linux-stable.git/net/core/sock.c, branch linux-6.7.y Linux kernel stable tree net: implement lockless setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) 2024-03-01T12:41:57+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2024-02-19T14:12:20+00:00 897f75e2cde8a5f9f7529b55249af1fa4248c83b [ Upstream commit 56667da7399eb19af857e30f41bea89aa6fa812c ] syzbot reported a lockdep violation [1] involving af_unix support of SO_PEEK_OFF. Since SO_PEEK_OFF is inherently not thread safe (it uses a per-socket sk_peek_off field), there is really no point to enforce a pointless thread safety in the kernel. After this patch : - setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) no longer acquires the socket lock. - skb_consume_udp() no longer has to acquire the socket lock. - af_unix no longer needs a special version of sk_set_peek_off(), because it does not lock u->iolock anymore. As a followup, we could replace prot->set_peek_off to be a boolean and avoid an indirect call, since we always use sk_set_peek_off(). [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Not tainted syz-executor.2/30025 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880765e7d80 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3524 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x1275/0x12c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2415 sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x18e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:1046 ____sys_recvmsg+0x3c0/0x470 net/socket.c:2801 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 -> #0 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360 do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); lock(&u->iolock); lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); lock(&u->iolock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.2/30025: #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 30025 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360 do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 RIP: 0033:0x7f78a1c7dda9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f78a0fde0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f78a1dac050 RCX: 00007f78a1c7dda9 RDX: 000000000000002a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007f78a1cca47a R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000180 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f78a1dac050 R15: 00007ffe5cd81ae8 Fixes: 859051dd165e ("bpf: Implement cgroup sockaddr hooks for unix sockets") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com> Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 56667da7399eb19af857e30f41bea89aa6fa812c ]

syzbot reported a lockdep violation [1] involving af_unix
support of SO_PEEK_OFF.

Since SO_PEEK_OFF is inherently not thread safe (it uses a per-socket
sk_peek_off field), there is really no point to enforce a pointless
thread safety in the kernel.

After this patch :

- setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) no longer acquires the socket lock.

- skb_consume_udp() no longer has to acquire the socket lock.

- af_unix no longer needs a special version of sk_set_peek_off(),
  because it does not lock u->iolock anymore.

As a followup, we could replace prot->set_peek_off to be a boolean
and avoid an indirect call, since we always use sk_set_peek_off().

[1]

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Not tainted

syz-executor.2/30025 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff8880765e7d80 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789

but task is already holding lock:
 ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline]
 ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline]
 ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3524
        lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline]
        __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x1275/0x12c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2415
        sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x18e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:1046
        ____sys_recvmsg+0x3c0/0x470 net/socket.c:2801
        ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
        do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939
        __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline]
        __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline]
        __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline]
        __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034
       do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77

-> #0 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
        validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
        __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
        __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
        unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789
       sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360
        do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307
        __sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
        __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
        __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
        __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
       do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX);
                               lock(&u->iolock);
                               lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX);
  lock(&u->iolock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor.2/30025:
  #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline]
  #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline]
  #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 30025 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
  check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
  check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
  check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
  validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
  __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
  lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
  __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
  __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
  unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789
 sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360
  do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307
  __sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
  __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
  __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
RIP: 0033:0x7f78a1c7dda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f78a0fde0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f78a1dac050 RCX: 00007f78a1c7dda9
RDX: 000000000000002a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f78a1cca47a R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000180 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f78a1dac050 R15: 00007ffe5cd81ae8

Fixes: 859051dd165e ("bpf: Implement cgroup sockaddr hooks for unix sockets")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
udp: fix busy polling 2024-02-01T00:21:05+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2024-01-18T20:17:49+00:00 4ff8c69389f221ac1ebedd4fb15be6d2b83d44bb [ Upstream commit a54d51fb2dfb846aedf3751af501e9688db447f5 ] Generic sk_busy_loop_end() only looks at sk->sk_receive_queue for presence of packets. Problem is that for UDP sockets after blamed commit, some packets could be present in another queue: udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue In some cases, a busy poller could spin until timeout expiration, even if some packets are available in udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue. v3: - make sk_busy_loop_end() nicer (Willem) v2: - add a READ_ONCE(sk->sk_family) in sk_is_inet() to avoid KCSAN splats. - add a sk_is_inet() check in sk_is_udp() (Willem feedback) - add a sk_is_inet() check in sk_is_tcp(). Fixes: 2276f58ac589 ("udp: use a separate rx queue for packet reception") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit a54d51fb2dfb846aedf3751af501e9688db447f5 ]

Generic sk_busy_loop_end() only looks at sk->sk_receive_queue
for presence of packets.

Problem is that for UDP sockets after blamed commit, some packets
could be present in another queue: udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue

In some cases, a busy poller could spin until timeout expiration,
even if some packets are available in udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue.

v3: - make sk_busy_loop_end() nicer (Willem)

v2: - add a READ_ONCE(sk->sk_family) in sk_is_inet() to avoid KCSAN splats.
    - add a sk_is_inet() check in sk_is_udp() (Willem feedback)
    - add a sk_is_inet() check in sk_is_tcp().

Fixes: 2276f58ac589 ("udp: use a separate rx queue for packet reception")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: Implement missing SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW cmsg support 2024-01-04T16:18:55+00:00 Thomas Lange thomas@corelatus.se 2024-01-04T08:57:44+00:00 382a32018b74f407008615e0e831d05ed28e81cd Commit 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW") added the new socket option SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW. However, it was never implemented in __sock_cmsg_send thus breaking SO_TIMESTAMPING cmsg for platforms using SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW. Fixes: 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a7281bf-bc4a-4f75-bb88-7011908ae471@app.fastmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Lange <thomas@corelatus.se> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104085744.49164-1-thomas@corelatus.se Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
Commit 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW") added the new
socket option SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW. However, it was never implemented in
__sock_cmsg_send thus breaking SO_TIMESTAMPING cmsg for platforms using
SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW.

Fixes: 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a7281bf-bc4a-4f75-bb88-7011908ae471@app.fastmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lange <thomas@corelatus.se>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104085744.49164-1-thomas@corelatus.se
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
net: Implement missing getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW) 2024-01-02T13:24:30+00:00 Jörn-Thorben Hinz jthinz@mailbox.tu-berlin.de 2023-12-21T23:19:01+00:00 7f6ca95d16b96567ce4cf458a2790ff17fa620c3 Commit 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW") added the new socket option SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW. Setting the option is handled in sk_setsockopt(), querying it was not handled in sk_getsockopt(), though. Following remarks on an earlier submission of this patch, keep the old behavior of getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_OLD) which returns the active flags even if they actually have been set through SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW. The new getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW) is stricter, returning flags only if they have been set through the same option. Fixes: 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230703175048.151683-1-jthinz@mailbox.tu-berlin.de/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/0d7cddc9-03fa-43db-a579-14f3e822615b@app.fastmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Jörn-Thorben Hinz <jthinz@mailbox.tu-berlin.de> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
Commit 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW") added the new
socket option SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW. Setting the option is handled in
sk_setsockopt(), querying it was not handled in sk_getsockopt(), though.

Following remarks on an earlier submission of this patch, keep the old
behavior of getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_OLD) which returns the active
flags even if they actually have been set through SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW.

The new getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW) is stricter, returning flags
only if they have been set through the same option.

Fixes: 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230703175048.151683-1-jthinz@mailbox.tu-berlin.de/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/0d7cddc9-03fa-43db-a579-14f3e822615b@app.fastmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Jörn-Thorben Hinz <jthinz@mailbox.tu-berlin.de>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Merge tag 'for-6.7/io_uring-sockopt-2023-10-30' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux 2023-11-01T21:16:34+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2023-11-01T21:16:34+00:00 f5277ad1e9768dbd05b1ae8dcdba690215d8c5b7 Pull io_uring {get,set}sockopt support from Jens Axboe: "This adds support for using getsockopt and setsockopt via io_uring. The main use cases for this is to enable use of direct descriptors, rather than first instantiating a normal file descriptor, doing the option tweaking needed, then turning it into a direct descriptor. With this support, we can avoid needing a regular file descriptor completely. The net and bpf bits have been signed off on their side" * tag 'for-6.7/io_uring-sockopt-2023-10-30' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: selftests/bpf/sockopt: Add io_uring support io_uring/cmd: Introduce SOCKET_URING_OP_SETSOCKOPT io_uring/cmd: Introduce SOCKET_URING_OP_GETSOCKOPT io_uring/cmd: return -EOPNOTSUPP if net is disabled selftests/net: Extract uring helpers to be reusable tools headers: Grab copy of io_uring.h io_uring/cmd: Pass compat mode in issue_flags net/socket: Break down __sys_getsockopt net/socket: Break down __sys_setsockopt bpf: Add sockptr support for setsockopt bpf: Add sockptr support for getsockopt 
Pull io_uring {get,set}sockopt support from Jens Axboe:
 "This adds support for using getsockopt and setsockopt via io_uring.

  The main use cases for this is to enable use of direct descriptors,
  rather than first instantiating a normal file descriptor, doing the
  option tweaking needed, then turning it into a direct descriptor. With
  this support, we can avoid needing a regular file descriptor
  completely.

