linux-stable.git/net/can, branch v4.14.331

can: bcm: Fix UAF in bcm_proc_show()

2023-08-11T09:33:47+00:00

commit 55c3b96074f3f9b0aee19bf93cd71af7516582bb upstream.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888155846230 by task cat/7862

CPU: 1 PID: 7862 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00153-gc8746099c197 #230
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd5/0x150
 print_report+0xc1/0x5e0
 kasan_report+0xba/0xf0
 bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80
 seq_read_iter+0x4f6/0x1260
 seq_read+0x165/0x210
 proc_reg_read+0x227/0x300
 vfs_read+0x1d5/0x8d0
 ksys_read+0x11e/0x240
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Allocated by task 7846:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9e/0xa0
 bcm_sendmsg+0x264b/0x44e0
 sock_sendmsg+0xda/0x180
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x735/0x920
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1b0
 __sys_sendmsg+0xfa/0x1d0
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 7846:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x161/0x1c0
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x119/0x220
 __kmem_cache_free+0xb4/0x2e0
 rcu_core+0x809/0x1bd0

bcm_op is freed before procfs entry be removed in bcm_release(),
this lead to bcm_proc_show() may read the freed bcm_op.

Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing 
Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230715092543.15548-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

can: bcm: bcm_tx_setup(): fix KMSAN uninit-value in vfs_write

2023-04-05T09:14:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2b4c99f7d9a57ecd644eda9b1fb0a1072414959f ]

Syzkaller reported the following issue:

=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
 aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
 aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
 io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Uninit was created at:
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:766 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x71f/0xce0 mm/slub.c:3491
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:967 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x11d/0x3b0 mm/slab_common.c:981
 kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:636 [inline]
 bcm_tx_setup+0x80e/0x29d0 net/can/bcm.c:930
 bcm_sendmsg+0x3a2/0xce0 net/can/bcm.c:1351
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
 sock_write_iter+0x495/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1108
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline]
 aio_write+0x63a/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
 io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

CPU: 1 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6-syzkaller-80422-geda666ff2276 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
=====================================================

We can follow the call chain and find that 'bcm_tx_setup' function
calls 'memcpy_from_msg' to copy some content to the newly allocated
frame of 'op->frames'. After that the 'len' field of copied structure
being compared with some constant value (64 or 8). However, if
'memcpy_from_msg' returns an error, we will compare some uninitialized
memory. This triggers 'uninit-value' issue.

This patch will add 'memcpy_from_msg' possible errors processing to
avoid uninit-value issue.

Tested via syzkaller

Reported-by: syzbot+c9bfd85eca611ebf5db1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=47f897f8ad958bbde5790ebf389b5e7e0a345089
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov 
Fixes: 6f3b911d5f29b ("can: bcm: add support for CAN FD frames")
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230314120445.12407-1-ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

can: bcm: check the result of can_send() in bcm_can_tx()

2022-10-26T11:17:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3fd7bfd28cfd68ae80a2fe92ea1615722cc2ee6e ]

If can_send() fail, it should not update frames_abs counter
in bcm_can_tx(). Add the result check for can_send() in bcm_can_tx().

Suggested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Suggested-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/9851878e74d6d37aee2f1ee76d68361a46f89458.1663206163.git.william.xuanziyang@huawei.com
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: add missing SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID support

2022-04-20T07:08:28+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8f932f762e7928d250e21006b00ff9b7718b0a64 ]

SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID is supported on TCP, UDP and RAW sockets.
But it was missing on RAW with IPPROTO_IP, PF_PACKET and CAN.

Add skb_setup_tx_timestamp that configures both tx_flags and tskey
for these paths that do not need corking or use bytestream keys.

Fixes: 09c2d251b707 ("net-timestamp: add key to disambiguate concurrent datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

can: bcm: fix UAF of bcm op

2022-01-29T09:17:06+00:00

Stopping tasklet and hrtimer rely on the active state of tasklet and
hrtimer sequentially in bcm_remove_op(), the op object will be freed
if they are all unactive. Assume the hrtimer timeout is short, the
hrtimer cb has been excuted after tasklet conditional judgment which
must be false after last round tasklet_kill() and before condition
hrtimer_active(), it is false when execute to hrtimer_active(). Bug
is triggerd, because the stopping action is end and the op object
will be freed, but the tasklet is scheduled. The resources of the op
object will occur UAF bug.

Move hrtimer_cancel() behind tasklet_kill() and switch 'while () {...}'
to 'do {...} while ()' to fix the op UAF problem.

Fixes: a06393ed0316 ("can: bcm: fix hrtimer/tasklet termination in bcm op removal")
Reported-by: syzbot+5ca851459ed04c778d1d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan 
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

can: raw: raw_setsockopt(): fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF

2021-08-04T10:22:15+00:00

commit 54f93336d000229f72c26d8a3f69dd256b744528 upstream.

We get a bug during ltp can_filter test as following.

===========================================
[60919.264984] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
[60919.265223] PGD 8000003dda726067 P4D 8000003dda726067 PUD 3dda727067 PMD 0
[60919.265443] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[60919.265550] CPU: 30 PID: 3638365 Comm: can_filter Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W         4.19.90+ #1
[60919.266068] RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x3e/0x200
[60919.293289] RSP: 0018:ffff8d53bfc03cf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[60919.307140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000001d RCX: 0000000000000007
[60919.320756] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8d5104a8ed00 RDI: ffff8d53bfc03d30
[60919.334319] RBP: ffff8d9338056800 R08: ffff8d53bfc29d80 R09: 0000000000000001
[60919.347969] R10: ffff8d53bfc03ec0 R11: ffffb8526ef47c98 R12: ffff8d53bfc03d30
[60919.350320] perf: interrupt took too long (3063 > 2500), lowering kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate to 65000
[60919.361148] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8d53bcf90000 R15: 0000000000000000
[60919.361151] FS:  00007fb78b6b3600(0000) GS:ffff8d53bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[60919.400812] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[60919.413730] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000003e3f784006 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[60919.426479] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[60919.439339] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[60919.451608] PKRU: 55555554
[60919.463622] Call Trace:
[60919.475617]  
[60919.487122]  ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0
[60919.498478]  ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0
[60919.509822]  ? account_entity_enqueue+0xc5/0xf0
[60919.520709]  security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40
[60919.531413]  sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x1b0
[60919.542178]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x38/0x1b0
[60919.552444]  sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x17/0x30
[60919.562477]  raw_rcv+0x110/0x190 [can_raw]
[60919.572539]  can_rcv_filter+0xbc/0x1b0 [can]
[60919.582173]  can_receive+0x6b/0xb0 [can]
[60919.591595]  can_rcv+0x31/0x70 [can]
[60919.600783]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5a/0x80
[60919.609864]  process_backlog+0x9b/0x150
[60919.618691]  net_rx_action+0x156/0x400
[60919.627310]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0
[60919.635714]  __do_softirq+0xe8/0x2e9
[60919.644161]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40
[60919.652154]  
[60919.659899]  do_softirq.part.17+0x4f/0x60
[60919.667475]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x60/0x70
[60919.675089]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x539/0x920
[60919.682267]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
[60919.689218]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
[60919.695886]  ? sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x211/0x230
[60919.702395]  ? can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can]
[60919.708882]  can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can]
[60919.715037]  raw_sendmsg+0x16d/0x268 [can_raw]

It's because raw_setsockopt() concurrently with
unregister_netdevice_many(). Concurrent scenario as following.

	cpu0						cpu1
raw_bind
raw_setsockopt					unregister_netdevice_many
						unlist_netdevice
dev_get_by_index				raw_notifier
raw_enable_filters				......
can_rx_register
can_rcv_list_find(..., net->can.rx_alldev_list)

......

sock_close
raw_release(sock_a)

......

can_receive
can_rcv_filter(net->can.rx_alldev_list, ...)
raw_rcv(skb, sock_a)
BUG

After unlist_netdevice(), dev_get_by_index() return NULL in
raw_setsockopt(). Function raw_enable_filters() will add sock
and can_filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list. Then the sock is closed.
Followed by, we sock_sendmsg() to a new vcan device use the same
can_filter. Protocol stack match the old receiver whose sock has
been released on net->can.rx_alldev_list in can_rcv_filter().
Function raw_rcv() uses the freed sock. UAF BUG is triggered.

We can find that the key issue is that net_device has not been
protected in raw_setsockopt(). Use rtnl_lock to protect net_device
in raw_setsockopt().

Fixes: c18ce101f2e4 ("[CAN]: Add raw protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722070819.1048263-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com
Cc: linux-stable 
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan 
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

can: gw: synchronize rcu operations before removing gw job entry

2021-07-20T14:17:29+00:00

commit fb8696ab14adadb2e3f6c17c18ed26b3ecd96691 upstream.

can_can_gw_rcv() is called under RCU protection, so after calling
can_rx_unregister(), we have to call synchronize_rcu in order to wait
for any RCU read-side critical sections to finish before removing the
kmem_cache entry with the referenced gw job entry.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210618173645.2238-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Fixes: c1aabdf379bc ("can-gw: add netlink based CAN routing")
Cc: linux-stable 
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

can: bcm: delay release of struct bcm_op after synchronize_rcu()

2021-07-20T14:17:29+00:00

commit d5f9023fa61ee8b94f37a93f08e94b136cf1e463 upstream.

can_rx_register() callbacks may be called concurrently to the call to
can_rx_unregister(). The callbacks and callback data, though, are
protected by RCU and the struct sock reference count.

So the callback data is really attached to the life of sk, meaning
that it should be released on sk_destruct. However, bcm_remove_op()
calls tasklet_kill(), and RCU callbacks may be called under RCU
softirq, so that cannot be used on kernels before the introduction of
HRTIMER_MODE_SOFT.

However, bcm_rx_handler() is called under RCU protection, so after
calling can_rx_unregister(), we may call synchronize_rcu() in order to
wait for any RCU read-side critical sections to finish. That is,
bcm_rx_handler() won't be called anymore for those ops. So, we only
free them, after we do that synchronize_rcu().

Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210619161813.2098382-1-cascardo@canonical.com
Cc: linux-stable 
Reported-by: syzbot+0f7e7e5e2f4f40fa89c0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Norbert Slusarek 
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier

2021-06-30T12:48:55+00:00

commit 8d0caedb759683041d9db82069937525999ada53 upstream.

syzbot is reporting hung task at register_netdevice_notifier() [1] and
unregister_netdevice_notifier() [2], for cleanup_net() might perform
time consuming operations while CAN driver's raw/bcm/isotp modules are
calling {register,unregister}_netdevice_notifier() on each socket.

Change raw/bcm/isotp modules to call register_netdevice_notifier() from
module's __init function and call unregister_netdevice_notifier() from
module's __exit function, as with gw/j1939 modules are doing.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=391b9498827788b3cc6830226d4ff5be87107c30 [1]
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1724d278c83ca6e6df100a2e320c10d991cf2bce [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/54a5f451-05ed-f977-8534-79e7aa2bcc8f@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Cc: linux-stable 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai 
Tested-by: syzbot 
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

can: bcm: fix infoleak in struct bcm_msg_head

2021-06-30T12:48:52+00:00

commit 5e87ddbe3942e27e939bdc02deb8579b0cbd8ecc upstream.

On 64-bit systems, struct bcm_msg_head has an added padding of 4 bytes between
struct members count and ival1. Even though all struct members are initialized,
the 4-byte hole will contain data from the kernel stack. This patch zeroes out
struct bcm_msg_head before usage, preventing infoleaks to userspace.

Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/trinity-7c1b2e82-e34f-4885-8060-2cd7a13769ce-1623532166177@3c-app-gmx-bs52
Cc: linux-stable 
Signed-off-by: Norbert Slusarek 
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp 
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman