linux-stable.git/mm, branch v5.4.38

mm: shmem: disable interrupt when acquiring info->lock in userfaultfd_copy path

2020-05-02T06:48:54+00:00

commit 94b7cc01da5a3cc4f3da5e0ff492ef008bb555d6 upstream.

Syzbot reported the below lockdep splat:

    WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
    5.6.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
    --------------------------------------------------------
    syz-executor.0/10317 just changed the state of lock:
    ffff888021d16568 (&(&info->lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
    ffff888021d16568 (&(&info->lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: shmem_mfill_atomic_pte+0x1012/0x21c0 mm/shmem.c:2407
    but this lock was taken by another, SOFTIRQ-safe lock in the past:
     (&(&xa->xa_lock)->rlock#5){..-.}

    and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

    other info that might help us debug this:
     Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

           CPU0                    CPU1
           ----                    ----
      lock(&(&info->lock)->rlock);
                                   local_irq_disable();
                                   lock(&(&xa->xa_lock)->rlock#5);
                                   lock(&(&info->lock)->rlock);
      
        lock(&(&xa->xa_lock)->rlock#5);

     *** DEADLOCK ***

The full report is quite lengthy, please see:

  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/alpine.LSU.2.11.2004152007370.13597@eggly.anvils/T/#m813b412c5f78e25ca8c6c7734886ed4de43f241d

It is because CPU 0 held info->lock with IRQ enabled in userfaultfd_copy
path, then CPU 1 is splitting a THP which held xa_lock and info->lock in
IRQ disabled context at the same time.  If softirq comes in to acquire
xa_lock, the deadlock would be triggered.

The fix is to acquire/release info->lock with *_irq version instead of
plain spin_{lock,unlock} to make it softirq safe.

Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Reported-by: syzbot+e27980339d305f2dbfd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Tested-by: syzbot+e27980339d305f2dbfd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1587061357-122619-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference when KSM zero page is enabled

2020-04-29T14:33:15+00:00

commit 56df70a63ed5d989c1d36deee94cae14342be6e9 upstream.

find_mergeable_vma() can return NULL.  In this case, it leads to a crash
when we access vm_mm(its offset is 0x40) later in write_protect_page.
And this case did happen on our server.  The following call trace is
captured in kernel 4.19 with the following patch applied and KSM zero
page enabled on our server.

  commit e86c59b1b12d ("mm/ksm: improve deduplication of zero pages with colouring")

So add a vma check to fix it.

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000040
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 9 PID: 510 Comm: ksmd Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 4.19.36.bsk.9-amd64 #4.19.36.bsk.9
  RIP: try_to_merge_one_page+0xc7/0x760
  Code: 24 58 65 48 33 34 25 28 00 00 00 89 e8 0f 85 a3 06 00 00 48 83 c4
        60 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 8b 46 08 a8 01 75 b8 <49>
        8b 44 24 40 4c 8d 7c 24 20 b9 07 00 00 00 4c 89 e6 4c 89 ff 48
  RSP: 0018:ffffadbdd9fffdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: ffffda83ffd4be08 RBX: ffffda83ffd4be40 RCX: 0000002c6e800000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffda83ffd4be40 RDI: 0000000000000000
  RBP: ffffa11939f02ec0 R08: 0000000094e1a447 R09: 00000000abe76577
  R10: 0000000000000962 R11: 0000000000004e6a R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffffda83b1e06380 R14: ffffa18f31f072c0 R15: ffffda83ffd4be40
  FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0da43b80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 0000002c77c0a003 CR4: 00000000007626e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
    ksm_scan_thread+0x115e/0x1960
    kthread+0xf5/0x130
    ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

[songmuchun@bytedance.com: if the vma is out of date, just exit]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200416025034.29780-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add the conventional braces, replace /** with /*]
Fixes: e86c59b1b12d ("mm/ksm: improve deduplication of zero pages with colouring")
Co-developed-by: Xiongchun Duan 
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand 
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Yang Shi 
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda 
Cc: Markus Elfring 
Cc: 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200416025034.29780-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200414132905.83819-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/hugetlb: fix a addressing exception caused by huge_pte_offset

2020-04-29T14:33:14+00:00

commit 3c1d7e6ccb644d517a12f73a7ff200870926f865 upstream.

Our machine encountered a panic(addressing exception) after run for a
long time and the calltrace is:

    RIP: hugetlb_fault+0x307/0xbe0
    RSP: 0018:ffff9567fc27f808  EFLAGS: 00010286
    RAX: e800c03ff1258d48 RBX: ffffd3bb003b69c0 RCX: e800c03ff1258d48
    RDX: 17ff3fc00eda72b7 RSI: 00003ffffffff000 RDI: e800c03ff1258d48
    RBP: ffff9567fc27f8c8 R08: e800c03ff1258d48 R09: 0000000000000080
    R10: ffffaba0704c22a8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff95c87b4b60d8
    R13: 00005fff00000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9567face8074
    FS:  00007fe2d9ffb700(0000) GS:ffff956900e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: ffffd3bb003b69c0 CR3: 000000be67374000 CR4: 00000000003627e0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Call Trace:
      follow_hugetlb_page+0x175/0x540
      __get_user_pages+0x2a0/0x7e0
      __get_user_pages_unlocked+0x15d/0x210
      __gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0x3c5/0x460 [kvm]
      try_async_pf+0x6e/0x2a0 [kvm]
      tdp_page_fault+0x151/0x2d0 [kvm]
     ...
      kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x330/0x490 [kvm]
      kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x309/0x6d0 [kvm]
      do_vfs_ioctl+0x3f0/0x540
      SyS_ioctl+0xa1/0xc0
      system_call_fastpath+0x22/0x27

For 1G hugepages, huge_pte_offset() wants to return NULL or pudp, but it
may return a wrong 'pmdp' if there is a race.  Please look at the
following code snippet:

    ...
    pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
    if (sz != PUD_SIZE && pud_none(*pud))
        return NULL;
    /* hugepage or swap? */
    if (pud_huge(*pud) || !pud_present(*pud))
        return (pte_t *)pud;

    pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
    if (sz != PMD_SIZE && pmd_none(*pmd))
        return NULL;
    /* hugepage or swap? */
    if (pmd_huge(*pmd) || !pmd_present(*pmd))
        return (pte_t *)pmd;
    ...

The following sequence would trigger this bug:

 - CPU0: sz = PUD_SIZE and *pud = 0 , continue
 - CPU0: "pud_huge(*pud)" is false
 - CPU1: calling hugetlb_no_page and set *pud to xxxx8e7(PRESENT)
 - CPU0: "!pud_present(*pud)" is false, continue
 - CPU0: pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr) and maybe return a wrong pmdp

However, we want CPU0 to return NULL or pudp in this case.

We must make sure there is exactly one dereference of pud and pmd.

Signed-off-by: Longpeng 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz 
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: Sean Christopherson 
Cc: 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200413010342.771-1-longpeng2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

vmalloc: fix remap_vmalloc_range() bounds checks

2020-04-29T14:33:14+00:00

commit bdebd6a2831b6fab69eb85cee74a8ba77f1a1cc2 upstream.

remap_vmalloc_range() has had various issues with the bounds checks it
promises to perform ("This function checks that addr is a valid
vmalloc'ed area, and that it is big enough to cover the vma") over time,
e.g.:

 - not detecting pgoff<
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Daniel Borkmann 
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau 
Cc: Song Liu 
Cc: Yonghong Song 
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko 
Cc: John Fastabend 
Cc: KP Singh 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200415222312.236431-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm, memcg: do not high throttle allocators based on wraparound

2020-04-17T08:50:17+00:00

commit 9b8b17541f13809d06f6f873325305ddbb760e3e upstream.

If a cgroup violates its memory.high constraints, we may end up unduly
penalising it.  For example, for the following hierarchy:

  A:   max high, 20 usage
  A/B: 9 high, 10 usage
  A/C: max high, 10 usage

We would end up doing the following calculation below when calculating
high delay for A/B:

  A/B: 10 - 9 = 1...
  A:   20 - PAGE_COUNTER_MAX = 21, so set max_overage to 21.

This gets worse with higher disparities in usage in the parent.

I have no idea how this disappeared from the final version of the patch,
but it is certainly Not Good(tm).  This wasn't obvious in testing because,
for a simple cgroup hierarchy with only one child, the result is usually
roughly the same.  It's only in more complex hierarchies that things go
really awry (although still, the effects are limited to a maximum of 2
seconds in schedule_timeout_killable at a maximum).

[chris@chrisdown.name: changelog]
Fixes: e26733e0d0ec ("mm, memcg: throttle allocators based on ancestral memory.high")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Chris Down 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: 	[5.4.x]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200331152424.GA1019937@chrisdown.name
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

slub: improve bit diffusion for freelist ptr obfuscation

2020-04-13T08:48:07+00:00

commit 1ad53d9fa3f6168ebcf48a50e08b170432da2257 upstream.

Under CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y, the obfuscation was relatively weak
in that the ptr and ptr address were usually so close that the first XOR
would result in an almost entirely 0-byte value[1], leaving most of the
"secret" number ultimately being stored after the third XOR.  A single
blind memory content exposure of the freelist was generally sufficient to
learn the secret.

Add a swab() call to mix bits a little more.  This is a cheap way (1
cycle) to make attacks need more than a single exposure to learn the
secret (or to know _where_ the exposure is in memory).

kmalloc-32 freelist walk, before:

ptr              ptr_addr            stored value      secret
ffff90c22e019020@ffff90c22e019000 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019040@ffff90c22e019020 is 86528eb656b3b5fd (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019060@ffff90c22e019040 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019080@ffff90c22e019060 is 86528eb656b3b57d (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e0190a0@ffff90c22e019080 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
...

after:

ptr              ptr_addr            stored value      secret
ffff9eed6e019020@ffff9eed6e019000 is 793d1135d52cda42 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019040@ffff9eed6e019020 is 593d1135d52cda22 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019060@ffff9eed6e019040 is 393d1135d52cda02 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019080@ffff9eed6e019060 is 193d1135d52cdae2 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e0190a0@ffff9eed6e019080 is f93d1135d52cdac2 (86528eb656b3b59d)

[1] https://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2020/03/weaknesses-in-linux-kernel-heap.html

Fixes: 2482ddec670f ("mm: add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation")
Reported-by: Silvio Cesare 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Pekka Enberg 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Cc: Joonsoo Kim 
Cc: 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/202003051623.AF4F8CB@keescook
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: mempolicy: require at least one nodeid for MPOL_PREFERRED

2020-04-08T07:08:47+00:00

commit aa9f7d5172fac9bf1f09e678c35e287a40a7b7dd upstream.

Using an empty (malformed) nodelist that is not caught during mount option
parsing leads to a stack-out-of-bounds access.

The option string that was used was: "mpol=prefer:,".  However,
MPOL_PREFERRED requires a single node number, which is not being provided
here.

Add a check that 'nodes' is not empty after parsing for MPOL_PREFERRED's
nodeid.

Fixes: 095f1fc4ebf3 ("mempolicy: rework shmem mpol parsing and display")
Reported-by: Entropy Moe <3ntr0py1337@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+b055b1a6b2b958707a21@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Tested-by: syzbot+b055b1a6b2b958707a21@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/89526377-7eb6-b662-e1d8-4430928abde9@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: fork: fix kernel_stack memcg stats for various stack implementations

2020-04-01T09:02:03+00:00

commit 8380ce479010f2f779587b462a9b4681934297c3 upstream.

Depending on CONFIG_VMAP_STACK and the THREAD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE ratio the
space for task stacks can be allocated using __vmalloc_node_range(),
alloc_pages_node() and kmem_cache_alloc_node().

In the first and the second cases page->mem_cgroup pointer is set, but
in the third it's not: memcg membership of a slab page should be
determined using the memcg_from_slab_page() function, which looks at
page->slab_cache->memcg_params.memcg .  In this case, using
mod_memcg_page_state() (as in account_kernel_stack()) is incorrect:
page->mem_cgroup pointer is NULL even for pages charged to a non-root
memory cgroup.

It can lead to kernel_stack per-memcg counters permanently showing 0 on
some architectures (depending on the configuration).

In order to fix it, let's introduce a mod_memcg_obj_state() helper,
which takes a pointer to a kernel object as a first argument, uses
mem_cgroup_from_obj() to get a RCU-protected memcg pointer and calls
mod_memcg_state().  It allows to handle all possible configurations
(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK and various THREAD_SIZE/PAGE_SIZE values) without
spilling any memcg/kmem specifics into fork.c .

Note: This is a special version of the patch created for stable
backports.  It contains code from the following two patches:
  - mm: memcg/slab: introduce mem_cgroup_from_obj()
  - mm: fork: fix kernel_stack memcg stats for various stack implementations

[guro@fb.com: introduce mem_cgroup_from_obj()]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200324004221.GA36662@carbon.dhcp.thefacebook.com
Fixes: 4d96ba353075 ("mm: memcg/slab: stop setting page->mem_cgroup pointer for slab pages")
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt 
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Bharata B Rao 
Cc: Shakeel Butt 
Cc: 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303233550.251375-1-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/sparse: fix kernel crash with pfn_section_valid check

2020-04-01T09:02:03+00:00

commit b943f045a9af9fd02f923e43fe8d7517e9961701 upstream.