  The net and bpf bits have been signed off on their side"

* tag 'for-6.7/io_uring-sockopt-2023-10-30' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
  selftests/bpf/sockopt: Add io_uring support
  io_uring/cmd: Introduce SOCKET_URING_OP_SETSOCKOPT
  io_uring/cmd: Introduce SOCKET_URING_OP_GETSOCKOPT
  io_uring/cmd: return -EOPNOTSUPP if net is disabled
  selftests/net: Extract uring helpers to be reusable
  tools headers: Grab copy of io_uring.h
  io_uring/cmd: Pass compat mode in issue_flags
  net/socket: Break down __sys_getsockopt
  net/socket: Break down __sys_setsockopt
  bpf: Add sockptr support for setsockopt
  bpf: Add sockptr support for getsockopt
sock: Ignore memcg pressure heuristics when raising allocated 2023-10-24T08:38:30+00:00 Abel Wu wuyun.abel@bytedance.com 2023-10-19T12:00:26+00:00 66e6369e312d161708786123fb44ecd53ff32d82 Before sockets became aware of net-memcg's memory pressure since commit e1aab161e013 ("socket: initial cgroup code."), the memory usage would be granted to raise if below average even when under protocol's pressure. This provides fairness among the sockets of same protocol. That commit changes this because the heuristic will also be effective when only memcg is under pressure which makes no sense. So revert that behavior. After reverting, __sk_mem_raise_allocated() no longer considers memcg's pressure. As memcgs are isolated from each other w.r.t. memory accounting, consuming one's budget won't affect others. So except the places where buffer sizes are needed to be tuned, allow workloads to use the memory they are provisioned. Signed-off-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231019120026.42215-3-wuyun.abel@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> 
Before sockets became aware of net-memcg's memory pressure since
commit e1aab161e013 ("socket: initial cgroup code."), the memory
usage would be granted to raise if below average even when under
protocol's pressure. This provides fairness among the sockets of
same protocol.

That commit changes this because the heuristic will also be
effective when only memcg is under pressure which makes no sense.
So revert that behavior.

After reverting, __sk_mem_raise_allocated() no longer considers
memcg's pressure. As memcgs are isolated from each other w.r.t.
memory accounting, consuming one's budget won't affect others.
So except the places where buffer sizes are needed to be tuned,
allow workloads to use the memory they are provisioned.

Signed-off-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231019120026.42215-3-wuyun.abel@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
sock: Doc behaviors for pressure heurisitics 2023-10-24T08:38:30+00:00 Abel Wu wuyun.abel@bytedance.com 2023-10-19T12:00:25+00:00 2e12072c67b5f65fc71a569985a1262531fbdc06 There are now two accounting infrastructures for skmem, while the heuristics in __sk_mem_raise_allocated() were actually introduced before memcg was born. Add some comments to clarify whether they can be applied to both infrastructures or not. Suggested-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231019120026.42215-2-wuyun.abel@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> 
There are now two accounting infrastructures for skmem, while the
heuristics in __sk_mem_raise_allocated() were actually introduced
before memcg was born.

Add some comments to clarify whether they can be applied to both
infrastructures or not.

Suggested-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231019120026.42215-2-wuyun.abel@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
sock: Code cleanup on __sk_mem_raise_allocated() 2023-10-24T08:38:30+00:00 Abel Wu wuyun.abel@bytedance.com 2023-10-19T12:00:24+00:00 2def8ff3fdb66d10ebe3ec84787799ac0244eb23 Code cleanup for both better simplicity and readability. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231019120026.42215-1-wuyun.abel@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> 
Code cleanup for both better simplicity and readability.
No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231019120026.42215-1-wuyun.abel@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
net/socket: Break down __sys_getsockopt 2023-10-19T22:41:37+00:00 Breno Leitao leitao@debian.org 2023-10-16T13:47:42+00:00 0b05b0cd78c92371fdde6333d006f39eaf9e0860 Split __sys_getsockopt() into two functions by removing the core logic into a sub-function (do_sock_getsockopt()). This will avoid code duplication when doing the same operation in other callers, for instance. do_sock_getsockopt() will be called by io_uring getsockopt() command operation in the following patch. The same was done for the setsockopt pair. Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231016134750.1381153-5-leitao@debian.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> 
Split __sys_getsockopt() into two functions by removing the core
logic into a sub-function (do_sock_getsockopt()). This will avoid
code duplication when doing the same operation in other callers, for
instance.

do_sock_getsockopt() will be called by io_uring getsockopt() command
operation in the following patch.

The same was done for the setsockopt pair.

Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231016134750.1381153-5-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
net: annotate data-races around sk->sk_dst_pending_confirm 2023-10-01T18:09:54+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2023-09-21T20:28:18+00:00 eb44ad4e635132754bfbcb18103f1dcb7058aedd This field can be read or written without socket lock being held. Add annotations to avoid load-store tearing. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
This field can be read or written without socket lock being held.

Add annotations to avoid load-store tearing.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>