linux-stable.git/net/core, branch v6.3.12 Linux kernel stable tree revert "net: align SO_RCVMARK required privileges with SO_MARK" 2023-06-28T09:14:17+00:00 Maciej Żenczykowski maze@google.com 2023-06-18T10:31:30+00:00 3654477d43a839d7d7485efd5caa297f078db42d [ Upstream commit a9628e88776eb7d045cf46467f1afdd0f7fe72ea ] This reverts commit 1f86123b9749 ("net: align SO_RCVMARK required privileges with SO_MARK") because the reasoning in the commit message is not really correct: SO_RCVMARK is used for 'reading' incoming skb mark (via cmsg), as such it is more equivalent to 'getsockopt(SO_MARK)' which has no priv check and retrieves the socket mark, rather than 'setsockopt(SO_MARK) which sets the socket mark and does require privs. Additionally incoming skb->mark may already be visible if sysctl_fwmark_reflect and/or sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept are enabled. Furthermore, it is easier to block the getsockopt via bpf (either cgroup setsockopt hook, or via syscall filters) then to unblock it if it requires CAP_NET_RAW/ADMIN. On Android the socket mark is (among other things) used to store the network identifier a socket is bound to. Setting it is privileged, but retrieving it is not. We'd like unprivileged userspace to be able to read the network id of incoming packets (where mark is set via iptables [to be moved to bpf])... An alternative would be to add another sysctl to control whether setting SO_RCVMARK is privilged or not. (or even a MASK of which bits in the mark can be exposed) But this seems like over-engineering... Note: This is a non-trivial revert, due to later merged commit e42c7beee71d ("bpf: net: Consider has_current_bpf_ctx() when testing capable() in sk_setsockopt()") which changed both 'ns_capable' into 'sockopt_ns_capable' calls. Fixes: 1f86123b9749 ("net: align SO_RCVMARK required privileges with SO_MARK") Cc: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com> Cc: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Patrick Rohr <prohr@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230618103130.51628-1-maze@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit a9628e88776eb7d045cf46467f1afdd0f7fe72ea ]

This reverts commit 1f86123b9749 ("net: align SO_RCVMARK required
privileges with SO_MARK") because the reasoning in the commit message
is not really correct:
  SO_RCVMARK is used for 'reading' incoming skb mark (via cmsg), as such
  it is more equivalent to 'getsockopt(SO_MARK)' which has no priv check
  and retrieves the socket mark, rather than 'setsockopt(SO_MARK) which
  sets the socket mark and does require privs.

  Additionally incoming skb->mark may already be visible if
  sysctl_fwmark_reflect and/or sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept are enabled.

  Furthermore, it is easier to block the getsockopt via bpf
  (either cgroup setsockopt hook, or via syscall filters)
  then to unblock it if it requires CAP_NET_RAW/ADMIN.

On Android the socket mark is (among other things) used to store
the network identifier a socket is bound to.  Setting it is privileged,
but retrieving it is not.  We'd like unprivileged userspace to be able
to read the network id of incoming packets (where mark is set via
iptables [to be moved to bpf])...

An alternative would be to add another sysctl to control whether
setting SO_RCVMARK is privilged or not.
(or even a MASK of which bits in the mark can be exposed)
But this seems like over-engineering...

Note: This is a non-trivial revert, due to later merged commit e42c7beee71d
("bpf: net: Consider has_current_bpf_ctx() when testing capable() in sk_setsockopt()")
which changed both 'ns_capable' into 'sockopt_ns_capable' calls.

Fixes: 1f86123b9749 ("net: align SO_RCVMARK required privileges with SO_MARK")
Cc: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Patrick Rohr <prohr@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230618103130.51628-1-maze@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
neighbour: delete neigh_lookup_nodev as not used 2023-06-21T14:02:18+00:00 Leon Romanovsky leonro@nvidia.com 2023-03-08T09:23:13+00:00 b0ec36dddffb3e772dcad634f332a59c573c15a4 commit 76b9bf965c98c9b53ef7420b3b11438dbd764f92 upstream. neigh_lookup_nodev isn't used in the kernel after removal of DECnet. So let's remove it. Fixes: 1202cdd66531 ("Remove DECnet support from kernel") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/eb5656200d7964b2d177a36b77efa3c597d6d72d.1678267343.git.leonro@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 76b9bf965c98c9b53ef7420b3b11438dbd764f92 upstream.

neigh_lookup_nodev isn't used in the kernel after removal
of DECnet. So let's remove it.

Fixes: 1202cdd66531 ("Remove DECnet support from kernel")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/eb5656200d7964b2d177a36b77efa3c597d6d72d.1678267343.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: sched: add rcu annotations around qdisc->qdisc_sleeping 2023-06-14T09:16:50+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-06-06T11:19:29+00:00 3a4741bb13caf482b877b10ac1bcf7390cad7077 [ Upstream commit d636fc5dd692c8f4e00ae6e0359c0eceeb5d9bdb ] syzbot reported a race around qdisc->qdisc_sleeping [1] It is time we add proper annotations to reads and writes to/from qdisc->qdisc_sleeping. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in dev_graft_qdisc / qdisc_lookup_rcu read to 0xffff8881286fc618 of 8 bytes by task 6928 on cpu 1: qdisc_lookup_rcu+0x192/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_api.c:331 __tcf_qdisc_find+0x74/0x3c0 net/sched/cls_api.c:1174 tc_get_tfilter+0x18f/0x990 net/sched/cls_api.c:2547 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7af/0x8c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6386 netlink_rcv_skb+0x126/0x220 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2546 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6413 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x56f/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365 netlink_sendmsg+0x665/0x770 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1913 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x375/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2503 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2557 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1e3/0x270 net/socket.c:2586 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2595 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2593 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2593 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd write to 0xffff8881286fc618 of 8 bytes by task 6912 on cpu 0: dev_graft_qdisc+0x4f/0x80 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1115 qdisc_graft+0x7d0/0xb60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1103 tc_modify_qdisc+0x712/0xf10 net/sched/sch_api.c:1693 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x807/0x8c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6395 netlink_rcv_skb+0x126/0x220 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2546 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6413 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x56f/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365 netlink_sendmsg+0x665/0x770 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1913 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x375/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2503 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2557 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1e3/0x270 net/socket.c:2586 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2595 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2593 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2593 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 6912 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc3-syzkaller-00190-g0d85b27b0cc6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/16/2023 Fixes: 3a7d0d07a386 ("net: sched: extend Qdisc with rcu") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim<jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit d636fc5dd692c8f4e00ae6e0359c0eceeb5d9bdb ]

syzbot reported a race around qdisc->qdisc_sleeping [1]

It is time we add proper annotations to reads and writes to/from
qdisc->qdisc_sleeping.

[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in dev_graft_qdisc / qdisc_lookup_rcu

read to 0xffff8881286fc618 of 8 bytes by task 6928 on cpu 1:
qdisc_lookup_rcu+0x192/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_api.c:331
__tcf_qdisc_find+0x74/0x3c0 net/sched/cls_api.c:1174
tc_get_tfilter+0x18f/0x990 net/sched/cls_api.c:2547
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7af/0x8c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6386
netlink_rcv_skb+0x126/0x220 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2546
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6413
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x56f/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
netlink_sendmsg+0x665/0x770 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1913
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x375/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2503
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2557 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x1e3/0x270 net/socket.c:2586
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2595 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2593 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2593
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

write to 0xffff8881286fc618 of 8 bytes by task 6912 on cpu 0:
dev_graft_qdisc+0x4f/0x80 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1115
qdisc_graft+0x7d0/0xb60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1103
tc_modify_qdisc+0x712/0xf10 net/sched/sch_api.c:1693
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x807/0x8c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6395
netlink_rcv_skb+0x126/0x220 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2546
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6413
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x56f/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
netlink_sendmsg+0x665/0x770 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1913
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x375/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2503
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2557 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x1e3/0x270 net/socket.c:2586
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2595 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2593 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2593
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 6912 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc3-syzkaller-00190-g0d85b27b0cc6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/16/2023

Fixes: 3a7d0d07a386 ("net: sched: extend Qdisc with rcu")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim<jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
rfs: annotate lockless accesses to RFS sock flow table 2023-06-14T09:16:50+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-06-06T07:41:15+00:00 bced76c83b231e610e59fc7331db6ac30ae9bdcb [ Upstream commit 5c3b74a92aa285a3df722bf6329ba7ccf70346d6 ] Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() on accesses to the sock flow table. This also prevents a (smart ?) compiler to remove the condition in: if (table->ents[index] != newval) table->ents[index] = newval; We need the condition to avoid dirtying a shared cache line. Fixes: fec5e652e58f ("rfs: Receive Flow Steering") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 5c3b74a92aa285a3df722bf6329ba7ccf70346d6 ]

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() on accesses to the sock flow table.

This also prevents a (smart ?) compiler to remove the condition in:

if (table->ents[index] != newval)
        table->ents[index] = newval;

We need the condition to avoid dirtying a shared cache line.

Fixes: fec5e652e58f ("rfs: Receive Flow Steering")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf, sockmap: Avoid potential NULL dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() 2023-06-14T09:16:43+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-05-30T19:51:49+00:00 303742b31a2d2da09d574a9505beccaafec3268d [ Upstream commit b320a45638296b63be8d9a901ca8bc43716b1ae1 ] syzbot found sk_psock(sk) could return NULL when called from sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(). Just make sure to handle this case. [1] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000005c: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000002e0-0x00000000000002e7] CPU: 0 PID: 15 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc3-syzkaller-00588-g4781e965e655 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/16/2023 RIP: 0010:sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x19f/0x3c0 net/core/skmsg.c:1213 Code: 4c 89 e6 e8 63 70 5e f9 4d 85 e4 75 75 e8 19 74 5e f9 48 8d bb e0 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 07 02 00 00 48 89 ef ff 93 e0 02 00 00 e8 29 fd RSP: 0018:ffffc90000147688 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000100 RDX: 000000000000005c RSI: ffffffff8825ceb7 RDI: 00000000000002e0 RBP: ffff888076518c40 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000008000 R15: ffff888076518c40 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f901375bab0 CR3: 000000004bf26000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_data_ready+0x10a/0x520 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5006 tcp_data_queue+0x25d3/0x4c50 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5080 tcp_rcv_established+0x829/0x1f90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6019 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x65a/0x9c0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1726 tcp_v4_rcv+0x2cbf/0x3340 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2148 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x9f/0x480 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2ec/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:297 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1ae/0x200 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input include/net/dst.h:468 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0x1cf/0x2f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:297 [inline] ip_rcv+0xae/0xd0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x114/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5491 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5605 process_backlog+0x101/0x670 net/core/dev.c:5933 __napi_poll+0xb7/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:6499 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6566 [inline] net_rx_action+0x8a9/0xcb0 net/core/dev.c:6699 __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905 kernel/softirq.c:571 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:939 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x31/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:931 smpboot_thread_fn+0x659/0x9e0 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x344/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:379 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Fixes: 6df7f764cd3c ("bpf, sockmap: Wake up polling after data copy") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230530195149.68145-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit b320a45638296b63be8d9a901ca8bc43716b1ae1 ]

syzbot found sk_psock(sk) could return NULL when called
from sk_psock_verdict_data_ready().

Just make sure to handle this case.

[1]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000005c: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000002e0-0x00000000000002e7]
CPU: 0 PID: 15 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc3-syzkaller-00588-g4781e965e655 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/16/2023
RIP: 0010:sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x19f/0x3c0 net/core/skmsg.c:1213
Code: 4c 89 e6 e8 63 70 5e f9 4d 85 e4 75 75 e8 19 74 5e f9 48 8d bb e0 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 07 02 00 00 48 89 ef ff 93 e0 02 00 00 e8 29 fd
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000147688 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000100
RDX: 000000000000005c RSI: ffffffff8825ceb7 RDI: 00000000000002e0
RBP: ffff888076518c40 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000008000 R15: ffff888076518c40
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f901375bab0 CR3: 000000004bf26000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tcp_data_ready+0x10a/0x520 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5006
tcp_data_queue+0x25d3/0x4c50 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5080
tcp_rcv_established+0x829/0x1f90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6019
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x65a/0x9c0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1726
tcp_v4_rcv+0x2cbf/0x3340 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2148
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x9f/0x480 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2ec/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:297 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x1ae/0x200 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input include/net/dst.h:468 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish+0x1cf/0x2f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:297 [inline]
ip_rcv+0xae/0xd0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x114/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5491
__netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5605
process_backlog+0x101/0x670 net/core/dev.c:5933
__napi_poll+0xb7/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:6499
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6566 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x8a9/0xcb0 net/core/dev.c:6699
__do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905 kernel/softirq.c:571
run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:939 [inline]
run_ksoftirqd+0x31/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:931
smpboot_thread_fn+0x659/0x9e0 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x344/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:379
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
</TASK>

Fixes: 6df7f764cd3c ("bpf, sockmap: Wake up polling after data copy")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230530195149.68145-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
rtnetlink: add the missing IFLA_GRO_ tb check in validate_linkmsg 2023-06-09T08:47:57+00:00 Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com 2023-05-31T16:01:44+00:00 9b3da191c0c77fee78c96f47b83c9a6b6b3d652e [ Upstream commit 65d6914e253f3d83b724a9bbfc889ae95711e512 ] This fixes the issue that dev gro_max_size and gso_ipv4_max_size can be set to a huge value: # ip link add dummy1 type dummy # ip link set dummy1 gro_max_size 4294967295 # ip -d link show dummy1 dummy addrgenmode eui64 ... gro_max_size 4294967295 Fixes: 0fe79f28bfaf ("net: allow gro_max_size to exceed 65536") Fixes: 9eefedd58ae1 ("net: add gso_ipv4_max_size and gro_ipv4_max_size per device") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 65d6914e253f3d83b724a9bbfc889ae95711e512 ]

This fixes the issue that dev gro_max_size and gso_ipv4_max_size
can be set to a huge value:

  # ip link add dummy1 type dummy
  # ip link set dummy1 gro_max_size 4294967295
  # ip -d link show dummy1
    dummy addrgenmode eui64 ... gro_max_size 4294967295

Fixes: 0fe79f28bfaf ("net: allow gro_max_size to exceed 65536")
Fixes: 9eefedd58ae1 ("net: add gso_ipv4_max_size and gro_ipv4_max_size per device")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
rtnetlink: move IFLA_GSO_ tb check to validate_linkmsg 2023-06-09T08:47:57+00:00 Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com 2023-05-31T16:01:43+00:00 7bfab44e1346ff8511aa929f47c9f90332ece9f5 [ Upstream commit fef5b228dd38378148bc850f7e69a7783f3b95a4 ] These IFLA_GSO_* tb check should also be done for the new created link, otherwise, they can be set to a huge value when creating links: # ip link add dummy1 gso_max_size 4294967295 type dummy # ip -d link show dummy1 dummy addrgenmode eui64 ... gso_max_size 4294967295 Fixes: 46e6b992c250 ("rtnetlink: allow GSO maximums to be set on device creation") Fixes: 9eefedd58ae1 ("net: add gso_ipv4_max_size and gro_ipv4_max_size per device") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit fef5b228dd38378148bc850f7e69a7783f3b95a4 ]

These IFLA_GSO_* tb check should also be done for the new created link,
otherwise, they can be set to a huge value when creating links:

  # ip link add dummy1 gso_max_size 4294967295 type dummy
  # ip -d link show dummy1
    dummy addrgenmode eui64 ... gso_max_size 4294967295

Fixes: 46e6b992c250 ("rtnetlink: allow GSO maximums to be set on device creation")
Fixes: 9eefedd58ae1 ("net: add gso_ipv4_max_size and gro_ipv4_max_size per device")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
rtnetlink: call validate_linkmsg in rtnl_create_link 2023-06-09T08:47:56+00:00 Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com 2023-05-31T16:01:42+00:00 7a622f0c56c25052e52d15bff3529caa81450200 [ Upstream commit b0ad3c179059089d809b477a1d445c1183a7b8fe ] validate_linkmsg() was introduced by commit 1840bb13c22f5b ("[RTNL]: Validate hardware and broadcast address attribute for RTM_NEWLINK") to validate tb[IFLA_ADDRESS/BROADCAST] for existing links. The same check should also be done for newly created links. This patch adds validate_linkmsg() call in rtnl_create_link(), to avoid the invalid address set when creating some devices like: # ip link add dummy0 type dummy # ip link add link dummy0 name mac0 address 01:02 type macsec Fixes: 0e06877c6fdb ("[RTNETLINK]: rtnl_link: allow specifying initial device address") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit b0ad3c179059089d809b477a1d445c1183a7b8fe ]

validate_linkmsg() was introduced by commit 1840bb13c22f5b ("[RTNL]:
Validate hardware and broadcast address attribute for RTM_NEWLINK")
to validate tb[IFLA_ADDRESS/BROADCAST] for existing links. The same
check should also be done for newly created links.

This patch adds validate_linkmsg() call in rtnl_create_link(), to
avoid the invalid address set when creating some devices like:

  # ip link add dummy0 type dummy
  # ip link add link dummy0 name mac0 address 01:02 type macsec

Fixes: 0e06877c6fdb ("[RTNETLINK]: rtnl_link: allow specifying initial device address")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
udp6: Fix race condition in udp6_sendmsg & connect 2023-06-09T08:47:54+00:00 Vladislav Efanov VEfanov@ispras.ru 2023-05-30T11:39:41+00:00 abaf030b6d62de3936cd6b7bd83dceec618a428a [ Upstream commit 448a5ce1120c5bdbce1f1ccdabcd31c7d029f328 ] Syzkaller got the following report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sk_setup_caps+0x621/0x690 net/core/sock.c:2018 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888027f82780 by task syz-executor276/3255 The function sk_setup_caps (called by ip6_sk_dst_store_flow-> ip6_dst_store) referenced already freed memory as this memory was freed by parallel task in udpv6_sendmsg->ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow-> sk_dst_check. task1 (connect) task2 (udp6_sendmsg) sk_setup_caps->sk_dst_set | | sk_dst_check-> | sk_dst_set | dst_release sk_setup_caps references | to already freed dst_entry| The reason for this race condition is: sk_setup_caps() keeps using the dst after transferring the ownership to the dst cache. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with syzkaller. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Vladislav Efanov <VEfanov@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 448a5ce1120c5bdbce1f1ccdabcd31c7d029f328 ]

Syzkaller got the following report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sk_setup_caps+0x621/0x690 net/core/sock.c:2018
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888027f82780 by task syz-executor276/3255

The function sk_setup_caps (called by ip6_sk_dst_store_flow->
ip6_dst_store) referenced already freed memory as this memory was
freed by parallel task in udpv6_sendmsg->ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow->
sk_dst_check.

          task1 (connect)              task2 (udp6_sendmsg)
        sk_setup_caps->sk_dst_set |
                                  |  sk_dst_check->
                                  |      sk_dst_set
                                  |      dst_release
        sk_setup_caps references  |
        to already freed dst_entry|

The reason for this race condition is: sk_setup_caps() keeps using
the dst after transferring the ownership to the dst cache.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with syzkaller.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Efanov <VEfanov@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf, sockmap: Incorrectly handling copied_seq 2023-06-05T07:29:42+00:00 John Fastabend john.fastabend@gmail.com 2023-05-23T02:56:12+00:00 f9b4a0b537be7a6e5f002ca64b09dcca9c14e6ed [ Upstream commit e5c6de5fa025882babf89cecbed80acf49b987fa ] The read_skb() logic is incrementing the tcp->copied_seq which is used for among other things calculating how many outstanding bytes can be read by the application. This results in application errors, if the application does an ioctl(FIONREAD) we return zero because this is calculated from the copied_seq value. To fix this we move tcp->copied_seq accounting into the recv handler so that we update these when the recvmsg() hook is called and data is in fact copied into user buffers. This gives an accurate FIONREAD value as expected and improves ACK handling. Before we were calling the tcp_rcv_space_adjust() which would update 'number of bytes copied to user in last RTT' which is wrong for programs returning SK_PASS. The bytes are only copied to the user when recvmsg is handled. Doing the fix for recvmsg is straightforward, but fixing redirect and SK_DROP pkts is a bit tricker. Build a tcp_psock_eat() helper and then call this from skmsg handlers. This fixes another issue where a broken socket with a BPF program doing a resubmit could hang the receiver. This happened because although read_skb() consumed the skb through sock_drop() it did not update the copied_seq. Now if a single reccv socket is redirecting to many sockets (for example for lb) the receiver sk will be hung even though we might expect it to continue. The hang comes from not updating the copied_seq numbers and memory pressure resulting from that. We have a slight layer problem of calling tcp_eat_skb even if its not a TCP socket. To fix we could refactor and create per type receiver handlers. I decided this is more work than we want in the fix and we already have some small tweaks depending on caller that use the helper skb_bpf_strparser(). So we extend that a bit and always set the strparser bit when it is in use and then we can gate the seq_copied updates on this. Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-9-john.fastabend@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit e5c6de5fa025882babf89cecbed80acf49b987fa ]

The read_skb() logic is incrementing the tcp->copied_seq which is used for
among other things calculating how many outstanding bytes can be read by
the application. This results in application errors, if the application
does an ioctl(FIONREAD) we return zero because this is calculated from
the copied_seq value.

To fix this we move tcp->copied_seq accounting into the recv handler so
that we update these when the recvmsg() hook is called and data is in
fact copied into user buffers. This gives an accurate FIONREAD value
as expected and improves ACK handling. Before we were calling the
tcp_rcv_space_adjust() which would update 'number of bytes copied to
user in last RTT' which is wrong for programs returning SK_PASS. The
bytes are only copied to the user when recvmsg is handled.

Doing the fix for recvmsg is straightforward, but fixing redirect and
SK_DROP pkts is a bit tricker. Build a tcp_psock_eat() helper and then
call this from skmsg handlers. This fixes another issue where a broken
socket with a BPF program doing a resubmit could hang the receiver. This
happened because although read_skb() consumed the skb through sock_drop()
it did not update the copied_seq. Now if a single reccv socket is
redirecting to many sockets (for example for lb) the receiver sk will be
hung even though we might expect it to continue. The hang comes from
not updating the copied_seq numbers and memory pressure resulting from
that.

We have a slight layer problem of calling tcp_eat_skb even if its not
a TCP socket. To fix we could refactor and create per type receiver
handlers. I decided this is more work than we want in the fix and we
already have some small tweaks depending on caller that use the
helper skb_bpf_strparser(). So we extend that a bit and always set
the strparser bit when it is in use and then we can gate the
seq_copied updates on this.

Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-9-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>