Fix the crash like this:

    BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
    Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000c3447c
    Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    CPU: 11 PID: 7519 Comm: lt-ndctl Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-autotest #1
    ...
    NIP [c000000000c3447c] vmemmap_populated+0x98/0xc0
    LR [c000000000088354] vmemmap_free+0x144/0x320
    Call Trace:
       section_deactivate+0x220/0x240
       __remove_pages+0x118/0x170
       arch_remove_memory+0x3c/0x150
       memunmap_pages+0x1cc/0x2f0
       devm_action_release+0x30/0x50
       release_nodes+0x2f8/0x3e0
       device_release_driver_internal+0x168/0x270
       unbind_store+0x130/0x170
       drv_attr_store+0x44/0x60
       sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0x80
       kernfs_fop_write+0x100/0x290
       __vfs_write+0x3c/0x70
       vfs_write+0xcc/0x240
       ksys_write+0x7c/0x140
       system_call+0x5c/0x68

The crash is due to NULL dereference at

	test_bit(idx, ms->usage->subsection_map);

due to ms->usage = NULL in pfn_section_valid()

With commit d41e2f3bd546 ("mm/hotplug: fix hot remove failure in
SPARSEMEM|!VMEMMAP case") section_mem_map is set to NULL after
depopulate_section_mem().  This was done so that pfn_page() can work
correctly with kernel config that disables SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP.  With that
config pfn_to_page does

	__section_mem_map_addr(__sec) + __pfn;

where

  static inline struct page *__section_mem_map_addr(struct mem_section *section)
  {
	unsigned long map = section->section_mem_map;
	map &= SECTION_MAP_MASK;
	return (struct page *)map;
  }

Now with SPASEMEM_VMEMAP enabled, mem_section->usage->subsection_map is
used to check the pfn validity (pfn_valid()).  Since section_deactivate
release mem_section->usage if a section is fully deactivated,
pfn_valid() check after a subsection_deactivate cause a kernel crash.

  static inline int pfn_valid(unsigned long pfn)
  {
  ...
	return early_section(ms) || pfn_section_valid(ms, pfn);
  }

where

  static inline int pfn_section_valid(struct mem_section *ms, unsigned long pfn)
  {
	int idx = subsection_map_index(pfn);

	return test_bit(idx, ms->usage->subsection_map);
  }

Avoid this by clearing SECTION_HAS_MEM_MAP when mem_section->usage is
freed.  For architectures like ppc64 where large pages are used for
vmmemap mapping (16MB), a specific vmemmap mapping can cover multiple
sections.  Hence before a vmemmap mapping page can be freed, the kernel
needs to make sure there are no valid sections within that mapping.
Clearing the section valid bit before depopulate_section_memap enables
this.

[aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com: add comment]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200326133235.343616-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.comLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200325031914.107660-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: d41e2f3bd546 ("mm/hotplug: fix hot remove failure in SPARSEMEM|!VMEMMAP case")
Reported-by: Sachin Sant 
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Tested-by: Sachin Sant 
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He 
Reviewed-by: Wei Yang 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: Dan Williams 
Cc: David Hildenbrand 
Cc: Oscar Salvador 
Cc: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/swapfile.c: move inode_lock out of claim_swapfile

2020-04-01T09:02:02+00:00

commit d795a90e2ba024dbf2f22107ae89c210b98b08b8 upstream.

claim_swapfile() currently keeps the inode locked when it is successful,
or the file is already swapfile (with -EBUSY).  And, on the other error
cases, it does not lock the inode.

This inconsistency of the lock state and return value is quite confusing
and actually causing a bad unlock balance as below in the "bad_swap"
section of __do_sys_swapon().

This commit fixes this issue by moving the inode_lock() and IS_SWAPFILE
check out of claim_swapfile().  The inode is unlocked in
"bad_swap_unlock_inode" section, so that the inode is ensured to be
unlocked at "bad_swap".  Thus, error handling codes after the locking now
jumps to "bad_swap_unlock_inode" instead of "bad_swap".

    =====================================
    WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
    5.5.0-rc7+ #176 Not tainted
    -------------------------------------
    swapon/4294 is trying to release lock (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key) at: __do_sys_swapon+0x94b/0x3550
    but there are no more locks to release!

    other info that might help us debug this:
    no locks held by swapon/4294.

    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 5 PID: 4294 Comm: swapon Not tainted 5.5.0-rc7-BTRFS-ZNS+ #176
    Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H87-PRO, BIOS 2102 07/29/2014
    Call Trace:
     dump_stack+0xa1/0xea
     print_unlock_imbalance_bug.cold+0x114/0x123
     lock_release+0x562/0xed0
     up_write+0x2d/0x490
     __do_sys_swapon+0x94b/0x3550
     __x64_sys_swapon+0x54/0x80
     do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x4b0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x7f15da0a0dc7

Fixes: 1638045c3677 ("mm: set S_SWAPFILE on blockdev swap devices")
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Tested-by: Qais Youef 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200206090132.154869-1-naohiro.aota@wdc.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman