<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/mm, branch v5.4.285</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm: krealloc: Fix MTE false alarm in __do_krealloc</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qun-Wei Lin</name>
<email>qun-wei.lin@mediatek.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-25T08:58:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8ebee7565effdeae6085458f8f8463363120a871'/>
<id>8ebee7565effdeae6085458f8f8463363120a871</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 704573851b51808b45dae2d62059d1d8189138a2 upstream.

This patch addresses an issue introduced by commit 1a83a716ec233 ("mm:
krealloc: consider spare memory for __GFP_ZERO") which causes MTE
(Memory Tagging Extension) to falsely report a slab-out-of-bounds error.

The problem occurs when zeroing out spare memory in __do_krealloc. The
original code only considered software-based KASAN and did not account
for MTE. It does not reset the KASAN tag before calling memset, leading
to a mismatch between the pointer tag and the memory tag, resulting
in a false positive.

Example of the error:
==================================================================
swapper/0: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __memset+0x84/0x188
swapper/0: Write at addr f4ffff8005f0fdf0 by task swapper/0/1
swapper/0: Pointer tag: [f4], memory tag: [fe]
swapper/0:
swapper/0: CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.
swapper/0: Hardware name: MT6991(ENG) (DT)
swapper/0: Call trace:
swapper/0:  dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c
swapper/0:  show_stack+0x18/0x28
swapper/0:  dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0
swapper/0:  print_report+0x1b8/0x71c
swapper/0:  kasan_report+0xec/0x14c
swapper/0:  __do_kernel_fault+0x60/0x29c
swapper/0:  do_bad_area+0x30/0xdc
swapper/0:  do_tag_check_fault+0x20/0x34
swapper/0:  do_mem_abort+0x58/0x104
swapper/0:  el1_abort+0x3c/0x5c
swapper/0:  el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xcc
swapper/0:  el1h_64_sync+0x68/0x6c
swapper/0:  __memset+0x84/0x188
swapper/0:  btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x280/0x3d8
swapper/0:  __register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x43c/0x468
swapper/0:  register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x48/0x60
swapper/0:  register_nf_nat_bpf+0x1c/0x40
swapper/0:  nf_nat_init+0xc0/0x128
swapper/0:  do_one_initcall+0x184/0x464
swapper/0:  do_initcall_level+0xdc/0x1b0
swapper/0:  do_initcalls+0x70/0xc0
swapper/0:  do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28
swapper/0:  kernel_init_freeable+0x144/0x1b8
swapper/0:  kernel_init+0x20/0x1a8
swapper/0:  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
==================================================================

Fixes: 1a83a716ec233 ("mm: krealloc: consider spare memory for __GFP_ZERO")
Signed-off-by: Qun-Wei Lin &lt;qun-wei.lin@mediatek.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 704573851b51808b45dae2d62059d1d8189138a2 upstream.

This patch addresses an issue introduced by commit 1a83a716ec233 ("mm:
krealloc: consider spare memory for __GFP_ZERO") which causes MTE
(Memory Tagging Extension) to falsely report a slab-out-of-bounds error.

The problem occurs when zeroing out spare memory in __do_krealloc. The
original code only considered software-based KASAN and did not account
for MTE. It does not reset the KASAN tag before calling memset, leading
to a mismatch between the pointer tag and the memory tag, resulting
in a false positive.

Example of the error:
==================================================================
swapper/0: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __memset+0x84/0x188
swapper/0: Write at addr f4ffff8005f0fdf0 by task swapper/0/1
swapper/0: Pointer tag: [f4], memory tag: [fe]
swapper/0:
swapper/0: CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.
swapper/0: Hardware name: MT6991(ENG) (DT)
swapper/0: Call trace:
swapper/0:  dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c
swapper/0:  show_stack+0x18/0x28
swapper/0:  dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0
swapper/0:  print_report+0x1b8/0x71c
swapper/0:  kasan_report+0xec/0x14c
swapper/0:  __do_kernel_fault+0x60/0x29c
swapper/0:  do_bad_area+0x30/0xdc
swapper/0:  do_tag_check_fault+0x20/0x34
swapper/0:  do_mem_abort+0x58/0x104
swapper/0:  el1_abort+0x3c/0x5c
swapper/0:  el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xcc
swapper/0:  el1h_64_sync+0x68/0x6c
swapper/0:  __memset+0x84/0x188
swapper/0:  btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x280/0x3d8
swapper/0:  __register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x43c/0x468
swapper/0:  register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x48/0x60
swapper/0:  register_nf_nat_bpf+0x1c/0x40
swapper/0:  nf_nat_init+0xc0/0x128
swapper/0:  do_one_initcall+0x184/0x464
swapper/0:  do_initcall_level+0xdc/0x1b0
swapper/0:  do_initcalls+0x70/0xc0
swapper/0:  do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28
swapper/0:  kernel_init_freeable+0x144/0x1b8
swapper/0:  kernel_init+0x20/0x1a8
swapper/0:  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
==================================================================

Fixes: 1a83a716ec233 ("mm: krealloc: consider spare memory for __GFP_ZERO")
Signed-off-by: Qun-Wei Lin &lt;qun-wei.lin@mediatek.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: shmem: fix data-race in shmem_getattr()</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeongjun Park</name>
<email>aha310510@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-09T12:35:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7cc30ada84323be19395094d567579536e0d187e'/>
<id>7cc30ada84323be19395094d567579536e0d187e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d949d1d14fa281ace388b1de978e8f2cd52875cf upstream.

I got the following KCSAN report during syzbot testing:

==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in generic_fillattr / inode_set_ctime_current

write to 0xffff888102eb3260 of 4 bytes by task 6565 on cpu 1:
 inode_set_ctime_to_ts include/linux/fs.h:1638 [inline]
 inode_set_ctime_current+0x169/0x1d0 fs/inode.c:2626
 shmem_mknod+0x117/0x180 mm/shmem.c:3443
 shmem_create+0x34/0x40 mm/shmem.c:3497
 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3578 [inline]
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3647 [inline]
 path_openat+0xdbc/0x1f00 fs/namei.c:3883
 do_filp_open+0xf7/0x200 fs/namei.c:3913
 do_sys_openat2+0xab/0x120 fs/open.c:1416
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1431 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1447 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1442 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0xf3/0x120 fs/open.c:1442
 x64_sys_call+0x1025/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:258
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

read to 0xffff888102eb3260 of 4 bytes by task 3498 on cpu 0:
 inode_get_ctime_nsec include/linux/fs.h:1623 [inline]
 inode_get_ctime include/linux/fs.h:1629 [inline]
 generic_fillattr+0x1dd/0x2f0 fs/stat.c:62
 shmem_getattr+0x17b/0x200 mm/shmem.c:1157
 vfs_getattr_nosec fs/stat.c:166 [inline]
 vfs_getattr+0x19b/0x1e0 fs/stat.c:207
 vfs_statx_path fs/stat.c:251 [inline]
 vfs_statx+0x134/0x2f0 fs/stat.c:315
 vfs_fstatat+0xec/0x110 fs/stat.c:341
 __do_sys_newfstatat fs/stat.c:505 [inline]
 __se_sys_newfstatat+0x58/0x260 fs/stat.c:499
 __x64_sys_newfstatat+0x55/0x70 fs/stat.c:499
 x64_sys_call+0x141f/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:263
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

value changed: 0x2755ae53 -&gt; 0x27ee44d3

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3498 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00326-gd1f2d51b711a-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
==================================================================

When calling generic_fillattr(), if you don't hold read lock, data-race
will occur in inode member variables, which can cause unexpected
behavior.

Since there is no special protection when shmem_getattr() calls
generic_fillattr(), data-race occurs by functions such as shmem_unlink()
or shmem_mknod(). This can cause unexpected results, so commenting it out
is not enough.

Therefore, when calling generic_fillattr() from shmem_getattr(), it is
appropriate to protect the inode using inode_lock_shared() and
inode_unlock_shared() to prevent data-race.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240909123558.70229-1-aha310510@gmail.com
Fixes: 44a30220bc0a ("shmem: recalculate file inode when fstat")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park &lt;aha310510@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroup.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yu Zhao &lt;yuzhao@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d949d1d14fa281ace388b1de978e8f2cd52875cf upstream.

I got the following KCSAN report during syzbot testing:

==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in generic_fillattr / inode_set_ctime_current

write to 0xffff888102eb3260 of 4 bytes by task 6565 on cpu 1:
 inode_set_ctime_to_ts include/linux/fs.h:1638 [inline]
 inode_set_ctime_current+0x169/0x1d0 fs/inode.c:2626
 shmem_mknod+0x117/0x180 mm/shmem.c:3443
 shmem_create+0x34/0x40 mm/shmem.c:3497
 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3578 [inline]
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3647 [inline]
 path_openat+0xdbc/0x1f00 fs/namei.c:3883
 do_filp_open+0xf7/0x200 fs/namei.c:3913
 do_sys_openat2+0xab/0x120 fs/open.c:1416
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1431 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1447 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1442 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0xf3/0x120 fs/open.c:1442
 x64_sys_call+0x1025/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:258
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

read to 0xffff888102eb3260 of 4 bytes by task 3498 on cpu 0:
 inode_get_ctime_nsec include/linux/fs.h:1623 [inline]
 inode_get_ctime include/linux/fs.h:1629 [inline]
 generic_fillattr+0x1dd/0x2f0 fs/stat.c:62
 shmem_getattr+0x17b/0x200 mm/shmem.c:1157
 vfs_getattr_nosec fs/stat.c:166 [inline]
 vfs_getattr+0x19b/0x1e0 fs/stat.c:207
 vfs_statx_path fs/stat.c:251 [inline]
 vfs_statx+0x134/0x2f0 fs/stat.c:315
 vfs_fstatat+0xec/0x110 fs/stat.c:341
 __do_sys_newfstatat fs/stat.c:505 [inline]
 __se_sys_newfstatat+0x58/0x260 fs/stat.c:499
 __x64_sys_newfstatat+0x55/0x70 fs/stat.c:499
 x64_sys_call+0x141f/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:263
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

value changed: 0x2755ae53 -&gt; 0x27ee44d3

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3498 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00326-gd1f2d51b711a-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
==================================================================

When calling generic_fillattr(), if you don't hold read lock, data-race
will occur in inode member variables, which can cause unexpected
behavior.

Since there is no special protection when shmem_getattr() calls
generic_fillattr(), data-race occurs by functions such as shmem_unlink()
or shmem_mknod(). This can cause unexpected results, so commenting it out
is not enough.

Therefore, when calling generic_fillattr() from shmem_getattr(), it is
appropriate to protect the inode using inode_lock_shared() and
inode_unlock_shared() to prevent data-race.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240909123558.70229-1-aha310510@gmail.com
Fixes: 44a30220bc0a ("shmem: recalculate file inode when fstat")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park &lt;aha310510@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroup.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yu Zhao &lt;yuzhao@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/swapfile: skip HugeTLB pages for unuse_vma</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Liu Shixin</name>
<email>liushixin2@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-15T01:45:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ba7f982cdb37ff5a7739dec85d7325ea66fc1496'/>
<id>ba7f982cdb37ff5a7739dec85d7325ea66fc1496</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7528c4fb1237512ee18049f852f014eba80bbe8d upstream.

I got a bad pud error and lost a 1GB HugeTLB when calling swapoff.  The
problem can be reproduced by the following steps:

 1. Allocate an anonymous 1GB HugeTLB and some other anonymous memory.
 2. Swapout the above anonymous memory.
 3. run swapoff and we will get a bad pud error in kernel message:

  mm/pgtable-generic.c:42: bad pud 00000000743d215d(84000001400000e7)

We can tell that pud_clear_bad is called by pud_none_or_clear_bad in
unuse_pud_range() by ftrace.  And therefore the HugeTLB pages will never
be freed because we lost it from page table.  We can skip HugeTLB pages
for unuse_vma to fix it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015014521.570237-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Fixes: 0fe6e20b9c4c ("hugetlb, rmap: add reverse mapping for hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin &lt;liushixin2@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Muchun Song &lt;muchun.song@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;nao.horiguchi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7528c4fb1237512ee18049f852f014eba80bbe8d upstream.

I got a bad pud error and lost a 1GB HugeTLB when calling swapoff.  The
problem can be reproduced by the following steps:

 1. Allocate an anonymous 1GB HugeTLB and some other anonymous memory.
 2. Swapout the above anonymous memory.
 3. run swapoff and we will get a bad pud error in kernel message:

  mm/pgtable-generic.c:42: bad pud 00000000743d215d(84000001400000e7)

We can tell that pud_clear_bad is called by pud_none_or_clear_bad in
unuse_pud_range() by ftrace.  And therefore the HugeTLB pages will never
be freed because we lost it from page table.  We can skip HugeTLB pages
for unuse_vma to fix it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015014521.570237-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Fixes: 0fe6e20b9c4c ("hugetlb, rmap: add reverse mapping for hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin &lt;liushixin2@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Muchun Song &lt;muchun.song@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;nao.horiguchi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: krealloc: consider spare memory for __GFP_ZERO</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Danilo Krummrich</name>
<email>dakr@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-12T22:34:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c383263ee82a01a5a9bc1a466025ccde39a38cae'/>
<id>c383263ee82a01a5a9bc1a466025ccde39a38cae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1a83a716ec233990e1fd5b6fbb1200ade63bf450 upstream.

As long as krealloc() is called with __GFP_ZERO consistently, starting
with the initial memory allocation, __GFP_ZERO should be fully honored.

However, if for an existing allocation krealloc() is called with a
decreased size, it is not ensured that the spare portion the allocation is
zeroed.  Thus, if krealloc() is subsequently called with a larger size
again, __GFP_ZERO can't be fully honored, since we don't know the previous
size, but only the bucket size.

Example:

	buf = kzalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
	memset(buf, 0xff, 64);

	buf = krealloc(buf, 48, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

	/* After this call the last 16 bytes are still 0xff. */
	buf = krealloc(buf, 64, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

Fix this, by explicitly setting spare memory to zero, when shrinking an
allocation with __GFP_ZERO flag set or init_on_alloc enabled.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240812223707.32049-1-dakr@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich &lt;dakr@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo &lt;42.hyeyoo@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Roman Gushchin &lt;roman.gushchin@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1a83a716ec233990e1fd5b6fbb1200ade63bf450 upstream.

As long as krealloc() is called with __GFP_ZERO consistently, starting
with the initial memory allocation, __GFP_ZERO should be fully honored.

However, if for an existing allocation krealloc() is called with a
decreased size, it is not ensured that the spare portion the allocation is
zeroed.  Thus, if krealloc() is subsequently called with a larger size
again, __GFP_ZERO can't be fully honored, since we don't know the previous
size, but only the bucket size.

Example:

	buf = kzalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
	memset(buf, 0xff, 64);

	buf = krealloc(buf, 48, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

	/* After this call the last 16 bytes are still 0xff. */
	buf = krealloc(buf, 64, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

Fix this, by explicitly setting spare memory to zero, when shrinking an
allocation with __GFP_ZERO flag set or init_on_alloc enabled.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240812223707.32049-1-dakr@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich &lt;dakr@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo &lt;42.hyeyoo@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Roman Gushchin &lt;roman.gushchin@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: only enforce minimum stack gap size if it's sensible</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gow</name>
<email>davidgow@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-03T07:46:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6ed7f633da6ddc545fe4353a6b289f6a7ec46f03'/>
<id>6ed7f633da6ddc545fe4353a6b289f6a7ec46f03</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 69b50d4351ed924f29e3d46b159e28f70dfc707f upstream.

The generic mmap_base code tries to leave a gap between the top of the
stack and the mmap base address, but enforces a minimum gap size (MIN_GAP)
of 128MB, which is too large on some setups.  In particular, on arm tasks
without ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT, the STACK_TOP value is less than 128MB, so it's
impossible to fit such a gap in.

Only enforce this minimum if MIN_GAP &lt; MAX_GAP, as we'd prefer to honour
MAX_GAP, which is defined proportionally, so scales better and always
leaves us with both _some_ stack space and some room for mmap.

This fixes the usercopy KUnit test suite on 32-bit arm, as it doesn't set
any personality flags so gets the default (in this case 26-bit) task size.
This test can be run with: ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --arch arm
usercopy --make_options LLVM=1

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240803074642.1849623-2-davidgow@google.com
Fixes: dba79c3df4a2 ("arm: use generic mmap top-down layout and brk randomization")
Signed-off-by: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti &lt;alex@ghiti.fr&gt;
Cc: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 69b50d4351ed924f29e3d46b159e28f70dfc707f upstream.

The generic mmap_base code tries to leave a gap between the top of the
stack and the mmap base address, but enforces a minimum gap size (MIN_GAP)
of 128MB, which is too large on some setups.  In particular, on arm tasks
without ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT, the STACK_TOP value is less than 128MB, so it's
impossible to fit such a gap in.

Only enforce this minimum if MIN_GAP &lt; MAX_GAP, as we'd prefer to honour
MAX_GAP, which is defined proportionally, so scales better and always
leaves us with both _some_ stack space and some room for mmap.

This fixes the usercopy KUnit test suite on 32-bit arm, as it doesn't set
any personality flags so gets the default (in this case 26-bit) task size.
This test can be run with: ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --arch arm
usercopy --make_options LLVM=1

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240803074642.1849623-2-davidgow@google.com
Fixes: dba79c3df4a2 ("arm: use generic mmap top-down layout and brk randomization")
Signed-off-by: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti &lt;alex@ghiti.fr&gt;
Cc: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>memcg_write_event_control(): fix a user-triggerable oops</title>
<updated>2024-09-04T11:14:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-21T18:45:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1b37ec85ad95b612307627758c6018cd9d92cca8'/>
<id>1b37ec85ad95b612307627758c6018cd9d92cca8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 046667c4d3196938e992fba0dfcde570aa85cd0e upstream.

we are *not* guaranteed that anything past the terminating NUL
is mapped (let alone initialized with anything sane).

Fixes: 0dea116876ee ("cgroup: implement eventfd-based generic API for notifications")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 046667c4d3196938e992fba0dfcde570aa85cd0e upstream.

we are *not* guaranteed that anything past the terminating NUL
is mapped (let alone initialized with anything sane).

Fixes: 0dea116876ee ("cgroup: implement eventfd-based generic API for notifications")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: avoid overflows in dirty throttling logic</title>
<updated>2024-08-19T03:33:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-21T14:42:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4d3817b64eda07491bdd86a234629fe0764fb42a'/>
<id>4d3817b64eda07491bdd86a234629fe0764fb42a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 385d838df280eba6c8680f9777bfa0d0bfe7e8b2 ]

The dirty throttling logic is interspersed with assumptions that dirty
limits in PAGE_SIZE units fit into 32-bit (so that various multiplications
fit into 64-bits).  If limits end up being larger, we will hit overflows,
possible divisions by 0 etc.  Fix these problems by never allowing so
large dirty limits as they have dubious practical value anyway.  For
dirty_bytes / dirty_background_bytes interfaces we can just refuse to set
so large limits.  For dirty_ratio / dirty_background_ratio it isn't so
simple as the dirty limit is computed from the amount of available memory
which can change due to memory hotplug etc.  So when converting dirty
limits from ratios to numbers of pages, we just don't allow the result to
exceed UINT_MAX.

This is root-only triggerable problem which occurs when the operator
sets dirty limits to &gt;16 TB.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621144246.11148-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Zach O'Keefe &lt;zokeefe@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-By: Zach O'Keefe &lt;zokeefe@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 385d838df280eba6c8680f9777bfa0d0bfe7e8b2 ]

The dirty throttling logic is interspersed with assumptions that dirty
limits in PAGE_SIZE units fit into 32-bit (so that various multiplications
fit into 64-bits).  If limits end up being larger, we will hit overflows,
possible divisions by 0 etc.  Fix these problems by never allowing so
large dirty limits as they have dubious practical value anyway.  For
dirty_bytes / dirty_background_bytes interfaces we can just refuse to set
so large limits.  For dirty_ratio / dirty_background_ratio it isn't so
simple as the dirty limit is computed from the amount of available memory
which can change due to memory hotplug etc.  So when converting dirty
limits from ratios to numbers of pages, we just don't allow the result to
exceed UINT_MAX.

This is root-only triggerable problem which occurs when the operator
sets dirty limits to &gt;16 TB.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621144246.11148-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Zach O'Keefe &lt;zokeefe@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-By: Zach O'Keefe &lt;zokeefe@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "mm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again"</title>
<updated>2024-07-18T09:40:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-21T14:42:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=23a28f5f3f6ca1e4184bd0e9631cd0944cf1c807'/>
<id>23a28f5f3f6ca1e4184bd0e9631cd0944cf1c807</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 30139c702048f1097342a31302cbd3d478f50c63 upstream.

Patch series "mm: Avoid possible overflows in dirty throttling".

Dirty throttling logic assumes dirty limits in page units fit into
32-bits.  This patch series makes sure this is true (see patch 2/2 for
more details).


This patch (of 2):

This reverts commit 9319b647902cbd5cc884ac08a8a6d54ce111fc78.

The commit is broken in several ways.  Firstly, the removed (u64) cast
from the multiplication will introduce a multiplication overflow on 32-bit
archs if wb_thresh * bg_thresh &gt;= 1&lt;&lt;32 (which is actually common - the
default settings with 4GB of RAM will trigger this).  Secondly, the
div64_u64() is unnecessarily expensive on 32-bit archs.  We have
div64_ul() in case we want to be safe &amp; cheap.  Thirdly, if dirty
thresholds are larger than 1&lt;&lt;32 pages, then dirty balancing is going to
blow up in many other spectacular ways anyway so trying to fix one
possible overflow is just moot.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621144017.30993-1-jack@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621144246.11148-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: 9319b647902c ("mm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-By: Zach O'Keefe &lt;zokeefe@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 30139c702048f1097342a31302cbd3d478f50c63 upstream.

Patch series "mm: Avoid possible overflows in dirty throttling".

Dirty throttling logic assumes dirty limits in page units fit into
32-bits.  This patch series makes sure this is true (see patch 2/2 for
more details).


This patch (of 2):

This reverts commit 9319b647902cbd5cc884ac08a8a6d54ce111fc78.

The commit is broken in several ways.  Firstly, the removed (u64) cast
from the multiplication will introduce a multiplication overflow on 32-bit
archs if wb_thresh * bg_thresh &gt;= 1&lt;&lt;32 (which is actually common - the
default settings with 4GB of RAM will trigger this).  Secondly, the
div64_u64() is unnecessarily expensive on 32-bit archs.  We have
div64_ul() in case we want to be safe &amp; cheap.  Thirdly, if dirty
thresholds are larger than 1&lt;&lt;32 pages, then dirty balancing is going to
blow up in many other spectacular ways anyway so trying to fix one
possible overflow is just moot.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621144017.30993-1-jack@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621144246.11148-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: 9319b647902c ("mm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-By: Zach O'Keefe &lt;zokeefe@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm/pat: fix VM_PAT handling in COW mappings</title>
<updated>2024-04-13T10:51:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Hildenbrand</name>
<email>david@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-03T21:21:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=09e6bb53217bf388a0d2fd7fb21e74ab9dffc173'/>
<id>09e6bb53217bf388a0d2fd7fb21e74ab9dffc173</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 04c35ab3bdae7fefbd7c7a7355f29fa03a035221 upstream.

PAT handling won't do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or,
in fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon
folios.  Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using
follow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings.

Using follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon
folio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing
follow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and
track_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range().

In free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn't call memtype_free() or would call
it with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory.

To fix that, let's update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios,
and fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma-&gt;vm_pgoff for COW mappings
if we run into that.

We will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we
don't need the cachemode.  We'll have to fail fork()-&gt;track_pfn_copy() if
the first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we'd have to store
the cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size.

For now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that
case: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already,
and it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios.

Simple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn():

&lt;--- C reproducer ---&gt;
 #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
 #include &lt;sys/mman.h&gt;
 #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
 #include &lt;liburing.h&gt;

 int main(void)
 {
         struct io_uring_params p = {};
         int ring_fd;
         size_t size;
         char *map;

         ring_fd = io_uring_setup(1, &amp;p);
         if (ring_fd &lt; 0) {
                 perror("io_uring_setup");
                 return 1;
         }
         size = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned);

         /* Map the submission queue ring MAP_PRIVATE */
         map = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE,
                    ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
         if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
                 perror("mmap");
                 return 1;
         }

         /* We have at least one page. Let's COW it. */
         *map = 0;
         pause();
         return 0;
 }
&lt;--- C reproducer ---&gt;

On a system with 16 GiB RAM and swap configured:
 # ./iouring &amp;
 # memhog 16G
 # killall iouring
[  301.552930] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  301.553285] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1402 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:1060 untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.553989] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_g
[  301.558232] CPU: 7 PID: 1402 Comm: iouring Not tainted 6.7.5-100.fc38.x86_64 #1
[  301.558772] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebu4
[  301.559569] RIP: 0010:untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.559893] Code: 75 c4 eb cf 48 8b 43 10 8b a8 e8 00 00 00 3b 6b 28 74 b8 48 8b 7b 30 e8 ea 1a f7 000
[  301.561189] RSP: 0018:ffffba2c0377fab8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  301.561590] RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: ffff9208c8ce9cc0 RCX: 000000010455e047
[  301.562105] RDX: 07fffffff0eb1e0a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9208c391d200
[  301.562628] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffba2c0377fab8 R09: 0000000000000000
[  301.563145] R10: ffff9208d2292d50 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 00007fea890e0000
[  301.563669] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba2c0377fc08 R15: 0000000000000000
[  301.564186] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff920c2fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  301.564773] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  301.565197] CR2: 00007fea88ee8a20 CR3: 00000001033a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[  301.565725] PKRU: 55555554
[  301.565944] Call Trace:
[  301.566148]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  301.566325]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.566618]  ? __warn+0x81/0x130
[  301.566876]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.567163]  ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
[  301.567466]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[  301.567743]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[  301.568038]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[  301.568363]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.568660]  ? untrack_pfn+0x65/0x100
[  301.568947]  unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0
[  301.569247]  unmap_vmas+0xb5/0x190
[  301.569532]  exit_mmap+0xec/0x340
[  301.569801]  __mmput+0x3e/0x130
[  301.570051]  do_exit+0x305/0xaf0
...

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240403212131.929421-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Wupeng Ma &lt;mawupeng1@huawei.com&gt;
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227122814.3781907-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Fixes: b1a86e15dc03 ("x86, pat: remove the dependency on 'vm_pgoff' in track/untrack pfn vma routines")
Fixes: 5899329b1910 ("x86: PAT: implement track/untrack of pfnmap regions for x86 - v3")
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 04c35ab3bdae7fefbd7c7a7355f29fa03a035221 upstream.

PAT handling won't do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or,
in fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon
folios.  Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using
follow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings.

Using follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon
folio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing
follow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and
track_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range().

In free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn't call memtype_free() or would call
it with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory.

To fix that, let's update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios,
and fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma-&gt;vm_pgoff for COW mappings
if we run into that.

We will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we
don't need the cachemode.  We'll have to fail fork()-&gt;track_pfn_copy() if
the first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we'd have to store
the cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size.

