linux-stable.git/mm, branch v3.18.6

memcg: remove extra newlines from memcg oom kill log

2015-02-06T06:36:09+00:00

commit 0346dadbf041a2606bcb5bd27828b0d105897f4a upstream.

Commit e61734c55c24 ("cgroup: remove cgroup->name") added two extra
newlines to memcg oom kill log messages.  This makes dmesg hard to read
and parse.  The issue affects 3.15+.

Example:

  Task in /t                          <<< extra #1
   killed as a result of limit of /t
                                      <<< extra #2
  memory: usage 102400kB, limit 102400kB, failcnt 274712

Remove the extra newlines from memcg oom kill messages, so the messages
look like:

  Task in /t killed as a result of limit of /t
  memory: usage 102400kB, limit 102400kB, failcnt 240649

Fixes: e61734c55c24 ("cgroup: remove cgroup->name")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

vm: make stack guard page errors return VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV rather than SIGBUS

2015-02-06T06:36:01+00:00

commit 9c145c56d0c8a0b62e48c8d71e055ad0fb2012ba upstream.

The stack guard page error case has long incorrectly caused a SIGBUS
rather than a SIGSEGV, but nobody actually noticed until commit
fee7e49d4514 ("mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard
page") because that error case was never actually triggered in any
normal situations.

Now that we actually report the error, people noticed the wrong signal
that resulted.  So far, only the test suite of libsigsegv seems to have
actually cared, but there are real applications that use libsigsegv, so
let's not wait for any of those to break.

Reported-and-tested-by: Takashi Iwai 
Tested-by: Jan Engelhardt 
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens  # "s390 still compiles and boots"
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

vm: add VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV handling support

2015-02-06T06:36:01+00:00

commit 33692f27597fcab536d7cbbcc8f52905133e4aa7 upstream.

The core VM already knows about VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, but cannot return a
"you should SIGSEGV" error, because the SIGSEGV case was generally
handled by the caller - usually the architecture fault handler.

That results in lots of duplication - all the architecture fault
handlers end up doing very similar "look up vma, check permissions, do
retries etc" - but it generally works.  However, there are cases where
the VM actually wants to SIGSEGV, and applications _expect_ SIGSEGV.

In particular, when accessing the stack guard page, libsigsegv expects a
SIGSEGV.  And it usually got one, because the stack growth is handled by
that duplicated architecture fault handler.

However, when the generic VM layer started propagating the error return
from the stack expansion in commit fee7e49d4514 ("mm: propagate error
from stack expansion even for guard page"), that now exposed the
existing VM_FAULT_SIGBUS result to user space.  And user space really
expected SIGSEGV, not SIGBUS.

To fix that case, we need to add a VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV, and teach all those
duplicate architecture fault handlers about it.  They all already have
the code to handle SIGSEGV, so it's about just tying that new return
value to the existing code, but it's all a bit annoying.

This is the mindless minimal patch to do this.  A more extensive patch
would be to try to gather up the mostly shared fault handling logic into
one generic helper routine, and long-term we really should do that
cleanup.

Just from this patch, you can generally see that most architectures just
copied (directly or indirectly) the old x86 way of doing things, but in
the meantime that original x86 model has been improved to hold the VM
semaphore for shorter times etc and to handle VM_FAULT_RETRY and other
"newer" things, so it would be a good idea to bring all those
improvements to the generic case and teach other architectures about
them too.

Reported-and-tested-by: Takashi Iwai 
Tested-by: Jan Engelhardt 
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens  # "s390 still compiles and boots"
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: get rid of radix tree gfp mask for pagecache_get_page

2015-01-30T01:40:46+00:00

commit 45f87de57f8fad59302fd263dd81ffa4843b5b24 upstream.

Commit 2457aec63745 ("mm: non-atomically mark page accessed during page
cache allocation where possible") has added a separate parameter for
specifying gfp mask for radix tree allocations.

Not only this is less than optimal from the API point of view because it
is error prone, it is also buggy currently because
grab_cache_page_write_begin is using GFP_KERNEL for radix tree and if
fgp_flags doesn't contain FGP_NOFS (mostly controlled by fs by
AOP_FLAG_NOFS flag) but the mapping_gfp_mask has __GFP_FS cleared then
the radix tree allocation wouldn't obey the restriction and might
recurse into filesystem and cause deadlocks.  This is the case for most
filesystems unfortunately because only ext4 and gfs2 are using
AOP_FLAG_NOFS.

Let's simply remove radix_gfp_mask parameter because the allocation
context is same for both page cache and for the radix tree.  Just make
sure that the radix tree gets only the sane subset of the mask (e.g.  do
not pass __GFP_WRITE).

Long term it is more preferable to convert remaining users of
AOP_FLAG_NOFS to use mapping_gfp_mask instead and simplify this
interface even further.

Reported-by: Dave Chinner 
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: Don't count the stack guard page towards RLIMIT_STACK

2015-01-16T14:59:57+00:00

commit 690eac53daff34169a4d74fc7bfbd388c4896abb upstream.

Commit fee7e49d4514 ("mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for
guard page") made sure that we return the error properly for stack
growth conditions.  It also theorized that counting the guard page
towards the stack limit might break something, but also said "Let's see
if anybody notices".

Somebody did notice.  Apparently android-x86 sets the stack limit very
close to the limit indeed, and including the guard page in the rlimit
check causes the android 'zygote' process problems.

So this adds the (fairly trivial) code to make the stack rlimit check be
against the actual real stack size, rather than the size of the vma that
includes the guard page.

Reported-and-tested-by: Chih-Wei Huang 
Cc: Jay Foad 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page

2015-01-16T14:59:57+00:00

commit fee7e49d45149fba60156f5b59014f764d3e3728 upstream.

Jay Foad reports that the address sanitizer test (asan) sometimes gets
confused by a stack pointer that ends up being outside the stack vma
that is reported by /proc/maps.

This happens due to an interaction between RLIMIT_STACK and the guard
page: when we do the guard page check, we ignore the potential error
from the stack expansion, which effectively results in a missing guard
page, since the expected stack expansion won't have been done.

And since /proc/maps explicitly ignores the guard page (commit
d7824370e263: "mm: fix up some user-visible effects of the stack guard
page"), the stack pointer ends up being outside the reported stack area.

This is the minimal patch: it just propagates the error.  It also
effectively makes the guard page part of the stack limit, which in turn
measn that the actual real stack is one page less than the stack limit.

Let's see if anybody notices.  We could teach acct_stack_growth() to
allow an extra page for a grow-up/grow-down stack in the rlimit test,
but I don't want to add more complexity if it isn't needed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jay Foad 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm, vmscan: prevent kswapd livelock due to pfmemalloc-throttled process being killed

2015-01-16T14:59:57+00:00

commit 9e5e3661727eaf960d3480213f8e87c8d67b6956 upstream.

Charles Shirron and Paul Cassella from Cray Inc have reported kswapd
stuck in a busy loop with nothing left to balance, but
kswapd_try_to_sleep() failing to sleep.  Their analysis found the cause
to be a combination of several factors:

1. A process is waiting in throttle_direct_reclaim() on pgdat->pfmemalloc_wait

2. The process has been killed (by OOM in this case), but has not yet been
   scheduled to remove itself from the waitqueue and die.

3. kswapd checks for throttled processes in prepare_kswapd_sleep():

        if (waitqueue_active(&pgdat->pfmemalloc_wait)) {
                wake_up(&pgdat->pfmemalloc_wait);
		return false; // kswapd will not go to sleep
	}

   However, for a process that was already killed, wake_up() does not remove
   the process from the waitqueue, since try_to_wake_up() checks its state
   first and returns false when the process is no longer waiting.

4. kswapd is running on the same CPU as the only CPU that the process is
   allowed to run on (through cpus_allowed, or possibly single-cpu system).

5. CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE=y kernel is used. If there's nothing to balance, kswapd
   encounters no voluntary preemption points and repeatedly fails
   prepare_kswapd_sleep(), blocking the process from running and removing
   itself from the waitqueue, which would let kswapd sleep.

So, the source of the problem is that we prevent kswapd from going to
sleep until there are processes waiting on the pfmemalloc_wait queue,
and a process waiting on a queue is guaranteed to be removed from the
queue only when it gets scheduled.  This was done to make sure that no
process is left sleeping on pfmemalloc_wait when kswapd itself goes to
sleep.

However, it isn't necessary to postpone kswapd sleep until the
pfmemalloc_wait queue actually empties.  To prevent processes from being
left sleeping, it's actually enough to guarantee that all processes
waiting on pfmemalloc_wait queue have been woken up by the time we put
kswapd to sleep.

This patch therefore fixes this issue by substituting 'wake_up' with
'wake_up_all' and removing 'return false' in the code snippet from
prepare_kswapd_sleep() above.  Note that if any process puts itself in
the queue after this waitqueue_active() check, or after the wake up
itself, it means that the process will also wake up kswapd - and since
we are under prepare_to_wait(), the wake up won't be missed.  Also we
update the comment prepare_kswapd_sleep() to hopefully more clearly
describe the races it is preventing.

Fixes: 5515061d22f0 ("mm: throttle direct reclaimers if PF_MEMALLOC reserves are low and swap is backed by network storage")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Rik van Riel 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: protect set_page_dirty() from ongoing truncation

2015-01-16T14:59:57+00:00

commit 2d6d7f98284648c5ed113fe22a132148950b140f upstream.

Tejun, while reviewing the code, spotted the following race condition
between the dirtying and truncation of a page:

__set_page_dirty_nobuffers()       __delete_from_page_cache()
  if (TestSetPageDirty(page))
                                     page->mapping = NULL
				     if (PageDirty())
				       dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_FILE_DIRTY);
				       dec_bdi_stat(mapping->backing_dev_info, BDI_RECLAIMABLE);
    if (page->mapping)
      account_page_dirtied(page)
        __inc_zone_page_state(page, NR_FILE_DIRTY);
	__inc_bdi_stat(mapping->backing_dev_info, BDI_RECLAIMABLE);

which results in an imbalance of NR_FILE_DIRTY and BDI_RECLAIMABLE.

Dirtiers usually lock out truncation, either by holding the page lock
directly, or in case of zap_pte_range(), by pinning the mapcount with
the page table lock held.  The notable exception to this rule, though,
is do_wp_page(), for which this race exists.  However, do_wp_page()
already waits for a locked page to unlock before setting the dirty bit,
in order to prevent a race where clear_page_dirty() misses the page bit
in the presence of dirty ptes.  Upgrade that wait to a fully locked
set_page_dirty() to also cover the situation explained above.

Afterwards, the code in set_page_dirty() dealing with a truncation race
is no longer needed.  Remove it.

Reported-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner 
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/CMA: fix boot regression due to physical address of high_memory

2015-01-08T18:30:28+00:00

commit 6b101e2a3ce4d2a0312087598bd1ab4a1db2ac40 upstream.

high_memory isn't direct mapped memory so retrieving it's physical address
isn't appropriate.  But, it would be useful to check physical address of
highmem boundary so it's justfiable to get physical address from it.  In
x86, there is a validation check if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL and it triggers
following boot failure reported by Ingo.

  ...
  BUG: Int 6: CR2 00f06f53
  ...
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x41/0x52
    early_idt_handler+0x6b/0x6b
    cma_declare_contiguous+0x33/0x212
    dma_contiguous_reserve_area+0x31/0x4e
    dma_contiguous_reserve+0x11d/0x125
    setup_arch+0x7b5/0xb63
    start_kernel+0xb8/0x3e6
    i386_start_kernel+0x79/0x7d

To fix boot regression, this patch implements workaround to avoid
validation check in x86 when retrieving physical address of high_memory.
__pa_nodebug() used by this patch is implemented only in x86 so there is
no choice but to use dirty #ifdef.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim 
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar 
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Marek Szyprowski 
Cc: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

slab: fix nodeid bounds check for non-contiguous node IDs

2014-12-03T17:36:04+00:00

The bounds check for nodeid in ____cache_alloc_node gives false
positives on machines where the node IDs are not contiguous, leading to
a panic at boot time.  For example, on a POWER8 machine the node IDs are
typically 0, 1, 16 and 17.  This means that num_online_nodes() returns
4, so when ____cache_alloc_node is called with nodeid = 16 the VM_BUG_ON
triggers, like this:

  kernel BUG at /home/paulus/kernel/kvm/mm/slab.c:3079!
  Call Trace:
    .____cache_alloc_node+0x5c/0x270 (unreliable)
    .kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0xdc/0x360
    .init_list+0x3c/0x128
    .kmem_cache_init+0x1dc/0x258
    .start_kernel+0x2a0/0x568
    start_here_common+0x20/0xa8

To fix this, we instead compare the nodeid with MAX_NUMNODES, and
additionally make sure it isn't negative (since nodeid is an int).  The
check is there mainly to protect the array dereference in the get_node()
call in the next line, and the array being dereferenced is of size
MAX_NUMNODES.  If the nodeid is in range but invalid (for example if the
node is off-line), the BUG_ON in the next line will catch that.

Fixes: 14e50c6a9bc2 ("mm: slab: Verify the nodeid passed to ____cache_alloc_node")
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras 
Reviewed-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu 
Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg 
Acked-by: David Rientjes 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Joonsoo Kim 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds