220574]  [] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20
[ 7858.220790]  [] default_idle_call+0x4c/0x60
[ 7858.221016]  [] cpu_startup_entry+0x39b/0x4d0
[ 7858.221257]  [] rest_init+0x135/0x140
[ 7858.221469]  [] start_kernel+0x50e/0x51b
[ 7858.221670]  [] ? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120
[ 7858.221894]  [] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
[ 7858.222113]  [] x86_64_start_kernel+0x13b/0x14a

Fixes: 2942e9005056 ("[RTNETLINK]: Use rtnl_unicast() for rtnetlink unicasts")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

ipmr, ip6mr: return lastuse relative to now

2016-09-21T04:58:23+00:00

When I introduced the lastuse member I made a subtle error because it was
returned as an absolute value but that is meaningless to user-space as it
doesn't allow to see how old exactly an entry is. Let's make it similar to
how the bridge returns such values and make it relative to "now" (jiffies).
This allows us to show the actual age of the entries and is much more
useful (e.g. user-space daemons can age out entries, iproute2 can display
the lastuse properly).

Fixes: 43b9e1274060 ("net: ipmr/ip6mr: add support for keeping an entry age")
Reported-by: Satish Ashok 
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net: ipmr/ip6mr: update lastuse on entry change

2016-07-26T22:18:31+00:00

Currently lastuse is updated on entry creation and cache hit, but it should
also be updated on entry change. Since both on add and update the ttl array
is updated we can simply update the lastuse in ipmr_update_thresholds.

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov 
CC: Roopa Prabhu 
CC: Donald Sharp 
CC: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net/ipv4: Introduce IPSKB_FRAG_SEGS bit to inet_skb_parm.flags

2016-07-19T23:40:22+00:00

This flag indicates whether fragmentation of segments is allowed.

Formerly this policy was hardcoded according to IPSKB_FORWARDED (set by
either ip_forward or ipmr_forward).

Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Cc: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani 
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net: ipmr/ip6mr: add support for keeping an entry age

2016-07-17T03:19:43+00:00

In preparation for hardware offloading of ipmr/ip6mr we need an
interface that allows to check (and later update) the age of entries.
Relying on stats alone can show activity but not actual age of the entry,
furthermore when there're tens of thousands of entries a lot of the
hardware implementations only support "hit" bits which are cleared on
read to denote that the entry was active and shouldn't be aged out,
these can then be naturally translated into age timestamp and will be
compatible with the software forwarding age. Using a lastuse entry doesn't
affect performance because the members in that cache line are written to
along with the age.
Since all new users are encouraged to use ipmr via netlink, this is
exported via the RTA_EXPIRES attribute.
Also do a minor local variable declaration style adjustment - arrange them
longest to shortest.

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov 
CC: Roopa Prabhu 
CC: Shrijeet Mukherjee 
CC: Satish Ashok 
CC: Donald Sharp 
CC: David S. Miller 
CC: Alexey Kuznetsov 
CC: James Morris 
CC: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI 
CC: Patrick McHardy 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

ipmr/ip6mr: Initialize the last assert time of mfc entries.

2016-06-28T08:14:09+00:00

This fixes wrong-interface signaling on 32-bit platforms for entries
created when jiffies > 2^31 + MFC_ASSERT_THRESH.

Signed-off-by: Tom Goff 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller