<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net/bridge/netfilter, branch linux-4.9.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nft_reject_bridge: enable reject with bridge vlan</title>
<updated>2020-06-03T06:16:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Braun</name>
<email>michael-dev@fami-braun.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-06T09:46:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b614b8642fb89de42585b80b0a2485002a2d47da'/>
<id>b614b8642fb89de42585b80b0a2485002a2d47da</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e9c284ec4b41c827f4369973d2792992849e4fa5 upstream.

Currently, using the bridge reject target with tagged packets
results in untagged packets being sent back.

Fix this by mirroring the vlan id as well.

Fixes: 85f5b3086a04 ("netfilter: bridge: add reject support")
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun &lt;michael-dev@fami-braun.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e9c284ec4b41c827f4369973d2792992849e4fa5 upstream.

Currently, using the bridge reject target with tagged packets
results in untagged packets being sent back.

Fix this by mirroring the vlan id as well.

Fixes: 85f5b3086a04 ("netfilter: bridge: add reject support")
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun &lt;michael-dev@fami-braun.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: reject trailing data after last rule</title>
<updated>2020-01-29T09:24:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-05T16:47:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=82366de36f1f468daa0856da5f424d50e9b33d5a'/>
<id>82366de36f1f468daa0856da5f424d50e9b33d5a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 680f6af5337c98d116e4f127cea7845339dba8da ]

If userspace provides a rule blob with trailing data after last target,
we trigger a splat, then convert ruleset to 64bit format (with trailing
data), then pass that to do_replace_finish() which then returns -EINVAL.

Erroring out right away avoids the splat plus unneeded translation and
error unwind.

Fixes: 81e675c227ec ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 680f6af5337c98d116e4f127cea7845339dba8da ]

If userspace provides a rule blob with trailing data after last target,
we trigger a splat, then convert ruleset to 64bit format (with trailing
data), then pass that to do_replace_finish() which then returns -EINVAL.

Erroring out right away avoids the splat plus unneeded translation and
error unwind.

Fixes: 81e675c227ec ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ebtables: compat: reject all padding in matches/watchers</title>
<updated>2020-01-04T12:41:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-15T02:49:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=35b61a14c3493f89dba313d1ed8cf39b21d48cd5'/>
<id>35b61a14c3493f89dba313d1ed8cf39b21d48cd5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e608f631f0ba5f1fc5ee2e260a3a35d13107cbfe upstream.

syzbot reported following splat:

BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155
Read of size 4 at addr ffffc900004461f4 by task syz-executor267/7937

CPU: 1 PID: 7937 Comm: syz-executor267 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
 size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline]
 compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155
 compat_do_replace+0x344/0x720 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2249
 compat_do_ebt_set_ctl+0x22f/0x27e net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2333
 [..]

Because padding isn't considered during computation of -&gt;buf_user_offset,
"total" is decremented by fewer bytes than it should.

Therefore, the first part of

if (*total &lt; sizeof(*entry) || entry-&gt;next_offset &lt; sizeof(*entry))

will pass, -- it should not have.  This causes oob access:
entry-&gt;next_offset is past the vmalloced size.

Reject padding and check that computed user offset (sum of ebt_entry
structure plus all individual matches/watchers/targets) is same
value that userspace gave us as the offset of the next entry.

Reported-by: syzbot+f68108fed972453a0ad4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 81e675c227ec ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e608f631f0ba5f1fc5ee2e260a3a35d13107cbfe upstream.

syzbot reported following splat:

BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155
Read of size 4 at addr ffffc900004461f4 by task syz-executor267/7937

CPU: 1 PID: 7937 Comm: syz-executor267 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
 size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline]
 compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155
 compat_do_replace+0x344/0x720 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2249
 compat_do_ebt_set_ctl+0x22f/0x27e net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2333
 [..]

Because padding isn't considered during computation of -&gt;buf_user_offset,
"total" is decremented by fewer bytes than it should.

Therefore, the first part of

if (*total &lt; sizeof(*entry) || entry-&gt;next_offset &lt; sizeof(*entry))

will pass, -- it should not have.  This causes oob access:
entry-&gt;next_offset is past the vmalloced size.

Reject padding and check that computed user offset (sum of ebt_entry
structure plus all individual matches/watchers/targets) is same
value that userspace gave us as the offset of the next entry.

Reported-by: syzbot+f68108fed972453a0ad4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 81e675c227ec ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ebtables: fix a memory leak bug in compat</title>
<updated>2019-09-06T08:19:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wenwen Wang</name>
<email>wenwen@cs.uga.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-20T12:22:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c2ccc347e521ce7232d97c237c1fde8fd7556795'/>
<id>c2ccc347e521ce7232d97c237c1fde8fd7556795</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 15a78ba1844a8e052c1226f930133de4cef4e7ad ]

In compat_do_replace(), a temporary buffer is allocated through vmalloc()
to hold entries copied from the user space. The buffer address is firstly
saved to 'newinfo-&gt;entries', and later on assigned to 'entries_tmp'. Then
the entries in this temporary buffer is copied to the internal kernel
structure through compat_copy_entries(). If this copy process fails,
compat_do_replace() should be terminated. However, the allocated temporary
buffer is not freed on this path, leading to a memory leak.

To fix the bug, free the buffer before returning from compat_do_replace().

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wenwen@cs.uga.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 15a78ba1844a8e052c1226f930133de4cef4e7ad ]

In compat_do_replace(), a temporary buffer is allocated through vmalloc()
to hold entries copied from the user space. The buffer address is firstly
saved to 'newinfo-&gt;entries', and later on assigned to 'entries_tmp'. Then
the entries in this temporary buffer is copied to the internal kernel
structure through compat_copy_entries(). If this copy process fails,
compat_do_replace() should be terminated. However, the allocated temporary
buffer is not freed on this path, leading to a memory leak.

To fix the bug, free the buffer before returning from compat_do_replace().

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wenwen@cs.uga.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: drop a bogus WARN_ON</title>
<updated>2019-05-02T07:32:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-14T22:43:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74da2dc3d3ded84bb9dc64568a4b6a9710828948'/>
<id>74da2dc3d3ded84bb9dc64568a4b6a9710828948</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7caa56f006e9d712b44f27b32520c66420d5cbc6 upstream.

It means userspace gave us a ruleset where there is some other
data after the ebtables target but before the beginning of the next rule.

Fixes: 81e675c227ec ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support")
Reported-by: syzbot+659574e7bcc7f7eb4df7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7caa56f006e9d712b44f27b32520c66420d5cbc6 upstream.

It means userspace gave us a ruleset where there is some other
data after the ebtables target but before the beginning of the next rule.

Fixes: 81e675c227ec ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support")
Reported-by: syzbot+659574e7bcc7f7eb4df7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Fix usage of pskb_trim_rcsum</title>
<updated>2019-01-31T07:12:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ross Lagerwall</name>
<email>ross.lagerwall@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-17T15:34:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=04663e84f0429d3777ccb2c3f895fc8a37bddf31'/>
<id>04663e84f0429d3777ccb2c3f895fc8a37bddf31</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6c57f0458022298e4da1729c67bd33ce41c14e7a ]

In certain cases, pskb_trim_rcsum() may change skb pointers.
Reinitialize header pointers afterwards to avoid potential
use-after-frees. Add a note in the documentation of
pskb_trim_rcsum(). Found by KASAN.

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall &lt;ross.lagerwall@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6c57f0458022298e4da1729c67bd33ce41c14e7a ]

In certain cases, pskb_trim_rcsum() may change skb pointers.
Reinitialize header pointers afterwards to avoid potential
use-after-frees. Add a note in the documentation of
pskb_trim_rcsum(). Found by KASAN.

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall &lt;ross.lagerwall@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ebtables: account ebt_table_info to kmemcg</title>
<updated>2019-01-23T07:10:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shakeel Butt</name>
<email>shakeelb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-03T03:14:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c6c0e52ab3fbe3915066eca7f072ee5977957eb5'/>
<id>c6c0e52ab3fbe3915066eca7f072ee5977957eb5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e2c8d550a973bb34fc28bc8d0ec996f84562fb8a upstream.

The [ip,ip6,arp]_tables use x_tables_info internally and the underlying
memory is already accounted to kmemcg. Do the same for ebtables. The
syzbot, by using setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES), was able to OOM the
whole system from a restricted memcg, a potential DoS.

By accounting the ebt_table_info, the memory used for ebt_table_info can
be contained within the memcg of the allocating process. However the
lifetime of ebt_table_info is independent of the allocating process and
is tied to the network namespace. So, the oom-killer will not be able to
relieve the memory pressure due to ebt_table_info memory. The memory for
ebt_table_info is allocated through vmalloc. Currently vmalloc does not
handle the oom-killed allocating process correctly and one large
allocation can bypass memcg limit enforcement. So, with this patch,
at least the small allocations will be contained. For large allocations,
we need to fix vmalloc.

Reported-by: syzbot+7713f3aa67be76b1552c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e2c8d550a973bb34fc28bc8d0ec996f84562fb8a upstream.

The [ip,ip6,arp]_tables use x_tables_info internally and the underlying
memory is already accounted to kmemcg. Do the same for ebtables. The
syzbot, by using setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES), was able to OOM the
whole system from a restricted memcg, a potential DoS.

By accounting the ebt_table_info, the memory used for ebt_table_info can
be contained within the memcg of the allocating process. However the
lifetime of ebt_table_info is independent of the allocating process and
is tied to the network namespace. So, the oom-killer will not be able to
relieve the memory pressure due to ebt_table_info memory. The memory for
ebt_table_info is allocated through vmalloc. Currently vmalloc does not
handle the oom-killed allocating process correctly and one large
allocation can bypass memcg limit enforcement. So, with this patch,
at least the small allocations will be contained. For large allocations,
we need to fix vmalloc.

Reported-by: syzbot+7713f3aa67be76b1552c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ebtables: arpreply: Add the standard target sanity check</title>
<updated>2018-10-13T07:18:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gao Feng</name>
<email>gfree.wind@vip.163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-16T01:30:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fcbd4cc28b190277f77d9a82c1e4d736224bc8c6'/>
<id>fcbd4cc28b190277f77d9a82c1e4d736224bc8c6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c953d63548207a085abcb12a15fefc8a11ffdf0a upstream.

The info-&gt;target comes from userspace and it would be used directly.
So we need to add the sanity check to make sure it is a valid standard
target, although the ebtables tool has already checked it. Kernel needs
to validate anything coming from userspace.

If the target is set as an evil value, it would break the ebtables
and cause a panic. Because the non-standard target is treated as one
offset.

Now add one helper function ebt_invalid_target, and we would replace
the macro INVALID_TARGET later.

Signed-off-by: Gao Feng &lt;gfree.wind@vip.163.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Loic &lt;hackurx@opensec.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c953d63548207a085abcb12a15fefc8a11ffdf0a upstream.

The info-&gt;target comes from userspace and it would be used directly.
So we need to add the sanity check to make sure it is a valid standard
target, although the ebtables tool has already checked it. Kernel needs
to validate anything coming from userspace.

If the target is set as an evil value, it would break the ebtables
and cause a panic. Because the non-standard target is treated as one
offset.

Now add one helper function ebt_invalid_target, and we would replace
the macro INVALID_TARGET later.

Signed-off-by: Gao Feng &lt;gfree.wind@vip.163.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Loic &lt;hackurx@opensec.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ebtables: reject non-bridge targets</title>
<updated>2018-07-22T12:27:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-06T10:14:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=064d9e9744728d0c10ef5e22e955e8886f3dfcca'/>
<id>064d9e9744728d0c10ef5e22e955e8886f3dfcca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 11ff7288beb2b7da889a014aff0a7b80bf8efcf3 upstream.

the ebtables evaluation loop expects targets to return
positive values (jumps), or negative values (absolute verdicts).

This is completely different from what xtables does.
In xtables, targets are expected to return the standard netfilter
verdicts, i.e. NF_DROP, NF_ACCEPT, etc.

ebtables will consider these as jumps.

Therefore reject any target found due to unspec fallback.
v2: also reject watchers.  ebtables ignores their return value, so
a target that assumes skb ownership (and returns NF_STOLEN) causes
use-after-free.

The only watchers in the 'ebtables' front-end are log and nflog;
both have AF_BRIDGE specific wrappers on kernel side.

Reported-by: syzbot+2b43f681169a2a0d306a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 11ff7288beb2b7da889a014aff0a7b80bf8efcf3 upstream.

the ebtables evaluation loop expects targets to return
positive values (jumps), or negative values (absolute verdicts).

This is completely different from what xtables does.
In xtables, targets are expected to return the standard netfilter
verdicts, i.e. NF_DROP, NF_ACCEPT, etc.

ebtables will consider these as jumps.

Therefore reject any target found due to unspec fallback.
v2: also reject watchers.  ebtables ignores their return value, so
a target that assumes skb ownership (and returns NF_STOLEN) causes
use-after-free.

The only watchers in the 'ebtables' front-end are log and nflog;
both have AF_BRIDGE specific wrappers on kernel side.

Reported-by: syzbot+2b43f681169a2a0d306a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: x_tables: initialise match/target check parameter struct</title>
<updated>2018-07-17T09:37:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-07T19:34:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=40352e791c0c407ae260c294e04d81bd989e00a5'/>
<id>40352e791c0c407ae260c294e04d81bd989e00a5</id>
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commit c568503ef02030f169c9e19204def610a3510918 upstream.

syzbot reports following splat:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ebt_stp_mt_check+0x24b/0x450
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_stp.c:162
 ebt_stp_mt_check+0x24b/0x450 net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_stp.c:162
 xt_check_match+0x1438/0x1650 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:506
 ebt_check_match net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:372 [inline]
 ebt_check_entry net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:702 [inline]

The uninitialised access is
   xt_mtchk_param-&gt;nft_compat

... which should be set to 0.
Fix it by zeroing the struct beforehand, same for tgchk.

ip(6)tables targetinfo uses c99-style initialiser, so no change
needed there.

Reported-by: syzbot+da4494182233c23a5fcf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 55917a21d0cc0 ("netfilter: x_tables: add context to know if extension runs from nft_compat")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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commit c568503ef02030f169c9e19204def610a3510918 upstream.

syzbot reports following splat:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ebt_stp_mt_check+0x24b/0x450
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_stp.c:162
 ebt_stp_mt_check+0x24b/0x450 net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_stp.c:162
 xt_check_match+0x1438/0x1650 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:506
 ebt_check_match net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:372 [inline]
 ebt_check_entry net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:702 [inline]

The uninitialised access is
   xt_mtchk_param-&gt;nft_compat

... which should be set to 0.
Fix it by zeroing the struct beforehand, same for tgchk.

ip(6)tables targetinfo uses c99-style initialiser, so no change
needed there.

Reported-by: syzbot+da4494182233c23a5fcf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 55917a21d0cc0 ("netfilter: x_tables: add context to know if extension runs from nft_compat")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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