linux-stable.git/net/bluetooth, branch v4.9.321 Linux kernel stable tree Bluetooth: fix dangling sco_conn and use-after-free in sco_sock_timeout 2022-06-14T14:52:32+00:00 Ying Hsu yinghsu@chromium.org 2022-03-26T07:09:28+00:00 9de3dc09e56f8deacd2bdbf4cecb71e11a312405 [ Upstream commit 7aa1e7d15f8a5b65f67bacb100d8fc033b21efa2 ] Connecting the same socket twice consecutively in sco_sock_connect() could lead to a race condition where two sco_conn objects are created but only one is associated with the socket. If the socket is closed before the SCO connection is established, the timer associated with the dangling sco_conn object won't be canceled. As the sock object is being freed, the use-after-free problem happens when the timer callback function sco_sock_timeout() accesses the socket. Here's the call trace: dump_stack+0x107/0x163 ? refcount_inc+0x1c/ print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x47e ? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b kasan_report+0x13a/0x173 ? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b check_memory_region+0x132/0x139 refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b sco_sock_timeout+0xb2/0x1ba process_one_work+0x739/0xbd1 ? cancel_delayed_work+0x13f/0x13f ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0xf0/0xf0 ? to_kthread+0x59/0x85 worker_thread+0x593/0x70e kthread+0x346/0x35a ? drain_workqueue+0x31a/0x31a ? kthread_bind+0x4b/0x4b ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2bef95d3ab4daa10155b Reported-by: syzbot+2bef95d3ab4daa10155b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e1dee2c1de2b ("Bluetooth: fix repeated calls to sco_sock_kill") Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Joseph Hwang <josephsih@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 7aa1e7d15f8a5b65f67bacb100d8fc033b21efa2 ]

Connecting the same socket twice consecutively in sco_sock_connect()
could lead to a race condition where two sco_conn objects are created
but only one is associated with the socket. If the socket is closed
before the SCO connection is established, the timer associated with the
dangling sco_conn object won't be canceled. As the sock object is being
freed, the use-after-free problem happens when the timer callback
function sco_sock_timeout() accesses the socket. Here's the call trace:

dump_stack+0x107/0x163
? refcount_inc+0x1c/
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x47e
? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b
kasan_report+0x13a/0x173
? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b
check_memory_region+0x132/0x139
refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b
sco_sock_timeout+0xb2/0x1ba
process_one_work+0x739/0xbd1
? cancel_delayed_work+0x13f/0x13f
? __raw_spin_lock_init+0xf0/0xf0
? to_kthread+0x59/0x85
worker_thread+0x593/0x70e
kthread+0x346/0x35a
? drain_workqueue+0x31a/0x31a
? kthread_bind+0x4b/0x4b
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2bef95d3ab4daa10155b
Reported-by: syzbot+2bef95d3ab4daa10155b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e1dee2c1de2b ("Bluetooth: fix repeated calls to sco_sock_kill")
Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Hwang <josephsih@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: Fix the creation of hdev->name 2022-05-15T17:39:17+00:00 Itay Iellin ieitayie@gmail.com 2022-05-07T12:32:48+00:00 b104109c9fdf750710a09bbffccb52d38e5c9336 commit 103a2f3255a95991252f8f13375c3a96a75011cd upstream. Set a size limit of 8 bytes of the written buffer to "hdev->name" including the terminating null byte, as the size of "hdev->name" is 8 bytes. If an id value which is greater than 9999 is allocated, then the "snprintf(hdev->name, sizeof(hdev->name), "hci%d", id)" function call would lead to a truncation of the id value in decimal notation. Set an explicit maximum id parameter in the id allocation function call. The id allocation function defines the maximum allocated id value as the maximum id parameter value minus one. Therefore, HCI_MAX_ID is defined as 10000. Signed-off-by: Itay Iellin <ieitayie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 103a2f3255a95991252f8f13375c3a96a75011cd upstream.

Set a size limit of 8 bytes of the written buffer to "hdev->name"
including the terminating null byte, as the size of "hdev->name" is 8
bytes. If an id value which is greater than 9999 is allocated,
then the "snprintf(hdev->name, sizeof(hdev->name), "hci%d", id)"
function call would lead to a truncation of the id value in decimal
notation.

Set an explicit maximum id parameter in the id allocation function call.
The id allocation function defines the maximum allocated id value as the
maximum id parameter value minus one. Therefore, HCI_MAX_ID is defined
as 10000.

Signed-off-by: Itay Iellin <ieitayie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: Fix use after free in hci_send_acl 2022-04-20T07:06:43+00:00 Luiz Augusto von Dentz luiz.von.dentz@intel.com 2022-03-11T21:19:33+00:00 c41de54b0a963e59e4dd04c029a4a6d73f45ef9c [ Upstream commit f63d24baff787e13b723d86fe036f84bdbc35045 ] This fixes the following trace caused by receiving HCI_EV_DISCONN_PHY_LINK_COMPLETE which does call hci_conn_del without first checking if conn->type is in fact AMP_LINK and in case it is do properly cleanup upper layers with hci_disconn_cfm: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e404818 by task bluetoothd/142 CPU: 0 PID: 142 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-00006-gda4022eeac1a #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 l2cap_do_send+0x23f/0x3d0 l2cap_chan_send+0xc06/0x2cc0 l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x201/0x2b0 sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0x110 sock_write_iter+0x20f/0x370 do_iter_readv_writev+0x343/0x690 do_iter_write+0x132/0x640 vfs_writev+0x198/0x570 do_writev+0x202/0x280 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RSP: 002b:00007ffce8a099b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffce8a099e0 RDI: 0000000000000015 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce8a099e0 RCX: 00007f788fc3cf77 R10: 00007ffce8af7080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e4ccf75580 RBP: 0000000000000015 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001 </TASK> R13: 000055e4ccf754a0 R14: 000055e4ccf75cd0 R15: 000055e4ccf4a6b0 Allocated by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x2f0 l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdc0 l2cap_connect_cfm+0x236/0x1000 le_conn_complete_evt+0x15a7/0x1db0 hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x226/0x2c0 hci_le_meta_evt+0x247/0x450 hci_event_packet+0x61b/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Freed by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130 kfree+0xac/0x350 hci_conn_cleanup+0x101/0x6a0 hci_conn_del+0x27e/0x6c0 hci_disconn_phylink_complete_evt+0xe0/0x120 hci_event_packet+0x812/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f0500 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address belongs to the page: 128-byte region [ffff88800c0f0500, ffff88800c0f0580) flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) page:00000000fe45cd86 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xc0f0 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00003a2c80 dead000000000004 ffff8880078418c0 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected ffff88800c0f0400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc Memory state around the buggy address: >ffff88800c0f0500: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88800c0f0480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88800c0f0580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ================================================================== ffff88800c0f0600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Reported-by: Sönke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de> Tested-by: Sönke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit f63d24baff787e13b723d86fe036f84bdbc35045 ]

This fixes the following trace caused by receiving
HCI_EV_DISCONN_PHY_LINK_COMPLETE which does call hci_conn_del without
first checking if conn->type is in fact AMP_LINK and in case it is
do properly cleanup upper layers with hci_disconn_cfm:

 ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50
    Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e404818 by task bluetoothd/142

    CPU: 0 PID: 142 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted
    5.17.0-rc5-00006-gda4022eeac1a #7
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
    rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
     print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150
     kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
     hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50
     l2cap_do_send+0x23f/0x3d0
     l2cap_chan_send+0xc06/0x2cc0
     l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x201/0x2b0
     sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0x110
     sock_write_iter+0x20f/0x370
     do_iter_readv_writev+0x343/0x690
     do_iter_write+0x132/0x640
     vfs_writev+0x198/0x570
     do_writev+0x202/0x280
     do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
    RSP: 002b:00007ffce8a099b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
    Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3
    0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05
    <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
    RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffce8a099e0 RDI: 0000000000000015
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce8a099e0 RCX: 00007f788fc3cf77
    R10: 00007ffce8af7080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e4ccf75580
    RBP: 0000000000000015 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
    </TASK>
    R13: 000055e4ccf754a0 R14: 000055e4ccf75cd0 R15: 000055e4ccf4a6b0

    Allocated by task 45:
        kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
        __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
        hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x2f0
        l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdc0
        l2cap_connect_cfm+0x236/0x1000
        le_conn_complete_evt+0x15a7/0x1db0
        hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x226/0x2c0
        hci_le_meta_evt+0x247/0x450
        hci_event_packet+0x61b/0xe90
        hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50
        process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0
        worker_thread+0x576/0x1240
        kthread+0x29d/0x340
        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

    Freed by task 45:
        kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
        kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
        kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
        __kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130
        kfree+0xac/0x350
        hci_conn_cleanup+0x101/0x6a0
        hci_conn_del+0x27e/0x6c0
        hci_disconn_phylink_complete_evt+0xe0/0x120
        hci_event_packet+0x812/0xe90
        hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50
        process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0
        worker_thread+0x576/0x1240
        kthread+0x29d/0x340
        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

    The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f0500
    The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
    which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
    The buggy address belongs to the page:
    128-byte region [ffff88800c0f0500, ffff88800c0f0580)
    flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1)
    page:00000000fe45cd86 refcount:1 mapcount:0
    mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xc0f0
    raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff
    0000000000000000
    raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00003a2c80 dead000000000004
    ffff8880078418c0
    page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
    ffff88800c0f0400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc
    Memory state around the buggy address:
    >ffff88800c0f0500: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
    ffff88800c0f0480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    ffff88800c0f0580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                ^
    ==================================================================
    ffff88800c0f0600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Reported-by: Sönke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de>
Tested-by: Sönke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: refactor malicious adv data check 2022-02-08T17:15:26+00:00 Brian Gix brian.gix@intel.com 2021-11-24T20:16:28+00:00 7889b38a7f21ed19314f83194622b195d328465c commit 899663be5e75dc0174dc8bda0b5e6826edf0b29a upstream. Check for out-of-bound read was being performed at the end of while num_reports loop, and would fill journal with false positives. Added check to beginning of loop processing so that it doesn't get checked after ptr has been advanced. Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <brian.gix@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: syphyr <syphyr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 899663be5e75dc0174dc8bda0b5e6826edf0b29a upstream.

Check for out-of-bound read was being performed at the end of while
num_reports loop, and would fill journal with false positives. Added
check to beginning of loop processing so that it doesn't get checked
after ptr has been advanced.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <brian.gix@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: syphyr <syphyr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: Fix debugfs entry leak in hci_register_dev() 2022-01-27T07:47:36+00:00 Wei Yongjun weiyongjun1@huawei.com 2021-10-13T08:55:46+00:00 69f728dac41d13fc3e8d4514684e476ebd0d61f5 [ Upstream commit 5a4bb6a8e981d3d0d492aa38412ee80b21033177 ] Fault injection test report debugfs entry leak as follows: debugfs: Directory 'hci0' with parent 'bluetooth' already present! When register_pm_notifier() failed in hci_register_dev(), the debugfs create by debugfs_create_dir() do not removed in the error handing path. Add the remove debugfs code to fix it. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 5a4bb6a8e981d3d0d492aa38412ee80b21033177 ]

Fault injection test report debugfs entry leak as follows:

debugfs: Directory 'hci0' with parent 'bluetooth' already present!

When register_pm_notifier() failed in hci_register_dev(), the debugfs
create by debugfs_create_dir() do not removed in the error handing path.

Add the remove debugfs code to fix it.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: stop proccessing malicious adv data 2022-01-27T07:47:33+00:00 Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com 2021-11-01T07:12:12+00:00 7d4238edd3bf8b8c75571cc3b382bc10438ac588 [ Upstream commit 3a56ef719f0b9682afb8a86d64b2399e36faa4e6 ] Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds read in hci_le_adv_report_evt(). The problem was in missing validaion check. We should check if data is not malicious and we can read next data block. If we won't check ptr validness, code can read a way beyond skb->end and it can cause problems, of course. Fixes: e95beb414168 ("Bluetooth: hci_le_adv_report_evt code refactoring") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e3fcb9c4f3c2a931dc40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 3a56ef719f0b9682afb8a86d64b2399e36faa4e6 ]

Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds read in hci_le_adv_report_evt(). The
problem was in missing validaion check.

We should check if data is not malicious and we can read next data block.
If we won't check ptr validness, code can read a way beyond skb->end and
it can cause problems, of course.

Fixes: e95beb414168 ("Bluetooth: hci_le_adv_report_evt code refactoring")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e3fcb9c4f3c2a931dc40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: cmtp: fix possible panic when cmtp_init_sockets() fails 2022-01-27T07:47:33+00:00 Wang Hai wanghai38@huawei.com 2021-10-25T13:10:12+00:00 4929c804e3f1ac37533c6e820b59b2338d82a9d2 [ Upstream commit 2a7ca7459d905febf519163bd9e3eed894de6bb7 ] I got a kernel BUG report when doing fault injection test: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:45! ... RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x12/0x4d ... Call Trace: proto_unregister+0x83/0x220 cmtp_cleanup_sockets+0x37/0x40 [cmtp] cmtp_exit+0xe/0x1f [cmtp] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae If cmtp_init_sockets() in cmtp_init() fails, cmtp_init() still returns success. This will cause a kernel bug when accessing uncreated ctmp related data when the module exits. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 2a7ca7459d905febf519163bd9e3eed894de6bb7 ]

I got a kernel BUG report when doing fault injection test:

------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:45!
...
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x12/0x4d
...
Call Trace:
 proto_unregister+0x83/0x220
 cmtp_cleanup_sockets+0x37/0x40 [cmtp]
 cmtp_exit+0xe/0x1f [cmtp]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

If cmtp_init_sockets() in cmtp_init() fails, cmtp_init() still returns
success. This will cause a kernel bug when accessing uncreated ctmp
related data when the module exits.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
HID: introduce hid_is_using_ll_driver 2021-12-14T09:04:46+00:00 Jason Gerecke killertofu@gmail.com 2017-07-24T16:46:18+00:00 e1e84bd83f1d2eb4d37ad1b62aa67c29665e1184 commit fc2237a724a9e448599076d7d23497f51e2f7441 upstream. Although HID itself is transport-agnostic, occasionally a driver may want to interact with the low-level transport that a device is connected through. To do this, we need to know what kind of bus is in use. The first guess may be to look at the 'bus' field of the 'struct hid_device', but this field may be emulated in some cases (e.g. uhid). More ideally, we can check which ll_driver a device is using. This function introduces a 'hid_is_using_ll_driver' function and makes the 'struct hid_ll_driver' of the four most common transports accessible through hid.h. Signed-off-by: Jason Gerecke <jason.gerecke@wacom.com> Acked-By: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit fc2237a724a9e448599076d7d23497f51e2f7441 upstream.

Although HID itself is transport-agnostic, occasionally a driver may
want to interact with the low-level transport that a device is connected
through. To do this, we need to know what kind of bus is in use. The
first guess may be to look at the 'bus' field of the 'struct hid_device',
but this field may be emulated in some cases (e.g. uhid).

More ideally, we can check which ll_driver a device is using. This
function introduces a 'hid_is_using_ll_driver' function and makes the
'struct hid_ll_driver' of the four most common transports accessible
through hid.h.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gerecke <jason.gerecke@wacom.com>
Acked-By: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: fix use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested() 2021-11-26T10:48:27+00:00 Wang ShaoBo bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com 2021-09-01T00:35:37+00:00 d19ea7da0eeb61be28ec05d8b8bddec3dde71610 [ Upstream commit 1bff51ea59a9afb67d2dd78518ab0582a54a472c ] use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested is reported: [ 179.140137][ T3731] ===================================================== [ 179.142675][ T3731] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0 [ 179.145494][ T3731] CPU: 4 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #54 [ 179.148432][ T3731] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 179.151806][ T3731] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 179.152730][ T3731] Call Trace: [ 179.153301][ T3731] dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0 [ 179.154063][ T3731] kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0 [ 179.154855][ T3731] __msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0 [ 179.155579][ T3731] lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0 [ 179.156436][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 [ 179.157257][ T3731] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0xb8/0x890 [ 179.158154][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20 [ 179.159141][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 [ 179.159994][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0 [ 179.160959][ T3731] ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x420/0x420 [ 179.161834][ T3731] l2cap_chan_del+0x3e1/0x1d50 [ 179.162608][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 [ 179.163435][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0 [ 179.164406][ T3731] l2cap_chan_close+0xeea/0x1050 [ 179.165189][ T3731] ? kmsan_internal_unpoison_shadow+0x42/0x70 [ 179.166180][ T3731] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x1da/0x590 [ 179.167066][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20 [ 179.168023][ T3731] ? l2cap_chan_create+0x560/0x560 [ 179.168818][ T3731] process_one_work+0x121d/0x1ff0 [ 179.169598][ T3731] worker_thread+0x121b/0x2370 [ 179.170346][ T3731] kthread+0x4ef/0x610 [ 179.171010][ T3731] ? process_one_work+0x1ff0/0x1ff0 [ 179.171828][ T3731] ? kthread_blkcg+0x110/0x110 [ 179.172587][ T3731] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 179.173348][ T3731] [ 179.173752][ T3731] Uninit was created at: [ 179.174409][ T3731] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0xf0 [ 179.175373][ T3731] kmsan_slab_free+0x76/0xc0 [ 179.176060][ T3731] kfree+0x3a5/0x1180 [ 179.176664][ T3731] __sk_destruct+0x8af/0xb80 [ 179.177375][ T3731] __sk_free+0x812/0x8c0 [ 179.178032][ T3731] sk_free+0x97/0x130 [ 179.178686][ T3731] l2cap_sock_release+0x3d5/0x4d0 [ 179.179457][ T3731] sock_close+0x150/0x450 [ 179.180117][ T3731] __fput+0x6bd/0xf00 [ 179.180787][ T3731] ____fput+0x37/0x40 [ 179.181481][ T3731] task_work_run+0x140/0x280 [ 179.182219][ T3731] do_exit+0xe51/0x3e60 [ 179.182930][ T3731] do_group_exit+0x20e/0x450 [ 179.183656][ T3731] get_signal+0x2dfb/0x38f0 [ 179.184344][ T3731] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xaa/0xe10 [ 179.185266][ T3731] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2d2/0x560 [ 179.186136][ T3731] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x35/0x60 [ 179.186984][ T3731] do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x140 [ 179.187681][ T3731] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 179.188604][ T3731] ===================================================== In our case, there are two Thread A and B: Context: Thread A: Context: Thread B: l2cap_chan_timeout() __se_sys_shutdown() l2cap_chan_close() l2cap_sock_shutdown() l2cap_chan_del() l2cap_chan_close() l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() Once l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() excuted, this sock will be marked as SOCK_ZAPPED, and can be treated as killable in l2cap_sock_kill() if sock_orphan() has excuted, at this time we close sock through sock_close() which end to call l2cap_sock_kill() like Thread C: Context: Thread C: sock_close() l2cap_sock_release() sock_orphan() l2cap_sock_kill() #free sock if refcnt is 1 If C completed, Once A or B reaches l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() again, use-after-free happened. We should set chan->data to NULL if sock is destructed, for telling teardown operation is not allowed in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(), and also we should avoid killing an already killed socket in l2cap_sock_close_cb(). Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 1bff51ea59a9afb67d2dd78518ab0582a54a472c ]

use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested is reported:

[  179.140137][ T3731] =====================================================
[  179.142675][ T3731] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
[  179.145494][ T3731] CPU: 4 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #54
[  179.148432][ T3731] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  179.151806][ T3731] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
[  179.152730][ T3731] Call Trace:
[  179.153301][ T3731]  dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0
[  179.154063][ T3731]  kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0
[  179.154855][ T3731]  __msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0
[  179.155579][ T3731]  lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
[  179.156436][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
[  179.157257][ T3731]  l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0xb8/0x890
[  179.158154][ T3731]  ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
[  179.159141][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
[  179.159994][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
[  179.160959][ T3731]  ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x420/0x420
[  179.161834][ T3731]  l2cap_chan_del+0x3e1/0x1d50
[  179.162608][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
[  179.163435][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
[  179.164406][ T3731]  l2cap_chan_close+0xeea/0x1050
[  179.165189][ T3731]  ? kmsan_internal_unpoison_shadow+0x42/0x70
[  179.166180][ T3731]  l2cap_chan_timeout+0x1da/0x590
[  179.167066][ T3731]  ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
[  179.168023][ T3731]  ? l2cap_chan_create+0x560/0x560
[  179.168818][ T3731]  process_one_work+0x121d/0x1ff0
[  179.169598][ T3731]  worker_thread+0x121b/0x2370
[  179.170346][ T3731]  kthread+0x4ef/0x610
[  179.171010][ T3731]  ? process_one_work+0x1ff0/0x1ff0
[  179.171828][ T3731]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x110/0x110
[  179.172587][ T3731]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[  179.173348][ T3731]
[  179.173752][ T3731] Uninit was created at:
[  179.174409][ T3731]  kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0xf0
[  179.175373][ T3731]  kmsan_slab_free+0x76/0xc0
[  179.176060][ T3731]  kfree+0x3a5/0x1180
[  179.176664][ T3731]  __sk_destruct+0x8af/0xb80
[  179.177375][ T3731]  __sk_free+0x812/0x8c0
[  179.178032][ T3731]  sk_free+0x97/0x130
[  179.178686][ T3731]  l2cap_sock_release+0x3d5/0x4d0
[  179.179457][ T3731]  sock_close+0x150/0x450
[  179.180117][ T3731]  __fput+0x6bd/0xf00
[  179.180787][ T3731]  ____fput+0x37/0x40
[  179.181481][ T3731]  task_work_run+0x140/0x280
[  179.182219][ T3731]  do_exit+0xe51/0x3e60
[  179.182930][ T3731]  do_group_exit+0x20e/0x450
[  179.183656][ T3731]  get_signal+0x2dfb/0x38f0
[  179.184344][ T3731]  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xaa/0xe10
[  179.185266][ T3731]  exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2d2/0x560
[  179.186136][ T3731]  syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x35/0x60
[  179.186984][ T3731]  do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x140
[  179.187681][ T3731]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  179.188604][ T3731] =====================================================

In our case, there are two Thread A and B:

Context: Thread A:              Context: Thread B:

l2cap_chan_timeout()            __se_sys_shutdown()
  l2cap_chan_close()              l2cap_sock_shutdown()
    l2cap_chan_del()                l2cap_chan_close()
      l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()        l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()

Once l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() excuted, this sock will be marked as SOCK_ZAPPED,
and can be treated as killable in l2cap_sock_kill() if sock_orphan() has
excuted, at this time we close sock through sock_close() which end to call
l2cap_sock_kill() like Thread C:

Context: Thread C:

sock_close()
  l2cap_sock_release()
    sock_orphan()
    l2cap_sock_kill()  #free sock if refcnt is 1

If C completed, Once A or B reaches l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() again,
use-after-free happened.

We should set chan->data to NULL if sock is destructed, for telling teardown
operation is not allowed in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(), and also we should
avoid killing an already killed socket in l2cap_sock_close_cb().

Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: sco: Fix lock_sock() blockage by memcpy_from_msg() 2021-11-26T10:48:26+00:00 Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de 2021-08-28T16:18:18+00:00 9bbe312ebea40c9b586c2b07a0d0948ff418beca [ Upstream commit 99c23da0eed4fd20cae8243f2b51e10e66aa0951 ] The sco_send_frame() also takes lock_sock() during memcpy_from_msg() call that may be endlessly blocked by a task with userfaultd technique, and this will result in a hung task watchdog trigger. Just like the similar fix for hci_sock_sendmsg() in commit 92c685dc5de0 ("Bluetooth: reorganize functions..."), this patch moves the memcpy_from_msg() out of lock_sock() for addressing the hang. This should be the last piece for fixing CVE-2021-3640 after a few already queued fixes. Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 99c23da0eed4fd20cae8243f2b51e10e66aa0951 ]

The sco_send_frame() also takes lock_sock() during memcpy_from_msg()
call that may be endlessly blocked by a task with userfaultd
technique, and this will result in a hung task watchdog trigger.

Just like the similar fix for hci_sock_sendmsg() in commit
92c685dc5de0 ("Bluetooth: reorganize functions..."), this patch moves
the  memcpy_from_msg() out of lock_sock() for addressing the hang.

This should be the last piece for fixing CVE-2021-3640 after a few
already queued fixes.

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>