linux-stable.git/net/bluetooth, branch linux-5.7.y Linux kernel stable tree Bluetooth: Fix suspend notifier race 2020-08-19T06:24:01+00:00 Abhishek Pandit-Subedi abhishekpandit@chromium.org 2020-07-28T16:58:07+00:00 79baed5a17a3037cef5b41efe19e9348282ce89e [ Upstream commit 4e8c36c3b0d73d46aa27cfd4308aaa445a1067df ] Unregister from suspend notifications and cancel suspend preparations before running hci_dev_do_close. Otherwise, the suspend notifier may race with unregister and cause cmd_timeout even after hdev has been freed. Below is the trace from when this panic was seen: [ 832.578518] Bluetooth: hci_core.c:hci_cmd_timeout() hci0: command 0x0c05 tx timeout [ 832.586200] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 832.586203] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 832.586205] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 832.586206] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 832.586210] PM: suspend exit [ 832.608870] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 832.613232] CPU: 3 PID: 10755 Comm: kworker/3:7 Not tainted 5.4.44-04894-g1e9dbb96a161 #1 [ 832.630036] Workqueue: events hci_cmd_timeout [bluetooth] [ 832.630046] RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0xf0/0x374 [ 832.630051] RSP: 0018:ffff9b5285f1fdf8 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 832.674033] RAX: ffff8a97681bac00 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8a976a000600 [ 832.681162] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000009 RDI: ffff8a976a000748 [ 832.688289] RBP: ffff9b5285f1fe38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8a97681bac00 [ 832.695418] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff8a976a0006d8 R12: ffff8a9745107600 [ 832.698045] usb 1-6: new full-speed USB device number 119 using xhci_hcd [ 832.702547] R13: ffff8a9673658850 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 000000000000001e [ 832.702549] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a976af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 832.702550] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 832.702550] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010415a000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 [ 832.702551] Call Trace: [ 832.702558] queue_work_on+0x3f/0x68 [ 832.702562] process_one_work+0x1db/0x396 [ 832.747397] worker_thread+0x216/0x375 [ 832.751147] kthread+0x138/0x140 [ 832.754377] ? pr_cont_work+0x58/0x58 [ 832.758037] ? kthread_blkcg+0x2e/0x2e [ 832.761787] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 [ 832.846191] ---[ end trace fa93f466da517212 ]--- Fixes: 9952d90ea2885 ("Bluetooth: Handle PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE and PM_POST_SUSPEND") Signed-off-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Miao-chen Chou <mcchou@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 4e8c36c3b0d73d46aa27cfd4308aaa445a1067df ]

Unregister from suspend notifications and cancel suspend preparations
before running hci_dev_do_close. Otherwise, the suspend notifier may
race with unregister and cause cmd_timeout even after hdev has been
freed.

Below is the trace from when this panic was seen:

[  832.578518] Bluetooth: hci_core.c:hci_cmd_timeout() hci0: command 0x0c05 tx timeout
[  832.586200] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[  832.586203] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  832.586205] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  832.586206] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  832.586210] PM: suspend exit
[  832.608870] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  832.613232] CPU: 3 PID: 10755 Comm: kworker/3:7 Not tainted 5.4.44-04894-g1e9dbb96a161 #1
[  832.630036] Workqueue: events hci_cmd_timeout [bluetooth]
[  832.630046] RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0xf0/0x374
[  832.630051] RSP: 0018:ffff9b5285f1fdf8 EFLAGS: 00010046
[  832.674033] RAX: ffff8a97681bac00 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8a976a000600
[  832.681162] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000009 RDI: ffff8a976a000748
[  832.688289] RBP: ffff9b5285f1fe38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8a97681bac00
[  832.695418] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff8a976a0006d8 R12: ffff8a9745107600
[  832.698045] usb 1-6: new full-speed USB device number 119 using xhci_hcd
[  832.702547] R13: ffff8a9673658850 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 000000000000001e
[  832.702549] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a976af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  832.702550] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  832.702550] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010415a000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
[  832.702551] Call Trace:
[  832.702558]  queue_work_on+0x3f/0x68
[  832.702562]  process_one_work+0x1db/0x396
[  832.747397]  worker_thread+0x216/0x375
[  832.751147]  kthread+0x138/0x140
[  832.754377]  ? pr_cont_work+0x58/0x58
[  832.758037]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x2e/0x2e
[  832.761787]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40
[  832.846191] ---[ end trace fa93f466da517212 ]---

Fixes: 9952d90ea2885 ("Bluetooth: Handle PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE and PM_POST_SUSPEND")
Signed-off-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miao-chen Chou <mcchou@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: btusb: Fix and detect most of the Chinese Bluetooth controllers 2020-08-19T06:24:01+00:00 Ismael Ferreras Morezuelas swyterzone@gmail.com 2020-07-26T21:12:28+00:00 4bd896e23adb60aa379b8f27ae534d17fc4deaee [ Upstream commit cde1a8a992875a7479c4321b2a4a190c2e92ec2a ] For some reason they tend to squat on the very first CSR/ Cambridge Silicon Radio VID/PID instead of paying fees. This is an extremely common problem; the issue goes as back as 2013 and these devices are only getting more popular, even rebranded by reputable vendors and sold by retailers everywhere. So, at this point in time there are hundreds of modern dongles reusing the ID of what originally was an early Bluetooth 1.1 controller. Linux is the only place where they don't work due to spotty checks in our detection code. It only covered a minimum subset. So what's the big idea? Take advantage of the fact that all CSR chips report the same internal version as both the LMP sub-version and HCI revision number. It always matches, couple that with the manufacturer code, that rarely lies, and we now have a good idea of who is who. Additionally, by compiling a list of user-reported HCI/lsusb dumps, and searching around for legit CSR dongles in similar product ranges we can find what CSR BlueCore firmware supported which Bluetooth versions. That way we can narrow down ranges of fakes for each of them. e.g. Real CSR dongles with LMP subversion 0x73 are old enough that support BT 1.1 only; so it's a dead giveaway when some third-party BT 4.0 dongle reuses it. So, to sum things up; there are multiple classes of fake controllers reusing the same 0A12:0001 VID/PID. This has been broken for a while. Known 'fake' bcdDevices: 0x0100, 0x0134, 0x1915, 0x2520, 0x7558, 0x8891 IC markings on 0x7558: FR3191AHAL 749H15143 (???) https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60824 Fixes: 81cac64ba258ae (Deal with USB devices that are faking CSR vendor) Reported-by: Michał Wiśniewski <brylozketrzyn@gmail.com> Tested-by: Mike Johnson <yuyuyak@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ricardo Rodrigues <ekatonb@gmail.com> Tested-by: M.Hanny Sabbagh <mhsabbagh@outlook.com> Tested-by: Oussama BEN BRAHIM <b.brahim.oussama@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ismael Ferreras Morezuelas <swyterzone@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ismael Ferreras Morezuelas <swyterzone@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit cde1a8a992875a7479c4321b2a4a190c2e92ec2a ]

For some reason they tend to squat on the very first CSR/
Cambridge Silicon Radio VID/PID instead of paying fees.

This is an extremely common problem; the issue goes as back as 2013
and these devices are only getting more popular, even rebranded by
reputable vendors and sold by retailers everywhere.

So, at this point in time there are hundreds of modern dongles reusing
the ID of what originally was an early Bluetooth 1.1 controller.

Linux is the only place where they don't work due to spotty checks
in our detection code. It only covered a minimum subset.

So what's the big idea? Take advantage of the fact that all CSR
chips report the same internal version as both the LMP sub-version and
HCI revision number. It always matches, couple that with the manufacturer
code, that rarely lies, and we now have a good idea of who is who.

Additionally, by compiling a list of user-reported HCI/lsusb dumps, and
searching around for legit CSR dongles in similar product ranges we can
find what CSR BlueCore firmware supported which Bluetooth versions.

That way we can narrow down ranges of fakes for each of them.

e.g. Real CSR dongles with LMP subversion 0x73 are old enough that
     support BT 1.1 only; so it's a dead giveaway when some
     third-party BT 4.0 dongle reuses it.

So, to sum things up; there are multiple classes of fake controllers
reusing the same 0A12:0001 VID/PID. This has been broken for a while.

Known 'fake' bcdDevices: 0x0100, 0x0134, 0x1915, 0x2520, 0x7558, 0x8891
  IC markings on 0x7558: FR3191AHAL 749H15143 (???)

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60824

Fixes: 81cac64ba258ae (Deal with USB devices that are faking CSR vendor)
Reported-by: Michał Wiśniewski <brylozketrzyn@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Mike Johnson <yuyuyak@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ricardo Rodrigues <ekatonb@gmail.com>
Tested-by: M.Hanny Sabbagh <mhsabbagh@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Oussama BEN BRAHIM <b.brahim.oussama@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ismael Ferreras Morezuelas <swyterzone@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ferreras Morezuelas <swyterzone@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: Allow suspend even when preparation has failed 2020-08-19T06:23:45+00:00 Abhishek Pandit-Subedi abhishekpandit@chromium.org 2020-06-05T20:50:15+00:00 d790826bcf163cbdba45070b87e92d2c84b450e7 [ Upstream commit a9ec8423134a54c9f0ae8d4ef59e1e833ca917c2 ] It is preferable to allow suspend even when Bluetooth has problems preparing for sleep. When Bluetooth fails to finish preparing for suspend, log the error and allow the suspend notifier to continue instead. To also make it clearer why suspend failed, change bt_dev_dbg to bt_dev_err when handling the suspend timeout. Fixes: dd522a7429b07e ("Bluetooth: Handle LE devices during suspend") Reported-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit a9ec8423134a54c9f0ae8d4ef59e1e833ca917c2 ]

It is preferable to allow suspend even when Bluetooth has problems
preparing for sleep. When Bluetooth fails to finish preparing for
suspend, log the error and allow the suspend notifier to continue
instead.

To also make it clearer why suspend failed, change bt_dev_dbg to
bt_dev_err when handling the suspend timeout.

Fixes: dd522a7429b07e ("Bluetooth: Handle LE devices during suspend")
Reported-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: add a mutex lock to avoid UAF in do_enale_set 2020-08-19T06:23:34+00:00 Lihong Kou koulihong@huawei.com 2020-06-23T12:28:41+00:00 38964e03097153f7bdbddf2138f223912e7a180a [ Upstream commit f9c70bdc279b191da8d60777c627702c06e4a37d ] In the case we set or free the global value listen_chan in different threads, we can encounter the UAF problems because the method is not protected by any lock, add one to avoid this bug. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_chan_close+0x48/0x990 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:730 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888096950000 by task kworker/1:102/2868 CPU: 1 PID: 2868 Comm: kworker/1:102 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events do_enable_set Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1fb/0x318 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x74/0x5c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report+0x149/0x1c0 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x26/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135 l2cap_chan_close+0x48/0x990 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:730 do_enable_set+0x660/0x900 net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:1074 process_one_work+0x7f5/0x10f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2264 worker_thread+0xbbc/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2410 kthread+0x332/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Allocated by task 2870: save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:72 [inline] set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x118/0x1c0 mm/kasan/common.c:515 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:529 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x221/0x2f0 mm/slab.c:3551 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:555 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline] l2cap_chan_create+0x50/0x320 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:446 chan_create net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:640 [inline] bt_6lowpan_listen net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:959 [inline] do_enable_set+0x6a4/0x900 net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:1078 process_one_work+0x7f5/0x10f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2264 worker_thread+0xbbc/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2410 kthread+0x332/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Freed by task 2870: save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:72 [inline] set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:337 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1e0 mm/kasan/common.c:476 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:485 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] kfree+0x10d/0x220 mm/slab.c:3757 l2cap_chan_destroy net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:484 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] l2cap_chan_put+0x170/0x190 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:498 do_enable_set+0x66c/0x900 net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:1075 process_one_work+0x7f5/0x10f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2264 worker_thread+0xbbc/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2410 kthread+0x332/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888096950000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff888096950000, ffff888096950800) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00025a5400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400e00 index:0x0 flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab) raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00027d1548 ffffea0002397808 ffff8880aa400e00 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888096950000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88809694ff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88809694ff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888096950000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888096950080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888096950100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Reported-by: syzbot+96414aa0033c363d8458@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Lihong Kou <koulihong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit f9c70bdc279b191da8d60777c627702c06e4a37d ]

In the case we set or free the global value listen_chan in
different threads, we can encounter the UAF problems because
the method is not protected by any lock, add one to avoid
this bug.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_chan_close+0x48/0x990
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:730
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888096950000 by task kworker/1:102/2868

CPU: 1 PID: 2868 Comm: kworker/1:102 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events do_enable_set
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1fb/0x318 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description+0x74/0x5c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report+0x149/0x1c0 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x26/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:641
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
 l2cap_chan_close+0x48/0x990 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:730
 do_enable_set+0x660/0x900 net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:1074
 process_one_work+0x7f5/0x10f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2264
 worker_thread+0xbbc/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2410
 kthread+0x332/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:255
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

Allocated by task 2870:
 save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:72 [inline]
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x118/0x1c0 mm/kasan/common.c:515
 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:529
 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x221/0x2f0 mm/slab.c:3551
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:555 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
 l2cap_chan_create+0x50/0x320 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:446
 chan_create net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:640 [inline]
 bt_6lowpan_listen net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:959 [inline]
 do_enable_set+0x6a4/0x900 net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:1078
 process_one_work+0x7f5/0x10f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2264
 worker_thread+0xbbc/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2410
 kthread+0x332/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:255
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

Freed by task 2870:
 save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:72 [inline]
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:337 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1e0 mm/kasan/common.c:476
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:485
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
 kfree+0x10d/0x220 mm/slab.c:3757
 l2cap_chan_destroy net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:484 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
 l2cap_chan_put+0x170/0x190 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:498
 do_enable_set+0x66c/0x900 net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:1075
 process_one_work+0x7f5/0x10f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2264
 worker_thread+0xbbc/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2410
 kthread+0x332/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:255
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888096950000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
 2048-byte region [ffff888096950000, ffff888096950800)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00025a5400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400e00 index:0x0
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00027d1548 ffffea0002397808 ffff8880aa400e00
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888096950000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88809694ff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88809694ff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888096950000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                   ^
 ffff888096950080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888096950100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================

Reported-by: syzbot+96414aa0033c363d8458@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lihong Kou <koulihong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: Prevent out-of-bounds read in hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt() 2020-08-11T13:35:32+00:00 Peilin Ye yepeilin.cs@gmail.com 2020-07-10T21:45:26+00:00 c9c49205b2f130b5cd258e6f8abdbd3fda429ffe commit 629b49c848ee71244203934347bd7730b0ddee8d upstream. Check `num_rsp` before using it as for-loop counter. Add `unlock` label. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 629b49c848ee71244203934347bd7730b0ddee8d upstream.

Check `num_rsp` before using it as for-loop counter. Add `unlock` label.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: Prevent out-of-bounds read in hci_inquiry_result_evt() 2020-08-11T13:35:32+00:00 Peilin Ye yepeilin.cs@gmail.com 2020-07-10T21:39:18+00:00 e70b3552ac337c9480d9a74b3c6459710fe8364c commit 75bbd2ea50ba1c5d9da878a17e92eac02fe0fd3a upstream. Check `num_rsp` before using it as for-loop counter. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 75bbd2ea50ba1c5d9da878a17e92eac02fe0fd3a upstream.

Check `num_rsp` before using it as for-loop counter.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt() 2020-08-11T13:35:32+00:00 Peilin Ye yepeilin.cs@gmail.com 2020-07-10T16:09:15+00:00 886a27c346901b6b5a3d5b12ca50ca821817185d commit 51c19bf3d5cfaa66571e4b88ba2a6f6295311101 upstream. Check upon `num_rsp` is insufficient. A malformed event packet with a large `num_rsp` number makes hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt() go out of bounds. Fix it. This patch fixes the following syzbot bug: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=4bf11aa05c4ca51ce0df86e500fce486552dc8d2 Reported-by: syzbot+d8489a79b781849b9c46@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 51c19bf3d5cfaa66571e4b88ba2a6f6295311101 upstream.

Check upon `num_rsp` is insufficient. A malformed event packet with a
large `num_rsp` number makes hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt() go out
of bounds. Fix it.

This patch fixes the following syzbot bug:

    https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=4bf11aa05c4ca51ce0df86e500fce486552dc8d2

Reported-by: syzbot+d8489a79b781849b9c46@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: fix kernel oops in store_pending_adv_report 2020-08-05T07:58:46+00:00 Alain Michaud alainm@chromium.org 2020-07-27T20:48:55+00:00 15a9441c207a546ae7cadfe092aea5ae9751c967 [ Upstream commit a2ec905d1e160a33b2e210e45ad30445ef26ce0e ] Fix kernel oops observed when an ext adv data is larger than 31 bytes. This can be reproduced by setting up an advertiser with advertisement larger than 31 bytes. The issue is not sensitive to the advertisement content. In particular, this was reproduced with an advertisement of 229 bytes filled with 'A'. See stack trace below. This is fixed by not catching ext_adv as legacy adv are only cached to be able to concatenate a scanable adv with its scan response before sending it up through mgmt. With ext_adv, this is no longer necessary. general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 205 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-37-generic #41-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 7590/0CF6RR, BIOS 1.7.0 05/11/2020 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth] RIP: 0010:hci_bdaddr_list_lookup+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth] Code: ff ff e9 26 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8b 07 48 89 e5 48 39 c7 75 0a eb 24 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 1c 44 8b 06 <44> 39 40 10 75 ef 44 0f b7 4e 04 66 44 39 48 14 75 e3 38 50 16 75 RSP: 0018:ffffbc6a40493c70 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 4141414141414141 RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9903e76c100f RDI: ffff9904289d4b28 RBP: ffffbc6a40493c70 R08: 0000000093570362 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9904344eae38 R12: ffff9904289d4000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffa3 R15: ffff9903e76c100f FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff990434580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007feed125a000 CR3: 00000001b860a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Call Trace: process_adv_report+0x12e/0x560 [bluetooth] hci_le_meta_evt+0x7b2/0xba0 [bluetooth] hci_event_packet+0x1c29/0x2a90 [bluetooth] hci_rx_work+0x19b/0x360 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x400 kthread+0x104/0x140 Fixes: c215e9397b00 ("Bluetooth: Process extended ADV report event") Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Balakrishna Godavarthi <bgodavar@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Alain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org> Tested-by: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit a2ec905d1e160a33b2e210e45ad30445ef26ce0e ]

Fix kernel oops observed when an ext adv data is larger than 31 bytes.

This can be reproduced by setting up an advertiser with advertisement
larger than 31 bytes.  The issue is not sensitive to the advertisement
content.  In particular, this was reproduced with an advertisement of
229 bytes filled with 'A'.  See stack trace below.

This is fixed by not catching ext_adv as legacy adv are only cached to
be able to concatenate a scanable adv with its scan response before
sending it up through mgmt.

With ext_adv, this is no longer necessary.

  general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 6 PID: 205 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-37-generic #41-Ubuntu
  Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 7590/0CF6RR, BIOS 1.7.0 05/11/2020
  Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth]
  RIP: 0010:hci_bdaddr_list_lookup+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth]
  Code: ff ff e9 26 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8b 07 48 89 e5 48 39 c7 75 0a eb 24 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 1c 44 8b 06 <44> 39 40 10 75 ef 44 0f b7 4e 04 66 44 39 48 14 75 e3 38 50 16 75
  RSP: 0018:ffffbc6a40493c70 EFLAGS: 00010286
  RAX: 4141414141414141 RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9903e76c100f RDI: ffff9904289d4b28
  RBP: ffffbc6a40493c70 R08: 0000000093570362 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9904344eae38 R12: ffff9904289d4000
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffa3 R15: ffff9903e76c100f
  FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff990434580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007feed125a000 CR3: 00000001b860a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0
  Call Trace:
    process_adv_report+0x12e/0x560 [bluetooth]
    hci_le_meta_evt+0x7b2/0xba0 [bluetooth]
    hci_event_packet+0x1c29/0x2a90 [bluetooth]
    hci_rx_work+0x19b/0x360 [bluetooth]
    process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0
    worker_thread+0x4d/0x400
    kthread+0x104/0x140

Fixes: c215e9397b00 ("Bluetooth: Process extended ADV report event")
Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Balakrishna Godavarthi <bgodavar@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Alain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: Add SCO fallback for invalid LMP parameters error 2020-06-22T07:32:23+00:00 Hsin-Yu Chao hychao@chromium.org 2020-05-15T09:27:04+00:00 a8a52caf03c13e866fa7556969868a8bb3f1eb7b [ Upstream commit 56b5453a86203a44726f523b4133c1feca49ce7c ] Bluetooth PTS test case HFP/AG/ACC/BI-12-I accepts SCO connection with invalid parameter at the first SCO request expecting AG to attempt another SCO request with the use of "safe settings" for given codec, base on section 5.7.1.2 of HFP 1.7 specification. This patch addresses it by adding "Invalid LMP Parameters" (0x1e) to the SCO fallback case. Verified with below log: < HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17 Handle: 256 Transmit bandwidth: 8000 Receive bandwidth: 8000 Max latency: 13 Setting: 0x0003 Input Coding: Linear Input Data Format: 1's complement Input Sample Size: 8-bit # of bits padding at MSB: 0 Air Coding Format: Transparent Data Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02) Packet type: 0x0380 3-EV3 may not be used 2-EV5 may not be used 3-EV5 may not be used > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3 Handle: 256 Max slots: 1 > HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17 Status: Invalid LMP Parameters / Invalid LL Parameters (0x1e) Handle: 0 Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC) Link type: eSCO (0x02) Transmission interval: 0x00 Retransmission window: 0x02 RX packet length: 0 TX packet length: 0 Air mode: Transparent (0x03) < HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17 Handle: 256 Transmit bandwidth: 8000 Receive bandwidth: 8000 Max latency: 8 Setting: 0x0003 Input Coding: Linear Input Data Format: 1's complement Input Sample Size: 8-bit # of bits padding at MSB: 0 Air Coding Format: Transparent Data Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02) Packet type: 0x03c8 EV3 may be used 2-EV3 may not be used 3-EV3 may not be used 2-EV5 may not be used 3-EV5 may not be used > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3 Handle: 256 Max slots: 5 > HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3 Handle: 256 Max slots: 1 > HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 257 Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC) Link type: eSCO (0x02) Transmission interval: 0x06 Retransmission window: 0x04 RX packet length: 30 TX packet length: 30 Air mode: Transparent (0x03) Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yu Chao <hychao@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 56b5453a86203a44726f523b4133c1feca49ce7c ]

Bluetooth PTS test case HFP/AG/ACC/BI-12-I accepts SCO connection
with invalid parameter at the first SCO request expecting AG to
attempt another SCO request with the use of "safe settings" for
given codec, base on section 5.7.1.2 of HFP 1.7 specification.

This patch addresses it by adding "Invalid LMP Parameters" (0x1e)
to the SCO fallback case. Verified with below log:

< HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17
        Handle: 256
        Transmit bandwidth: 8000
        Receive bandwidth: 8000
        Max latency: 13
        Setting: 0x0003
          Input Coding: Linear
          Input Data Format: 1's complement
          Input Sample Size: 8-bit
          # of bits padding at MSB: 0
          Air Coding Format: Transparent Data
        Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02)
        Packet type: 0x0380
          3-EV3 may not be used
          2-EV5 may not be used
          3-EV5 may not be used
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
      Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Max slots: 1
> HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17
        Status: Invalid LMP Parameters / Invalid LL Parameters (0x1e)
        Handle: 0
        Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC)
        Link type: eSCO (0x02)
        Transmission interval: 0x00
        Retransmission window: 0x02
        RX packet length: 0
        TX packet length: 0
        Air mode: Transparent (0x03)
< HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17
        Handle: 256
        Transmit bandwidth: 8000
        Receive bandwidth: 8000
        Max latency: 8
        Setting: 0x0003
          Input Coding: Linear
          Input Data Format: 1's complement
          Input Sample Size: 8-bit
          # of bits padding at MSB: 0
          Air Coding Format: Transparent Data
        Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02)
        Packet type: 0x03c8
          EV3 may be used
          2-EV3 may not be used
          3-EV3 may not be used
          2-EV5 may not be used
          3-EV5 may not be used
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
      Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Max slots: 5
> HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Max slots: 1
> HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 257
        Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC)
        Link type: eSCO (0x02)
        Transmission interval: 0x06
        Retransmission window: 0x04
        RX packet length: 30
        TX packet length: 30
        Air mode: Transparent (0x03)

Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yu Chao <hychao@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Use DEFER_SETUP to group ECRED connections 2020-03-25T21:16:08+00:00 Luiz Augusto von Dentz luiz.von.dentz@intel.com 2020-03-25T19:37:53+00:00 da49b602f7f75ccc91386e1274b3ef71676cd092 This uses the DEFER_SETUP flag to group channels with L2CAP_CREDIT_BASED_CONNECTION_REQ. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> 
This uses the DEFER_SETUP flag to group channels with
L2CAP_CREDIT_BASED_CONNECTION_REQ.

Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>