For now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that
case: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already,
and it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios.

Simple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn():

&lt;--- C reproducer ---&gt;
 #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
 #include &lt;sys/mman.h&gt;
 #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
 #include &lt;liburing.h&gt;

 int main(void)
 {
         struct io_uring_params p = {};
         int ring_fd;
         size_t size;
         char *map;

         ring_fd = io_uring_setup(1, &amp;p);
         if (ring_fd &lt; 0) {
                 perror("io_uring_setup");
                 return 1;
         }
         size = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned);

         /* Map the submission queue ring MAP_PRIVATE */
         map = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE,
                    ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
         if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
                 perror("mmap");
                 return 1;
         }

         /* We have at least one page. Let's COW it. */
         *map = 0;
         pause();
         return 0;
 }
&lt;--- C reproducer ---&gt;

On a system with 16 GiB RAM and swap configured:
 # ./iouring &amp;
 # memhog 16G
 # killall iouring
[  301.552930] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  301.553285] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1402 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:1060 untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.553989] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_g
[  301.558232] CPU: 7 PID: 1402 Comm: iouring Not tainted 6.7.5-100.fc38.x86_64 #1
[  301.558772] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebu4
[  301.559569] RIP: 0010:untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.559893] Code: 75 c4 eb cf 48 8b 43 10 8b a8 e8 00 00 00 3b 6b 28 74 b8 48 8b 7b 30 e8 ea 1a f7 000
[  301.561189] RSP: 0018:ffffba2c0377fab8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  301.561590] RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: ffff9208c8ce9cc0 RCX: 000000010455e047
[  301.562105] RDX: 07fffffff0eb1e0a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9208c391d200
[  301.562628] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffba2c0377fab8 R09: 0000000000000000
[  301.563145] R10: ffff9208d2292d50 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 00007fea890e0000
[  301.563669] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba2c0377fc08 R15: 0000000000000000
[  301.564186] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff920c2fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  301.564773] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  301.565197] CR2: 00007fea88ee8a20 CR3: 00000001033a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[  301.565725] PKRU: 55555554
[  301.565944] Call Trace:
[  301.566148]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  301.566325]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.566618]  ? __warn+0x81/0x130
[  301.566876]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.567163]  ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
[  301.567466]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[  301.567743]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[  301.568038]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[  301.568363]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[  301.568660]  ? untrack_pfn+0x65/0x100
[  301.568947]  unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0
[  301.569247]  unmap_vmas+0xb5/0x190
[  301.569532]  exit_mmap+0xec/0x340
[  301.569801]  __mmput+0x3e/0x130
[  301.570051]  do_exit+0x305/0xaf0
...

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240403212131.929421-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Wupeng Ma &lt;mawupeng1@huawei.com&gt;
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227122814.3781907-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Fixes: b1a86e15dc03 ("x86, pat: remove the dependency on 'vm_pgoff' in track/untrack pfn vma routines")
Fixes: 5899329b1910 ("x86: PAT: implement track/untrack of pfnmap regions for x86 - v3")
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, vmscan: prevent infinite loop for costly GFP_NOIO | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL allocations</title>
<updated>2024-04-13T10:51:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-21T11:43:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ab81b3d2f3ccf514e0b130fab5722ac65b10ae40'/>
<id>ab81b3d2f3ccf514e0b130fab5722ac65b10ae40</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 803de9000f334b771afacb6ff3e78622916668b0 upstream.

Sven reports an infinite loop in __alloc_pages_slowpath() for costly order
__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL allocations that are also GFP_NOIO.  Such combination
can happen in a suspend/resume context where a GFP_KERNEL allocation can
have __GFP_IO masked out via gfp_allowed_mask.

Quoting Sven:

1. try to do a "costly" allocation (order &gt; PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER)
   with __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL set.

2. page alloc's __alloc_pages_slowpath tries to get a page from the
   freelist. This fails because there is nothing free of that costly
   order.

3. page alloc tries to reclaim by calling __alloc_pages_direct_reclaim,
   which bails out because a zone is ready to be compacted; it pretends
   to have made a single page of progress.

4. page alloc tries to compact, but this always bails out early because
   __GFP_IO is not set (it's not passed by the snd allocator, and even
   if it were, we are suspending so the __GFP_IO flag would be cleared
   anyway).

5. page alloc believes reclaim progress was made (because of the
   pretense in item 3) and so it checks whether it should retry
   compaction. The compaction retry logic thinks it should try again,
   because:
    a) reclaim is needed because of the early bail-out in item 4
    b) a zonelist is suitable for compaction

6. goto 2. indefinite stall.

