linux-stable.git/net/core/dev.c, branch linux-6.11.y Linux kernel stable tree net: skip offload for NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM if ipv6 header contains extension 2024-11-08T15:30:48+00:00 Benoît Monin benoit.monin@gmx.fr 2024-10-24T14:01:54+00:00 705350fbd6ed4b5d89ee045fa57a0594a72b17d7 [ Upstream commit 04c20a9356f283da623903e81e7c6d5df7e4dc3c ] As documented in skbuff.h, devices with NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM capability can only checksum TCP and UDP over IPv6 if the IP header does not contains extension. This is enforced for UDP packets emitted from user-space to an IPv6 address as they go through ip6_make_skb(), which calls __ip6_append_data() where a check is done on the header size before setting CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. But the introduction of UDP encapsulation with fou6 added a code-path where it is possible to get an skb with a partial UDP checksum and an IPv6 header with extension: * fou6 adds a UDP header with a partial checksum if the inner packet does not contains a valid checksum. * ip6_tunnel adds an IPv6 header with a destination option extension header if encap_limit is non-zero (the default value is 4). The thread linked below describes in more details how to reproduce the problem with GRE-in-UDP tunnel. Add a check on the network header size in skb_csum_hwoffload_help() to make sure no IPv6 packet with extension header is handed to a network device with NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM capability. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/26548921.1r3eYUQgxm@benoit.monin/T/#u Fixes: aa3463d65e7b ("fou: Add encap ops for IPv6 tunnels") Signed-off-by: Benoît Monin <benoit.monin@gmx.fr> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5fbeecfc311ea182aa1d1c771725ab8b4cac515e.1729778144.git.benoit.monin@gmx.fr Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 04c20a9356f283da623903e81e7c6d5df7e4dc3c ]

As documented in skbuff.h, devices with NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM capability
can only checksum TCP and UDP over IPv6 if the IP header does not
contains extension.

This is enforced for UDP packets emitted from user-space to an IPv6
address as they go through ip6_make_skb(), which calls
__ip6_append_data() where a check is done on the header size before
setting CHECKSUM_PARTIAL.

But the introduction of UDP encapsulation with fou6 added a code-path
where it is possible to get an skb with a partial UDP checksum and an
IPv6 header with extension:
* fou6 adds a UDP header with a partial checksum if the inner packet
does not contains a valid checksum.
* ip6_tunnel adds an IPv6 header with a destination option extension
header if encap_limit is non-zero (the default value is 4).

The thread linked below describes in more details how to reproduce the
problem with GRE-in-UDP tunnel.

Add a check on the network header size in skb_csum_hwoffload_help() to
make sure no IPv6 packet with extension header is handed to a network
device with NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM capability.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/26548921.1r3eYUQgxm@benoit.monin/T/#u
Fixes: aa3463d65e7b ("fou: Add encap ops for IPv6 tunnels")
Signed-off-by: Benoît Monin <benoit.monin@gmx.fr>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5fbeecfc311ea182aa1d1c771725ab8b4cac515e.1729778144.git.benoit.monin@gmx.fr
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: add more sanity checks to qdisc_pkt_len_init() 2024-10-10T10:03:00+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2024-09-24T15:02:57+00:00 1eebe602a8d8264a12e35e39d0645fa88dbbacdd [ Upstream commit ab9a9a9e9647392a19e7a885b08000e89c86b535 ] One path takes care of SKB_GSO_DODGY, assuming skb->len is bigger than hdr_len. virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() does not fully dissect TCP headers, it only make sure it is at least 20 bytes. It is possible for an user to provide a malicious 'GSO' packet, total length of 80 bytes. - 20 bytes of IPv4 header - 60 bytes TCP header - a small gso_size like 8 virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() would declare this packet as a normal GSO packet, because it would see 40 bytes of payload, bigger than gso_size. We need to make detect this case to not underflow qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len. Fixes: 1def9238d4aa ("net_sched: more precise pkt_len computation") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit ab9a9a9e9647392a19e7a885b08000e89c86b535 ]

One path takes care of SKB_GSO_DODGY, assuming
skb->len is bigger than hdr_len.

virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() does not fully dissect TCP headers,
it only make sure it is at least 20 bytes.

It is possible for an user to provide a malicious 'GSO' packet,
total length of 80 bytes.

- 20 bytes of IPv4 header
- 60 bytes TCP header
- a small gso_size like 8

virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() would declare this packet as a normal
GSO packet, because it would see 40 bytes of payload,
bigger than gso_size.

We need to make detect this case to not underflow
qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len.

Fixes: 1def9238d4aa ("net_sched: more precise pkt_len computation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO 2024-10-10T10:03:00+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2024-09-24T15:02:56+00:00 81fd007dcd47c34471766249853e4d4bce8eea4b [ Upstream commit c20029db28399ecc50e556964eaba75c43b1e2f1 ] After commit 7c6d2ecbda83 ("net: be more gentle about silly gso requests coming from user") virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() had sanity check to detect malicious attempts from user space to cook a bad GSO packet. Then commit cf9acc90c80ec ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO") while fixing one issue, allowed user space to cook a GSO packet with the following characteristic : IPv4 SKB_GSO_UDP, gso_size=3, skb->len = 28. When this packet arrives in qdisc_pkt_len_init(), we end up with hdr_len = 28 (IPv4 header + UDP header), matching skb->len Then the following sets gso_segs to 0 : gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len, shinfo->gso_size); Then later we set qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len to back to zero :/ qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len; This leads to the following crash in fq_codel [1] qdisc_pkt_len_init() is best effort, we only want an estimation of the bytes sent on the wire, not crashing the kernel. This patch is fixing this particular issue, a following one adds more sanity checks for another potential bug. [1] [ 70.724101] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 70.724561] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 70.724561] PGD 10ac61067 P4D 10ac61067 PUD 107ee2067 PMD 0 [ 70.724561] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 70.724561] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 2163 Comm: b358537762 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #991 [ 70.724561] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 70.724561] RIP: 0010:fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel [ 70.724561] Code: 24 08 49 c1 e1 06 44 89 7c 24 18 45 31 ed 45 31 c0 31 ff 89 44 24 14 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 eb 04 39 ca 73 37 4d 8b 39 83 c7 01 <49> 8b 17 49 89 11 41 8b 57 28 45 8b 5f 34 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 49 All code ======== 0: 24 08 and $0x8,%al 2: 49 c1 e1 06 shl $0x6,%r9 6: 44 89 7c 24 18 mov %r15d,0x18(%rsp) b: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d e: 45 31 c0 xor %r8d,%r8d 11: 31 ff xor %edi,%edi 13: 89 44 24 14 mov %eax,0x14(%rsp) 17: 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 add 0x190(%rbx),%r9 1e: eb 04 jmp 0x24 20: 39 ca cmp %ecx,%edx 22: 73 37 jae 0x5b 24: 4d 8b 39 mov (%r9),%r15 27: 83 c7 01 add $0x1,%edi 2a:* 49 8b 17 mov (%r15),%rdx <-- trapping instruction 2d: 49 89 11 mov %rdx,(%r9) 30: 41 8b 57 28 mov 0x28(%r15),%edx 34: 45 8b 5f 34 mov 0x34(%r15),%r11d 38: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 movq $0x0,(%r15) 3f: 49 rex.WB Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 49 8b 17 mov (%r15),%rdx 3: 49 89 11 mov %rdx,(%r9) 6: 41 8b 57 28 mov 0x28(%r15),%edx a: 45 8b 5f 34 mov 0x34(%r15),%r11d e: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 movq $0x0,(%r15) 15: 49 rex.WB [ 70.724561] RSP: 0018:ffff95ae85e6fb90 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 70.724561] RAX: 0000000002000000 RBX: ffff95ae841de000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 70.724561] RBP: ffff95ae85e6fbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff95b710a30000 [ 70.724561] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: bdf289445ce31881 R12: ffff95ae85e6fc58 [ 70.724561] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] FS: 000000002c5c1380(0000) GS:ffff95bd7fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 70.724561] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010c568000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 70.724561] Call Trace: [ 70.724561] <TASK> [ 70.724561] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434) [ 70.724561] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:715) [ 70.724561] ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:87 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:147 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1489 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539) [ 70.724561] ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623) [ 70.724561] ? fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel [ 70.724561] dev_qdisc_enqueue (net/core/dev.c:3784) [ 70.724561] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3880 (discriminator 2) net/core/dev.c:4390 (discriminator 2)) [ 70.724561] ? irqentry_enter (kernel/entry/common.c:237) [ 70.724561] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h:74 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 (discriminator 2)) [ 70.724561] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:58 (discriminator 4)) [ 70.724561] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702) [ 70.724561] ? virtio_net_hdr_to_skb.constprop.0 (./include/linux/virtio_net.h:129 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3145 (discriminator 1) net/packet/af_packet.c:3177 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2170 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1302 (discriminator 4) ./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock.h:187 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:127 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 (discriminator 4)) [ 70.724561] ? netdev_name_node_lookup_rcu (net/core/dev.c:325 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:745 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2210 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] ? __sys_setsockopt (./include/linux/file.h:34 net/socket.c:2355) [ 70.724561] __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2222 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) [ 70.724561] RIP: 0033:0x41ae09 Fixes: cf9acc90c80ec ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit c20029db28399ecc50e556964eaba75c43b1e2f1 ]

After commit 7c6d2ecbda83 ("net: be more gentle about silly gso
requests coming from user") virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() had sanity check
to detect malicious attempts from user space to cook a bad GSO packet.

Then commit cf9acc90c80ec ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count
transport header in UFO") while fixing one issue, allowed user space
to cook a GSO packet with the following characteristic :

IPv4 SKB_GSO_UDP, gso_size=3, skb->len = 28.

When this packet arrives in qdisc_pkt_len_init(), we end up
with hdr_len = 28 (IPv4 header + UDP header), matching skb->len

Then the following sets gso_segs to 0 :

gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len,
                        shinfo->gso_size);

Then later we set qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len to back to zero :/

qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len;

This leads to the following crash in fq_codel [1]

qdisc_pkt_len_init() is best effort, we only want an estimation
of the bytes sent on the wire, not crashing the kernel.

This patch is fixing this particular issue, a following one
adds more sanity checks for another potential bug.

[1]
[   70.724101] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[   70.724561] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   70.724561] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   70.724561] PGD 10ac61067 P4D 10ac61067 PUD 107ee2067 PMD 0
[   70.724561] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   70.724561] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 2163 Comm: b358537762 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #991
[   70.724561] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   70.724561] RIP: 0010:fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel
[ 70.724561] Code: 24 08 49 c1 e1 06 44 89 7c 24 18 45 31 ed 45 31 c0 31 ff 89 44 24 14 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 eb 04 39 ca 73 37 4d 8b 39 83 c7 01 <49> 8b 17 49 89 11 41 8b 57 28 45 8b 5f 34 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 49
All code
========
   0:	24 08                	and    $0x8,%al
   2:	49 c1 e1 06          	shl    $0x6,%r9
   6:	44 89 7c 24 18       	mov    %r15d,0x18(%rsp)
   b:	45 31 ed             	xor    %r13d,%r13d
   e:	45 31 c0             	xor    %r8d,%r8d
  11:	31 ff                	xor    %edi,%edi
  13:	89 44 24 14          	mov    %eax,0x14(%rsp)
  17:	4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 	add    0x190(%rbx),%r9
  1e:	eb 04                	jmp    0x24
  20:	39 ca                	cmp    %ecx,%edx
  22:	73 37                	jae    0x5b
  24:	4d 8b 39             	mov    (%r9),%r15
  27:	83 c7 01             	add    $0x1,%edi
  2a:*	49 8b 17             	mov    (%r15),%rdx		<-- trapping instruction
  2d:	49 89 11             	mov    %rdx,(%r9)
  30:	41 8b 57 28          	mov    0x28(%r15),%edx
  34:	45 8b 5f 34          	mov    0x34(%r15),%r11d
  38:	49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 	movq   $0x0,(%r15)
  3f:	49                   	rex.WB

Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
   0:	49 8b 17             	mov    (%r15),%rdx
   3:	49 89 11             	mov    %rdx,(%r9)
   6:	41 8b 57 28          	mov    0x28(%r15),%edx
   a:	45 8b 5f 34          	mov    0x34(%r15),%r11d
   e:	49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 	movq   $0x0,(%r15)
  15:	49                   	rex.WB
[   70.724561] RSP: 0018:ffff95ae85e6fb90 EFLAGS: 00000202
[   70.724561] RAX: 0000000002000000 RBX: ffff95ae841de000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   70.724561] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001
[   70.724561] RBP: ffff95ae85e6fbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff95b710a30000
[   70.724561] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: bdf289445ce31881 R12: ffff95ae85e6fc58
[   70.724561] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 0000000000000000
[   70.724561] FS:  000000002c5c1380(0000) GS:ffff95bd7fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   70.724561] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   70.724561] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010c568000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   70.724561] Call Trace:
[   70.724561]  <TASK>
[   70.724561] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434)
[   70.724561] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:715)
[   70.724561] ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:87 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:147 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1489 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539)
[   70.724561] ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623)
[   70.724561] ? fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel
[   70.724561] dev_qdisc_enqueue (net/core/dev.c:3784)
[   70.724561] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3880 (discriminator 2) net/core/dev.c:4390 (discriminator 2))
[   70.724561] ? irqentry_enter (kernel/entry/common.c:237)
[   70.724561] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h:74 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 (discriminator 2))
[   70.724561] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:58 (discriminator 4))
[   70.724561] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702)
[   70.724561] ? virtio_net_hdr_to_skb.constprop.0 (./include/linux/virtio_net.h:129 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3145 (discriminator 1) net/packet/af_packet.c:3177 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2170 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1302 (discriminator 4) ./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock.h:187 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:127 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 (discriminator 4))
[   70.724561] ? netdev_name_node_lookup_rcu (net/core/dev.c:325 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:745 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2210 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] ? __sys_setsockopt (./include/linux/file.h:34 net/socket.c:2355)
[   70.724561] __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2222 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   70.724561] RIP: 0033:0x41ae09

Fixes: cf9acc90c80ec ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: Fix gso_features_check to check for both dev->gso_{ipv4_,}max_size 2024-10-10T10:02:59+00:00 Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net 2024-09-23T21:22:42+00:00 8a26fd046beb0e9318f8dd9bdfce315e729ab700 [ Upstream commit e609c959a939660c7519895f853dfa5624c6827a ] Commit 24ab059d2ebd ("net: check dev->gso_max_size in gso_features_check()") added a dev->gso_max_size test to gso_features_check() in order to fall back to GSO when needed. This was added as it was noticed that some drivers could misbehave if TSO packets get too big. However, the check doesn't respect dev->gso_ipv4_max_size limit. For instance, a device could be configured with BIG TCP for IPv4, but not IPv6. Therefore, add a netif_get_gso_max_size() equivalent to netif_get_gro_max_size() and use the helper to respect both limits before falling back to GSO engine. Fixes: 24ab059d2ebd ("net: check dev->gso_max_size in gso_features_check()") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240923212242.15669-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit e609c959a939660c7519895f853dfa5624c6827a ]

Commit 24ab059d2ebd ("net: check dev->gso_max_size in gso_features_check()")
added a dev->gso_max_size test to gso_features_check() in order to fall
back to GSO when needed.

This was added as it was noticed that some drivers could misbehave if TSO
packets get too big. However, the check doesn't respect dev->gso_ipv4_max_size
limit. For instance, a device could be configured with BIG TCP for IPv4,
but not IPv6.

Therefore, add a netif_get_gso_max_size() equivalent to netif_get_gro_max_size()
and use the helper to respect both limits before falling back to GSO engine.

Fixes: 24ab059d2ebd ("net: check dev->gso_max_size in gso_features_check()")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240923212242.15669-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: Make USO depend on CSUM offload 2024-08-10T04:58:08+00:00 Jakub Sitnicki jakub@cloudflare.com 2024-08-08T09:56:21+00:00 2b2bc3bab158b7e036508742b16cd8a3c2f59a12 UDP segmentation offload inherently depends on checksum offload. It should not be possible to disable checksum offload while leaving USO enabled. Enforce this dependency in code. There is a single tx-udp-segmentation feature flag to indicate support for both IPv4/6, hence the devices wishing to support USO must offer checksum offload for both IP versions. Fixes: 10154dbded6d ("udp: Allow GSO transmit from devices with no checksum offload") Suggested-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240808-udp-gso-egress-from-tunnel-v4-1-f5c5b4149ab9@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
UDP segmentation offload inherently depends on checksum offload. It should
not be possible to disable checksum offload while leaving USO enabled.
Enforce this dependency in code.

There is a single tx-udp-segmentation feature flag to indicate support for
both IPv4/6, hence the devices wishing to support USO must offer checksum
offload for both IP versions.

Fixes: 10154dbded6d ("udp: Allow GSO transmit from devices with no checksum offload")
Suggested-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240808-udp-gso-egress-from-tunnel-v4-1-f5c5b4149ab9@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
tun: Add missing bpf_net_ctx_clear() in do_xdp_generic() 2024-07-29T09:55:15+00:00 Jeongjun Park aha310510@gmail.com 2024-07-25T21:40:49+00:00 9da49aa80d686582bc3a027112a30484c9be6b6e There are cases where do_xdp_generic returns bpf_net_context without clearing it. This causes various memory corruptions, so the missing bpf_net_ctx_clear must be added. Reported-by: syzbot+44623300f057a28baf1e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: fecef4cd42c6 ("tun: Assign missing bpf_net_context.") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+3c2b6d5d4bec3b904933@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+707d98c8649695eaf329@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+c226757eb784a9da3e8b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+61a1cfc2b6632363d319@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+709e4c85c904bcd62735@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
There are cases where do_xdp_generic returns bpf_net_context without
clearing it. This causes various memory corruptions, so the missing
bpf_net_ctx_clear must be added.

Reported-by: syzbot+44623300f057a28baf1e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: fecef4cd42c6 ("tun: Assign missing bpf_net_context.")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+3c2b6d5d4bec3b904933@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+707d98c8649695eaf329@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c226757eb784a9da3e8b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61a1cfc2b6632363d319@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+709e4c85c904bcd62735@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
netdevice: define and allocate &net_device _properly_ 2024-07-12T01:11:31+00:00 Alexander Lobakin aleksander.lobakin@intel.com 2024-07-10T11:30:28+00:00 13cabc47f8ae69d24653f32c28399d493fde0a56 In fact, this structure contains a flexible array at the end, but historically its size, alignment etc., is calculated manually. There are several instances of the structure embedded into other structures, but also there's ongoing effort to remove them and we could in the meantime declare &net_device properly. Declare the array explicitly, use struct_size() and store the array size inside the structure, so that __counted_by() can be applied. Don't use PTR_ALIGN(), as SLUB itself tries its best to ensure the allocated buffer is aligned to what the user expects. Also, change its alignment from %NETDEV_ALIGN to the cacheline size as per several suggestions on the netdev ML. bloat-o-meter for vmlinux: free_netdev 445 440 -5 netdev_freemem 24 - -24 alloc_netdev_mqs 1481 1450 -31 On x86_64 with several NICs of different vendors, I was never able to get a &net_device pointer not aligned to the cacheline size after the change. Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240710113036.2125584-1-leitao@debian.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
In fact, this structure contains a flexible array at the end, but
historically its size, alignment etc., is calculated manually.
There are several instances of the structure embedded into other
structures, but also there's ongoing effort to remove them and we
could in the meantime declare &net_device properly.
Declare the array explicitly, use struct_size() and store the array
size inside the structure, so that __counted_by() can be applied.
Don't use PTR_ALIGN(), as SLUB itself tries its best to ensure the
allocated buffer is aligned to what the user expects.
Also, change its alignment from %NETDEV_ALIGN to the cacheline size
as per several suggestions on the netdev ML.

bloat-o-meter for vmlinux:

free_netdev                                  445     440      -5
netdev_freemem                                24       -     -24
alloc_netdev_mqs                            1481    1450     -31

On x86_64 with several NICs of different vendors, I was never able to
get a &net_device pointer not aligned to the cacheline size after the
change.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240710113036.2125584-1-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
tun: Assign missing bpf_net_context. 2024-07-05T23:59:37+00:00 Sebastian Andrzej Siewior bigeasy@linutronix.de 2024-07-04T14:48:15+00:00 fecef4cd42c689a200bdd39e6fffa71475904bc1 During the introduction of struct bpf_net_context handling for XDP-redirect, the tun driver has been missed. Jakub also pointed out that there is another call chain to do_xdp_generic() originating from netif_receive_skb() and drivers may use it outside from the NAPI context. Set the bpf_net_context before invoking BPF XDP program within the TUN driver. Set the bpf_net_context also in do_xdp_generic() if a xdp program is available. Reported-by: syzbot+0b5c75599f1d872bea6f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+5ae46b237278e2369cac@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+c1e04a422bbc0f0f2921@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 401cb7dae8130 ("net: Reference bpf_redirect_info via task_struct on PREEMPT_RT.") Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240704144815.j8xQda5r@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
During the introduction of struct bpf_net_context handling for
XDP-redirect, the tun driver has been missed.
Jakub also pointed out that there is another call chain to
do_xdp_generic() originating from netif_receive_skb() and drivers may
use it outside from the NAPI context.

Set the bpf_net_context before invoking BPF XDP program within the TUN
driver. Set the bpf_net_context also in do_xdp_generic() if a xdp
program is available.

Reported-by: syzbot+0b5c75599f1d872bea6f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+5ae46b237278e2369cac@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c1e04a422bbc0f0f2921@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 401cb7dae8130 ("net: Reference bpf_redirect_info via task_struct on PREEMPT_RT.")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240704144815.j8xQda5r@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
net: ethtool: add a mutex protecting RSS contexts 2024-06-29T01:53:21+00:00 Edward Cree ecree.xilinx@gmail.com 2024-06-27T15:33:51+00:00 87925151191b64d9623e63ccf11e517eacc99d7d While this is not needed to serialise the ethtool entry points (which are all under RTNL), drivers may have cause to asynchronously access dev->ethtool->rss_ctx; taking dev->ethtool->rss_lock allows them to do this safely without needing to take the RTNL. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7f9c15eb7525bf87af62c275dde3a8570ee8bf0a.1719502240.git.ecree.xilinx@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
While this is not needed to serialise the ethtool entry points (which
 are all under RTNL), drivers may have cause to asynchronously access
 dev->ethtool->rss_ctx; taking dev->ethtool->rss_lock allows them to
 do this safely without needing to take the RTNL.

Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7f9c15eb7525bf87af62c275dde3a8570ee8bf0a.1719502240.git.ecree.xilinx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
net: ethtool: add an extack parameter to new rxfh_context APIs 2024-06-29T01:53:21+00:00 Edward Cree ecree.xilinx@gmail.com 2024-06-27T15:33:50+00:00 30a32cdf6b130356805b3193a6208de25cbb2015 Currently passed as NULL, but will allow drivers to report back errors when ethnl support for these ops is added. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/6e0012347d175fdd1280363d7bfa76a2f2777e17.1719502240.git.ecree.xilinx@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
Currently passed as NULL, but will allow drivers to report back errors
 when ethnl support for these ops is added.

Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/6e0012347d175fdd1280363d7bfa76a2f2777e17.1719502240.git.ecree.xilinx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>