<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/can, branch v5.4.271</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER)</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:25:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksij Rempel</name>
<email>o.rempel@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-20T13:38:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=08de58abedf6e69396e1207e4f99ef8904b2b532'/>
<id>08de58abedf6e69396e1207e4f99ef8904b2b532</id>
<content type='text'>
commit efe7cf828039aedb297c1f9920b638fffee6aabc upstream.

Lock jsk-&gt;sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...)
modifies jsk-&gt;filters while receiving packets.

Following trace was seen on affected system:
 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350

 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G        W  OE      6.5.0-rc5 #1
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  print_report+0xd3/0x620
  ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200
  ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
  kasan_report+0xc2/0x100
  ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
  __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0
  j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
  j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939]
  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
  ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]
  ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939]
  ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939]
  j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939]
  ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]
  ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw]
  ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]
  can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can]
  can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can]
  ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can]
  can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can]
  ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can]
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150
  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10
  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0
  __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0
  process_backlog+0x107/0x260
  __napi_poll+0x69/0x310
  net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580
  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0
  __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8
  do_softirq+0x53/0x80
  &lt;/IRQ&gt;
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70
  netif_rx+0x16b/0x180
  can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can]
  ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can]
  ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410
  raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw]
  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw]
  ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40
  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw]
  sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100
  sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220
  ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10
  ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80
  ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320
  vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750
  ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
  ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0
  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280
  ksys_write+0x143/0x170
  ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
  ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70
  __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
  ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
  ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50
  ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

 Allocated by task 348:
  kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
  kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
  kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30
  __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0
  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160
  j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939]
  __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

 Freed by task 349:
  kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
  kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
  kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50
  __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0
  __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380
  kfree+0x7a/0x120
  j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939]
  __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Reported-by: Sili Luo &lt;rootlab@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Sili Luo &lt;rootlab@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit efe7cf828039aedb297c1f9920b638fffee6aabc upstream.

Lock jsk-&gt;sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...)
modifies jsk-&gt;filters while receiving packets.

Following trace was seen on affected system:
 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350

 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G        W  OE      6.5.0-rc5 #1
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  print_report+0xd3/0x620
  ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200
  ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
  kasan_report+0xc2/0x100
  ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
  __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0
  j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
  j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939]
  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
  ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]
  ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939]
  ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939]
  j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939]
  ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]
  ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw]
  ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]
  can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can]
  can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can]
  ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can]
  can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can]
  ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can]
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150
  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10
  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0
  __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0
  process_backlog+0x107/0x260
  __napi_poll+0x69/0x310
  net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580
  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0
  __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8
  do_softirq+0x53/0x80
  &lt;/IRQ&gt;
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70
  netif_rx+0x16b/0x180
  can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can]
  ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can]
  ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410
  raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw]
  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw]
  ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40
  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw]
  sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100
  sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220
  ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10
  ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80
  ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320
  vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750
  ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
  ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0
  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280
  ksys_write+0x143/0x170
  ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
  ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70
  __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
  ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
  ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50
  ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

 Allocated by task 348:
  kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
  kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
  kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30
  __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0
  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160
  j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939]
  __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

 Freed by task 349:
  kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
  kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
  kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50
  __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0
  __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380
  kfree+0x7a/0x120
  j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939]
  __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Reported-by: Sili Luo &lt;rootlab@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Sili Luo &lt;rootlab@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: raw: add support for SO_MARK</title>
<updated>2024-01-15T17:25:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Kleine-Budde</name>
<email>mkl@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-09T09:10:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2cdb65084824619794dc1128974f9409d1742808'/>
<id>2cdb65084824619794dc1128974f9409d1742808</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0826e82b8a32e646b7b32ba8b68ba30812028e47 ]

Add support for SO_MARK to the CAN_RAW protocol. This makes it
possible to add traffic control filters based on the fwmark.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221210113653.170346-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 7f6ca95d16b9 ("net: Implement missing getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW)")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0826e82b8a32e646b7b32ba8b68ba30812028e47 ]

Add support for SO_MARK to the CAN_RAW protocol. This makes it
possible to add traffic control filters based on the fwmark.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221210113653.170346-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 7f6ca95d16b9 ("net: Implement missing getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW)")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: raw: add support for SO_TXTIME/SCM_TXTIME</title>
<updated>2024-01-15T17:25:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Kleine-Budde</name>
<email>mkl@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-21T10:31:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=96a6d1bb28edd01303965a805fff035dc9ad7abc'/>
<id>96a6d1bb28edd01303965a805fff035dc9ad7abc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 51a0d5e51178fcd147c1b8fdab2ed16b561326db ]

This patch calls into sock_cmsg_send() to parse the user supplied
control information into a struct sockcm_cookie. Then assign the
requested transmit time to the skb.

This makes it possible to use the Earliest TXTIME First (ETF) packet
scheduler with the CAN_RAW protocol. The user can send a CAN_RAW frame
with a TXTIME and the kernel (with the ETF scheduler) will take care
of sending it to the network interface.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220502091946.1916211-3-mkl@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 7f6ca95d16b9 ("net: Implement missing getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW)")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 51a0d5e51178fcd147c1b8fdab2ed16b561326db ]

This patch calls into sock_cmsg_send() to parse the user supplied
control information into a struct sockcm_cookie. Then assign the
requested transmit time to the skb.

This makes it possible to use the Earliest TXTIME First (ETF) packet
scheduler with the CAN_RAW protocol. The user can send a CAN_RAW frame
with a TXTIME and the kernel (with the ETF scheduler) will take care
of sending it to the network interface.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220502091946.1916211-3-mkl@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 7f6ca95d16b9 ("net: Implement missing getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW)")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: bcm: Fix UAF in bcm_proc_show()</title>
<updated>2023-07-27T06:37:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>YueHaibing</name>
<email>yuehaibing@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-15T09:25:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9533dbfac0ff7edd77a5fa2c24974b1d66c8b0a6'/>
<id>9533dbfac0ff7edd77a5fa2c24974b1d66c8b0a6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 55c3b96074f3f9b0aee19bf93cd71af7516582bb upstream.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888155846230 by task cat/7862

CPU: 1 PID: 7862 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00153-gc8746099c197 #230
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd5/0x150
 print_report+0xc1/0x5e0
 kasan_report+0xba/0xf0
 bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80
 seq_read_iter+0x4f6/0x1260
 seq_read+0x165/0x210
 proc_reg_read+0x227/0x300
 vfs_read+0x1d5/0x8d0
 ksys_read+0x11e/0x240
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Allocated by task 7846:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9e/0xa0
 bcm_sendmsg+0x264b/0x44e0
 sock_sendmsg+0xda/0x180
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x735/0x920
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1b0
 __sys_sendmsg+0xfa/0x1d0
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 7846:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x161/0x1c0
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x119/0x220
 __kmem_cache_free+0xb4/0x2e0
 rcu_core+0x809/0x1bd0

bcm_op is freed before procfs entry be removed in bcm_release(),
this lead to bcm_proc_show() may read the freed bcm_op.

Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230715092543.15548-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 55c3b96074f3f9b0aee19bf93cd71af7516582bb upstream.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888155846230 by task cat/7862

CPU: 1 PID: 7862 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00153-gc8746099c197 #230
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd5/0x150
 print_report+0xc1/0x5e0
 kasan_report+0xba/0xf0
 bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80
 seq_read_iter+0x4f6/0x1260
 seq_read+0x165/0x210
 proc_reg_read+0x227/0x300
 vfs_read+0x1d5/0x8d0
 ksys_read+0x11e/0x240
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Allocated by task 7846:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9e/0xa0
 bcm_sendmsg+0x264b/0x44e0
 sock_sendmsg+0xda/0x180
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x735/0x920
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1b0
 __sys_sendmsg+0xfa/0x1d0
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 7846:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x161/0x1c0
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x119/0x220
 __kmem_cache_free+0xb4/0x2e0
 rcu_core+0x809/0x1bd0

bcm_op is freed before procfs entry be removed in bcm_release(),
this lead to bcm_proc_show() may read the freed bcm_op.

Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230715092543.15548-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: j1939: avoid possible use-after-free when j1939_can_rx_register fails</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T08:59:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fedor Pchelkin</name>
<email>pchelkin@ispras.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-26T17:19:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2416bac0e7b21113aa8047ecf8e97c9d559e26a3'/>
<id>2416bac0e7b21113aa8047ecf8e97c9d559e26a3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9f16eb106aa5fce15904625661312623ec783ed3 upstream.

Syzkaller reports the following failure:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kref_put include/linux/kref.h:64 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in j1939_priv_put+0x25/0xa0 net/can/j1939/main.c:172
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888141c15058 by task swapper/3/0

CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 5.10.144-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x220 mm/kasan/report.c:385
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:562
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x145/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:101 [inline]
 atomic_fetch_sub_release include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:220 [inline]
 __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:272 [inline]
 __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline]
 refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:64 [inline]
 j1939_priv_put+0x25/0xa0 net/can/j1939/main.c:172
 j1939_sk_sock_destruct+0x44/0x90 net/can/j1939/socket.c:374
 __sk_destruct+0x4e/0x820 net/core/sock.c:1784
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2485 [inline]
 rcu_core+0xb35/0x1a30 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2726
 __do_softirq+0x289/0x9a3 kernel/softirq.c:298
 asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;
 __run_on_irqstack arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:26 [inline]
 run_on_irqstack_cond arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:77 [inline]
 do_softirq_own_stack+0xaa/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:77
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:393 [inline]
 __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:423 [inline]
 irq_exit_rcu+0x136/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:435
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x4d/0x100 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1095
 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:635

Allocated by task 1141:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:461
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline]
 j1939_priv_create net/can/j1939/main.c:131 [inline]
 j1939_netdev_start+0x111/0x860 net/can/j1939/main.c:268
 j1939_sk_bind+0x8ea/0xd30 net/can/j1939/socket.c:485
 __sys_bind+0x1f2/0x260 net/socket.c:1645
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1656 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1654 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1654
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6

Freed by task 1141:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:56
 kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
 __kasan_slab_free+0x112/0x170 mm/kasan/common.c:422
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1542 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xad/0x190 mm/slub.c:1576
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3149 [inline]
 kfree+0xd9/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4125
 j1939_netdev_start+0x5ee/0x860 net/can/j1939/main.c:300
 j1939_sk_bind+0x8ea/0xd30 net/can/j1939/socket.c:485
 __sys_bind+0x1f2/0x260 net/socket.c:1645
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1656 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1654 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1654
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6

It can be caused by this scenario:

CPU0					CPU1
j1939_sk_bind(socket0, ndev0, ...)
  j1939_netdev_start()
					j1939_sk_bind(socket1, ndev0, ...)
                                          j1939_netdev_start()
  mutex_lock(&amp;j1939_netdev_lock)
  j1939_priv_set(ndev0, priv)
  mutex_unlock(&amp;j1939_netdev_lock)
					  if (priv_new)
					    kref_get(&amp;priv_new-&gt;rx_kref)
					    return priv_new;
					  /* inside j1939_sk_bind() */
					  jsk-&gt;priv = priv
  j1939_can_rx_register(priv) // fails
  j1939_priv_set(ndev, NULL)
  kfree(priv)
					j1939_sk_sock_destruct()
					j1939_priv_put() // &lt;- uaf

To avoid this, call j1939_can_rx_register() under j1939_netdev_lock so
that a concurrent thread cannot process j1939_priv before
j1939_can_rx_register() returns.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin &lt;pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526171910.227615-3-pchelkin@ispras.ru
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9f16eb106aa5fce15904625661312623ec783ed3 upstream.

Syzkaller reports the following failure:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kref_put include/linux/kref.h:64 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in j1939_priv_put+0x25/0xa0 net/can/j1939/main.c:172
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888141c15058 by task swapper/3/0

CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 5.10.144-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x220 mm/kasan/report.c:385
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:562
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x145/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:101 [inline]
 atomic_fetch_sub_release include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:220 [inline]
 __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:272 [inline]
 __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline]
 refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:64 [inline]
 j1939_priv_put+0x25/0xa0 net/can/j1939/main.c:172
 j1939_sk_sock_destruct+0x44/0x90 net/can/j1939/socket.c:374
 __sk_destruct+0x4e/0x820 net/core/sock.c:1784
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2485 [inline]
 rcu_core+0xb35/0x1a30 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2726
 __do_softirq+0x289/0x9a3 kernel/softirq.c:298
 asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;
 __run_on_irqstack arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:26 [inline]
 run_on_irqstack_cond arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:77 [inline]
 do_softirq_own_stack+0xaa/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:77
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:393 [inline]
 __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:423 [inline]
 irq_exit_rcu+0x136/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:435
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x4d/0x100 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1095
 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:635

Allocated by task 1141:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:461
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline]
 j1939_priv_create net/can/j1939/main.c:131 [inline]
 j1939_netdev_start+0x111/0x860 net/can/j1939/main.c:268
 j1939_sk_bind+0x8ea/0xd30 net/can/j1939/socket.c:485
 __sys_bind+0x1f2/0x260 net/socket.c:1645
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1656 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1654 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1654
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6

Freed by task 1141:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:56
 kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
 __kasan_slab_free+0x112/0x170 mm/kasan/common.c:422
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1542 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xad/0x190 mm/slub.c:1576
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3149 [inline]
 kfree+0xd9/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4125
 j1939_netdev_start+0x5ee/0x860 net/can/j1939/main.c:300
 j1939_sk_bind+0x8ea/0xd30 net/can/j1939/socket.c:485
 __sys_bind+0x1f2/0x260 net/socket.c:1645
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1656 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1654 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1654
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6

It can be caused by this scenario:

CPU0					CPU1
j1939_sk_bind(socket0, ndev0, ...)
  j1939_netdev_start()
					j1939_sk_bind(socket1, ndev0, ...)
                                          j1939_netdev_start()
  mutex_lock(&amp;j1939_netdev_lock)
  j1939_priv_set(ndev0, priv)
  mutex_unlock(&amp;j1939_netdev_lock)
					  if (priv_new)
					    kref_get(&amp;priv_new-&gt;rx_kref)
					    return priv_new;
					  /* inside j1939_sk_bind() */
					  jsk-&gt;priv = priv
  j1939_can_rx_register(priv) // fails
  j1939_priv_set(ndev, NULL)
  kfree(priv)
					j1939_sk_sock_destruct()
					j1939_priv_put() // &lt;- uaf

To avoid this, call j1939_can_rx_register() under j1939_netdev_lock so
that a concurrent thread cannot process j1939_priv before
j1939_can_rx_register() returns.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin &lt;pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526171910.227615-3-pchelkin@ispras.ru
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: j1939: change j1939_netdev_lock type to mutex</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T08:59:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fedor Pchelkin</name>
<email>pchelkin@ispras.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-26T17:19:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bf0245bd44c0913472fbfb26434906d4cb1b7caa'/>
<id>bf0245bd44c0913472fbfb26434906d4cb1b7caa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cd9c790de2088b0d797dc4d244b4f174f9962554 upstream.

It turns out access to j1939_can_rx_register() needs to be serialized,
otherwise j1939_priv can be corrupted when parallel threads call
j1939_netdev_start() and j1939_can_rx_register() fails. This issue is
thoroughly covered in other commit which serializes access to
j1939_can_rx_register().

Change j1939_netdev_lock type to mutex so that we do not need to remove
GFP_KERNEL from can_rx_register().

j1939_netdev_lock seems to be used in normal contexts where mutex usage
is not prohibited.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Suggested-by: Alexey Khoroshilov &lt;khoroshilov@ispras.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin &lt;pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526171910.227615-2-pchelkin@ispras.ru
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cd9c790de2088b0d797dc4d244b4f174f9962554 upstream.

It turns out access to j1939_can_rx_register() needs to be serialized,
otherwise j1939_priv can be corrupted when parallel threads call
j1939_netdev_start() and j1939_can_rx_register() fails. This issue is
thoroughly covered in other commit which serializes access to
j1939_can_rx_register().

Change j1939_netdev_lock type to mutex so that we do not need to remove
GFP_KERNEL from can_rx_register().

j1939_netdev_lock seems to be used in normal contexts where mutex usage
is not prohibited.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Suggested-by: Alexey Khoroshilov &lt;khoroshilov@ispras.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin &lt;pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526171910.227615-2-pchelkin@ispras.ru
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: j1939: j1939_sk_send_loop_abort(): improved error queue handling in J1939 Socket</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T08:59:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksij Rempel</name>
<email>o.rempel@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-26T08:19:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9eed68d62e2aa835b9366ba93062b7446bd47584'/>
<id>9eed68d62e2aa835b9366ba93062b7446bd47584</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2a84aea80e925ecba6349090559754f8e8eb68ef upstream.

This patch addresses an issue within the j1939_sk_send_loop_abort()
function in the j1939/socket.c file, specifically in the context of
Transport Protocol (TP) sessions.

Without this patch, when a TP session is initiated and a Clear To Send
(CTS) frame is received from the remote side requesting one data packet,
the kernel dispatches the first Data Transport (DT) frame and then waits
for the next CTS. If the remote side doesn't respond with another CTS,
the kernel aborts due to a timeout. This leads to the user-space
receiving an EPOLLERR on the socket, and the socket becomes active.

However, when trying to read the error queue from the socket with
sock.recvmsg(, , socket.MSG_ERRQUEUE), it returns -EAGAIN,
given that the socket is non-blocking. This situation results in an
infinite loop: the user-space repeatedly calls epoll(), epoll() returns
the socket file descriptor with EPOLLERR, but the socket then blocks on
the recv() of ERRQUEUE.

This patch introduces an additional check for the J1939_SOCK_ERRQUEUE
flag within the j1939_sk_send_loop_abort() function. If the flag is set,
it indicates that the application has subscribed to receive error queue
messages. In such cases, the kernel can communicate the current transfer
state via the error queue. This allows for the function to return early,
preventing the unnecessary setting of the socket into an error state,
and breaking the infinite loop. It is crucial to note that a socket
error is only needed if the application isn't using the error queue, as,
without it, the application wouldn't be aware of transfer issues.

Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Reported-by: David Jander &lt;david@protonic.nl&gt;
Tested-by: David Jander &lt;david@protonic.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526081946.715190-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2a84aea80e925ecba6349090559754f8e8eb68ef upstream.

This patch addresses an issue within the j1939_sk_send_loop_abort()
function in the j1939/socket.c file, specifically in the context of
Transport Protocol (TP) sessions.

Without this patch, when a TP session is initiated and a Clear To Send
(CTS) frame is received from the remote side requesting one data packet,
the kernel dispatches the first Data Transport (DT) frame and then waits
for the next CTS. If the remote side doesn't respond with another CTS,
the kernel aborts due to a timeout. This leads to the user-space
receiving an EPOLLERR on the socket, and the socket becomes active.

However, when trying to read the error queue from the socket with
sock.recvmsg(, , socket.MSG_ERRQUEUE), it returns -EAGAIN,
given that the socket is non-blocking. This situation results in an
infinite loop: the user-space repeatedly calls epoll(), epoll() returns
the socket file descriptor with EPOLLERR, but the socket then blocks on
the recv() of ERRQUEUE.

This patch introduces an additional check for the J1939_SOCK_ERRQUEUE
flag within the j1939_sk_send_loop_abort() function. If the flag is set,
it indicates that the application has subscribed to receive error queue
messages. In such cases, the kernel can communicate the current transfer
state via the error queue. This allows for the function to return early,
preventing the unnecessary setting of the socket into an error state,
and breaking the infinite loop. It is crucial to note that a socket
error is only needed if the application isn't using the error queue, as,
without it, the application wouldn't be aware of transfer issues.

Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Reported-by: David Jander &lt;david@protonic.nl&gt;
Tested-by: David Jander &lt;david@protonic.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526081946.715190-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: j1939: recvmsg(): allow MSG_CMSG_COMPAT flag</title>
<updated>2023-05-30T11:44:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Hartkopp</name>
<email>socketcan@hartkopp.net</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-06T11:08:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e658112893467b5f44a8d3810ee2dad976834645'/>
<id>e658112893467b5f44a8d3810ee2dad976834645</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1db080cbdbab28752bbb1c86d64daf96253a5da1 upstream.

The control message provided by J1939 support MSG_CMSG_COMPAT but
blocked recvmsg() syscalls that have set this flag, i.e. on 32bit user
space on 64 bit kernels.

Link: https://github.com/hartkopp/can-isotp/issues/59
Cc: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Suggested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20230505110308.81087-3-mkl@pengutronix.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1db080cbdbab28752bbb1c86d64daf96253a5da1 upstream.

The control message provided by J1939 support MSG_CMSG_COMPAT but
blocked recvmsg() syscalls that have set this flag, i.e. on 32bit user
space on 64 bit kernels.

Link: https://github.com/hartkopp/can-isotp/issues/59
Cc: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Suggested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20230505110308.81087-3-mkl@pengutronix.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: j1939: j1939_tp_tx_dat_new(): fix out-of-bounds memory access</title>
<updated>2023-04-20T10:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksij Rempel</name>
<email>o.rempel@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-04T07:31:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d2136f05690c272dfc9f9d6efcc51d5f53494b33'/>
<id>d2136f05690c272dfc9f9d6efcc51d5f53494b33</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b45193cb4df556fe6251b285a5ce44046dd36b4a upstream.

In the j1939_tp_tx_dat_new() function, an out-of-bounds memory access
could occur during the memcpy() operation if the size of skb-&gt;cb is
larger than the size of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb. This is because the
memcpy() operation uses the size of skb-&gt;cb, leading to a read beyond
the struct j1939_sk_buff_cb.

Updated the memcpy() operation to use the size of struct
j1939_sk_buff_cb instead of the size of skb-&gt;cb. This ensures that the
memcpy() operation only reads the memory within the bounds of struct
j1939_sk_buff_cb, preventing out-of-bounds memory access.

Additionally, add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to check that the size of skb-&gt;cb
is greater than or equal to the size of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb. This
ensures that the skb-&gt;cb buffer is large enough to hold the
j1939_sk_buff_cb structure.

Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Reported-by: Shuangpeng Bai &lt;sjb7183@psu.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Shuangpeng Bai &lt;sjb7183@psu.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller/c/G_LL-C3plRs/m/-8xCi6dCAgAJ
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230404073128.3173900-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[mkl: rephrase commit message]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b45193cb4df556fe6251b285a5ce44046dd36b4a upstream.

In the j1939_tp_tx_dat_new() function, an out-of-bounds memory access
could occur during the memcpy() operation if the size of skb-&gt;cb is
larger than the size of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb. This is because the
memcpy() operation uses the size of skb-&gt;cb, leading to a read beyond
the struct j1939_sk_buff_cb.

Updated the memcpy() operation to use the size of struct
j1939_sk_buff_cb instead of the size of skb-&gt;cb. This ensures that the
memcpy() operation only reads the memory within the bounds of struct
j1939_sk_buff_cb, preventing out-of-bounds memory access.

Additionally, add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to check that the size of skb-&gt;cb
is greater than or equal to the size of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb. This
ensures that the skb-&gt;cb buffer is large enough to hold the
j1939_sk_buff_cb structure.

Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Reported-by: Shuangpeng Bai &lt;sjb7183@psu.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Shuangpeng Bai &lt;sjb7183@psu.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller/c/G_LL-C3plRs/m/-8xCi6dCAgAJ
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230404073128.3173900-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[mkl: rephrase commit message]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: bcm: bcm_tx_setup(): fix KMSAN uninit-value in vfs_write</title>
<updated>2023-04-05T09:16:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ivan Orlov</name>
<email>ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-14T12:04:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=78bc7f0ab99458221224d3ab97199c0f8e6861f1'/>
<id>78bc7f0ab99458221224d3ab97199c0f8e6861f1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2b4c99f7d9a57ecd644eda9b1fb0a1072414959f ]

Syzkaller reported the following issue:

=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
 aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
 aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
 io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Uninit was created at:
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:766 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x71f/0xce0 mm/slub.c:3491
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:967 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x11d/0x3b0 mm/slab_common.c:981
 kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:636 [inline]
 bcm_tx_setup+0x80e/0x29d0 net/can/bcm.c:930
 bcm_sendmsg+0x3a2/0xce0 net/can/bcm.c:1351
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
 sock_write_iter+0x495/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1108
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline]
 aio_write+0x63a/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
 io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

CPU: 1 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6-syzkaller-80422-geda666ff2276 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
=====================================================

We can follow the call chain and find that 'bcm_tx_setup' function
calls 'memcpy_from_msg' to copy some content to the newly allocated
frame of 'op-&gt;frames'. After that the 'len' field of copied structure
being compared with some constant value (64 or 8). However, if
'memcpy_from_msg' returns an error, we will compare some uninitialized
memory. This triggers 'uninit-value' issue.

This patch will add 'memcpy_from_msg' possible errors processing to
avoid uninit-value issue.

Tested via syzkaller

Reported-by: syzbot+c9bfd85eca611ebf5db1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=47f897f8ad958bbde5790ebf389b5e7e0a345089
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov &lt;ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 6f3b911d5f29b ("can: bcm: add support for CAN FD frames")
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230314120445.12407-1-ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2b4c99f7d9a57ecd644eda9b1fb0a1072414959f ]

Syzkaller reported the following issue:

=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
 aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
 aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
 io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Uninit was created at:
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:766 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x71f/0xce0 mm/slub.c:3491
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:967 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x11d/0x3b0 mm/slab_common.c:981
 kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:636 [inline]
 bcm_tx_setup+0x80e/0x29d0 net/can/bcm.c:930
 bcm_sendmsg+0x3a2/0xce0 net/can/bcm.c:1351
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
 sock_write_iter+0x495/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1108
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline]
 aio_write+0x63a/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
 io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

CPU: 1 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6-syzkaller-80422-geda666ff2276 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
=====================================================

We can follow the call chain and find that 'bcm_tx_setup' function
calls 'memcpy_from_msg' to copy some content to the newly allocated
frame of 'op-&gt;frames'. After that the 'len' field of copied structure
being compared with some constant value (64 or 8). However, if
'memcpy_from_msg' returns an error, we will compare some uninitialized
memory. This triggers 'uninit-value' issue.

This patch will add 'memcpy_from_msg' possible errors processing to
avoid uninit-value issue.

Tested via syzkaller

Reported-by: syzbot+c9bfd85eca611ebf5db1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=47f897f8ad958bbde5790ebf389b5e7e0a345089
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov &lt;ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 6f3b911d5f29b ("can: bcm: add support for CAN FD frames")
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230314120445.12407-1-ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