(end quote)

The immediate root cause is confusing the COMPACT_SKIPPED returned from
__alloc_pages_direct_compact() (step 4) due to lack of __GFP_IO to be
indicating a lack of order-0 pages, and in step 5 evaluating that in
should_compact_retry() as a reason to retry, before incrementing and
limiting the number of retries.  There are however other places that
wrongly assume that compaction can happen while we lack __GFP_IO.

To fix this, introduce gfp_compaction_allowed() to abstract the __GFP_IO
evaluation and switch the open-coded test in try_to_compact_pages() to use
it.

Also use the new helper in:
- compaction_ready(), which will make reclaim not bail out in step 3, so
  there's at least one attempt to actually reclaim, even if chances are
  small for a costly order
- in_reclaim_compaction() which will make should_continue_reclaim()
  return false and we don't over-reclaim unnecessarily
- in __alloc_pages_slowpath() to set a local variable can_compact,
  which is then used to avoid retrying reclaim/compaction for costly
  allocations (step 5) if we can't compact and also to skip the early
  compaction attempt that we do in some cases

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240221114357.13655-2-vbabka@suse.cz
Fixes: 3250845d0526 ("Revert "mm, oom: prevent premature OOM killer invocation for high order request"")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Sven van Ashbrook &lt;svenva@chromium.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG-rBihs_xMKb3wrMO1%2B-%2Bp4fowP9oy1pa_OTkfxBzPUVOZF%2Bg@mail.gmail.com/
Tested-by: Karthikeyan Ramasubramanian &lt;kramasub@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Geffon &lt;bgeffon@google.com&gt;
Cc: Curtis Malainey &lt;cujomalainey@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela &lt;perex@perex.cz&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 803de9000f334b771afacb6ff3e78622916668b0 upstream.

Sven reports an infinite loop in __alloc_pages_slowpath() for costly order
__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL allocations that are also GFP_NOIO.  Such combination
can happen in a suspend/resume context where a GFP_KERNEL allocation can
have __GFP_IO masked out via gfp_allowed_mask.

Quoting Sven:

1. try to do a "costly" allocation (order &gt; PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER)
   with __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL set.

2. page alloc's __alloc_pages_slowpath tries to get a page from the
   freelist. This fails because there is nothing free of that costly
   order.

3. page alloc tries to reclaim by calling __alloc_pages_direct_reclaim,
   which bails out because a zone is ready to be compacted; it pretends
   to have made a single page of progress.

4. page alloc tries to compact, but this always bails out early because
   __GFP_IO is not set (it's not passed by the snd allocator, and even
   if it were, we are suspending so the __GFP_IO flag would be cleared
   anyway).

5. page alloc believes reclaim progress was made (because of the
   pretense in item 3) and so it checks whether it should retry
   compaction. The compaction retry logic thinks it should try again,
   because:
    a) reclaim is needed because of the early bail-out in item 4
    b) a zonelist is suitable for compaction

6. goto 2. indefinite stall.

(end quote)

The immediate root cause is confusing the COMPACT_SKIPPED returned from
__alloc_pages_direct_compact() (step 4) due to lack of __GFP_IO to be
indicating a lack of order-0 pages, and in step 5 evaluating that in
should_compact_retry() as a reason to retry, before incrementing and
limiting the number of retries.  There are however other places that
wrongly assume that compaction can happen while we lack __GFP_IO.

To fix this, introduce gfp_compaction_allowed() to abstract the __GFP_IO
evaluation and switch the open-coded test in try_to_compact_pages() to use
it.

Also use the new helper in:
- compaction_ready(), which will make reclaim not bail out in step 3, so
  there's at least one attempt to actually reclaim, even if chances are
  small for a costly order
- in_reclaim_compaction() which will make should_continue_reclaim()
  return false and we don't over-reclaim unnecessarily
- in __alloc_pages_slowpath() to set a local variable can_compact,
  which is then used to avoid retrying reclaim/compaction for costly
  allocations (step 5) if we can't compact and also to skip the early
  compaction attempt that we do in some cases

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240221114357.13655-2-vbabka@suse.cz
Fixes: 3250845d0526 ("Revert "mm, oom: prevent premature OOM killer invocation for high order request"")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Sven van Ashbrook &lt;svenva@chromium.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG-rBihs_xMKb3wrMO1%2B-%2Bp4fowP9oy1pa_OTkfxBzPUVOZF%2Bg@mail.gmail.com/
Tested-by: Karthikeyan Ramasubramanian &lt;kramasub@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Geffon &lt;bgeffon@google.com&gt;
Cc: Curtis Malainey &lt;cujomalainey@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela &lt;perex@perex.cz&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
